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Abstract	
This	thesis	presents	a	comprehensive	institutional	analysis	of	China’s	urban	tap	water	provision	system	
from	a	‘source	to	sip’	holistic	research	perspective.	With	the	examination	of	each	agent’s	function	in	the	
system,	this	thesis	coins	the	concepts	of	semi-potable	tap	water	and	Hybrid	Institutional	Architecture	to	
illustrate	the	essence	of	China’s	urban	water	provision	system	as	a	‘source	to	consumer’	semi-potable	tap	
water	 provision	 system.	 Based	 on	 this	 argument,	 the	 concept	 of	 Consumer	 Coping	 Strategy	Matrix	 is	
established	 with	 analyses	 of	 its	 seven	 facilitating	 factors	 to	 explain	 Chinese	 tap	 water	 consumers’	
involvement	in	the	potable	water	production.	Their	activities	have	established	a	‘consumer	to	sip’	potable	
water	production	process,	functioning	as	a	compensation	to	‘source	to	consumer’	urban	semi-potable	tap	
water	provision	system.	The	combination	of	these	two	systems	is	a	‘source	to	sip’	urban	potable	tap	water	
provision	system.	This	thesis	also	provides	a	detailed	analysis	of	the	three	institutional	inconsistencies	in	
this	system,	arguing	that	they	have	filled	the	Hybrid	Institutional	Architecture	with	internal	inconsistencies,	
which	 makes	 semi-potable	 tap	 water	 an	 inevitable	 outcome	 of	 Hybrid	 Institutional	 Architecture.	
Meanwhile,	this	thesis	illustrates	the	concept	of	Consumer’s	Normalisation	to	semi-potable	tap	water,	the	
Hybrid	Institutional	Architecture	and	Consumer	Coping	Strategy	Matrix,	arguing	that	such	normalisation	
has	disguises	and	justified	not	only	the	existence	of	the	aforementioned	concepts,	but	also	the	existence	
of	the	latent	social	injustice	and	consumer’s	powerlessness.	All	of	these	analyses	contribute	to	the	form	
of	 consumer’s	 institutional	 distrust	 in	 semi-potable	 tap	 water.	 With	 this	 institutionalised	 distrust,	 an	
imbalanced	dialectical	relationship	between	the	Hybrid	Institutional	Architecture,	the	Consumer	Coping	
Strategy	Matrix	 and	water	 crises	will	 turn	 consumer	 into	 the	 trigger	of	 sociogenic	water	 sustainability	
crises.	A	detailed	case	study	of	Harbin	is	presented	to	demonstrate	the	two	sociogenic	water	sustainability	
crises	occurred	in	Harbin	with	archival	data	and	the	establishments	of	contingent	combination	model,	and	
the	 Hybrid	 Institutional	 Architecture	 of	 Harbin’s	 urban	 tap	 water	 provision	 system	 with	 examining	
interview	materials	from	four	senior	officials	of	key	departments.
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 Introduction:	Tap	Water	in	
China		
To	most	Chinese	tap	water	consumers,	fresh	water	resources	has	an	internal	paradox.	From	a	sustainability	
perspective,	fresh	water	resources	are	precious.	China’s	fresh	water	resources	capacity	is	not	only	limited	
but	also	geographically	unevenly	distributed,	leading	to	the	fact	that	nearly	every	water	crisis	is	a	long-
term	and	difficult	one	(Hu	and	Wang,	2003).	From	a	management	perspective,	the	administration	of	fresh	
water	 resources	 is	 full	 of	 challenges.	 China’s	 tap	 water	 provision	 system	 is	 one	 of	 the	most	 complex	
government	 administration	 systems,	 which	 has	 been	 influenced	 by	 at	 least	 three	 government	
administration	 reforms	 since	 1998	 and	 remains	 full	 of	 conflict	 and	 incoherency.	 From	 consumer’s	
perspective,	fresh	water	provision	is	commonplace.	Consumers	have	taken	for	granted	the	semi-potable	
tap	water	(the	definition	of	it	will	be	given	in	section	3.2),	as	well	as	its	low	water	price,	for	a	long	time,	
and	have	developed	a	series	of	coping	strategies	to	deal	with	the	inferior	quality	of	tap	water.	Obviously,	
these	three	distinctive	yet	interconnected	dimensions	of	fresh	water	resources	have	certain	contradictions	
with	 each	 other,	 which	would	 give	 rise	 to	 the	 outbreak	 of	 a	 sociogenic	 water	 sustainability	 crisis	 (its	
definition	will	be	introduced	in	section	3.9).	A	comprehensive	understanding	of	these	three	perspectives,	
as	 well	 as	 the	 sustainability	 crisis	 they	 have	 triggered,	 can	 only	 be	 established	 through	 institutional	
analyses	of	three	themes:	China’s	unique	urban	tap	water	provision	system,	Chinese	tap	water	consumer’s	
behaviour	and	distrust	in	tap	water,	and,	most	importantly,	the	mutual	influences	between	them.	
However,	although	a	large	volume	of	research	has	focused	on	the	problems	either	of	China’s	tap	water	
quality,	tap	water	quantity,	or	tap	water	provision	system,	little	attention	has	been	spent	on	Chinese	tap	
water	consumer,	which	then	results	the	neglect	of	the	political,	economic	and	power	problems	associated	
with	the	tap	water	consumer	in	dealing	with	semi-potable	tap	water.	As	Erik	Swyngedouw	(Swyngedouw,	
2009,	p.58)	has	rightly	pointed	out:	‘water	research	has	for	too	long	concentrated	on	either	the	physical	
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side	or	the	managerial	side	of	the	water	problematic,	often	tiptoeing	around	the	vexed	question	of	how	
political,	 economic	 power	 relations	 fuse	 the	 physical	 and	 the	 managerial	 together	 in	 particular	 and	
invariably	socially	uneven	ways.’		
Why	 does	 the	 consumer’s	 trust	 in	 tap	water	 deserve	 our	 attention?	 There	 is	 a	 simple	 answer	 to	 this	
question.	It	is	because	the	pervasive	institutional	distrust	of	the	urban	tap	water	in	China	has	become	such	
an	obvious	social	fact	that	no	one	can	deny	its	existence	and	ignore	the	social	unrests	it	has	triggered	in	
recent	years.	 In	other	words,	 the	 theme	of	 ‘trust	 in	water’	 is	not	an	 invention,	but	a	 reflection	of	 the	
problem	that	already	exists	 in	Chinese	people’s	 lives.	 It	 is	not	only	related	to	a	series	of	environmental	
accidents	and	scandals,	but	also	the	centre	of	many	debates.	In	other	words,	it	is	not	the	theories	that	
prompt	us	to	examine	the	 issue	of	trust	 in	tap	water,	but	the	many	catastrophic	outcomes	 initiated	by	
pollution	accidents	and	scandals	that	remind	us	consistently	of	the	necessity	of	examining	the	consumer’s	
trust	in	urban	tap	water	at	an	institutional	level.		
1.1 China's	urban	tap	water	provision	system	
China	is	a	country	famous	for	its	urban	tap	water	provision	system	in	both	positive	and	negative	ways.	It	
is	 in	 this	 country	 that	 the	 largest	water	 diversion	project	 in	 human	history,	 the	 South-to-North	Water	
Diversion	 Project	 was	 implemented	 and	 completed,	 even	 though	 the	 idea	 of	 modern	 tap	 water	 was	
introduced	as	late	as	the	end	of	the	19th	century	when	many	Western	countries	had	already	developed	
tap	water	for	many	years.	Given	the	data	from	China	Urban	Construction	Statistical	Yearbook	(Ministry	of	
Housing	and	Urban-Rural	Development,	2016,	p.227),	between	1978	and		2015,	the	tap	water	coverage	
rate	had	 increased	 from	45.1%	 in	1985	to	98.07%	 in	2015.	The	 length	of	pipeline	grew	from	 less	 than	
35,985	kilometres	in	1978	to	710,206	kilometres	in	2015.	The	number	of	water-served	population	rose	
from	62.671	million	in	1978	to	451.126	million	in	2015.	The	total	amount	of	domestic	water	consumption	
has	increased	from	2.75854	billion	cubic	meters	to	28.72695	billion	cubic	meters.	
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At	the	same	time,	it	is	also	in	this	country	that	a	series	of	tap	water	scandals	influenced	millions	of	citizens’	
daily	lives.	For	example,	in	March	2013,	there	were	10,164	dead	pigs	floating	down	the	Huangpu	River,	
the	tap	water	source	for	Shanghai	as	a	city	with	a	population	of	14.35	million	(China	Water	Safety	Charity	
Fund,	2015)	(see	Figure	1.1).	It	is	also	in	this	country	that	during	each	of	these	crises,	many	urban	citizens	
ignored	the	government	announcements	and	promise	for	the	safety	of	tap	water,	and	rushed	to	empty	
shelves	of	bottled	water	(see	Figure	1.2).	It	is	also	in	this	country	that	boiling	water	is	still	pervasive	today	
as	an	advocated	individualised	protocol	for	disinfecting	water	for	everybody,	reflecting	a	practice	that	was	
adopted	for	thousands	of	years	and	was	justified	by	Chinese	traditions	and	medicines.	
	
Figure	1.1:	The	corpses	of	dead	pig	beside	Huangpu	River1	
																																								 																				
1	Source:	http://www.japantimes.co.jp/news/2013/03/12/asia-pacific/dead-pigs-in-river-havent-hurt-water-supply-shanghai-says	Accessed:	15	April	2017	
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Figure	1.2:	The	empty	shelves	of	bottled	water	in	a	shopping	mall	after	the	outbreak	of	Lanzhou	tap	
water	pollution	scandal,	20142	
Moreover,	by	taking	a	closer	look	at	the	whole	system	of	urban	tap	water	provision,	one	can	observe	that	
nearly	every	section	of	the	system	has	serious	problems.	In	respect	to	the	water	source,	in	some	reports,	
97%	of	the	freshwater	resources	in	China	have	been	polluted	(Luo,	2014).	In	respect	to	water	treatment	
plants,	Wang	Zhansheng,	the	president	of	the	National	Water	Advanced	Treatment	Research	Association	
claimed	in	a	report	that	‘99%	of	China’s	water	treatment	plants	are	still	equipped	with	the	water	treatment	
technology	that	has	been	used	for	one	hundred	years’	 (Luo,	2014).	 In	respect	to	the	quality	of	treated	
water,	 given	 the	 survey	 result	of	 the	 treated	water	quality	among	4457	urban	water	 treatment	plants	
between	2008	 and	2009,	 only	 58.2%	of	 them	produced	 tap	water	 that	was	 certified	 according	 to	 the	
national	standard	of	tap	water	(Xinhuanet,	2012).	In	respect	to	monitoring	and	supervision,	several	serious	
																																								 																				
2	Source:	http://english.caixin.com/2014-04-24/100669924.html	Accessed:	15	April	2017	
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water	pollution	accidents	in	China	were	noticed	by	chance,	including	the	cadmium	pollution	in	Zhuzhou	
and	Xiangtan	in	2008,	the	cadmium	pollution	in	Longjiang	River	in	Guangxi	Province	in	2012,	and	the	tap	
water	pollution	accident	that	happened	in	Lanzhou	in	2014,	which	has	affected	over	2.4	million	citizens	
(Luo,	2014).	In	all	three	cases,	the	pollution	was	identified	in	random	examinations.	Hence,	there	is	a	high	
possibility	that	there	are	other	pollution	accidents	that	have	not	been	noticed,	since	they	may	outbreak	
in	the	time	gaps	between	different	water	quality	examinations.	With	respect	to	the	pipeline	system,	in	
China,	32.8%	of	the	main	urban	pipeline	is	made	from	substandard	materials,	and	37%	of	them	have	an	
aging	problem.	In	some	Northern	areas	of	China,	the	leakage	rate	of	the	urban	water	supply	even	reached	
66%	 (Gong	 and	 Liu,	 2012).	 With	 respect	 to	 the	 secondary	 water	 supply	 (or	 decentralised	
locally/community	managed	water	 supply	equipment/facilities),	 the	administration	of	 its	equipment	 is	
varying	 by	 cities.	 In	 some	 undeveloped	 cities,	without	 effective	 administration	 and	 supervision,	 these	
facilities	have	been	problematic	for	a	long	time,	reflecting	on	occasional	news	about	dead	mouse	in	the	
water	 tank3.	 Finally,	 these	 facilities	are	always	managed	by	 local	 community	 services,	who	are	neither	
qualified	nor	have	a	willingness	to	manage	them.	Finally,	regarding	public	participation,	in	many	cities	and	
counties	of	China,	public	visits	to	the	local	tap	water	treatment	plants	are	strictly	controlled,	if	not	fully	
prohibited.	Meanwhile,	 there	 is	 no	 unified	 information	 disclosure	 for	 China’s	 urban	 tap	water	 quality.	
However,	despite	all	these	institutional	incoherencies,	the	current	urban	tap	water	provision	system	still	
operates	in	an	apparently	stable	and	self-balanced	manner.		
These	serious	problems	lead	to	another	serious	question:	If	trust	in	tap	water	is	so	important,	why	hasn’t	
it	received	more	attention	from	social	scientists?	As	part	of	the	endeavor	to	deal	with	the	tap	water	crises,	
researchers	have	published	several	reports	and	papers	focusing	on	the	technology	of	water	treatment.	
However,	 compared	 to	 the	passion	 for	 technology	 innovation	 studies,	 few	 research	papers	 have	been	
written	 discussing	 the	 sociogenic	 roots	 of	 water	 sustainability	 crises.	 The	 research	 tendency	 has	
progressively	reached	an	extremely	unbalanced	point.	For	instance,	between	2012	to	2015,	there	were	
																																								 																				
3	Source:	http://www.chinanews.com/sh/2012/01-30/3630558.shtml	Accessed:	12	April	2017	
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15902	newspaper	and	84098	web	articles	related	to	tap	water	pollution	in	China,	more	than	100	news	
reports	per	day	on	average4.	One	of	the	most	prestigious	science	journals,	Nature,	has	published	5925	
relevant	articles	and	papers	about	water	affairs	in	China	from	2005	to	20155,	this	is	a	sharp	contrast	to	the	
1,414	relevant	articles	and	papers	published	in	all	social	science	and	sociology	journals	between	2005	to	
20156.		
Moreover,	 there	 is	 a	 general	 neglect	 of	 social	 research	 in	 the	production	process	of	 tap	water,	 not	 to	
mention	to	study	it	in	the	context	of	the	particular	country,	culture,	political	regime,	economic	pattern	and	
social	routine,	and	to	study	its	associated	impacts	on	the	different	agents	of	urban	tap	water	provision	
system.	As	Mark	Harvey	 (2015,	p.15)	 rightly	pointed	out,	 ‘much	of	 the	discussion	around	processes	of	
qualification	has	been	focused	on	market	commodities	(of	which	commercial	bottled	water	is	a	case	in	
point).’		
Why	 has	 such	 an	 essential	 environmental-sociological	 topic	 been	 neglected	 by	 China’s	 social	 science	
researchers	for	such	long	time?	One	possible	explanation	is	that	given	the	particular	cultural,	social	and	
technological	 backgrounds	 of	 the	 tap	water	 provision	 system,	 despite	 having	 experienced	 several	 tap	
water	crises,	the	acceptance	of	semi-potable	urban	tap	water	(this	concept	is	defined	in	section	3.2)	has	
long	been	 taken	 for	 granted	by	 the	Chinese.	As	will	 be	 revealed	 in	 this	 thesis,	 owing	 to	 tradition,	 the	
government’s	tacit	consent,	market,	media	propaganda,	the	low	tap	water	price,	water	crises	and	social	
memory,	and	the	knowledge	and	 information	gap,	the	public	has	normalised	and	accepts	the	fact	that	
China’s	tap	water	is	not	potable.	This	normalisation	and	acceptance	surprise	many	foreigners	who	come	
from	other	countries	and	places	where	tap	water	can	be	drunk	directly.	McGuire	(2014),	commenting	the	
practice	of	boiling	water	in	China,	argued	that	it	is	not	as	simple	as	tradition.	The	custom	of	boiling	water	
																																								 																				
4		It	 is	 the	 searching	 result	 by	 using	 WiseNewsSearch	 with	 the	 date	 period	 between	 2012/1/1	 to	 2015/1/1	 and	 the	 two	 key	 words:	 tap	 water	 and	 pollution.	
http://www.wisers.com/zh-cn/products_services/wise_news	Accessed:	2	March	2016	
5	It	is	the	searching	result	from	the	website	of	Nature	with	the	date	period	between	2005	to	2015.	http://www.nature.com/index.html	Accessed:	1	December	2016	
6	It	is	the	searching	result	from	website	of	JOSTER	with	the	date	period	between	2005	to	2015	in	discipliners	of	Sociology	and	Social	Science.	http://www.jstor.org	Accessed:	5	April	
2016	
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has	imposed	a	profound	and	deep-rooted	influence	on	the	development	of	the	urban	tap	water	provision	
system.	His	perspective	is	essential	for	us	to	understand	the	‘missing’	link	between	‘source	to	consumer’	
tap	water	provision	 system	and	 ‘consumer-made	potable	water.’	A	neglect	of	 this	 individualised	water	
disinfection	protocol	has	at	the	same	time	masked	many	 institutional	 flaws	 long-existing	 in	the	China’s	
current	urban	tap	water	provision	system.		
Such	cultural,	social	and	technological	influences	combine	with	the	complexities	of	the	aforementioned	
‘vicious	circle’	to	formulate	an	image	of	tap	water	that	is	full	of	paradoxes	and	contradictions.	Only	when	
water	crises	happened	did	many	Chinese	for	the	first	time	become	aware	of	the	problem	of	tap	water	and	
their	powerlessness	in	dealing	with	it.	As	will	be	demonstrated	in	Chapter	5,	when	consumers	aware	their	
powerlessness	in	water	crises,	they	would	become	extremely	anxious,	which	is	one	of	the	main	triggers	of	
sociogenic	water	sustainability	crisis.	
In	conclusion,	a	consumer-oriented	institutional	analysis	of	China’s	urban	tap	water	provision	system	is	
necessary	for	achieving	a	comprehensive	understanding	the	characteristics	of	and	 incoherencies	 in	the	
power,	money,	and	water	flows	circulating	between	government,	market	and	consumer.	In	Chapter	1,	with	
an	introduction	of	the	imperative	of	institutional	analysis	of	tap	water,	the	research	rationale	is	outlined	
and	accompanied	by	a	discussion	of	research	methodology.	Chapter	2	provides	a	literature	review	on	the	
main	themes	of	this	thesis,	which	paves	the	way	for	the	construction	of	the	theoretical	framework	from	a	
holistic	research	perspective	in	Chapter	3,	which	presents	two	essential	concepts	of	this	thesis,	the	Hybrid	
Institutional	Architecture,	and	Consumer	Coping	Strategy	Matrix.	To	have	an	in-depth	understanding	of	
these	two	concepts,	 in	Chapter	4,	an	institutional	analysis	of	three	incoherencies	 in	power,	money	and	
water	flow	of	China’s	‘source	to	consumer’	semi-potable	tap	water	provision	system	will	be	presented	on	
the	 basis	 of	 systematic	 analysis	 of	 the	 data	 and	 information	 from	 interview	materials,	media	 reports,	
government	documents,	academic	publications	and	so	on.	Chapter	5	and	6	present	a	comprehensive	and	
detailed	case	study	of	Harbin,	a	city	located	in	the	North	China.	With	organisating	data	and	information	
from	various	sources,	Chapter	5	offers	an	institutional	analysis	of	two	sociogenic	sustainability	crises	that	
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have	occurred	 in	 the	recent	history	of	Harbin.	Chapter	6	presents	 institutional	analysis	on	the	basis	of	
synchronised	 interview	 materials	 from	 four	 interviewees	 in	 key	 responsibility	 of	 Harbin’s	 tap	 water	
provision	 system,	 revealing	 the	 intricacies	 of	 China’s	 ‘source	 to	 consumer’	 semi-potable	 tap	 water	
provision	system,	underlining	the	production	of	semi-potable	tap	water	and	Consumer	Coping	Strategy	
Matrix	 as	 the	 inevitable	 outcomes	 of	 the	 Hybrid	 Institutional	 Architecture.	 In	 the	 end,	 the	 general	
discussion	of	the	thesis	is	concluded	in	Chapter	7.	
1.2 Research	 rationale:	 the	 trajectory	 of	
understanding	trust	
Few	would	doubt	the	validity	of	the	following	claim:	tap	water	is	an	indispensable	part	of	urban	citizens’	
everyday	lives,	but	few	have	given	a	thought	to	the	meaning	of	trust	in	tap	water.	Both	‘trust’	and	‘tap	
water’	are	themes	with	far-reaching	academic	potential	that	 impossible	to	be	exhausted	 in	one	thesis.	
They	can	both	relate	to	very	general	theories	and	very	specific	case	studies.	Thus,	the	main	challenge	of	
establishing	 a	 research	 rationale	 to	 study	 trust	 in	 tap	 water	 is	 how	 to	 keep	 a	 balance	 between	 the	
generality	and	specificity	of	‘trust’	and	‘tap	water.’		
To	 solve	 this	 problem,	 it	 is	 necessary	 to	 ask	 several	 rather	 than	 one	 research	 question	 to	 reveal	 the	
connection	between	the	generality	and	specificity	of	these	two	concepts.	The	generality	of	two	concepts	
will	be	defined	by	research	questions,	and	the	Chinese	specificity	of	them	will	be	elaborated	in	the	answers.	
In	this	thesis,	three	interconnected	subordinate	research	questions	and	one	main	research	question	will	
be	posed	and	answered	in	the	following	chapters.	
The	three	subordinate	research	questions	are:	
First,	what	kind	of	tap	water	is	supplied	to	China’s	tap	water	consumer?		
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Second,	 on	 the	 basis	 of	 the	 answer	 to	 the	 first	 question,	 what	 kind	 of	 system	 is	 supplying	 the	
aforementioned	tap	water?	
Third,	on	the	basis	of	the	answers	to	the	first	and	second	question,	what	are	the	consumer’s	reactions	and	
responses	in	the	aforementioned	tap	water	and	tap	water	provision	system?		
The	institutional	analysis	of	these	three	subordinate	questions	have	formulated	a	cumulative	theoretical	
logic	 for,	 and	 the	 springboards	 of	 inquiry	 into,	 the	 main	 research	 question	 of	 this	 thesis:	 What	 is	
consumer’s	institutional	trust	and/or	distrust	in	China’s	tap	water?	
Compared	to	the	traditional	research	pathway	that	dives	into	the	massive	literature	and	data	regarding	
trust	 and	 tap	 water,	 this	 research	 rationale	 aims	 to	 constitute	 the	 foundations	 for	 the	 theoretical	
framework,	paving	the	way	for	an	in-depth	examination	of	these	two	concepts.	Such	a	research	rationale	
is	particularly	useful	 for	studies	targeting	China,	since	 its	situation	 is	too	complex	and	distinctive	when	
compared	tap	water	provision	systems	in	other	countries.	
In	general,	this	question-answer	rationale	can	be	described	as	similar	to	the	effort	of	cutting	a	big	apple	
into	smaller	pieces,	finding	its	core	and	then	assembling	these	pieces	back	together.	The	assembled	‘apple’	
may	still	look	like	the	original	one,	but	regarding	an	inside-out	‘analysis’	it	can	be	digested	piece	by	piece,	
rather	than	eaten	as	a	whole.		
On	a	closer	inspection	of	the	three	subordinate	questions	above,	a	certain	logic	can	be	observed.	The	first	
question	 is	to	define	the	tap	water	regarding	the	specific	temporal	and	geographical	conditions,	which	
turns	it	into	a	macroscopic	question.	The	second	question	is	about	the	system	of	supplying	tap	water	as	
defined	 in	 the	 first	question.	 It	 is	an	 intermediate	question	that	connects	 the	analyses	at	a	macro	and	
micro	level.	The	third	question	focuses	on	the	tap	water	consumer’s	role,	a	crucial	factor	that,	to	a	large	
extent,	compensates	the	deficiencies	of	the	current	urban	tap	water	provision	system.		This	three-level	
framework	 of	 research	 inquiry	 presents	 both	 the	 prerequisite	 and	 the	 rationale	 for	 analysing	 the	
consumer’s	institutional	distrust	in	China’s	tap	water.		
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1.3 Methodology		
1.3.1 Archival	research	
Given	the	sensitivity	of	the	theme	and	the	novelty	of	the	theoretical	framework	of	this	thesis,	there	are	
not	many	academic	publications	available	for	reference.	This	thesis	tries	to	compensate	for	the	deficiency	
in	academic	sources	by	explaining	archival	data	from	a	wide	variety	of	other	sources,	 including	but	not	
limited	to	government	documents,	other	Ph.D.	dissertations,	monographs,	web	articles,	news	reports,	and	
social	media.	To	guarantee	and	secure	the	credibility	of	these	data,	especially	data	from	web	articles,	this	
thesis	 mainly	 relies	 on	 data	 from	 authoritative	 news	 websites	 or	 government	 official	 news	 websites.	
Among	 these	 archival	 data,	 the	 Chinese	 archival	 data	 is	 mainly	 collected	 through	 online	 databases,	
including	but	not	limited	to	China’s	Core	Newspaper	Database,	China’s	Core	Journal	Database,	and	China’s	
Outstanding	 Dissertation	 Database.	 All	 of	 these	 Chinese	 databases	 are	 sub-databases	 of	 National	
Knowledge	Infrastructure	(CNKI).	
This	thesis	will	comment	on	archival	data	that	does	not	have	reliable	and	authoritative	sources.	However,	
since	their	number	is	not	significant,	these	archival	data	will	not	exert	a	major	influence	on	the	general	
picture	of	institutional	analysis.		
All	of	the	aforementioned	archival	data	are	the	foundation	of	the	theoretical	framework	established	in	
Chapter	3	and	the	main	reference	of	the	institutional	analyses	in	Chapter	4	and	5.	
1.3.2 Semi-structured	interview	
Due	to	the	fact	that	water	resources	are	managed	by	a	centralised	and	complicated	administration	system	
in	China,	the	consumer	does	not	hold	much	of	its	information.	Rather,	these	information	is	held	by	a	few	
people	who	are	in	key	positions	in	this	system.	Thus,	a	semi-structured	interview	with	the	powerful	elite	
is	employed	in	this	research.	Here,	the	powerful	is	defined	as	a	certain	group	of	people,	though	in	a	small	
number,	who	 are	 the	 ‘cause	 and	 cure	 of	 social	 problems’	 (Williams,	 2012,	 p1)	 .	Williams	 (2012,	 p11)	
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pointed	out	that	the	study	targeting	the	powerful	is	defined	as	elite	study	targeting	‘up-system’,	which	is	
different	from	the	traditional	social	study	that	often	targets	people	from	‘down-system’	of	the	society.		
To	elaborate	this	‘up-system’	research,	an	in-depth	and	semi-structured	interview	is	employed	as	a	probe	
to	identify	the	stances,	arguments,	and	interests	of	both	these	interviewees	themselves	and	their	working	
departments.	For	Irving	Seidman	(2015,	p.7),	interview	is	a	way	in	which	details	of	experience	has	been	
reorganised	 by	 interviewee	 to	 reflect	 the	 social	 issues	 predicated	 on	 them	 in	 an	 abstraction	 form.	
Accordingly,	ten	people	who	hold	important	positions	in	the	urban	tap	water	provision	system,	have	been	
interviewed	in	this	thesis,	including	three	experts	in	tap	water	provision	and	sewage	treatment,	one	senior	
official	 in	water	 administration	 department,	 one	 senior	 official	 in	 health	 supervision	 department,	 one	
senior	engineer	in	water	treatment	plant,	one	senior	official	in	water	supply	group,	one	senior	manager	
in	water	 utility	 company,	 one	 NGO	 leader,	 and	 one	 senior	 representative	 of	 drinking	water	 industrial	
association.		
The	small	number	of	interviews	owes	much	to	the	political	and	social	sensitivity	of	the	theme	of	this	thesis.	
Before	the	author	employing	his	social	network	to	identify	and	access	the	gate	keepers	of	key	departments,	
ten	interview	requests	were	either	ignored	or	rejected,	including	five	interview	requests	of	experts,	three	
interview	requests	of	governmental	departments,	and	one	interview	request	of	industrial	associations	and	
one	interview	request	of	water	company.	Given	that,	the	author	decided	to	restructure	the	content	of	this	
thesis	by	omitting	the	case	study	of	Beijing.	
Getting	access	to	these	ten	interviewees	was	incredibly	difficult.	Obtaining	access	required	personal	and	
political	networks	and	connections,	which	means	that	certain	areas	of	discussion	are	taboo,	especially	in	
the	 interview	case	with	senior	officials	 from	government	departments.	As	Melanie	Manion	(1994)	and	
Zhou	Lihong	and	Miguel	Baptista	Nunes	(2013,	p.420)	have	pointed	out,	 this	problem	is	related	to	the	
difficulties	of	conducting	social	science	research	in	a	special	‘Chinese	context’.	Manion	(1994,	p.741-742)	
argued	that	for	quantitative	research,	‘obtain	nation-wide	probability	sample	of	the	Chinese	population	is	
both	 impossible	 and	 impractical’,	 and	 for	 qualitative	 research,	 interviewees	 are	 ‘[…]	 chosen	 partly	 for	
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convenience	and	always	subject	to	the	approval	of	the	Communist	authorities.’	In	the	case	study	of	Harbin,	
with	the	help	of	parents,	the	author	got	access	at	first	to	a	senior	official	whose	working	areas	include	
water	administration.	This	senior	official	then	contacted	one	interviewee	in	water	company,	from	whom	
the	 author	 got	 the	 permission	 to	 visit	 water	 treatment	 plant	 and	 the	 contact	 information	 of	 other	
interviewees.	Thus,	here	it	can	be	said	that	the	interview	strategy	in	this	research	is	that	It	is	essential	to	
be	introduced	by	a	senior	figure	who	performs	as	gatekeeper	in	an	inner	circle	such	as	water	provision	
system,	since	him	or	her	always	can	 introduce	you	to	other	 interviewees	who	were	hard	to	get	access	
through	 other	 means.	 In	 this	 sense,	 the	 obstacles,	 restrictions	 and	 limited	 channels	 of	 access	 to	
interviewing	stakeholders	in	the	water	provision	system	are	themselves	an	indication	of	why	there	is	a	lack	
of	public	trust	in	tap	water	provision.	
Those	 interview	materials	 have	 been	 embedded	 in	 Chapter	 3	 for	 theory	 development,	 Chapter	 4	 for	
institutional	analysis,	and	Chapters	5	and	6	for	a	case	study	of	Harbin’s	current	tap	water	provision	system.	
During	 this	 process,	 both	 the	 name	 and	 the	 identities	 of	 interviewees	 have	 been	 anonymised	 for	
confidentiality.	
During	 the	 semi-structured	 interviews,	 none	 of	 the	 respondents	 have	 disclosed	 any	 confidential	 data	
regarding	any	organisations.	Most	of	their	narratives	are	about	their	experiences	and	opinions.	As	it	may	
occur	in	any	interview	analysis,	there	is	a	risk	of	misinterpretation	and	misunderstanding.	To	deal	with	this	
risk,	 the	 interview	materials	 are	 analysed	 in	 the	 context	 of	 their	 current	 jobs,	 and	 their	 opinions	 are	
examined	 in	 light	of	 the	data	 collected	 in	 the	archival	 research	 introduced	 in	 the	previous	 section.	By	
combining	 these	 two	methodologies,	 the	potential	 risks	 is	 counteracted	 to	 an	 acceptable	degree.	 The	
interview	materials	are	translated,	organised	and	analysed	through	NVivo.	
These	 interviews	are	designed	on	 the	basis	of	every	 interviewee’s	situation	specifically,	with	 the	semi-
structured	format	and	open-ended	questions.	This	design	is	predicated	on	two	considerations:	first,	the	
aim	 of	 these	 interviews	 is	 not	 to	 test	 any	 existed	 hypotheses,	 but	 to	 construct	 new	 hypotheses.	 The	
opened-up	 questions	 are	 useful	 tools	 to	 collect	 the	 ideas,	 opinions,	 and	 information.	 Second,	 the	
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differences	between	these	interviewees	and	the	general	public	are	stark.	In	their	replies,	they	always	went	
beyond	the	bounds	of	the	questions	being	asked	to	give	additional	information.	Therefore,	it	would	have	
been	 difficult	 to	 confine	 the	 interviewees	 within	 the	 format	 of	 a	 standardised	 structured	 interview	
schedule.	In	this	case,	the	material	generalised	from	the	interview	is	mainly	through	inductive	reasoning,	
accompanied	by	the	deductive	reasoning	employed	in	the	process	of	archival	research.	
To	overcome	the	difficulty	of	insufficient	interview	materials,	this	thesis	supplements	these	materials	with	
all	kinds	of	resources,	 including	but	not	 limited	to	the	data	from	relevant	academic	publications,	news	
reports,	web	articles,	government	documents,	NGO	reports,	and	so	on.	As	a	result,	the	interview	materials	
are	embedded	into	an	analytical	framework	established	in	Chapter	3	and	are	checked	and	triangulated	
against	other	sources	to	demonstrate	the	intricacy	of	the	urban	tap	water	provision	system.	
1.3.3 Case	study	
Case	study	has	been	employed	with	the	aims	of	narrowing	down	the	research	into	a	manageable	scope	
on	the	one	hand,	and	to	examine	and	refine	the	theoretical	framework	constructed	in	Chapter	3	on	the	
other.	This	thesis	selects	Harbin,	a	city	located	in	North	China,	as	the	target	of	case	study.	
The	reasons	for	choosing	this	city	as	the	target	of	case	study	require	further	explanation.	First,	both	trust	
and	 urban	 tap	water	 are	 broad	 research	 themes.	 Case	 study	 is	 useful	 to	 specify	 their	 generality	 to	 a	
tangible	degree	through	integrating	a	series	of	specific	temporal,	geographical,	environmental,	political,	
economic	and	 social	 conditions	 into	analysis.	 Second,	a	detailed	 scrutiny	of	urban	 tap	water	provision	
system	would	be	helpful	to	summarise	the	developmental	trajectories	of	other	Chinese	cities’	urban	tap	
water	provision	systems.	
Third,	given	the	difficulties	associated	with	the	research	on	trust	 in	 individual	 level,	the	case	study	can	
provide	a	compensation	to	the	understanding	of	consumer’s	reaction	to	urban	tap	water	provision	system.	
In	 other	 words,	 consumer’s	 trust	 and	 distrust	 can	 be	 revealed	 through	 analysing	 the	 developmental	
trajectory	of	urban	water	provision	system	in	the	case	city.	This	is	because	the	fact	that	compared	to	the	
Chapter	1	Introduction:	Tap	Water	in	China																																																																																																							|	14	
	
data	of	consumer’s	behaviour,	the	data	of	a	city’s	development	is	much	more	abundant,	much	easier	to	
access,	 and	much	more	 comprehensive	 to	 be	 examined	 to	 establish	 new	 theoretical	 hypotheses	 and	
frameworks.	These	data	are	mainly	derived	from	city’s	yearbook	and	statistical	record,	as	well	as	various	
papers	and	books	focusing	on	the	operation	of	one	or	many	agents	in	Harbin’s	urban	tap	water	provision	
system.	
Besides,	 as	will	 be	 demonstrated	 in	 Chapter	 6,	 the	 institutional	 analysis	 of	 urban	 tap	water	 provision	
system,	especially	the	institutional	analysis	of	the	Hybrid	Institutional	Architecture	(its	definition	will	be	
coined	in	section	3.4)	requires	a	holistic	research	perspective	to	establish	the	causality	between	reality	
and	 hypotheses	 and	 between	 the	 limited	 conditions,	 problems	 and	 inevitable	 outcomes	 of	 urban	 tap	
water	provision	system.	Only	case	studies	of	a	city	can	present	such	analysis	in	an	institutional	level.	
Given	the	analyses	above,	Harbin,	the	capital	city	of	Heilongjiang,	has	been	thoroughly	examined	in	this	
thesis	for	two	reasons:	first,	it	is	a	famous	industrial	city	which	has	experienced	at	least	two	remarkable	
sociogenic	water	sustainability	crises.	Thus,	the	 institutional	characteristics	of	this	capital	city	are	quite	
distinctive,	 and	 looking	 at	 institutional	 variation	 is	 an	 effective	way	 to	 understand	 the	 specificities	 of	
Chinese	water	provisioning	systems.	Its	tap	water	provision	system	can	link	the	developmental	trajectories	
of	other	major	industrial	cities	throughout	China;	second,	Harbin	is	the	only	city	that	the	author	can	use	
his	social	network	(guanxi)	to	get	access	the	gatekeeper	and	other	interviewees	in	key	agent	of	urban	tap	
water	provision	system.	For	author,	it	would	be	nearly	impossible	to	implement	the	same	case	study	in	
other	cities	since	he	would	have	no	social	network	(guanxi)	there	to	interview	the	local	powerful	people.	
In	a	qualitative	study,	the	major	task	is	to	interpret	how	the	target	of	research	works	in	a	particular	context.	
The	examination	of	Harbin	takes	into	the	account	of	the	generality	of	the	main	themes,	the	theoretical	
hypothesis	constructed	in	Chapter	3,	and	the	characteristics	of	the	case	cities.	With	detailed	institutional	
analyses	of	the	historical,	cultural	and	social	development	of	the	tap	water	provision	system,	Chapter	5	
mainly	 analysed	 Harbin’s	 two	 sociogenic	 sustainability	 crises.	 Chapter	 6,	 in	 another	 hand,	 analysed	
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Harbin’s	current	‘source	to	consumer’	urban	semi-potable	tap	water	provision	system	with	an	institutional	
analysis	of	interview	materials.	
1.4 Conclusion	
This	chapter	introduced	the	structure	of	this	thesis.	It	stresses	the	imperative	of	developing	an	institutional	
analysis	 in	 China’s	 urban	 tap	 water	 provision	 system	 from	 a	 consumer	 perspective.	 To	 have	 a	
comprehensive	understanding	of	the	risk	of	sociogenic	water	sustainability	crisis,	which	has	yet	been	fully	
studied,	 demands	 an	 examination	 of	 China’s	 tap	 water	 consumer.	 To	 achieve	 this	 goal,	 consumer’s	
trust/distrust	 in	 tap	water	 is	 the	 signal	of	 consumer’s	 attitude	 towards,	 and	 the	 reaction	 to,	 the	 flaws	
existing	in	the	current	tap	water	provision	system.	Three	subordinate	research	questions	and	one	main	
research	question	are	presented	as	research	rationale.	Connected	each	other	by	cumulative	theoretical	
thread,	these	research	questions	manage	to	cover	four	different	themes,	tap	water,	tap	water	provision	
system,	tap	water	consumer	and	consumer’s	institutional	trust	in	tap	water,	into	a	rationale	framework.	
Archival	research,	semi-structured	interview	and	case	study	are	the	three	methodologies	adopted	in	this	
thesis	to	achieve	data	from	various	sources.
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 A	Literature	Review:	Water,	
Consumer	and	Trust	
2.1 The	political	characteristics	of	water	resources	
To	 have	 a	 general	 view	 of	 the	 political	 characteristics	 of	 water	 resources,	 a	 scrutiny	 of	 historical	
perspectives	 is	 required.	 In	 the	 late	20th	century,	 there	was	a	heated	and	controversial	debate	on	the	
relationship	between	power,	water,	and	political	regimes.	
Karl	 August	 Wittfogel	 (1959)	 signals	 the	 culmination	 of	 such	 debate	 by	 the	 publication	 of	 Oriental	
Despotism:	A	Comparative	Study	of	Total	Power	in	1957,	believed	to	be	the	first	theoretical	analysis	of	the	
relationship	between	the	social	power	and	water	(Swyngedouw,	2006,	p.15).	Taking	China	as	the	example,	
Wittfogel	claimed	that	there	was	a	causal	connection	between	the	demand	of	utilising	water	resources	
and	the	emergence	and	operation	of	despotic	 regimes.	Presenting	 the	 idea	of	 ‘oriental	despotism,'	he	
argued	that	behind	these	despotisms	there	was	a	‘hydraulic	society’	whose	legal	and	moral	foundation	is	
the	 operation	 of	 a	 comprehensive	mechanism	of	 hydraulic	 facilities.	 However,	 he	 did	 not	 place	much	
emphasis	on	the	connection	between	the	hydraulic	facilities	and	tap	water	supply	facilities,	just	claimed	
that	the	former	were	the	grounds	for	the	latter.	
Based	 on	 the	 critique	 of	 communist	 ideology,	 Wittfogel	 used	 his	 theory	 as	 a	 weapon	 to	 attack	 the	
legitimacy	of	the	so-called	despotic	regimes.	Such	a	controversial	attempt	severely	divided	the	directions	
of	 further	 research	 by	 inspiring	 two	 new	 waves	 of	 research	 on	 the	 interaction	 between	 hydraulic	
management	 and	 political	 regimes	 in	 both	 Eastern	 and	Western	 academia.	 In	 China’s	 academia,	 the	
research	developed	in	three	stages.		
Chapter	2	Literature	Review:	Tap	Water	and	Trust																																																																																											|	17	
	
The	first	stage	was	the	ignoring	stage.	This	is	signaled	by	the	fact	that	although	Wittfogel’s	work	was	mainly	
targeting	the	history	of	China,	 it	was	not	published	until	1989,	and	was	never	reprinted	again,	despite	
having	been	translated	into	Chinese	in	the	early	1960s.	The	second	stage	was	the	denouncing	stage.	 It	
began	from	1990	and	lasted	almost	ten	years.	Two	special	symposia	were	held	in	1990	and	1994	in	China,	
whose	 main	 themes	 were	 to	 denounce	 Wittfogel's	 work	 critically.	 In	 1997,	 a	 collection	 titled	 The	
Comments	of	Wittfogel’s	Work	 ‘Oriental	Despotism’	was	published	based	on	 the	outcomes	of	 the	 two	
symposia.	It	consists	of	15	articles	by	18	prominent	Chinese	historians,	criticising	Wittfogel’s	work	from	
different	historical	and	theoretical	perspectives	(Li,	1997).	For	example,	one	contribution	argues	that	there	
were	several	equally	 important	 factors	 that	 influenced	 the	prosperity	of	 society,	which	discredited	 the	
direct	connection	between	the	power	of	Chinese	dynasties	and	the	intensity	of	hydraulic	management.	
This	book	paved	the	way	for	the	third	stage,	which	has	redefined	the	meaning	of	‘hydraulic	society’	in	the	
Chinese	context.	Wang	Ming	Ming	(2005,	p.23)	argued	that	 ‘[…]	the	way	of	a	combination	of	hydraulic	
resource	and	the	society	in	given	regions	is	possibly	a	topic	with	far	more	importance	than	the	idea	of	
“hydraulic	society”’.	The	main	concern	of	his	claim	is	that	the	various	kinds	of	contradiction	around	the	
distribution	of	water	resources	as	a	public	good	can	demonstrate	a	comprehensive	picture	of	society.	Until	
now,	it	can	be	said	that	the	research	perspective	of	the	idea	of	‘hydraulic	society’	has	been	transformed	
from	the	top-down	research	perspective	in	Wittfogel’s	work	to	a	bottom-up	research	perspective,	and	its	
definition	has	been	dramatically	depoliticised	in	a	more	detailed	research	scheme.		
Nowadays,	many	western	scholars	have	inherited	Wittfogel’s	perspective	in	analysing	the	development	of	
society	regarding	the	development	of	hydraulic	facilities.	For	example,	Erik	Swyngedouw	(2005)	has	coined	
a	conceptual	triad	about	the	relationship	between	water,	money,	and	power,	which	will	be	highlighted	in	
the	 next	 section.	 Francois	 Molle	 (2009)	 underlined	 the	 concept	 of	 ‘hydraulic	 bureaucracies’	 from	
Wittfogel’s	 narrative,	 though	 the	 original	 term	 only	 appeared	 once	 in	 the	 book	 as	 ‘agro-hydraulic	
bureaucracy,'	emphasising	the	crucial	function	of	a	type	of	bureaucracy	that	is	in	charge	of	the	specific	
issues	of	water	management.	Historically	speaking,	the	emergence	of	the	hydraulic	bureaucracies	can	be	
seen	as	the	natural	outcome	of	the	circulation	of	power	and	capital.	On	the	one	hand,	in	areas	with	low	
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agricultural	productivity,	there	was	a	high	demand	of	constructing	hydraulic	facilities.	On	the	other	hand,	
those	who	have	been	bestowed	with	the	power	of	managing	water	resources	are	eager	to	make	use	of	
this	power	by	circulating	it	in	a	given	administration	system,	which	would	then	promote	the	circulation	of	
capital.	As	a	 result	of	 the	combined	actions,	 the	construction	of	 large-scale	hydraulic	 facilities	became	
prevalent.	In	this	context,	power	and	capital	would	be	gradually	centralised	into	the	hands	of	a	small	group	
of	people,	which	consists	of	‘a	cadre	of	professionals’(Molle,	Mollinga	and	Wester,	2009,	p.328),	including	
but	not	limited	to	‘scientists	and	engineers	who	achieved	sophisticated	ability	to	manipulate	the	natural	
riverine	 environment’	 (Molle,	 Mollinga	 and	Wester,	 2009,	 p.329).	 These	 professionals	 always	 occupy	
leadership	 roles	 in	 various	 water	 resources	 management	 agencies,	 thus	 creating	 what	 is	 labeled	 as	
‘hydraulic	bureaucracies.’	Molle’s	work	tried	to	avoid	the	cold	war	style	of	debate	over	ideology	divergence,	
which	was	one	of	the	main	themes	in	Wittfogel,	resulting	in	the	omission,	to	a	large	extent,	of	the	direct	
connection	between	 the	hydraulic	 society	 and	 the	 regime.	 Therefore,	 the	developmental	 trajectory	of	
hydraulic	bureaucracies	is	similar	to	the	developmental	trajectories	of	other	types	of	bureaucracies,	whose	
foundations	are	also	the	circulations	of	power	and	capital.	The	hydraulic	bureaucracy	was	mainly	discussed	
regarding	its	negative	influence	on	constructing	and	managing	hydraulic	facilities,	rather	than	connecting	
it	to	the	legitimate	governing	of	people,	as	Wittfogel	demonstrated.		
Since	many	developed	countries	have	undergone	the	privatization	reforms	in	water	management	which	
have	contributed	to	the	decentralization	of	the	power	of	managing	water	resources,	and	since	the	rising	
environmental	movement	has	nurtured	the	awakening	awareness	of	their	civil	societies,	the	power	and	
capital	shared	by	such	bureaucracies	have	been	partially	shifted	to	the	market	and	the	hands	of	the	citizen,	
resulting	in	the	raising	of	a	series	of	new	questions	regarding	the	interconnection	between	water,	capital,	
market	 and	 community.	 The	 basic	 theoretical	 foundation	 of	 ‘hydraulic	 society’	 and	 ‘hydraulic	
bureaucracies’	is	undergoing	a	radical	modification.	
Karren	Bakker	(2013)	focused	on	managing	water	as	a	public	resource.	Developing	her	argument	about	
water	as	‘uncooperative	commodity'	(this	concept	will	be	reviewed	in	next	section),	she	claimed	that	given	
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the	turbulence	triggered	by	the	uncooperativeness	of	water	resources	in	both	pricing	and	managing,	tap	
water	 administration	 in	 UK	 has	 experienced	 both	 the	 ‘market	 failure’	 and	 ‘governance	 failure’	 in	 its	
attempt	of	neoliberalisation.	This	argument	reflects	the	complexity	of	 tap	water	administration	and	 its	
internal	conflict	with	the	ideology	of	neoliberalism.	
Maria	Kaika	(2003)	claimed	that	the	‘social	production’	of	water’s	scarcity	and	its	associated	implications	
for	water	politics	deserve	further	attention.	In	her	work,	the	project	of	water	facilities	in	Athens	did	not	
solve	the	problem	of	water	scarcity	but	sustained	the	socio-economic	order	and	the	current	economic	and	
social	pattern	of	water	supply	and	consumption.	She	pointed	out	that	by	building	the	equation	between	
scarcity,	valuable	and	expensive,	the	natural	drought	has	been	transformed	into	the	socially	constructed	
water	 scarcity,	 paving	 the	 way	 for	 the	 following	 hydraulic	 facilities,	 which	 sustains	 the	 current	 socio-
economic	arrangement	and	opens	up	the	opportunity	for	privatisation.	In	other	words,	the	manifestation	
of	water	scarcity	was	driven	by	the	social	agents	who	would	like	to	benefit	from	shifting	power	relations	
associated	with	 the	 new	water	 resources	 arrangement.	 In	 China,	 particularly	 in	 developed	 cities,	 the	
situation	 is	 the	 total	 opposite:	 the	 sense	 of	water	 affluence	 is	 socially	 and	 politically	 constructed	 and	
normalised	 to	 function	 as	 the	 stabiliser	 of	 the	 current	 urban	 tap	water	 provision	 system.	 This	will	 be	
analysed	in	further	in	Chapter	3.		
At	the	specific	level	of	hydraulic	facility	construction,	the	traditional	motivations	have	gradually	ceased	to	
be	 significant	 given	 two	 main	 reasons.	 First,	 agricultural	 productivity	 in	 China	 has	 been	 dramatically	
improved	by	the	wide-spread	utilisation	of	 fertiliser	and	pesticides.	Consequently,	 large-scale	hydraulic	
facilities	are	no	longer	urgently	demanded	as	the	sole	method	of	improving	the	agricultural	productivity,	
as	it	was	in	China’s	history.	Second,	the	basic	agricultural	hydraulic	network	has	been	already	established,	
and	 agricultural	 development	 has	 ceased	 to	 be	 the	 facilitator	 for	 constructing	 large-scale	 hydraulic	
facilities.	 Instead,	with	the	soaring	urbanisation,	the	construction	of	tap	water	provision	system	is	now	
increasingly	 important	 for	 infrastructure	 development.	 However,	 they	 also	 suffer	 numerous	
Chapter	2	Literature	Review:	Tap	Water	and	Trust																																																																																											|	20	
	
administration	 drawbacks.	 Chapter	 3	 will	 illustrate	 such	 importance	 and	 drawbacks	 with	 systematic	
analyses.	
2.2 The	 economic	 characteristics	 of	 water	
resources	
In	Chinese	academia,	the	discussions	around	economic	characteristics	of	water	resources	can	be	seen	as	
policy-oriented	and	practical-oriented.	This	 inevitably	 leads	 to	a	 fact	 that	most	studies	are	 focusing	on	
specific	 economic	 indicators	 instead	 of	 general	 relationship	 between	 economy,	 nature	 and	 society.	 In	
other	words,	water	 resources	 is	 always	 being	 studied	 in	 the	 economic	 context	 that	 isolate	 itself	 from	
natural	 and	 societal	 contexts.	 However,	 as	 Harvey	 (2015,	 p.3)	 pointed	 out,	 tap	water	 ‘[…]	 provided	 a	
powerful	 optic	 for	 exploring	 the	 relation	 between	 economy	 and	 nature.’	 Moreover,	 the	 recent	
development	of	China’s	urban	tap	water	provision	system	has	drawn	many	lessons	from	UK,	making	the	
analysis	about	UK’s	urban	tap	water	provision	system	also	becomes	a	particular	valuable	reference	 for	
understanding	China’s	system.	Given	the	above	analysis,	this	section	mainly	reviewed	three	theoretical	
frameworks,	which	not	only	demonstrate	the	economic	characteristics	of	water	resources	in	a	context	that	
integrate	not	only	economy	but	also	nature	and	 society,	but	 also	being	developed	 from	UK’s	practical	
experience	in	urban	tap	water	provision	system.	
The	 original	 source	 of	 such	 analytical	 perspective	 is	 from	 Karl	 Polanyi.	 Highlighting	 the	 dynamic	
relationship	between	market	and	society,	Polanyi	(1957)	argued	that	the	market	is	incapable	of	regulating	
natural	resources	to	prevent	commercial	exploitation	that	would	lead	to	environmental	destruction.	This	
argument	conflict	with	the	ideal	of	neoliberalism,	which	aims	to	‘reorganising	capitalism	at	multiple	scale’	
(de	Freitas,	2015,	p.240).		
Focusing	on	specific	regulatory	aspect	of	pervasive	neoliberalization	in	UK	and	Global	South,	Karen	Bakker	
(2003;	2005;	2013)	analysed	the	differentiations	between	definitions	of	privatisation,	marketisation	and	
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commodification	 in	 neoliberalization,	 arguing	 that	 tap	 water	 is	 an	 ‘uncooperative	 commodity’	 when	
supplied	 in	an	urban	 tap	water	provision	 system.	 In	 section	4.4.2,	an	analysis	of	China’s	marketisation	
reform	in	urban	public	utility	will	echo	her	argument	through	demonstrating	the	incoherency	in	money	
flow	circulating	in	the	urban	tap	water	provision	system.		
In	his	study	of	tap	water,	Mark	Harvey	(Harvey,	2015)	scrutinized	the	development	of	urban	tap	water	
provision	system	in	different	geographical	and	socio-economic	contexts,	elaborating	the	analyses	of	 its	
connection	 with	 cultural,	 political,	 legal,	 biological	 and	 environmental	 processes.	 The	 concept	 of	 the	
economy	in	his	research	is	defined	from	sociological	and	anthropological	one,	which	means	that	there	is	
an	 intellectual	 insulation	between	 the	presuppositions	of	 investigators’	understanding	of	 the	economy	
and	the	economy	that	under	investigation.	In	this	perspective,	there	is	a	fine	line	between	the	subjective	
judgment	of	the	economy	and	subjective	prejudice	of	economy.	
Karl	Polanyi’s	theoretical	framework:	examine	nature	resource	in	social	milieus	
To	locate	the	relevant	position	of	economic	issues	in	all	the	social	sciences,	Karl	Polanyi		(1957)	elaborated	
his	theoretical	approach	and	conceptual	categories	for	analysing	non-marketing	economies	 in	his	book	
Trade	and	Market	in	the	Early	Empires.	In	this	book,	he	offered	a	compact	conceptual	configuration	of	the	
substantive	meaning	of	economy,	aiming	to	bond	the	understandings	of	the	economy	and	nature	together	
and	 criticised	 the	 ‘formal’	meaning	 of	 economy	which	 advocates	 the	 ‘magic’	 of	 self-regulation	 of	 the	
market	mechanism.	By	this	 logic,	Polanyi	argued	that	the	economy’s	position	is	historically	and	socially	
dynamic,	and	the	market	mechanism	has	its	inherent	flaw	in	regulating	the	natural	resources	such	as	water.		
Polanyi’s	arguments	highlighted	the	fact	that	the	economic	characteristics	of	natural	resource	needed	to	
be	 socially	 examined	 in	 specific	 social	 milieus	 and	 relationships.	 His	 theoretical	 concerns	 realise	
individual’s	limitation	by	their	dependency	on	both	natural	environment	and	social	relations.	Both	natural	
resources	and	social	relations	are	required	for	human	beings	to	satisfy	their	material	demands.	Thus,	tap	
water	exemplified	the	need	to	develop	Polanyi’s	conception	of	substantive	economy.		
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Karen	Bakker’s	theoretical	framework:	neoliberalisation	of	water	resources	and	its	failure	
In	her	work	about	the	privatisation	of	tap	water,	Karen	Bakker	(2013)	raised	two	questions:	what	is	the	
different	between	privatisation,	marketization	and	commodification	of	water	resource,	and	why	they	are	
deemed	to	be	problematic	in	the	case	of	tap	water	provision?	
To	answer	these	two	questions,	Bakker	argued	that	the	privatisation	highlights	the	process	of	handover	of	
ownership	 and/or	management	 right	 from	 the	 central	 authority	 to	 private	 actors.	 Thus,	 it	 entails	 the	
change	of	organisational	ownership.	Marketisation	 includes	commodification	and	commercialisation,	 it	
changes	 the	mode	 of	 natural	 resource	management,	 emphasising	 the	 commercial	 principles	 (such	 as	
efficacy),	methods	(such	as	cost-benefit	assessment),	and	objectives	(such	as	profit-maximization)	(Bakker	
and	Bridge,	2006).	Thus,	it	entails	an	institutional	change,	which	may	include	the	change	of	rules,	norms,	
and	 customs.	 The	occurrence	of	privatisation	may	not	entail	 the	occurrence	of	marketisation,	 but	 the	
occurrence	of	marketisation	may	promote	the	occurrence	of	privatisation.	Besides,	in	China	marketisation	
is	also	considered	as	an	alternative	management	instrument	available	for	the	public	utilities	to	employ,	
mainly	aiming	to	recover	the	full	cost.	This	will	be	discussed	in	section	4.4.2.	
As	a	part	of	marketisation,	commodification	is	to	create	economic	good	from	natural	resources	enabled	
by	a	specific	 institution,	and	then	those	economic	goods	will	be	transmitted	to	the	market	mechanism	
with	a	price	being	determined	by	supply	and	demand.	The	commodification	can	be	summarised	into	two	
dimensions:	the	transforming	dimension,	which	entails	the	market	mechanism	to	initiate	the	exchange	of	
natural	 goods	 by	 pricing,	 charging	 and	 allocation;	 and	 the	 reconstruction	 dimension,	 which	 is	 to	
reconstruct	the	natural	goods	to	the	standardised	form	of	commodity	desired	by	consumers	(Bakker,	2003;	
2013).	Essentially,	commodification	is	a	process	where	natural	goods	are	alienated	from	their	source	and	
transformed	into	exchangeable	forms	adapted	to	the	market	mechanism.	
Bakker	 emphasised	 the	 essential	 function	 of	 historically-geographically	 specific	 practices.	 By	 this	
perspective,	neoliberalisation	is	a	re-regulation	and	reconfiguration	process	to	adjust	the	role	of	the	state	
in	 regulating	 natural	 resources	 within	 the	 context	 of	 ‘market	 environmentalism’	 (Bakker,	 2003,	 p.1).	
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However,	 the	 true	 competition	 and	 the	 implementation	 of	 cost-reflective	 pricing	 has	 been	 proved	
ineffective,	which	impeded	the	development	of	neoliberalisation	process.	The	water	resource’s	inherent	
characteristics	‘[…]	render	it	particularly	resistant	to	commodification’	(Bakker,	2005,	p.559).	For	example,	
water	 resources	 is	 cheap	 to	 store	 but	 expensive	 to	 transport,	 making	 it	 hard	 to	 be	 distributed	 in	 a	
financially	profitable	manner	(Bakker,	2003,	p.42).	Therefore,	economic,	political,	environmental	and	even	
ethical	dilemmas	emerged	in	the	attempts	of	valuing,	metering,	and	pricing	the	water	resource,	making	it	
an	‘uncooperative	commodity’.	
In	her	case	studies	of	water	provision	industry	in	England	and	Wales,	she	argued	the	traditional	neoliberal	
privatisation	 and	 marketisation	 processes	 was	 not	 fully	 demonstrated	 and	 failed	 in	 dealing	 with	 the	
contradictions	 in	 the	process	of	modifying	water	 resource,	 resulting	 in	a	 failure	of	neoliberalisation	of	
nature	resource.	However,	she	only	discussed	neoliberal	governance	 in	a	de-centralised	administration	
mechanism.	 This	 thesis	 will	 contribute	 to	 the	 understanding	 of	 neoliberalisation	 through	 providing	 a	
detailed	analysis	of	Chinese	centralised	administration	of	water	resources	and	tap	water	provision	system	
and	its	attempt	of	marketisation	reform.	
In	 addition,	 Bakker’s	 concept	 of	 ‘uncooperative	 commodity’	 also	 contributes	 to	 the	 form	 the	 concept	
Hybrid	Institutional	Architecture,	since	it	offers	an	explanation	to	the	institutional	incoherencies	in	money	
flow	(reviewed	in	section	2.3)	circulating	in	and	being	encapsulates	by	the	Hybrid	Institutional	Architecture.		
Mark	Harvey’s	theoretical	framework:	a	‘source	to	sip’	research	perspective	
Following	Bakker’s	arguments,	Harvey	(2015)	claims	that	tap	water	is	an	‘unruly	public	good’,	since	the	
‘public’	aspect	of	tap	water	is	always	contested,	as	it	centres	on	both	the	local	and	international	debates	
over	the	sustainability	relationship	between	human	demand	and	natural	supply.	As	Harvey	(2015,	p.20)	
claimed,	 his	 account	 is	 to	 respond	 Bakker’s	 analysis	 of	 neoliberalism	 ‘[…]	 by	 arguing	 for	 an	 historical	
account	 of	 the	 emergence	 of	 new	 forms	 of	 public,	 hybrid,	 and	 indeed	 commodity	 goods	 in	 different	
historical	and	societal	contexts.’	Moreover,	he	criticised	the	studies	of	understanding	the	water	resources	
as	a	‘common	pool,'	which	grounds	the	taking-for-granted	availability	of	water,	and	the	idea	of	‘free	access’	
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of	all	human	to	the	water	resource.	He	argues	that	the	‘common’	label	of	the	water	resources	disguise	the	
societal	variation	of	water	economy,	especially	the	ingrained	social	inequalities.	These	social	inequalities	
demonstrate	 themselves	 in	 various	 forms,	 especially	 in	 the	 taken-for-granted	 availability	 of	 tap	water.	
Based	on	 this	 viewpoint,	 he	highlighted	 that	 from	historical	 and	anthropological	 stances,	 these	 stoical	
inequalities	refleced	and	evidenced	different	forms	of	social	hierarchy	in	accessing	water	resources	that	
have	integrated	and	normalised	these	social	inequalities.		
Another	critical	perspective	of	his	research	is	historical	conceptualisation,	which	offers	a	standpoint	for	an	
elaborate	analysis	of	sociogenic	water	sustainability	crisis.	This	analytical	perspective	is	especially	helpful	
in	examining	the	sustainability	crises	happened	in	China.	Taking	historical,	anthropological,	and	societal	
variations	 and	 conditions	 into	 consideration,	 he	 established	 his	 theoretical	 framework,	 the	 Instituted	
Economic	Process,	to	examine	the	interconnections	between	the	production,	distribution,	exchange	and	
consumption	of	certain	commodity	(See	Figure	2.1)	
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Figure	2.1:	Instituted	Economic	Process	in	a	complex	nexus	of	interactions	between	various	conditions	
(Harvey,	2015,	p.7)	
By	adopting	 Instituted	Economic	Process	and	 recognising	Polanyi’s	 two	constitutional	processes	of	 the	
economy,	the	processes	of	displacing	entities	in	space	and	processes	of	changing	who	exercises	control	
over	 those	 entities,	 Harvey	 (2015,	 p.9)	 further	 developed	 another	 two	 constitutional	 processes	 of	
economy,	 the	 processes	 of	 transformation	 of	 qualitative	 characteristics	 of	 entities	 (objects,	 activities,	
people)	and	processes	of	transformation	of	the	functionality	of	using	those	entities.	Note	here	that	these	
four	 processes	 have	 constituted	 a	 research	 nexus	 combining	 both	 the	 geographic	 and	 political	
perspectives	into	the	research	of	economy,	reflecting	the	openness	of	this	research	mode.		
The	 two	 new	 economic	 processes	 correspond	 to	 the	 production/provision	 and	 consumption	 process	
respectively	(Glucksmann,	2013,	p.8).	In	the	case	of	tap	water,	these	two	processes	are	mainly	associated	
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with	the	quality	and	functionality	changes	in	tap	water	provision	and	consumption	processes.	Regarding	
quality	change,	the	processes	of	transformation	of	qualitative	characteristics	of	entities	reveal	a	series	of	
tap	 water	 quality	 transitions,	 from	 undrinkable	 nature	 water	 to	 standardised	 tap	 water.	 Regarding	
functionality	changes,	the	processes	of	transformation	of	the	functionality	of	using	those	entities	reveal	a	
series	 of	 tap	 water	 transitions	 from	 nature	 resource	 to	 a	 commodity.	 In	 other	 words,	 an	 Instituted	
Economic	Process	has	taken	into	consideration	the	whole	trajectory	of	tap	water	supply	from	a	‘source	to	
sip’	perspective	(Harvey,	2015,	p.10),	which	is	particularly	useful	 in	analysing	the	operation	of	complex	
system	that	contains	many	agents,	such	as	China’s	urban	tap	water	provision	system.	Thus,	this	holistic	
research	perspective	will	be	adopted	in	probing	China’s	urban	tap	water	provision	system,	which	will	be	
analysed	in	Chapter	3	and	Chapter	4.	
Here,	Miriam	Glucksmann’s	concept	of	consumption	work	 (reviewed	in	section	2.4)	also	sheds	 light	on	
both	processes.	This	concept	stresses	the	consumer’s	production	process	after	the	transfer	of	ownership	
of	certain	commodity,	which	determines	the	final	function	and	quality	of	certain	commodity	(Glucksmann,	
2009;	2013).	Particularly,	both	scholars	claimed	that	the	norms	and	routines	of	water	consumption	played	
a	major	role	in	the	consumption	behaviours.	As	will	be	highlighted	in	Chapter	3,	these	norms	and	routines	
to	 a	 large	 extent	 influence	 the	 development	 of	 tap	 water	 provision	 system,	 formulate	 the	 unique	
interaction	pattern	between	consumer	and	tap	water	provision	system.	
2.3 The	nexus	of	power/money/water	
The	previous	section	has	reviewed	the	economic	characteristics	of	water	resources	 from	a	perspective	
that	not	only	takes	water’s	economic	value	into	consideration,	but	also	scrutinises	such	value	in	a	more	
broader	historical,	geographical	and	societal	context.	They	have	revealed	the	fact	that	water	is	much	more	
than	a	tangble	entity	in	urban	areas,	since	it	is	always	intertwined	with	a	series	of	intangible	elemeents	
such	as	power	and	money.	Thus,	a	discussion	of	such	intertwining	is	necessary.	
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Expounding	Wittfogel’s	theory,	and	in	order	to	illustrate	the	relationship	between	the	flow	of	water,	the	
flow	 of	 power	 and	 the	 flow	 of	 money,	 Swyngedouw	 (2004,	 p.2)	 presented	 the	 conceptual	 triad	
‘power/money/water	nexus’,	emphasising	that	it	‘[…]	lays	bare	the	political	economy	of	the	urban	fabric	
and	the	functioning	of	mechanisms	of	domination	and	subordination	within	the	urban	arena.’	The	logic	
behind	this	conceptual	triad	is	that	the	access	of	water	resources	demands	certain	financial	capacity,	which	
is	 also	 inevitably	 connected	with	political	 power	 (Swyngedouw,	 2006).	 Thus,	 taking	 a	 holistic	 research	
perspective,	water	 flow,	money	 flow	 and	 power	 flow	 always	 demonstrates	 themselves	 in	 an	 intricate	
network	of	each	other.	
This	 conceptual	 triad	 centres	 on	 the	 contests	 around	 the	 access	 to	water.	 Swyngedouw	believed	 that	
during	 the	 process	 of	 accessing	 water,	 there	 are	 various	 contests	 among	 people	 of	 different	 classes,	
genders	 and	 ethnicities.	 This	 demonstrates	 the	 relationships	 of	 domination	 and	 subordination	
(Swyngedouw,	 2004;	 2006;	 2009).	 Thus,	 he	 used	 water	 as	 a	 probe	 to	 reveal	 the	 political	 economy	
circulating	behind	the	fabric	of	municipality	in	several	case	studies	(Swyngedouw,	2004,	p.4).	
Swyngedouw	has	modified	the	theoretic	flaws	existing	in	Wittfogel’s	theory	through	admitting	that	‘[…]	it	
has	now	been	commonly	accepted	that	there	is	no	necessary	link	between	aridity	or	relative	scarcity	of	
water	 and	 authoritarian	 political	 and	 economic	 power	 relations’	 (Swyngedouw,	 2006,	 p.17).	 As	
demonstrated	in	the	previous	section,	this	so-called	‘link’	has	been	criticised	by	Chinese	academia	as	well.	
While	keeping	a	safe	distance	from	this	argument,	Swyngedouw	at	the	same	time	tried	to	stress	that	there	
are	 links	 between	 the	 management	 of	 hydraulic	 construction	 and	 ‘large,	 hierarchically	 organised,	
bureaucratic	organisations’,	and	between	these	organisations	themselves	(Swyngedouw,	2006,	p.17).	
However,	four	restrictions	about	this	concept	can	be	observed.	First,	although	his	studies	have	recognised	
the	internal	connection	between	power,	money	and	water,	they	only	discussed	the	unequal	distribution	
of	 and	 access	 to	 the	water	 resource,	 rather	 than	 systematically	 investigating	 the	 concrete	 effects	 and	
influence	of	this	concept	in	specific	urban	tap	water	provision	system.	In	other	words,	by	admitting	the	
influences	of	unequal	power	positions	between	various	agents	of	certain	urban	tap	water	provision	system,	
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the	 resulting	chain	 reactions	 that	are	 triggered	by	such	 inequality	and	 its	associated	 influences	on	 the	
other	agents	have	yet	to	be	fully	revealed.	
Second,	 following	 this	 restriction,	 in	his	 research	 the	analyses	of	 tap	water	consumer	was	 inadequate.	
They	can	be	considered	as	people	who	do	get	access	to	tap	water	through	purchasing	but	still	 lack	the	
power	to	deal	with	other	agents	in	the	tap	water	provision	system.	Those	people,	even	though	may	be	in	
a	 better	 situation	 than	 those	 who	 are	 incapable	 of	 accessing	 water,	 also	 suffered	 a	 series	 of	 veiled	
problems	regarding	quality,	quantity,	scandal	and	legal	right	of	tap	water	in	many	developing	countries,	
such	as	China.	
Third,	in	his	analysis,	this	conceptual	triad	has	been	generalized	into	a	common	idea,	instead	of	a	concept	
that	can	be	employed	in	different	contexts	with	different	features.	Are	the	power/money/water	nexuses	
of	different	areas	coterminous	with	each	other?	The	answer	is	undoubtedly	no.	Given	the	difference	in	
the	 political	 regime,	 monetary	 system,	 water	 provision	 system,	 culture	 and	 traditions,	 their	
power/money/water	nexuses	must	occupy	various	socio-spatial	realms,	which	demand	more	detailed	and	
specific	analysis	to	every	single	case.	
Fourth,	Swyngedouw’s	studies	did	not	illustrate	how	the	power/money/water	nexus	functions	in	concrete	
water	provision	systems	in	a	central	command	economy.	In	this	context,	the	power/money/water	nexuses	
are	embodied	within	specific	agents	in	the	urban	water	provision	system,	such	as	water	source,	pipeline,	
hydraulic	project,	water	treatment	plant,	and	consumers.	In	this	sense,	the	mobility	of	flows	of	power	and	
money	needs	to	be	explored	in	a	relational	and	systematic	perspective.	Moreover,	Swyngedouw	failed	to	
illustrate	how	different	contests,	clashes,	and	social	struggles	have	certain	casual	connections	with	each	
other.	Taking	an	example	of	China,	the	social	struggle	between	the	government,	the	water	company	and	
the	consumer	 is	causally	 interrelated	to	the	 incoherent	power	and	money	flows	of	a	central	command	
political	regime.	Given	that,	Chapter	3	attempts	to	fill	the	gap	in	understanding	the	conceptual	triad	of	
power/money/water	through	defining	a	series	of	concepts	about	China’s	urban	tap	water	provision	system.	
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This	 conceptual	 triad	 of	 power/water/money	 nexus	 sheds	 a	 particular	 light	 on	 the	 macroscopic	
methodology	of	analysing	the	urban	water	supply	system.	However,	Swyngedouw	did	not	present	a	clear	
image	demonstrating	how	these	three	factors	function	in	specific	water	provision	system.	This	thesis	tries	
to	bridge	this	gap.	
When	taking	a	closer	look	to	this	conceptual	triad,	one	can	find	that	it	especially	fits	the	situation	of	tap	
water	 provision	 system	 in	 China,	 because,	 as	 has	 been	 highlighted	 before,	 China’s	 urban	 tap	 water	
provision	system	has	various	controversial	financial	and	regulation	issues,	reflected	in	the	incoherencies	
in	power/money/water	flows.	Even	though	some	of	these	problems	can	be	catalogued	into	more	specific	
classes,	such	as	the	problem	of	low	water	rates,	the	problem	of	standards,	the	problem	of	outdated	water	
treatment	equipment	and	so	on,	in	fact	these	problems	are	inextricably	linked	both	with	each	other	and	
with	the	three	main	agents	of	tap	water	provision	system:	the	government,	the	market	and	the	consumer.	
Therefore,	this	conceptual	triad	is	helpful	to	reveal	these	pivotal	links	in	the	tap	water	provision	system	as	
well	as	highlighting	the	importance	of	the	power/water/money	nexus	not	just	as	a	whole,	but	in	every	
single	systematic	section.	To	further	illustrate	this	concept,	the	theoretical	framework	in	Chapter	3	coined	
the	concept	of	the	Hybrid	Institutional	Architecture,	which	is	the	embodiment	of	this	power/water/money	
nexus.	
2.4 Consumer	and	tap	water	
So	 far,	 very	 little	 research	has	been	carried	out	on	 the	 relationship	between	consumer	and	 tap	water.	
However,	this	relationship	plays	a	vital	role	in	the	operation	of	urban	tap	water	provision	system.	To	have	
a	general	idea	about	this	relationship,	three	concepts	are	reviewed	in	this	section.	They	are	the	foundation	
of	the	Consumer	Coping	Strategy	Matrix,	an	essential	concept	coined	in	section	3.5.	
The	ordinariness	of	tap	water	
In	his	work,	Harvey	(2015,	p.1)	highlighted	an	 important	phenomenon:	the	consumer	seems	to	have	a	
sense	 that	domestic	 tap	water	 is	 characterised	by	 ‘taken-for-granted	 ready	availability.'	Moreover,	 this	
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sense	of	availability	is	the	root	of	another	consumer’s	sense,	the	‘ordinariness’	to	the	domestic	tap	water	
supply.	Most	consumers	recognise	the	water	flow	from	their	bathroom	taps	as	an	‘ordinariness’	in	daily	
lives,	though	they	may	know	little	about	the	exact	water	supply	system.	It	seems	true	to	them	that	only	
random	accidents	would	undermine	the	stability	of	such	a	system.	Harvey	emphasised	that	the	way	water	
develops	from	extraordinary	to	ordinary	is	simultaneously	a	process	in	which	water	is	manufactured	into	
an	all-purpose	water.	He	then	presents	the	case	studies	of	Delhi	and	Mexico	City	to	demonstrate	the	fact	
that	this	ordinariness	is	constructed	from	an	interaction	between	urban	tap	water	provision	system	and	
consumers.		
However,	there	is	another	problem	associated	with	the	ordinariness	of	tap	water.	If	the	tap	water	quality	
is	substandard,	then	the	ordinariness	of	the	tap	water	would	be	transformed	into	another	ordinariness:	
the	 consumer’s	 ordinariness	 and	 normalisation	 to	 the	 substandard	 tap	 water.	 Such	 transformation	 is	
crucial	in	understanding	the	consumer	coping	strategies	and	consumer’s	institutional	distrust	in	tap	water,	
which	will	be	analysed	furthermore	in	Chapter	3.	
Consumer	Coping	Strategy	
In	the	discussion	of	individualisation,	Beck	emphasised	that	the	changing	social	milieus	force	people	to	
become	their	centres	of	life	to	plan	and	conduct	their	plans	(Beck,	1992).	A	consumer	coping	strategy	can	
be	considered	as	a	good	reflection	of	this	argument.	To	explain	the	response	of	 Indian	citizens	to	their	
problematic	urban	water	supply	system,	Harvey	(2015,	p.17)	developed	the	concept	of	‘consumer	coping	
strategy’,	defining	it	as	a	series	of	actions	to	collect	water	from	different	sources	in	both	the	formal	and	
informal,	legal	and	illegal	ways		He	highlighted	that	the	internal	contradiction	of	the	coping	strategy	is	the	
interface	between	the	public	authority	and	the	privately	owned	property:	
The	 integrated	approach	moreover	highlights	aspects	which	may	be	overlooked:	public	
water	infrastructures	and	provision	of	tapwater	by	a	public	authority	are	complemented	
by	 privately	 owned	 domestic	 infrastructures,	 and	 the	 interface	 between	 the	 two	 (the	
transfer	of	control)	historically	has	often	been	highly	contentious	(Harvey,	2015,	p.10).	
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This	concept	highlights	two	important	factors:	first,	the	demand	for	water	cannot	be	compromised	even	
if	the	general	water	supply	system	is	flawed.	Second,	under	the	condition	of	the	first	factor,	the	consumers	
will	be	compelled	to	develop	strategies	for	accessing	potable	water.	This	concept	illustrates	the	consumer’s	
action	and	its	associated	influences	on	the	tap	water	provision	system	as	a	whole.	By	doing	so,	it	shifts	the	
vantage	point	from	the	discussion	about	the	performances	of	different	agents	in	the	water	supply	system	
to	consumers’	behaviours.	
In	Swyngedouw’s	(2004,	p.4)	analysis	of	the	power/money/water	nexus,	‘informal	struggles’	are	adopted	
by	the	powerless	local	tap	water	consumer	to	deal	with	their	problematic	water	supply.	This	is	an	analogic	
concept	of	‘copings	strategy.’	However,	there	is	an	essential	distinction	in	these	two	concepts:	the	‘informal	
struggle’	is	describing	activities	in	the	quest	for	control	over	water,	while	the	‘coping	strategies’	emphasise	
the	individual’s	behaviour	mode	in	reacting	to	the	other	agents’	control	over	the	water.	The	usage	of	such	
two	terms	can	be	told	from	two	sides	of	the	same	coin:	the	power	and	the	empowerment	of	controlling	
water.	The	‘informal	struggle’	emphasises	the	mobilisation	of	tap	water	consumer	who	tried	to	seize	the	
power	of	control	over	water	from	the	hand	of	governments;	the	 ‘coping	strategy’	asks	the	question	of	
when	consumers	are	powerless	compared	to	the	government	 in	controlling	over	water	resource,	what	
could	and	would	they	do	to	deal	with	the	problematic	tap	water?	In	other	words,	the	coping	strategy	can	
be	seen	as	a	peaceful	informal	struggle;	the	informal	struggle	can	be	seen	as	a	violent	or	pro-active	coping	
strategy.	
Moreover,	such	coping	strategy	may	exert	a	profound	 impact	on	the	development	of	the	water	supply	
system.	For	example,	Bakker	(2007,	p.1855)	concluded	in	her	case	study	of	Jakarta	that	those	residents	
who	were	not	bestowed	with	the	identity	of	‘citizen’	developed	alternatives	to	accessing	tap	water.	She	
believed	this	is	the	main	cause	that	promoted	the	fragmentation	of	the	water	supply	system,	which	is	not	
a	 top-down	 but	 a	 bottom-up	 driver.	 However,	 although	 she	 has	 witnessed	 the	 outcome	 of	 these	
alternatives	as	a	driver	of	fragmentation,	she	did	not	make	a	thorough	analysis	of	how	these	alternatives	
generate	such	influential	effects	on	driving	the	direction	of	the	development	of	tap	water	provision	system.		
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In	practical	perspective,	Michael	J	McGuire	(2004)	is	the	one	who	bestowed	‘boiled	water’	the	meaning	
equivalents	 to	 ‘coping	strategy’.	 In	his	blog	article,	he	defined	boiled	water	as	Chinese	 ‘individual	 safe	
drinking	water	solution’,	which	parallels	to	government’s	‘public	health	solution’.	With	discussion	about	
its	 incomprehensiveness,	 he	 argued	 that	 this	 is	 a	 phenomenon	 related	 to	 people’s	 distrust	 in	 water,	
whereas	 arguing	 that	 the	 cost	 of	 boiling	 water	 is	 huge	 in	 terms	 of	 energy	 consumption	 and	 waste	
generation.	His	article	has	 laid	bare	the	primitive	relationship	between	government,	consumer,	culture	
and	market	regarding	tap	water	provision.	However,	he	did	not	make	an	in-depth	exploration	on	how	such	
link	is	constituted	and	developed.	
In	sum,	to	present	a	comprehensive	understanding	of	the	consumer’s	position	and	their	behaviours,	it	is	
essential	 to	 examine	 this	 concept	 in	 specific	 cultural	 and	 political	 context.	 Therefore,	 in	 the	 following	
Chapter,	the	concept	of	Consumer	Coping	Strategy	Matrix	will	be	coined,	which	expands	the	concept	of	
consumer	coping	strategy	into	a	more	general	scope,	covering	not	only	consumer’s	behaviour,	but	also	
the	other	associated	strategic	arrangements	from	market	sphere.	
Consumer	Consumption	Work	
End	consumers	and	their	associated	work	have	been	studied	by	a	vast	and	growing	body	of	literature.	A	
series	of	terms,	such	as	consumer’s	self-service	(Pahl,	Wallace	and	Courtenay,	1986),	consumption	practice	
(Goss,	2006),	social	labour	(Anderson,	Hamilton	and	Tonner,	2016),	consumption	work	(Glucksmann,	2013)	
were	coined	and	delivered	by	scholars	from	various	fields,	especially	business	and	sociology.		
In	2004,	Sharon	Zukin	(2004)	pointed	out	in	her	book	the	consumer’s	work	for	smart	shopping.	However,	
she	did	not	present	a	comprehensive	analysis	to	such	‘work’	for	shopping,	neither	did	she	indicate	the	
work	 existing	 after	 consumption.	 Grounded	 by	 Zukin’s	 work,	 Jon	 Goss	 (2006)	 further	 elaborated	 the	
concept	of	work	of	consumption	in	its	commercial	context,	but	he	still	confined	his	analysis	to	a	practical	
level	rather	than	posting	it	into	a	bigger	picture	as	labour	division.	In	her	seminal	work	published	in	2009,	
Miriam	 Glucksmann	 (2009)	 firstly	 coined	 the	 concept	 of	 consumption	 work	 in	 the	 social	 context	 of	
renewed	economic	processual	social	labour	division.		
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Consumption	work	refers	to	the	labour	associated	with	the	consumption.	Glucksmann	(Glucksmann,	2013,	
p.2)		argued	that	goods	or	services	are	not	always	be	ready	to	be	used	when	their	ownership	shifts	from	
the	 seller	 to	 the	 consumer	 without	 further	 activities,	 enforcing	 consumers	 to	 be	 integrated	 into	 the	
provisioning	system	by	 implementing	these	activities.	Thus,	she	defines	consumption	work	as	 ‘all	work	
undertaken	by	consumers	necessary	 for	 the	purchase,	use,	 re-use	and	disposal	of	consumption	goods’	
(Glucksmann,	 2013,	 p.2).	 She	 further	 added	 that	 ‘the	 work	 of	 consumers	 includes	 a	 whole	 range	 of	
activities	both	before,	during	and	post-acquisition	of	goods	or	services	that	are	a	precondition	of	using	or	
appreciating	 them.	 Each	 good	 or	 service	 comes	 with	 its	 specific	 range	 of	 consumption	 work	 tasks’	
(Glucksmann,	 2013,	 p.10).	 She	 also	 pointed	 out	 that	 consumption	 works	 vary	 by	 different	 countries,	
cultures,	traditions	(Glucksmann,	2013,	p.7).	
Three	major	features	of	this	definition	have	been	highlighted	in	her	work:	first,	there	is	interdependent	
labour	 prior	 and	 after	 the	 purchase	 behaviour;	 second,	 the	 labour	 after	 the	 purchase	 should	 be	
distinguished	 from	 consumption;	 and	 third,	 the	 division	 of	 labour	 has	 been	 expanded	 from	 the	 paid	
employment	in	the	market	to	the	unpaid	labour	beyond	the	market.	Accordingly,	she	suggests	that	the	
role	 of	 the	 consumer	 should	 be	 revisited,	 and	 the	 notions	 of	 production	 and	 consumption	 should	 be	
modified.	
The	 concept	 of	 consumption	 work	 challenges	 the	 traditional	 understanding	 of	 division	 of	 labour.	
Glucksmann	(2009)	presented	an	analytical	framework	of	‘socio-economic	formations	of	labour’,	arguing	
that	besides	the	traditional	technical	division	of	labour,	there	are	division	of	labour	existing	in	and	between	
various	socio-economic	modals	and	the	processual	dimension	of	instituted	economic	process	composed	
of	four	transformations,	which	have	been	reviewed	in	section	2.2,	production,	exchange,	distribution	and	
consumption.	As	 she	 rightly	pointed	out,	 ‘work	does	not	 simply	disappear	when	 it	 shifts	across	 socio-
economic	boundaries’	 (Glucksmann,	2013,	p.5),	and	from	the	public	service	shifted	to	the	other	social	
agents	(Glucksmann,	2013,	p.18).	
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In	sum,	Glucksmann’s	work	restructured	the	concept	of	division	of	labour	in	a	modern	market	ecnonomy	
context,	shifting	and	expanding	the	attention	from	the	labour	generated	in	the	market	field	to	the	socio-
economic	labour	generated	both	in	and,	particularly,	between	economic	and	social	fields,	demonstrating	
that	these	labours	are	shaped	by	each	other	during	the	social	and	economic	processes.	Consumption	work,	
as	 she	emphasised,	 has	been	marginalised	 in	 the	 analysis	 of	 labour	division,	which	mainly	 focuses	on	
agents	in	the	context	of	market	relations	before	the	commodity	reaches	the	consumer.		
As	 she	 claimed,	 this	 theoretical	 framework	 is	 a	 preliminary	 one,	 demanding	 future	 exploration.	 For	
example,	she	argued	that	the	labour	division	is	partially	derived	from	the	shift	of	state’s	responsibility	to	
the	private	sector,	volunteer	sector	and	household	(Glucksmann,	2009).	However,	besides	the	overt,	active	
responsibility	shift	from	the	state	to	market,	which	initiates	the	latter’s	expansion	and	technology	reform,	
there	is	also	a	covert,	passive	production	responsibility	shifts	from	the	state	and	water	company	to	the	
consumer,	which	initiates	the	formation	of	Consumer	Coping	Strategy	Matrix	and,	as	a	consequence,	gives	
rise	to	the	booming	markets	of	bottled	water,	barrelled	water	and	domestic	water	filtration	equipment.	
As	will	be	explained	in	Chapter	3,	this	is	what	happens	in	China’s	tap	water	provision	system.		
Talking	about	tap	water	and	its	associated	consumption	work,	in	Glucksmann’s	conceptual	framework,	
the	consumption	work	related	to	tap	water	is	not	considered	significant	enough	to	be	counted	as	
consumer	work,	as	the	consumer	only	needs	to	turn	on	the	tap	(Glucksmann,	2013,	p.26).	Note	here	
that	there	are	different	types	of	labour	associated	with	water	in	homes,	but	in	this	thesis	the	
consumption	work	associated	with	tap	water	is	referring	explicitly	to	the	labour	embedded	in	the	
transformation	of	tap	water	into	potable	water,	not	the	household	services	that	are	delivered	through	
that	tap	water.	When	it	comes	to	China	and	many	other	developing	countries,	consumption	work	
associated	with	tap	water	provision	is	much	more	than	turning	on	the	tap.	This	consumption	work	is,	in	
essence,	the	coping	strategy	that	consumers	adopted	to	deal	with	the	semi-potable	tap	water.	As	will	be	
revealed	in	later	sections,	this	consumption	work	has	even	been	supported	by	the	state	government	for	
nearly	one	hundred	years	until	today.	Such	an	intersection	of	the	two	concepts	has	profound	
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implications	on	the	development	of	tap	water	provision	system	and	consumers’	institutional	distrust	in	
tap	water.	
In	this	thesis,	a	primary	focus	would	be	placed	on	the	shift	of	production	responsibility	from	state	and	
water	 company	 to	 the	 consumer,	 and	 the	 resulting	 constitution	 of	 Consumer	 Coping	 Strategy	Matrix.	
Together,	they	functioned	as	an	essential	condition	for	consumers’	institutional	distrust	in	tap	water.	
2.5 The	research	on	trust	
The	study	of	trust	has	received	considerable	attentions	from	studies	of	different	majors.	Most	research	
has	concerned	trust	at	both	individual	and	general	level.	
Trust	at	individual	level	
At	 the	 individual	 level,	 the	 study	of	 trust	 always	associates	with	other	 key	 factors,	 such	as	 leadership,	
knowledge,	rumour	transmission,	and	the	relationship	between	the	individual	and	other	entities.	Niclas	
Luhmann	 (1979)	 aimed	 to	 use	 trust	 as	 a	way	 to	 reveal	 the	highly	 abstract	 relations	 between	 self	 and	
environment.	He	argues	that	the	functional	analysis	did	not	build	the	connections	between	established	
data	and	knowledge,	but	to	take	into	account	the	increasing	social	complexity	of	the	space	and	time.	He	
argues	that	systems	want	to	have	different	alternatives	that	can	both	reduce	and	simplify	the	complexity	
they	meet,	so	as	to	maintain	their	inner	stabilities.	In	this	context,	he	believes	that	trust	can	be	explained	
as	 a	 dynamic	 process	 that	will	 both	 reduce	 the	 complexity	 and	 increase	 the	 risk	 of	 confronting	more	
complexity.		
Other	scholars	are	more	interested	in	to	what	extent	can	trust	influence	people’s	perception	and	reaction	
to	the	character	and	information	not	only	ascribed	to	other	people	(leader),	and	mediators	(knowledge,	
rumour,	tradition,	custom,	norm),	but	also	in	different	institutions	(organization,	group,	state	and	natural	
environment)	(Kramer	and	Cook,	2004;	Gurtman,	2004;	Meyer	and	Ward,	2009).		
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Another	 significant	 research	 tendency	 is	 to	 illuminate	 the	 interpersonal	 trust	 regarding	 economic	
rationality.	Since	trust	can	be	interpreted	as	anti-rationality	interaction,	at	the	same	time	it	demonstrates	
a	 strong	 willingness	 to	 take	 the	 risk	 of	 exposing	 the	 trustor’s	 weakness	 to	 the	 trustee	 either	 as	 a	
consequence	of	a	belief	in	a	partner’s	good	intent,	belief	in	their	competence	and	capability,	belief	in	their	
reliability,	or	belief	in	their	perceived	openness	(Nahapiet	and	Ghoshal,	1998).	Contrary	to	this,	James	S	
Coleman	(1994)	 indicates	that	the	elements	confronting	the	potential	 trustor	are	nothing	more	or	 less	
than	the	considerations	a	rational	actor	employed	in	deciding	whether	to	place	a	bet.	The	actor	knows	
how	much	may	be	lost	(the	size	of	the	bet),	how	much	may	be	gained	(the	amount	that	might	be	won),	
and	the	chance	of	winning.	He	premises	that	if	the	trustor	has	no	aversion	to	or	preference	for	risk,	it	is	a	
‘simple	matter’	for	him	to	decide	whether	to	place	the	bet.	Because	the	decision	could	be	simplified	as	
the	comparison	between	the	two	fractions:	the	chance	of	winning/chance	of	losing	and	the	amount	that	
would	be	lost/amount	that	would	be	won.	If	the	trustor	is	rational,	he/she	should	place	the	trust	over	the	
trustee.	 However,	 Coleman’s	 theory	 ignores	 an	 important	 question:	 how	 could	 people	 achieve	 the	
perception	 of	 what	 they	 will	 gain	 or	 lose	 before	 they	 place	 their	 trust	 over	 others	 and	 before	 such	
placement	generates	the	final	outcomes?	The	formulation	he	claimed,	if	they	truly	exist	in	people’s	minds,	
is	at	most	an	expectation	and	experience	stemming	from	people’s	personal	knowledge,	information	and	
the	institution	guaranteeing	the	safety	of	trust	placement.	
Parallel	to	Coleman’s	rational	choice	theory,	Herbert	A.	Simon	(1972)	established	the	theory	of	‘bounded	
rationality',	which	focused	on	the	perception	of	individuals	when	they	make	decisions.	As	argued	above,	
the	purely	rational	calculation	of	the	precise	gain	and	loss	of	bestowing	trust	over	others	is	difficult,	if	not	
impossible.	Given	that,	Simon	claimed	that	if	we	acknowledged	that	there	is	a	boundary	of	individual’s	
rationality,	 and	 if	 the	 precise	 prediction	 is	 displaced	by	 a	 feeling	 of	 satisfaction,	 the	 rationality	 choice	
theory	may	still	be	valid	in	explaining	the	individual’s	realistic	praxis.		
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Trust	at	general	level	
Trust	 at	 the	 organisational	 level	 has	 triggered	 the	 interests	 of	many	 for	 its	 close	 connection	with	 the	
business	management	and	market	order	building.	From	a	manager’s	point	of	view,	Chris	P.	Long	and	Sim	
B.	Sitkin	(2006)	analysed	the	relationship	between	task	control	and	trust–building	activities.	They	argue	
that	there	exists	a	dynamic	balance	between	the	control	and	the	trust	inside	the	body	of	a	company,	which	
exerts	significant	influence	upon	the	organisations’	performance.	Philip	Bromiley	and	Jared	Harris	(2006)	
critiqued	that	the	transaction	cost	economic	was	an	arbitrary	argument	on	the	combination	of	trust	and	
calculativeness.	They	argued	that	the	spillover	effect	of	business	to	the	social	relations	is	also	plausible	in	
the	reverse	direction.	
Many	scholars	argue	that	the	understanding	of	trust	should	be	embedded	in	a	more	general	framework	
to	 which	 different	 elements	 could	 be	 examined	 in	 certain	 historical-geophysical	 dimensions.	 Mark	
Granovetter	(2008)	acknowledged	the	idea	of	trust	as	a	social	mechanism	that	is	embodied	in	structures	
of	 social	 relations.	He	criticised	 that	 the	social	perspective	studies	 in	 trust	constitution	 in	 recent	years	
always	overweigh	their	moral	and	social	origins.	He	argued	that	the	reason	of	trust	could	be	explained	as	
the	comprehensive	outcome	of	influences	of	socially	constrained	contexts.	Sanjay	Banerjee,	Norman	E.	
Bowie	und	Carla	Pavone	(2006)	studied	the	ethical	value	of	the	general	recognition	and	agreement	of	the	
vulnerability	occurring	in	all	the	definitions	of	trust.	It	depends	on	the	specific	context,	as	they	argued,	
whether	the	trustee	should	be	judged	as	unethical	or	not,	in	living	up	to	the	trustor’s	expectation.	Mark	
Casson	and	Marina	Della	Giusta	(2004)	emphasized	the	function	of	 trust	 in	resource	distribution	while	
acknowledging	 its	 natural	 scarcity.	 They	 demonstrate	 that	 trust	 is	 both	 valuable	 in	 reducing	 the	
transactional	cost	and	the	reputation	building	on	the	basis	of	its	obligational,	emotional,	and	moral	basis.	
Here	it	is	necessary	to	highlight	the	relationship	between	trust	and	power,	which	is	always	considered	as	
an	important	theme	of	the	trust	between	person	and	organisation.	Bachmann	(2006)	argued	that	trust,	
similar	to	other	concepts	such	as	power,	functions	as	a	social	mechanism	that	allows	people	to	coordinate	
with	each	other	and	control	their	interactions.	He	argues	that	in	some	situations,	power	can	replace	trust	
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to	 initiate	 certain	 behaviours	 since	 it	 is	 a	 ‘combinable	 functional	 equivalents’	 to	 trust	 (Bachmann	 and	
Zaheer,	2006,	p.339).		
Different	forms	of	trust	and	power	can	constitute	different	mechanisms	of	combinations,	which	will	then	
have	different	effects	and	consequences	in	the	business	environment.	Russell	Hardin	(2002)	developed	
the	concept	of	‘encapsulated	interest’	account	of	trust,	emphasizing	the	influence	of	social	relations	on	
the	establishment	of	interpersonal	trust.	In	the	context	of	this	argument,	Henry	Farrell	(2004)	discussed	
the	logical	connections	between	trust,	distrust,	and	power.	He	has	two	major	arguments:	first,	in	certain	
circumstance,	power	will	drive	 trust	out	by	 ignoring	 the	 interests	of	people	who	have	 less	power	 into	
considerations	of	people	who	has	more	power.	Second,	if	the	powerful	person	is	not	powerful	enough	to	
violate	his/her	credible	commitments,	then	even	if	that	person’s	power	overweighs	the	power	of	the	other	
person,	the	trust	and	power	are	no	longer	‘mutually	exclusive’	as	they	are	in	the	first	argument	(Farrell,	
2004,	p.3).		
In	sum,	when	it	comes	to	the	institutional	analysis	of	consumer’s	trust/distrust	in	tap	water,	the	focus	on	
individual	choice,	individual	or	inter-individual	trust	is	not	the	focus	of	the	thesis	and	is	not	adequate	for	
theorising	trust	in	institutional	level.	To	understand	the	relationship	between	consumer,	power	and	tap	
water,	a	more	comprehensive	research	is	required.	
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 Theoretical	Framework	
3.1 Introduction	
Chapter	 1	 introduced	 the	 main	 research	 theme	 and	 research	 rationale	 of	 this	 thesis,	 outlining	 three	
subordinate	questions	and	the	main	research	question.	On	the	basis	of	the	literature	review	of	Chapter	2,	
this	chapter	aims	to	present	a	structure	about	the	conceptual	tools	and	apparatus	that	will	be	adopted	in	
the	analysis	of	later	case	studies.	In	so	doing,	the	framework	addresses	the	research	questions	outlined	in	
Chapter	1.		
The	 framework	 is	 formed	with	 seven	 interlocking	 concepts,	 which	will	 be	 explored	 in	 this	 chapter	 as	
follows:	
First,	the	definition	of	semi-potable	tap	water	was	presented	to	differentiate	the	quality	of	end	tap	water	
supplied	by	urban	tap	water	provision	system	from	the	quality	of	other	types	of	tap	water.		
Second,	this	thesis	will	adopt	a	holistic	research	perspective	and	two	institutional	analytical	dimensions	to	
examine	China’s	urban	tap	water	provision	system.	
Third,	given	a	holistic	research	perspective,	two	concepts,	Hybrid	Institutional	Architecture	and	‘source	to	
consumer’	urban	semi-potable	tap	water	provision	system,	are	coined	and	outlined.	This	thesis	argues	
that	the	circulation	of	power/money/water	flow	constitute	a	Hybrid	Institutional	Architecture,	which	leads	
to	two	inevitable	outcomes:	the	supply	of	semi-potable	tap	water,	and	the	implementation	of	Consumer	
Coping	Strategy	Matrix.		
Fourth,	 this	 thesis	 coined	 the	concept	of	Consumer	Coping	Strategy	Matrix,	outlining	 its	definition,	 its	
seven	facilitating	factors	and	consumer	stratification	based	on	it.	With	the	production	responsibility	shift,	
consumer	becomes	the	producer	of	potable	tap	water.	Through	Consumer	Coping	Strategy	Matrix,	they	
establish	a	‘consumer	to	sip’	potable	water	production	process.	
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Fifth,	with	introducing	the	concept	of	normalisation	and	the	re-enforcement	between	normalisations,	this	
thesis	argues	that	the	combination	of	‘source	to	consumer’	urban	semi-potable	tap	water	provision	system	
and	‘consumer	to	sip’	potable	water	production	process	has	formed	a	stable	and	self-balanced	‘source	to	
sip’	urban	potable	tap	water	provision	system.		
Sixth,	 in	 the	 context	 of	 consumer’s	 powerlessness	 and	 consumer’s	 dual	 identities,	 Consumer	 Coping	
Strategy	Matrix	is	by	itself	the	embodiment	of	consumer’s	institutionalised	distrust	in	semi-potable	tap	
water.		
Seventh,	this	thesis	argues	that	there	is	a	dialectic	relationship	between	Hybrid	Institutional	Architecture，	
Consumer	Coping	Strategy	Matrix,	and	water	crises.	On	the	one	hand,	they	are	keeping	a	balance	with	
each	other;	on	the	other,	they	also	mutually	stimulate	the	development	of	each	other.	Once	this	balance	
is	thrown	off	by	either	side,	a	sociogenic	water	sustainability	crisis	would	potentially	arise.	
3.2 The	definition	of	semi-potable	tap	water	
This	section	aims	to	answer	the	first	subordinate	question:	What	kind	of	tap	water	is	supplied	to	China’s	
tap	water	consumer?	To	answer	this	question,	this	section	coins	a	new	definition	for	the	tap	water	supplied	
from	China’s	urban	tap	water	provision	system.	
As	Swyngedouw	(2004)	pointed	out,	tap	water	has	been	bestowed	with	not	only	the	physical	and	chemical	
value	but	also	the	social	and	cultural	meaning.	Rather	than	being	considered	as	a	natural	substance	with	
purely	the	physical	function,	it,	in	fact,	is	a	compound	with	enriched	economic,	political,	cultural	and	social	
meanings.		
However,	many	 previous	 studies	 and	 government	 documents	 defined	 tap	water	 solely	 from	 technical	
perspective	 through	 various	 physical	 and	 chemical	 indicators	 and	 standards.	 For	 example,	 in	 China’s	
current	national	tap	water	standard,	the	Standards	for	Drinking	Water	Quality,	drinking	water	(include	tap	
water)	was	defined	as	the	water	used	for	people’s	livelihood	and	indoor	activities.	Another	essential	legal	
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document	regarding	urban	tap	water	provision,	the	Regulations	of	Urban	Water	Supply,	defines	tap	water	
as	 ‘the	water	 supplied	by	urban	 tap	water	 supply	enterprises	 through	public	water	pipeline	and	other	
associated	 facilities	 to	units	 and	 residents	 for	 their	 livelihoods.’	Other	 studies	presented	 several	much	
more	general	definitions,	not	including	tap	water	provision	but	also	sewage	treatment	and	all	activities	
related	to	water	(See	Xu,	1996;	Wang	Yali	and	Bi	Leqiang,	2011).	
Such	definitions	have	four	main	loopholes:	
First,	these	definitions	did	not	clarify	the	difference	between	the	outlet	tap	water	from	water	treatment	
plant	and	the	end	tap	water	received	by	domestic	tap	water	consumers	from	their	taps.	Such	‘negligence’	
failed	in	revealing	the	fact	that	the	aforementioned	two	types	of	tap	water	can	have	different	quality.	In	
some	cases,	the	outlet	tap	water,	namely	the	tap	water	that	has	been	treated	by	water	treatment	plant	
but	not	supplied	through	pipeline,	is	in	potable	quality,	whereas	the	end	tap	water,	namely	the	tap	water	
received	by	consumers	in	their	domestic	taps,	is	always	in	a	non-potable	quality.	This	is	due	to	the	fact	
that	there	is	a	contamination	risk	of	tap	water	in	pipeline	and	secondary	water	supply	facilities	(defines	in	
section	3.4).	They	are	both	considered	as	‘blind	spots’	in	many	previous	studies	(Cheng	et,al.,	2002;	Xu	
and	He,	2002;	Tong	and	Liu,	2005;	Zhang	et,	al.,	2005;	Chen,	2008).	In	other	words,	the	tap	water’s	quality	
varies	in	the	different	stages	of	tap	water	provision	system.	A	unified	tap	water	definition	cannot	reflect	
such	quality	difference	existing	in	tap	water	provision	system.	
Second,	 these	 definitions	 did	 not	 take	 into	 consideration	 about	 the	 influence	 of	 residual	 chemical	
compounds	in	tap	water,	such	as	residual	chlorine	and	its	by-products.	Currently,	most	water	treatment	
plants	in	China	use	chlorine	or	chlorine	dioxide	as	traditional	water	disinfection	method.	Through	chemical	
reaction	 in	 the	 water,	 they	 would	 generate	 hypochlorous	 acid	 and	 hypochlorite,	 which	 have	 strong	
oxidized	ability	that	can	eliminate	a	variety	of	bacteria	and	organic	pollutants.	In	those	water	treatment	
plants	who	cannot	afford	to	equip	advanced	treatment	apparatus,	this	is	their	only	disinfection	method	to	
disinfect	tap	water.	In	addition,	in	order	to	prevent	the	possible	bacteria	contamination	in	pipeline	and	
water	 tank,	 water	 treatment	 plants	 would	 add	 chlorine	 into	 the	 outlet	 water	 as	 well.	 However,	 this	
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traditional	water	disinfection	method	have	triggered	a	considerable	concern	on	the	toxicity	and	cancer	
risk	of	residual	chlorine	and	its	by-products	in	tap	water,	as	many	studies	have	already	revealed	(Morris	et	
al.,	1992;	Liu	and	Wan,	2005;	Wang,	2006;	Zhang,	et	al.,	2006;	Gopal	et	al.,	2007;	PANYAKAPO,	et	al.,	2008	).	
Besides	these	health	risks,	these	chemical	compounds	also	influence	the	palatability	of	tap	water.		
Third,	these	definitions	ignore	the	stance	of	tap	water	consumer,	who	is	the	end	user	of	tap	water.	Their	
perception	of	tap	water	quality	has	been	marginalised	in	the	general	discussion	of	China’s	tap	water	for	a	
long	time.	As	a	result,	the	discussion	of	tap	water	was	confined	in	a	context	of	tap	water	supply,	rather	
than	being	situated	in	a	more	general	and	practical	context	integrating	the	relationship	between	tap	water	
supply	and	tap	water	consumer.	Such	problem	has	been	highlighted	by	David	Harvey	(2001,	p.51):	
For	example,	‘resources’	can	be	defined	only	in	relationship	to	the	mode	of	production	
which	seeks	to	make	use	of	them	and	which	simultaneously	‘produces’	them	through	both	
the	 physical	 and	mental	 activity	 of	 the	 users.	 There	 is,	 therefore,	 no	 such	 thing	 as	 a	
resource	in	the	abstract	or	a	resource	which	exists	as	a	‘thing	in	itself’.	
In	 previous	 research	 on	 China’s	 tap	 water	 provision	 system,	 little	 attention	 has	 been	 placed	 on	 such	
relationship,	making	the	definition	of	tap	water	quality	a	stereotype	definition	incapable	of	reflecting	the	
dynamic	interaction	between	tap	water	provision	system	and	tap	water	consumer.	In	other	words,	as	has	
been	emphasised	in	section	2.4,	the	previous	studies	ignored	the	social	relations	between	consumer	and	
urban	tap	water	provision	system.	
Harvey’s	viewpoint	also	illustrates	the	fourth	loophole:	the	previous	way	of	defining	tap	water	ignores	the	
consumer’s	 physical	 and	 mental	 activities	 and	 their	 associated	 influence	 on	 tap	 water	 quality.	 In	 his	
concept	 of	 socio-natural	 unity,	 Swyngedouw	 (2004)	 emphasised	 that	 tap	 water	 is	 integrated	 into	 the	
composition	of	 the	social	 fabric,	as	 the	 tap	water	 resources	has	established	a	series	of	connections	 to	
consumer’s	livelihood,	establishing	the	unity	between	tap	water	and	consumer.	Behind	this	unity	are	social	
labours	that	have	been	spent	on	tap	water	production.	Similarly,	Ray	(2007)	pointed	out	that	in	primitive	
society	the	labour	of	fetching	water	is	significant,	occupying	a	large	share	of	people’s	daily	labour	time.	In	
today’s	tap	water	provision	system,	such	labour	was	dramatically	reduced,	but	not	eliminated.		
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For	example,	the	following	paragraph	described	a	typical	morning	of	numerous	Chinese	family:	when	a	
couple	gets	up	in	the	morning,	one	of	them	will	go	directly	to	the	kitchen,	turn	on	the	water	tap	and	fill	
their	kettle	up	with	tap	water,	then	put	the	kettle	on	the	gas	stove	and	light	the	fire.	At	this	period,	the	
other	person	has	washed	face	and	brushed	teeth.	He	or	she	will	come	to	the	kitchen	to	replace	his	or	her	
partner	so	as	the	latter	can	have	time	to	wash	face	and	brush	teeth.	Hearing	the	sound	of	water	boiling,	
he	or	she	turned	off	the	gas	stove	and	filled	the	large	thermos	bottle	with	newly	boiled	water.	This	special	
bottle	will	keep	the	tap	water	at	a	high	temperature	for	the	family’s	whole	day	consumption,	either	for	
drinking	or	for	brewing	tea	or	instant	coffee.		
Apparently,	the	above	description	contains	a	series	of	works,	and	if	considering	the	couple	as	tap	water	
consumers,	these	works	are	their	consumption	work	to	achieve	potable	water	from	tap	water.	Introduced	
in	 section	 2.4,	 the	 concept	 of	 consumption	 work	 was	 considered	 as	 consumer’s	 physical	 and	mental	
activity	and	social	labour	to	make	use	of	the	commodity	they	have	purchased	(Glucksmann,	2013,	p.2).	
When	this	commodity	is	a	‘resource,'	consumer	then	becomes	the	user	of	resource,	and	their	consumption	
work	becomes	part	of	 the	production	process	of	 tap	water.	Similarly,	as	 introduced	 in	 section	2.4,	 the	
consumer	coping	strategy	is	a	series	of	actions	to	collect	potable	water	from	different	sources	in	both	the	
formal	and	informal,	legal	and	illegal	ways.	When	the	tap	water	supplied	by	the	tap	water	provision	system	
cannot	be	drunk	directly,	consumers	then	would	have	to	find	strategies	to	cope	this	problem.	As	Kathryn	
Wheeler	and	Miriam	Glucksmann	(2016,	p.46)	have	pointed	out,	‘consumption	work	determines	what	is	
actually	consumed.’	Previous	definitions	of	tap	water	failed	in	revealing	the	difference	between	tap	water	
with	and	without	being	treated	with	consumption	work	and	consumer	coping	strategy.	
Therefore,	 with	 taking	 consumption	 work	 and	 consumer	 coping	 strategy	 into	 consideration,	 a	 new	
perspective	is	constituted.	It	is	necessary	to	present	a	new	definition	of	tap	water	from	this	perspective.	
From	 consumer’s	 perspective,	 the	 tap	water	 analysed	 in	 this	 thesis	 is	 classified	 into	 two	 types:	 semi-
potable	tap	water	and	potable	tap	water.	Urban	tap	water	is	supplied	from	certain	water	sources,	treated	
through	water	treatment	plant,	conducted	through	tap	water	pipeline	and	secondary	water	supply	facility	
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and	finally	reaches	the	tap	of	domestic	tap	water	consumer	living	in	urban	area.	Accordingly,	semi-potable	
tap	water	is	defined	in	this	thesis	as	the	tap	water	supplied	from	a	‘source	to	consumer’	urban	semi-tap	
water	provision	system	with	a	semi-potable	quality	that	demands	additional	treatments	to	have	a	potable	
quality.	 The	 tap	 water	 that	 has	 been	 treated	 by	 the	 consumer	 through	 additional	 treatment	 to	 have	
potable	quality	is	defined	as	the	potable	tap	water.	In	other	words,	semi-potable	tap	water	is	the	tap	water	
treated	by	urban	tap	water	provision	system	and	supplied	to	the	consumer,	whereas	potable	tap	water	is	
the	former	tap	water	that	being	treated	by	the	consumer	again	through	consumer	coping	strategies.		
However,	since	urban	tap	water	has	such	intricate	connection	with	the	individual’s	life,	a	simple	distinction	
is	far	to	be	sufficient.	Unlike	many	other	environmental	resources,	water	resources	has	experienced	a	long	
history	of	multiple	complex	technical,	social	and	cultural	transformations.	It	is	also	highly	symbolized	in	
various	forms	in	the	context	of	different	societies.	Functionally	speaking,	there	are	two	major	factors	that	
shape	the	development	of	the	urban	tap	water	provision	system:	the	population	growth	and	the	process	
of	urbanization.	The	dynamic	interactions	of	such	two	factors	pave	the	way	for	the	water	to	be	transformed	
from	natural	substance	to	domestic	necessity.	Such	a	way	of	conceptualizing	tap	water	from	object	sphere	
to	notion	sphere	is	simultaneously	a	way	of	stripping	water	from	the	natural	environment	and	embedding	
it	physically	and	theoretically	into	the	environment	of	‘second	nature,'	where	the	artificial	is	built	upon	
the	natural	(Cronon,	2009).	
3.3 Institutional	analysis:	from	source	to	sip	
As	has	been	explored	in	section	2.2,	Harvey	(2005)	presented	a	‘source	to	sip’	holistic	research	perspective	
of	 institutional	 analysis	 in	 his	 theoretical	 framework	 Instituted	 Economic	 Process.	 In	 section	 2.3,	
Swyngedouw	 (2004)	 presented	 a	 framework	 for	 analysing	 the	 power/money/water	 nexus.	 This	 thesis	
adopted	these	two	concepts	to	present	a	holistic	research	perspective	of	China’s	urban	tap	water	provision	
system	on	the	basis	of	power/money/water	nexus.		
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Although	extensive	studies	have	been	carried	out	on	China’s	urban	tap	water	provision	system,	few	studies	
present	a	holistic	optic	angle	to	examine	the	operation	of	the	whole	system.	Much	of	the	research	up	to	
now	has	been	descriptive,	and	restricted	its	analysis	in	the	limited	scope	of	certain	laws,	rules,	regulations	
and	policies	(Pu,	2005;	Shen	and	Jiang,	2005;	Xu,	2006;	Huang	et	al.,	2006;	Cosier	and	Shen,	2009;	Sun,	
Speed	and	Shen,	2013).	Few	studies	to	date	have	explored	the	complex	interactions	and	links	between	
various	agents	in	the	whole	system,	especially	the	link	between	the	other	agents	and	tap	water	consumer,	
which	 resulted	 in	 a	 failure	 to	 illuminate	 the	 inherent	 conflicts	 that	 have	 profoundly	 influenced	 the	
development	of	China’s	urban	tap	water	provision	system.		
In	light	of	the	concept	of	power/money/water	nexus,	this	section	considers	each	agent	in	China’s	urban	
tap	water	provision	system	as	a	power/money/water	nexus.	Except	central	government,	all	of	the	other	
agents	are	both	the	receiver	of	the	flows	of	either	power,	money	or	water	sending	from	the	other	agents	
and	the	sender	of	new	flows	of	either	power,	money	or	water.	The	central	government	was	the	source	of	
power/money	flow,	and	water	environment	was	the	source	of	water	flow.	
Together,	 all	 these	 nexuses	 establish	 the	 channels	 for	 the	 flow	 of	 power/money/water.	 By	 illustrating	
functions	of	these	agents	and	relationships	between	them,	this	section	reveals	that	the	urban	tap	water	
provision	 system	 is	 a	 socio-physical	 construction	 that	 is	 produced	 by	 both	 socio-political	 content	 and	
physical-environmental	qualities	(Swyngedouw,	2009;	Harvey,	2015).	Rather	than	being	a	simple	product	
of	a	series	of	physical	treatment	processes	depending	solely	on	technology,	tap	water	is	in	fact	predicated	
on	a	series	of	interactions	between	agents	with	different	socio-political	and	biophysical	background.	
In	this	context,	this	thesis	argues	that	China’s	urban	tap	water	provision	system	is	a	combination	of	‘source	
to	 consumer’	 urban	 semi-potable	 tap	 water	 provision	 system	 and	 ‘consumer	 to	 sip’	 potable	 water	
production	process.	In	the	former	system,	various	agents	functioning	as	nexuses	of	power/money/water	
flow	have	constituted	a	Hybrid	Institutional	Architecture.	This	can	be	seen	as	a	reflection	of	the	instinctive	
‘hybrid’	characteristic	of	water	(Swyngedouw,	2006,	p.5).	Consequently,	this	system	is	only	able	to	supply	
semi-potable	tap	water	to	the	consumer.	To	cope	with	such	semi-potable	tap	water,	tap	water	consumer	
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is	playing	an	essential	role	in	‘consumer	to	sip’	potable	water	production	process,	becoming	the	potable	
water	producer	for	their	potable	water	through	Consumer	Coping	Strategy	Matrix	(its	definition	will	be	
given	in	the	next	section).	It	is	because	of	the	existence	of	such	‘consumer	to	sip’	potable	water	production	
process	 that	 China’s	 ‘source	 to	 consumer’	 urban	 semi-potable	 tap	 water	 provision	 system	 can	 be	
compensated	into	a	‘source	to	sip’	urban	potable	tap	water	provision	system.	
3.4 ‘Source	 to	 consumer’	 urban	 semi-potable	 tap	
water	 provision	 system:	 Hybrid	 Institutional	
Architecture	
	
Figure	3.1:	‘Source	to	consumer’	urban	semi-potable	tap	water	provision	system	
This	 section	 aims	 to	 answer	 the	 second	 subordinate	 question:	What	 kind	 of	 system	 is	 supplying	 the	
aforementioned	tap	water?	To	answer	this	question,	in	a	holistic	perspective,	Figure	3.1	demonstrates	a	
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‘source	to	consumer’	urban	semi-potable	tap	water	provision	system	and	its	main	agents.	Here,	‘source	to	
consumer’	urban	semi-potable	tap	water	provision	system	is	defined	as	a	semi-potable	urban	tap	water	
provision	system	that	excludes	consumers	and	their	associated	influences	and	functions.	Different	from	
previous	ways	of	studying	urban	tap	water	provision	system,	the	concept	of	‘source	to	consumer’	urban	
semi-potable	tap	water	provision	system	is	established	on	the	basis	of	two	essential	acknowledgements:	
the	acknowledgement	of	the	idea	of	semi-potable	tap	water	and	the	acknowledgement	of	the	consumer’s	
role	and	function	in	the	urban	tap	water	provision	system.		
Taking	a	closer	look	at	this	system,	the	circulations	of	power/money/water	flow	between	different	nexus	
can	 be	 captured.	 From	 source	 to	 consumer,	 there	 are	 (at	 least)	 16	 agents	 functioning	 as	
power/money/water	 nexuses	 in	 it.	 They	 have	 formed	 a	 complicated	Hybrid	 Institutional	 Architecture,	
shown	in	Figure	3.2.		
In	this	thesis,	the	Hybrid	Institutional	Architecture	is	defined	as	an	institutional	architecture	of	China’s	
urban	tap	water	provision	system	that	composed	by	different	nexuses	with	hybrid	characteristics	of	
power	(political	status),	money	(economic	benefits)	and	water	(obligation	of	providing	tap	water).	All	
together,	these	different	nexuses	encapsulate	the	institutional	incoherencies	in	power/money/water	
flow.	It	can	be	seen	as	a	practical	reflection	of	the	two	concepts	that	have	been	reviewed	in	previous	
Chapter:	the	Swyngedouw’s	concept	of	‘the	nexus	of	power/money/water’	(reviewed	in	section	2.3),	the	
Harvey’s	holistic	analytical	perspective	‘Instituted	Economic	Process’	(reviewed	in	section	2.2)	and	
Bakker’s	argument	of	‘market	failure’	and	‘governance	failure’	(reviewed	in	section	2.2).	It	the	core	and	
foundation	of	China’s	‘source	to	sip’	urban	semi-potable	tap	water	provision	system.		
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Figure	 3.2:	 Hybrid	 Institutional	 Architecture	 of	 ‘source	 to	 consumer’	 urban	 semi-potable	 tap	 water	
provision	system	(also	see	figure	3.9	for	the	meaning	of	?)	
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As	shown	in	Figure	3.2,	source	water	(either	surface	water	or	groundwater)	is	extracted	from	the	water	
source	 located	 in	 a	 water	 environment.	 It	 then	 was	 sent	 to	 the	 aqueduct	 of	 one	 or	 more	 hydraulic	
constructions	(such	as	a	reservoir	and	water	transfer	project).	
In	 this	process,	 the	worst	problem	 is	water	pollution,	which	has	been	transferred	to	the	surface	water	
body	and	groundwater	resource.	Even	though	water	environment	and	water	source	are	always	located	in	
nature	reserve	that	under	the	protection	of	the	local	government,	fresh	water	resources	in	China	is	still	
being	seriously	polluted.	This	will	be	demonstrated	in	section	4.2	in	detail.	These	transferred	pollutions	
would	be	further	conveyed	with	source	water	through	the	hydraulic	construction	to	water	treatment	plant.	
When	the	source	water	is	conveyed	into	water	treatment	plant,	it	would	be	treated	with	a	water	treatment	
protocol	that	consists	four	conventional	processes:	coagulation,	sedimentation,	filtration	and	disinfection.	
This	protocol	has	been	adopted	in	hundreds	of	years	in	China	(McGuire,	2006)(Also	see	section	3.5.3	for	
more	detailed	analysis).	In	some	developed	cities	such	as	Beijing,	source	water	would	be	further	treated	
by	advanced	treatment	technology.	The	outlet	water	 from	the	water	 treatment	plant	should	meet	 the	
national	 tap	water	 standard	and	 is	 conveyed	 through	 the	pipeline	 to	different	urban	areas	 for	 various	
usages.	The	water	conveyed	 to	 the	domestic	 tap	water	consumers	 is	end	 tap	water.	Given	 the	various	
building	height,	tap	water	sometimes	needs	to	be	pressurised	by	secondary	water	supply	facility	to	reach	
the	domestic	tap	water	consumers	living	on	high	floors.		
Here	it	is	worth	to	provide	an	explanation	about	these	facilities.	There	are	two	types	of	secondary	water	
supply	facility:	water	tank	and	variable	frequency	pumps.	Some	buildings	install	either	of	the	two;	some	
install	 both.	 The	 variable	 frequency	pump	 transforms	 electric	 power	 into	 extra	pressure	 and	pulls	 the	
water	to	high	floors	directly	from	either	the	pipeline	or	water	tanks.	The	water	tank	is	located	on	the	roof	
of	the	building.	Sometimes	there	are	several	water	tanks	stored	on	different	floors	of	the	building.	They	
use	the	pull	force	generated	either	by	the	pumps	or	the	gravity	to	create	proper	tap	water	pressure	for	
domestic	consumers.	Since	in	water	tanks	tap	water	is	keeping	in	still,	there	is	a	risk	of	bacteria	pollution	
inside	these	water	tanks.		
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In	the	end,	tap	water	reaches	domestic	consumer’s	tap.	However,	what	happened	after	it	has	long	been	
ignored	and	normalised.	So	far	as	the	current	author	has	known,	no	previous	research	has	examined	the	
consumption	 behaviours	 of	 China’s	 tap	 water	 consumers,	 not	 to	 mention	 revealing	 their	 distinctive	
Consumer	Coping	Strategy	Matrix.	This	has	been	shown	through	‘question	mark’	in	Figure	3.2.	To	unravel	
this	question	mark,	the	concept	of	Consumer	Coping	Strategy	Matrix	and	‘consumer	to	sip’	potable	water	
production	process	will	be	coined	in	section	3.5.	
As	 shown	 in	 the	 Figure	 3.2,	 these	 aforementioned	 seven	 agents	 are	 in	 general	 administered	 by	 nine	
departments:	 Municipal	 Environmental	 Protection	 Bureau	 (MEPB),	 Municipal	 Water	 Affair	 Bureau	
(MWAB),	Municipal	Commission	of	Housing	and	Urban-Rural	Development	(MCHURD),	Water	Company,	
Municipal	Government,	Ministry	of	Water	resources	(MWR),	Ministry	of	Environmental	Protection	(MEP),	
Ministry	of	Housing	and	Urban-Rural	Development	(MHURD)	and	Central	Government.		
MEPB	is	in	charge	of	water	environment,	whereas	MWAB	is	in	charge	of	all	the	other	agents	in	the	urban	
tap	water	provision	system.	However,	as	shown	in	Figure	3.2	by	the	dotted	line	derived	from	MEPB,	the	
power	boundaries	of	the	above	two	departments	blurred	in	water	source	administration,	which	can	either	
be	considered	as	part	of	water	environment	or	not.	For	example,	the	waste	generated	by	the	local	people	
can	be	dumped	in	the	bank	of	the	lake,	where	the	administration	can	be	assigned	to	either	bureau.	
As	shown	in	Figure	3.2,	Municipal	Government	bestows	its	local	water	companies	the	right	of	building	and	
operating	water	treatment	plants	and	charging	water	rates	from	tap	water	consumers,	forming	the	money	
flow	 from	 consumer	 to	 the	water	 company.	 In	many	 cases,	 these	water	 companies	 are	 State-Owned-
Enterprise	 (SOE).	 In	 some	 cases,	 they	 are	 privately	 owned	 or	 supported	 by	 private	 capital,	 and	 the	
municipal	 government	 would	 sign	 concession	 contracts	 such	 as	 BOT	 (Building-Operation-Transfer)	
contract	 or	 PPP	 (Public-Private-Partnership)	 contract	 with	 them.	 All	 water	 companies	 need	 to	 submit	
sewage	treatment	fee	and	water	resources	fee	to	the	government,	forming	another	money	flow	from	the	
water	company	to	the	municipal	government.	Given	urban	water	supply	regulation,	tap	water	consumers	
must	sign	a	water	supply	contract	with	the	local	water	company	and	pay	their	water	rates	on	a	regular	
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basis.	With	the	fixed	profit	rate	decided	by	the	municipal	and	provincial	governments,	water	rates	is	the	
major	(sometimes	the	only)	income	for	many	water	company	to	keep	its	business	in	operation.	
However,	in	all	cases,	these	water	companies	are	not	operated	independently.	They	must	operate	under	
the	 supervision	 and	 administration	 of	 either	 Municipal	 Commission	 of	 Housing	 and	 Urban-Rural	
Development	(MCHURD)	or	MWAB,	depending	on	whether	the	 local	municipal	government	has	set	up	
MWAB	and	handed	over	it	the	administration	power.	
The	management	of	secondary	water	facility	is	varying	by	cities.	Owing	to	the	lack	of	appropriate	policies	
and	regulations,	it	is	managed	either	by	the	water	company,	MCHURD	or	the	resident	community	service	
company.	This	is	the	reason	why	all	power	and	money	flows	it	connected	are	in	dotted	line.	This	situation	
is	further	complicated	in	recent	years	by	the	incomplete	reform	of	the	integrated	administration	of	water	
affairs.	 Its	problematic	management	also	contributes	much	to	the	quality	deterioration	between	outlet	
tap	water	and	end	tap	water.		
Given	the	goal	of	the	Super-Ministry	reform,	urban	tap	water	provision	system	is	solely	administrated	by	
the	local	municipal	government.	As	shown	in	Figure	3.2,	municipal	government	is	the	only	department	
that	 keeps	 the	power/money	 flow	 from	 central	 government	 to	manage	urban	water	 affairs.	However,	
given	 the	 ambiguous	 power	 boundaries	 and	 institutional	 inertia,	MWR,	MEP,	 and	MHURD	 also	 keep	
certain	power	to	influence	municipal	government’s	administration.	Therefore,	all	three	of	them	impose	
power	flow	to	municipal	government,	reflecting	as	the	dotted	lines	connecting	them	and	power/money	
flow	between	central	government	and	municipal	government.	However,	among	these	three	departments,	
two	 institutional	 incoherencies	 in	 power	 flow	 can	 be	 observed.	 The	 first	 institutional	 incoherency	 is	
between	MHURD	and	MWR;	the	second	is	between	MEP	and	MWR.	These	will	be	highlighted	in	the	next	
chapter.	Meanwhile,	 since	 local	municipal	 government	became	 the	only	administration	department	of	
urban	 tap	water	provision	 system,	 there	 is	 a	 risk	of	 distrust	between	 local	municipal	 government	 and	
central	 government,	 especially	when	 the	 former	 tries	 to	 fraud	 the	 latter	during	water	 crises.	 This	was	
reflected	in	the	case	study	in	Chapter	5.		
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The	aforementioned	two	institutional	incoherencies	in	power	flow	have	been	transmitted	from	ministerial	
level	to	municipal	 level.	Thus,	the	administration	conflict	between	the	MEPB	and	MWAB	is	reflected	in	
administration	conflict	between	MCHURD	and	MWAB.	As	shown	in	Figure	3.2,	the	former	incoherency	is	
mainly	 about	 the	 ambiguous	 power	 boundary	 on	 water	 source	 administration,	 which	 can	 be	 either	
administrated	 by	 MEPB	 or	 by	 MWAB.	 The	 latter	 incoherency	 is	 primarily	 about	 the	 incoherent	
administration	of	water	treatment	plant,	pipeline,	water	company,	and	secondary	water	supply	facility.	
Given	 each	 municipality’s	 different	 condition,	 these	 facilities	 are	 either	 administrated	 by	 MWAB	 or	
MCHURD.	All	these	four	power	flow	incoherencies	will	be	analysed	again	in	Chapter	4	and	demonstrate	in	
a	case	study	in	Chapter	5	and	6.	
As	shown	in	Figure	3.2,	 in	current	urban	tap	water	provision	system,	the	third	party,	such	as	NGO	and	
Industrial	 Association,	 failed	 in	 bridging	 the	 power	 and	 information	 gap	 between	 Hybrid	 Institutional	
Architecture	and	tap	water	consumer,	reflecting	another	institutional	incoherency	in	power	flow.	Effective	
independent	supervisions	of	government	and	water	company’s	work	are	also	absented.	Many	of	the	third	
parties	are	significantly	marginalised	regarding	power	and	money,	whereas	others	have	chosen	to	combine	
their	 interests	 with	 the	 interests	 of	 certain	 government	 agents	 and/or	 water	 companies.	 This	 will	 be	
highlighted	again	in	section	4.3.5.	
In	sum,	because	of	the	intricate	relationships	between	all	agents,	China’s	urban	tap	water	provision	system	
can	be	considered	as	a	Hybrid	Institutional	Architecture.	Although	the	specific	conditions	of	each	city	are	
different,	 the	 centre	 of	 this	 Hybrid	 Institutional	 Architecture	 is	 always	 the	 combination	 of	 the	 water	
company,	government	departments,	water	treatment	plants	and	(sometimes)	hydraulic	projects.		
The	 power/money/water	 flows	 and	 the	Hybrid	 Institutional	 Architecture	 are	 causally	 interrelated	 and	
mutually	 strengthened.	 It	 is	 the	 circulation	 of	 flows	 of	 power/money/water	 that	 form	 the	 policy	
framework	 and	 financial	 energy	 of	 Hybrid	 Institutional	 Architecture,	 and	 it	 is	 the	 Hybrid	 Institutional	
Architecture	that	channeled	the	circulation	of	flows	of	power/money/water.	
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However,	because	of	these	institutional	incoherencies	in	power/money/water	flows,	each	agent	in	Hybrid	
Institutional	Architecture	has	their	limited	conditions	and	problems	respectively.	In	addition,	given	their	
interconnections,	they	also	have	several	‘hybrid	problems’	-	problems	that	related	to	multiple	agents.	This	
will	be	reflected	in	the	case	study	of	Chapter	6.	All	together,	these	hybrid	problems	lead	to	the	emergence	
of	two	inevitable	outcomes:	the	supply	of	semi-potable	tap	water	and	the	implementation	of	Consumer	
Coping	Strategy	Matrix.	As	the	result	of	these	two	outcomes,	rather	than	being	a	‘source	to	sip’	potable	
tap	water	provision	system,	China’s	urban	tap	water	provision	system	is	in	effect	a	‘source	to	consumer’	
semi-potable	tap	water	provision	system.	It	is	with	the	consumer’s	effort	in	producing	their	potable	tap	
water	by	themselves	that	makes	this	system	looks	like	a	‘source	to	sip’	potable	tap	water	provision	system.	
This	well	is	analysed	in	detail	in	the	next	section.	
3.5 Consumer	 Coping	 Strategy	 Matrix	 and	
‘consumer	to	sip’	potable	tap	water	production	
process	
This	section	aims	to	answer	the	third	subordinate	research	question:	what	are	the	consumer’s	reactions	
and	responses	in	the	aforementioned	tap	water	and	tap	water	provision	system?	To	answer	this	question,	
the	concept	of	Consumer	Coping	Strategy	Matrix	and	its	seven	facilitating	factors	are	defined	to	reflect	
consumer’s	reactions	to	the	‘source	to	consumer’	urban	semi-potable	tap	water	provision	system,	whose	
production	responsibility	and	power	are	shifted	to	‘consumer	to	sip’	potable	water	production	process.	
Centring	around	the	concept	Consumer	Coping	Strategy	Matrix,	there	also	has	a	consumer	stratification.	
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3.5.1 Shifted	potable	water	production	responsibility	
	
Figure	3.3:	The	economic	stance	and	anthropological	stances	of	water	production	
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As	 shown	 in	 Figure	3.3,	by	 implementing	 the	 certain	 tap	water	 coping	 strategy,	 consumers	have	been	
deeply	 integrated	 into	 the	 process	 of	 potable	 tap	 water	 production.	 If	 inspecting	 the	 whole	 Hybrid	
Institutional	Architecture	from	an	economic	stance,	it	can	be	divided	into	four	phases:	water	appropriation,	
water	 production,	 water	 distribution	 and	 water	 consumption.	Water	 production	 is	 merely	 one	 phase	
among	the	four	and	happened	only	 in	water	treatment	plant.	However,	 if	 inspecting	the	whole	Hybrid	
Institutional	Architecture	from	anthropological	stance,	the	production	process	can	be	seen	as	a	dynamic	
process	that	always	keep	the	quality	of	certain	commodity	in	change.	Likewise,	the	distribution	process	
can	be	seen	as	a	dynamic	process	that	always	keep	the	ownership	of	certain	commodity	in	change.	From	
this	stance,	there	is	a	whole	process	production	and	distribution	mechanism	operated	by	multiple	agents.	
As	shown	in	Figure	3.3,	in	this	mechanism	all	five	agents,	hydraulic	construction,	water	treatment	plant,	
pipeline,	secondary	water	supply	facility	and	consumer,	are	functioning	both	as	the	distributor	and	the	
producer	of	tap	water,	since	their	activities	have	changed	both	the	quality	and	ownership	of	tap	water	at	
the	same	time.	
This	can	also	be	seen	as	a	restructure	of	traditional	labour	division.	Using	semi-potable	tap	water	as	their	
‘raw	material,'	 consumers	 are	using	 their	 unpaid	 labour	 in	 the	 form	of	 consumption	work	 and	 coping	
strategy	to	produce	a	new	product.	They	are	both	the	producer	and	consumer	of	their	commodity:	the	
potable	tap	water.	In	fact,	this	production	process	even	has	been	acknowledged	by	the	government	for	a	
long	time,	evidenced	by	the	case	study	of	Harbin	in	Chapter	5.	
Along	 with	 this	 whole	 process	 water	 production	 and	 distribution	 mechanism,	 certain	 production	
responsibility	 is	 shifted	 from	the	other	agents	 in	 the	Hybrid	 Institutional	Architecture	to	 the	tap	water	
consumer.	As	Glusksmann	(2013,	p.24)	has	clearly	pointed	out:	
The	rhetoric	of	the	‘responsible’	individual	(whether	consumer,	citizen,	patient,	worker,	
parent)	suggests	a	further	cascading	down	and	spreading	of	‘responsibilisation’,	as	part	of	
the	process	of	‘devolving’	power	and	responsibilities	to	the	lowest	level	so	people	become	
‘take	ownership	of’	and	become	responsible	in	part	for	their	own	outcomes.	There	are	
clear	parallels	between	the	shift	of	tasks	or	responsibilities	from	the	public	sector	to	the	
citizen	and	the	market	sector	to	the	consumer,	but	these	need	to	be	investigated	much	
further.	
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The	shift	of	water	production	responsibility	is	exactly	the	‘shift	of	tasks	or	responsibilities	from	the	public	
sector	to	the	citizen’	mentioned	in	the	above	quotation.	Here,	one	of	the	differences	between	the	two	
types	(public	section	and	market)	of	shifts	is	that	the	responsibility	shift	in	public	section	is	coming	along	
with	a	‘power	share’.	For	example,	consumers	will	share	the	power	of	building	water	supply	facilities	with	
government	in	the	context	of	fragmented	tap	water	supply	or	non-central	water	supply.	All	these	facilities	
will	function	as	coping	strategy	to	fragmented	tap	water	distribution	and	semi-potable	tap	water.	However,	
in	 the	 context	 of	 central	water	 supply,	 the	 power	 of	 building	 self-built	water	 supply	 facility	would	 be	
deprived	by	the	government,	making	consumers	only	depend	on	other	consumer	coping	strategies.	The	
Harbin’s	 first	sociogenic	water	sustainability	crisis	 is	an	example,	which	will	be	analysed	 in	section	5.3,	
Chapter	5.	
Since	consumers	have	normalised	the	existence	of	Consumer	Coping	Strategy	Matrix,	they	would	not	have	
a	self-awareness	of	about	their	production	responsibility.	Moreover,	to	a	large	extent,	the	whole	process	
of	water	 production	 and	 distribution	mechanism	 also	 disguises	 the	 irresponsibility	 of	 other	 agents	 in	
Hybrid	 Institutional	 Architecture.	What’s	more,	 this	mechanism	 further	 intensifies	 the	marginalisation	
consumers	 have	 suffered	 from	 Hybrid	 Institutional	 Architecture.	 In	 conclude,	 the	 power	 attached	 to	
consumer	identity	is,	to	a	large	extent,	being	deprived	and	repressed	at	the	moment	when	their	identities	
being	transferred	 into	a	mixture	of	consumer	and	producer	of	 their	commodity.	A	detailed	case	about	
power	and	responsibility	shift	will	be	presented	in	section	5.3.1.	
3.5.2 The	definition	of	Consumer	Coping	Strategy	Matrix	
To	 date,	 there	 has	 been	 no	 research	 discussing	 the	missing	 link	 between	 the	 semi-potable	 tap	water	
received	by	China’s	tap	water	consumers	and	the	potable	tap	water	produced	by	them.	Many	research	
ignored	consumer	by	 simply	 classifying	all	 consumer-related	 issues	as	 the	dissatisfaction	of	 ‘tap	water	
service’	(Wan,	2002;	Dong	and	Wang,	2013).	However,	what	is	behind	this	link	is	much	more	complicated	
than	consumer’s	dissatisfaction.	There	is	huge	research	gap	around	consumers	that	that	deserves	an	in-
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depth	examination.	As	Daniel	Welch	(2017)	has	rightly	pointed	out,	‘consumption	norms	and	routines	are	
thus	critical	to	the	formation	of	economies.’	
	
Figure	3.4:	The	composition	of	Consumer	Coping	Strategy	Matrix	and	its	seven	facilitating	factors	
As	 shown	 in	错误!	未找到引用源。,	 on	 the	 basis	 of	 the	 definition	 of	 consumer	 coping	 strategy	 and	
consumption	work	(both	introduced	in	section	2.4),	this	thesis	defines	Consumer	Coping	Strategy	Matrix	
as	a	matrix	of	all	China’s	tap	water	consumer’s	coping	strategies	in	dealing	with	semi-potable	tap	water.	In	
this	sense,	it	encapsulates	the	consumer	consumption	work	functions	as	consumer	coping	strategy	and	
the	 consumer	 coping	 strategy	 in	 the	 form	of	 consumer	 consumption	work.	 It	 is	 also	 the	 reflection	 of	
potable	water	production	responsibility	and	power	that	shifted	from	other	agents	in	‘source	to	consumer’	
urban	semi-potable	tap	water	provision	system	to	the	tap	water	consumer.	
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Although	 the	 Consumer	 Coping	 Strategy	 Matrix	 is	 as	 fundamental	 as	 ‘source	 to	 consumer’	 Hybrid	
Institutional	Architecture,	 its	existence	is	as	unnoticeable	as	those	social	norms	and	routines	that	have	
been	widely	accepted	and	taken-for-granted	by	nearly	all	Chinese	people.	In	other	words,	it	becomes	the	
‘ordinariness’	 (introduced	 in	section	2.4)	of	people’s	daily	 life.	With	the	prevalent	of	Consumer	Coping	
Strategy	Matrix,	consumers	are	gradually	alienated	and	marginalised	in	tap	water	provision	system	as	a	
whole,	 since	 they	 nether	 have	 enough	 power	 nor	 awareness	 to	 actively	 stimulate	 modification	 and	
progress	in	Hybrid	Institutional	Architecture.	This	forms	a	quite	different	picture	compared	to	what	has	
happened	in	the	history	of	tap	water	provision	of	United	Kingdoms,	where	consumer	played	the	role	of	
major	stimulator	of	systematic	transformations	(Trentmann	and	Taylor,	2005)	.	
As	shown	in	错误!	未找到引用源。,	 in	general,	Consumer	Coping	Strategy	Matrix	 is	composed	by	five	
coping	strategies,	which	can	be	classified	into	four	types	in	two	perspectives.		
From	the	point	of	view	of	tap	water	usage,	there	are	two	types	of	coping	strategies:	Tap	Water	Coping	
Strategy,	which	includes	the	purchase	of	domestic	water	filtration	equipment	and	the	consumption	work	
of	boiling	semi-potable	tap	water;	and	Non-Tap-Water	Coping	Strategy,	which	includes	the	purchase	of	
bottled	water,	barrelled	water	and	self-built	water	supply	facilities.	
From	the	perspective	of	cost	and	consumption	work,	there	are	another	two	types	of	coping	strategies:	
Low	Cost	Traditional	Coping	Strategy,	which	includes	the	consumption	work	of	boiling	semi-potable	tap	
water	and	the	consumption	work	of	building	self-built	water	supply	facilities,	all	these	coping	strategies	
demands	 a	 certain	 amount	 of	 consumption	 work;	 and	 High	 Cost	 Commercial	 Coping	 Strategy,	 which	
includes	the	purchase	of	domestic	water	filtration	equipment,	bottled	water,	and	barrelled	water,	all	these	
coping	strategies	only	demand	little	consumption	work.		
As	shown	错误!	未找到引用源。,	there	are	certain	overlapping	between	the	two	perspectives	and	four	
types	of	 coping	 strategies.	All	 together,	 they	 composed	a	 small	matrix	of	 consumer	 coping	 strategy	 in	
dealing	with	semi-potable	tap	water,	thus	being	named	as	the	Consumer	Coping	Strategy	Matrix.	
Chapter	3	Theoretical	Framework																																																																																																																								|	59	
	
3.5.3 Seven	facilitating	factors	of	Consumer	Coping	Strategy	Matrix	
As	shown	in	错误!	未找到引用源。,	for	consumer,	there	are	seven	facilitating	factors	that	have	promoted,	
justified	and,	most	importantly,	normalised	the	existence	and	composition	of	Consumer	Coping	Strategy	
Matrix.	They	are	tradition,	government’s	tacit	consent,	market,	media’s	propaganda,	low	tap	water	rate,	
water	crisis	and	social	memory,	and	knowledge	and	information	gap.	They	function	together	to	embed	
Consumer	 Coping	 Strategy	 Matrix	 deeply	 and	 firmly	 into	 the	 fabric	 of	 Chinese	 society.	 As	 will	 be	
highlighted	 in	 section	 3.6,	 the	 normalisation	 they	 triggered	 will	 have	 a	 re-enforcement	 of	 other	
normalisation:	 it	 is	 further	 transformed	 into	 the	 consumer’s	 normalisation	 of	 semi-potable	 tap	water	
supply,	which	transformed	again	into	the	consumer’s	normalisation	of	Hybrid	Institutional	Architecture.	
This	will	be	highlighted	in	section	3.6.	
Tradition	
First,	as	section	2.4	has	reviewed,	Harvey	observed	that	tap	water	consumer’s	certain	norm	and	routine	
could	have	a	significant	impact	on	tap	water	provision	system	as	a	whole	(Harvey,	2015,	p.11).	For	Chinese	
consumers,	the	tradition	is	a	major	and	priority	factor	of	Consumer	Coping	Strategy	Matrix,	especially	for	
boiling	tap	water.	In	general,	it	can	be	classified	into	three	types:	the	tradition	of	boiling	water,	the	tradition	
of	Chinese	medicine,	and	the	tradition	of	drinking	tea.	All	three	types	of	traditions	helped	the	consumer	
to	establish,	implement	and	normalise	Consumer	Coping	Strategy	Matrix.		
The	tradition	of	boiling	water	can	be	dated	to	ancient	time	as	early	as	Neolithic.	In	his	blog	article,	Chen	
Mingyuan	(2009)	pointed	out	that	the	shape	difference	between	pottery	from	ancient	China	and	pottery	
from	other	civilisations	is	an	evidence	of	boiling	water.	He	argued	that	the	pottery	for	boiling	water	always	
have	a	special	shape	that	looks	like	a	pitcher	with	three	legs	because	people	need	to	place	timber	under	
it.	This	kind	of	pottery	only	exists	in	China,	which	has	a	series	of	different	shapes	such	as	Li,	Gui,	Zeng,	Yan	
and	Bing.	Residual	of	mineral	deposits	has	been	observed	in	the	debris	of	ancient	pottery	‘Gui’	(see	Figure	
3.5)	dated	back	to	4500	to	2500	BC,	demonstrating	that	it	had	been	used	to	boil	water.	
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Figure	3.5:	The	white	pottery	‘Gui’	of	China’s	Dawenkou	culture7	(4300	to	2500	BC)	
Surprisingly,	as	early	as	in	Zhou	dynasty	(1046	BC–256	BC),	the	Rites	of	Zhou	（《周礼》）has	a	record	for	
special	government	officers	 in	 regulating	water	quality.	They	projected	heated	stone	 into	 the	water	 to	
repel	 insects.	 In	 Eastern	 Jin	 dynasty	 (317-420	AD),	 a	 scholar	 specialised	 in	health,	 Zhang	 Zhan,	 clearly	
pointed	out	in	his	book	The	Essence	of	Health	（《养生要集》）that	‘once	people	drink	boiled	water,	no	
disease	will	 occur.’	 In	North	Song	dynasty	 (960-1127	AD),	 a	doctor	named	Zhuang	Zhuo	argued	 in	his	
collection	of	note	and	essay	The	Chicken	Ribs（《鸡肋篇》）that	‘in	eastern	south	area	(of	China),	even	on	
the	road,	average	people	still	insist	on	drinking	boiled	water.’		
																																								 																				
7	Source:	http://theme.npm.edu.tw/selection/Article.aspx?sNo=04001122	Accessed:	12	March	2017	
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Western	 scholar	 also	 noticed	 this	 phenomenon	 and	 its	 implication.	 Fernand	 Braudel	 (1992,	 p.230)	
indicated	in	his	work	Civilization	and	Capitalism,	15th-18th	Century:	The	structure	of	everyday	life:	
As	for	the	Chinese,	(…)	but	they	were	also	concerned	about	the	dangers	of	pollution	and	
recommended	boiling	any	suspect	water.	Hot	drinks	were	 in	any	case	the	rule	 in	China	
(vendors	 sold	 boiling	 water	 in	 the	 streets)	 and	 this	 habit	 no	 doubt	 considerably	
contributed	to	the	health	of	the	Chinese	population.		
The	data	describing	the	prevalence	of	boiling	water	in	today’s	China	is	rare.	However,	given	the	data	from	
a	survey	about	270	Beijing	citizens’	drinking	preference	in	2012,	74%	of	them	chose	to	drink	boiled	tap	
water	(Zhao,	et	al.,	2012).		
The	tradition	of	Chinese	medicine	also	significantly	influenced	people’s	attitudes	towards	boiling	water.	In	
Huang	Di	Nei	Jing	(《黄帝内经》),	the	oldest	doctrinal	source	of	Chinese	medicine	that	can	be	dated	back	
to	 2000	 years	 ago,	 decoction	medicine	 was	 considered	 as	 the	major	mean	 of	medical	 treatment.	 	 It	
involves	boiling	water	to	extract	and	concentrate	the	essence	of	substances	deemed	to	be	curative	(e.g.	
bark,	 leaves,	 roots).	 In	other	 classic	works	of	Chinese	medicine,	decoction	was	 considered	as	 the	best	
choice	for	taking	medicine,	being	used	as	the	most	common	way	for	medical	treatment.	As	shown	in	Figure	
3.6,	 even	 until	 today,	 numerous	 Chinese	 people	 still	 adopt	 decoction	 as	 their	 way	 of	 taking	 Chinese	
medicine.	In	this	process,	boiling	water	was	gradually	being	considered	as	a	healthy	water	that	essential	
for	the	medical	care	and	people’s	daily	life.	
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Figure	3.6:	Chinese	decoction	medicine8	
If	the	tradition	of	Chinese	medicine	can	be	seen	as	the	promotion	of	boiling	water	in	the	sense	of	health,	
then	 the	 tradition	 of	 drinking	 tea	 can	 be	 regarded	 as	 the	 promotion	 of	 boiling	water	 in	 the	 sense	 of	
domestic	life.	In	The	Classic	of	Tea	（《茶经》）,	the	world’s	first	known	treatise	on	tea	completed	in	Tang	
Dynasty	between	760	CE	and	762	CE,	Lu	Yu,	known	in	China	as	the	‘Sage	of	Tea’,	named	the	fifth	chapter	
as	‘Boiling’,	listed	the	guidelines	for	preparaing	tea,	which	includs	the	water	types,	water	quality	and	timing	
of	boiling	water.	Since	then,	boiling	water	becomes	the	necessary	procedure	in	tea	drinking	until	today.		
Braudel	(1992)	also	observed	the	connection	between	tea	and	boiled	water.	
Was	 it	 the	 social	 custom	 of	 tea	 that	 spread	 this	 strange	 ersatz	 of	 hot	 water?	 Or	 was	
everything	generally	drunk	hot	in	China,	as	in	Japan	-	tea,	sake,	alcohol	made	from	rice	or	
																																								 																				
8	Source:	http://www.360doc.com/content/16/0421/21/17293644_552681026.shtml	Accessed:	12	March	2017	
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millet,	and	even	water?	When	Father	de	Las	Cortes	drank	a	cup	of	cold	water,	he	shocked	
all	 the	 Chinese	 accompanying	 him,	who	 tried	 to	 dissuade	 him	 from	 such	 a	 dangerous	
practice.	'If	the	Spaniards,	who	have	a	passion	for	drinking	everything	iced	at	all	seasons,	
did	as	the	Chinese	do,'	remarks	a	very	sensible	book	(1762),	'they	would	not	see	so	many	
diseases	prevalent	in	their	midst,	nor	so	much	dryness	in	their	temperament'	(Braudel,	
1992,	p.254-255).	
In	his	web	article	published	in	2012	about	tea	drinking	and	the	development	of	ancient	East	towns,	Ling	
Wenfeng	(2012)	also	argues	that	boiled	water	and	tea	drinking	contributes	to	the	prevention	and	cure	of	
water-borne	disease,	improving	Chinese	people’s	health	status.	Similarly,	McGuire	(2014)	also	published	
a	blog	article	discussing	the	interconnection	between	tea,	boiled	water,	and	water	treatment,	claiming	
that	‘the	history	of	tea	in	Chinese	culture	is	part	of	the	history	of	individuals	protecting	themselves	from	
disease.’	
Government’s	tacit	consent	
The	second	facilitating	factor	is	government’s	tacit	consent.	To	compensate	the	systematic	flaws	in	urban	
tap	 water	 provision	 system,	 for	 a	 long	 time	 the	 government	 has	 kept	 a	 tacit	 consent	 towards	 the	
implementation	of	Consumer	Coping	Strategy	Matrix.	In	some	cities,	the	local	municipal	government	even	
shifted	a	certain	amount	of	power	 to	 the	consumer	 to	promote	their	 ‘non-central	water	supply’	as	an	
option	for	‘central	water	supply’.	Chapter	5	will	provide	a	detailed	example	later.	
Besides,	 it	 is	the	government	who	firstly	 initiate	and	promote	the	national	propaganda	for	plain	boiled	
water.	As	early	as	1934,	Chinese	Nationalist	Party,	the	China’s	ruling	party	at	that	time,	promoted	New	Life	
Movement,	which	 asked	Chinese	people	 to	drink	boiled	water9	.	 Chiang	Kai-shek,	 the	head	of	 Chinese	
Nationalist	Party,	 insisted	on	drinking	boiled	water	 instead	of	tea	or	coffee.	 In	1948,	 there	was	a	news	
report	that	the	mayor	of	Shanghai	advocated	citizens	to	drink	plain	boiled	water10.	However,	such	activity	
did	not	penetrate	into	rural	areas.		
																																								 																				
9	http://www.cqkangzhan.com:6080/kzsqdsml/417.jhtml?q=index	
10	Source:	http://www.dachengdata.com	Accessed:	13	March	2017	
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The	major	change	only	comes	when	Communist	Party	took	over	the	ruling	power.	In	1952	and	1953,	PRC	
government	initiated	a	national-wide	Patriotic	Public	Health	Campaign.	The	‘State	Council’s	Instructions	
of	 Continuing	 Patriotic	 Public	 Health	 Campaign	 in	 1953’	 highlighted	 that	 people	 must	 ‘not	 drinking	
unboiled	water’.	Given	the	record	in	the	memoirs	of	Guan	Er,	an	old	man	who	experienced	that	campaign	
as	a	child,	even	in	rural	areas,	every	child	would	be	checked	before	class	whether	they	had	brought	the	
jug	 for	drinking	boiled	water,	and	every	child	had	to	recite	a	doggerel	 including	 ‘not	drinking	unboiled	
water’	 (Guan,	 2015,	 p.24).	 At	 that	 time,	 the	 slogan	 and	 poster	 of	 drinking	 boiled	 water	 was	 posted	
everywhere,	especially	in	classrooms.	With	the	help	of	media	(introduced	later	as	Media’s	propaganda),	
even	until	today	plain	boiled	water	was	considered	in	China	as	a	kind	of	‘healthy’	water.	
Market	
As	Glucksmann	 (2013,	 p.12)	 pointed	 out,	 the	 consumption	work	 intensified	 the	 connections	 between	
different	market	 players,	 forming	 a	mutual	 cooperation	 between	 them.	 She	 further	 claimed	 that	 the	
development	 of	 market	 economy	 and	 commodity	 production	 is	 on	 the	 basis	 of	 the	 progress	 of	
consumption	work	(Glucksmann,	2013,	p.24).	Meanwhile,	an	outsourcing	of	consumption	work	to	other	
companies	has	created	a	new	market	targeting	on	the	consumption	work.	Her	viewpoint	is	fully	reflected	
in	China.	
When	 little	 academic	 attention	 was	 placed	 in	 Consumer	 Coping	 Strategy	 Matrix,	 the	 capsulate	 of	
consumption	 work,	 numerous	 China’s	 companies	 have	 already	 initiated	 to	 occupy	 the	 great	 market	
established	solely	on	it	since	1990s.	Given	the	data	of	a	2014	survey	about	30,000	Chinese	urban	residents	
in	100	major	cities	of	China,	only	59%	of	them	drink	boiled	tap	water	as	their	main	potable	water	source	
(Liu,	2016).	For	the	rest	41%	of	urban	populations,	25%	drink	barrelled	water,	14%	equip	domestic	tap	
water	 filtration	equipment,	2%	have	community	water	 treatment	 facility11.	A	 survey	about	270	Beijing	
citizens’	drinking	preference	in	2012	shows	that	78.9%	of	them	chose	to	drink	barrelled	and	bottled	water	
																																								 																				
11	Source:	http://zt.h2o-china.com/report/2014/2014gs_charts/	
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directly	(Zhao,	et	al.,	2012).	In	2012,	the	bottled	water	sales	in	China	reached	9	billion	US	dollars,	and	was	
expected	to	reach	16	billion	US	dollars	in	2017	(McGuire,	2014).	Data	from	International	Bottled	Water	
Association	(IBWA)	pointed	out	that	 in	2013	China’s	bottled	water	consumption	amount	 is	39.5	million	
cubic	metres,	accounting	as	number	one	market	in	the	world	and	15%	of	the	global	market	(Liu,	2016).	All	
these	data	demonstrate	that	the	market	size	of	bottled	water,	barrelled	water	and	domestic	tap	water	
filtration	equipment	 is	massive.	As	 Liu	 (2006)	pointed	out,	 ‘bottled	water	is	now	one	of	China's	fastest	
growing	sectors	in	the	food	and	drink	industry’.	
The	booming	bottled	water	market	in	China	is	more	like	the	emergence	of	bottled	water	in	the	history	of	
France	 and	 Italy.	 The	 former	 established	 its	 all-purpose	 tap	 water	 much	 later	 than	 UK	 with	 smaller	
coverage,	leaving	a	chance	for	bottled	water	to	function	as	a	compensation	of	tap	water	provision	system	
(Goubert,	1989;	Harvey,	2015).	The	latter,	even	to	this	day,	is	equipped	with	problematic	tap	water	that	
makes	people	distrust	its	safety	and	purity.	Bottled	water,	as	a	result,	becomes	Italians’	coping	strategy	to	
tap	water	(Harvey,	2015).		
In	 the	 face	of	 such	a	huge	profit,	 some	bottled	and	barrelled	water	 companies	began	 to	discredit	 the	
reputation	of	tap	water	by	various	means.	For	example,	in	Sina	Weibo,	a	China’s	Twitter-like	website,	there	
was	a	Weibo	published	at	5:20	16	May	2013	by	China	Newsweek12,	an	influential	news	magazine	in	China:	
#the	couple	who	do	not	drink	tap	water	for	20	years	got	a	new	idea#.	The	strict	tap	water	
standard	is	useless	if	the	source	of	tap	water	is	inferior.	It	is	a	misleading	to	discuss	tap	
water	from	standard	perspective.	The	transformation	of	‘safe	water’	to	‘health	water’	can	
only	happen	in	the	condition	that	people	begin	to	concern	the	source	of	tap	water.	The	
most	superior	water	source	 is	usually	 far	away	from	modern	pollution	areas,	such	as	a	
water	source	from	the	snow-capped	Kunlun	Mountains	in	Tibetan	Plateau.	(Translated	by	
the	author)	
Until	12	December	2016,	this	Weibo	has	been	reposted	for	73280	times	and	commented	on	5860	times.	
The	analytical	data	shown	in	Figure	3.7	is	generated	from	the	Weiboevent	Visual	Analytic	System	(Donghao	
Ren	et	al.,	2014),	an	online	weibo	analytic	tool.		
																																								 																				
12	Source:	http://www.weibo.com/1642512402/zwZB6Btj9?from=page_1002061642512402_profile&wvr=6&mod=weibotime	Accessed:	12	December	2016	
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Figure	3.7:	The	analytical	data	on	Chinese	Newsweek’s	Weibo	
The	layout	in	Figure	3.7	is	called	‘Circular	layout’.	In	this	layout,	the	original	Weibo	is	situated	in	the	centre,	
formulating	 a	 circle	 by	 itself.	 Every	 node	 around	 the	 circle	 represents	 a	Weibo	 that	 have	 reposted	 its	
content.	The	size	of	the	node	represents	the	number	of	every	Weibo	Account’s	followers.	From	Figure	3.7,	
there	are	23	major	Weibo	accounts	that	have	re-reposted	the	original	Weibo’s	content	and	got	reposted	
again	for	more	than	500	times.	Therefore,	they	can	be	considered	as	essential	promoters	of	original	Weibo.		
However,	all	of	them	are	counts	are	‘commercial	accounts,'	meaning	that	they	are	highly	likely	to	be	paid	
to	repost	this	certain	Weibo.	In	fact,	the	original	Weibo	by	itself	is	a	soft	advertisement	for	a	bottled	water	
brand	called	‘Kunlun	Mountain’	(昆仑山).	The	keyword	analysis	also	shows	that	the	name	of	this	brand	
ranked	secondary	after	the	most	mentioned	keyword	‘repost’.	Besides,	the	couple	described	in	the	Weibo	
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are	working	in	a	private	institute	called	‘Beijing	Public	Health	and	Tap	Water	Research	Institute,'	which	is	
famous	for	advertising	bottled	water.	
Media’s	propaganda	
	
Figure	3.8:	The	news	article	about	the	benefits	of	drinking	plain	boiled	water	published	in	191513	
The	 fourth	 facilitating	 factor	 is	media’s	propaganda.	As	has	been	highlighted	above,	 in	China’s	history,	
media	has	played	a	pivotal	role	in	advocating	Consumer	Coping	Strategy	Matrix.	The	media	propaganda	
																																								 																				
13	Source:	http://www.cnbksy.com/home	Accessed:	13	March	2017	
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of	boiled	water	can	be	traced	back	as	early	as	1915.	As	Figure	3.8	shows,	there	was	a	news	article	about	
the	benefits	 of	 drinking	 plain	 boiled	water,	which	was	written	 in	 classic	 Chinese	 and	published	 in	 the	
second	volume	of	Xin	Min	News	(《新民晚报》),	one	of	the	earliest	newspapers	in	modern	China.		
Later,	 a	 series	 of	 propaganda	 articles	 about	 the	 benefits	 of	 drinking	 boiled	water	 can	 be	 observed	 all	
through	the	publication	history	of	China’s	newspapers,	advocating	plain	boiled	water	as	healthy	water.	For	
example,	 given	 the	 searching	 result	 from	 a	 newspaper	 database 14	,	 ‘plain	 boiled	 water’	 has	 been	
mentioned	5132	times	in	all	news	titles	and	contents	of	China’s	newspapers	published	in	2016.	Among	16	
most	mentioned	words	associated	with	 ‘plain	boiled	water,'	at	 least	 four	words	are	associate	people’s	
health:	 ‘weather,'	 ‘old	people,'	 ‘food,'	and	‘body’.	 If	taking	web	articles	 into	account,	the	result	 is	even	
starker:	‘plain	boiled	water’	has	been	mentioned	70897	times	in	all	web	articles	published	in	2016	with	
‘doctor,'	‘old	people,'	‘hospital’	and	‘calculus’	as	the	most	mentioned	associated	words.	
Low	tap	water	rates	
The	 fifth	 facilitating	 factor	 is	 the	 low	 tap	water	 rates.	 Because	 of	 the	 consideration	 of	 public	welfare,	
China’s	urban	tap	water	rates	is	always	keeping	at	a	relatively	low	level.	This	low	water	rates	significantly	
influenced	the	water	company’s	 income,	but	 it	also	contributes	to	the	 justification	of	semi-potable	tap	
water.	For	consumer,	the	low	water	rates	forms	a	strong	justification	for	the	semi-potable	quality	of	tap	
water.	With	an	idea	that	tap	water	‘should	be’	a	cheap	commodity	with	undrinkable	quality,	consumers	
turn	to	Consumer	Coping	Strategy	Matrix.	Meanwhile,	a	low	water	rates	also	confined	the	circulation	of	
money	flow,	making	water	company	difficult	to	improve	its	tap	water	quality.	It	is	difficult	to	change	this	
price,	 since	 it	 is	not	 simply	a	 reflection	of	 supply	and	demand	 in	a	market	 that	 contains	 competitions	
between	various	companies.	It	is	an	outcome	of	complicated	political	and	economic	negotiation	between	
government	and	water	 company.	A	more	detailed	analysis	 and	 related	data	of	 low	water	 rates	will	be	
presented	in	section	4.4.1,	Chapter	4.		
																																								 																				
14	Source:	http://wisesearch.wisers.net	Accessed:	15	March	2017	
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Water	crises	and	social	memory	
Water	 crises	 and	 social	 memory	 is	 the	 sixth	 facilitating	 factor.	 In	 recent	 years,	 what	 consumers	 have	
observed	and	perceived	were	a	series	of	water	scandals	and	crises.	For	example,	in	March	2013,	Shanghai’s	
tap	water	quality	was	under	threat	after	16,000	diseased	pig	carcasses	were	found	in	tributaries	of	the	
Huangpu	River.	In	April	2013,	Beijing,	one	of	China’s	biggest	bottled-water	producers	accused	a	newspaper	
based	 in	 Beijing	 of	 deliberate	 defaming	 the	 company’s	 reputation.	 In	 April	 2014,	 Lanzhou’s	 residents	
rushed	to	buy	bottled	drinks	after	authorities	had	said	benzene	had	been	found	in	tap	water	at	20	times	
above	 national	 safety	 levels.	 In	 October	 2014,	 a	 recent	 report	 from	 the	 government	 official	 media	
disclosed	that	antibiotics	had	been	detected	in	the	river	water	of	Haihe	River,	the	Yangtze	River,	Huangpu	
River,	Pearl	River,	Liaohe	River	and	other	rivers.	It	was	derived	from	the	sewage	that	emitted	illegally	from	
medicine	company	and	 livestock	 farms	near	these	rivers.	From	a	report	about	urban	tap	water	quality	
published	in	February	2015	by	the	China	Water	Safety	Charity	Fund,	in	14	of	29	China’s	major	cities	the	
urban	tap	water	quality	were	below	the	national	standard	in	the	test	(China	Water	Safety	Charity	Fund,	
2015).		
Having	placed	little	attention	on	consumer’s	role	and	function	in	tap	water	provision	system,	many	tap	
water	studies	in	China	seem	to	imply	that	consumer’s	behaviour	will	not	be	influenced	and	changed	by	
water	pollutions	and	scandals.	In	fact,	the	opposite	is	true.	Consumers	have	tried	their	best	to	gain	security	
feeling	 in	 terms	 of	 adopting	 Consumer	 Coping	 Strategy	Matrix.	 It	 is	 just	 because	 their	 dependent	 on	
Consumer	Coping	Strategy	Matrix	that	the	market	of	bottled	water,	barrelled	water,	and	domestic	water	
filtration	equipment	began	to	boom	in	China.	For	those	who	is	not	wealth	enough	to	adopt	the	High	Cost	
Commercial	Coping	Strategy,	Low	Cost	Traditional	Coping	Strategy	becomes	their	only	choice	to	protect	
their	 health	 from	 the	 threat	 of	water	 crisis	 (See	 Figure	 3.4).	 The	 difference	 in	 consumer’s	 capacity	 of	
adopting	coping	strategy	leads	to	a	consumer’s	stratification,	which	will	be	highlighted	in	section	3.5.3	of	
this	 chapter.	A	more	detailed	evidence	about	 the	water	 crisis	 and	 social	memory	will	 be	presented	 in	
section	5.4.		
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Knowledge	and	information	gap	
The	 seventh	 facilitating	 factor	 is	 consumer’s	 knowledge	 and	 information	 gap.	Most	 previous	 research	
discussed	 the	 influence	 of	 information	 gap	 between	 tap	 water	 provision	 system	 and	 consumer	 from	
political	and	economic	perspectives,	mainly	focusing	on	issues	such	as	regional	monopoly	and	water	rates	
(for	example,	see	Zhu,	2008).	No	previous	research	has	targeted	the	influence	of	such	gap	in	a	social	and	
individual	perspective,	resulting	the	research	gap	of	consumer’s	‘response’	and	coping	strategies.	
From	Knowledge	and	information	gap	comprises	three	aspects:	the	rapid	technology	transition	of	modern	
tap	water,	the	problematic	information	disclosure	and	the	dysfunction	of	NGOs	and	Industrial	Associations.	
First,	given	the	historical	record,	in	China,	the	technology	transition	of	modern	tap	water	was	mainly	driven	
by	exogenous	drivers	rather	than	endogenic	drivers.	In	other	words,	it	was	the	western	colonists	(Russian	
for	example)	who	firstly	introduced	the	modern	technology	of	modern	tap	water	from	other	countries	to	
China,	 and	 ‘enforced’	 China’s	 society	 to	 accept	 it	 (see	 section	 5.2.2	 for	 detailed	 analysis).	 There	 is	 no	
‘endogenic	power’	or	internal	motivations	in	China	to	innovate	this	technology	by	itself.	Thus,	Chinese	tap	
water	consumers	neither	have	enough	time	nor	enough	opportunities	to	elaborate	a	more	‘modernised’	
recognition	of	tap	water,	which	forms	a	sharp	contrast	to	tap	water	consumers	in	the	UK	who	have	spent	
over	 one	 and	 a	 half	 century	 to	 recognise	 and	 improve	 tap	water	 (Harvey,	 2015).	 Consequently,	 semi-
potable	tap	water	has	been	recognised	as	an	ordinariness	in	the	process	of	technology	transition	driven	
by	exogenous	power.	This	will	be	illustrated	in	the	case	study	of	Harbin	in	section	5.2.	
Second,	given	the	complicity	of	Hybrid	Institutional	Architecture,	the	consumer	is	incapable	of	unraveling	
its	structure.	What	they	can	do	is	to	deal	with	the	problem	of	semi-potable	tap	water	independently	with	
the	help	of	their	knowledge	and	experience,	namely,	the	tradition,	and	the	help	of	market,	which	is	much	
easier	for	the	consumer	to	get	access.		
In	 fact,	 even	 the	 agents	 in	 the	Hybrid	 Institutional	 Architecture	 have	 information	 and	 knowledge	 gap	
between	 each	 other,	 not	 to	mention	 the	 gap	 between	 them	 and	 consumers.	 Section	 6.4	 and	 6.5	will	
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present	a	detailed	case	study	 regarding	problematic	 information	disclosure	between	 the	agents	 in	 the	
Hybrid	Institutional	Architecture	and	between	the	Hybrid	Institutional	Architecture	and	consumers.	
Third,	 in	 the	aforementioned	context,	 the	central	government	 still	 restricted	 the	development	of	both	
oversea	 and	 local	 NGOs	 through	 various	 means.	 The	 overseas	 NGO’s	 activities	 were	 mainly	 actively	
restricted	by	regulations,	whereas	local	NGO’s	activities	were	mianly	confined	by	local	government	and	
insufficient	 funds.	 Meanwhile,	 rather	 than	 establishing	 an	 effective	 communication	 between	 Hybrid	
Institutional	Architecture	and	consumers,	most	Industrial	Associations	have	posted	their	main	attention	
on	 the	 services	 they	 provide	 to	 bottled	 and	 barrelled	water	 companies.	 The	 dysfunction	 of	 NGO	 and	
Industrial	Association	will	be	highlighted	in	section	4.3.5.	
3.5.4 ‘Consumer	to	sip’	potable	tap	water	production	process	
Given	the	analyses	above,	the	question	mark	left	in	Figure	3.2	now	can	be	unraveled:	what	is	following	the	
‘source	to	consumer’	urban	semi-potable	tap	water	provision	system	is	a	‘consumer	to	sip’	potable	water	
production	process,	shown	in	Figure	3.9.	
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Figure	3.9:	‘Consumer	to	sip’	potable	water	production	process	
From	 this	 production	 process,	 two	 types	 of	 potable	 water	 are	 ‘produced’	 through	 Consumer	 Coping	
Strategy	Matrix:	potable	tap	water,	produced	through	Tap	Water	Coping	Strategy;	and	potable	non-tap-
water,	 produced	 through	Non-tap-water	 Coping	 Strategy.	All	 together,	 they	 function	 as	 the	 end	water	
consumes	in	their	daily	 life.	Thus,	no	matter	what	type	of	potable	water	it	 is,	consumers	have	satisfied	
their	potable	water	demand	through	this	process,	which	makes	them	normalise	their	powerlessness	in	
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the	Hybrid	Institutional	Architecture	and	the	semi-potable	tap	water		supplied	by	the	‘source	to	consumer’	
urban	semi-potable	tap	water	provision	system.		
The	existence	of	 ‘consumer	 to	sip’	potable	water	production	process	has	 long	been	 ignored,	 since	 the	
traditional	economic	understanding	of	labour	production	rarely	expand	beyond	consumption.	However,	
in	general	the	‘consumer	to	sip’	potable	water	production	process	has	imposed	a	profound	influence	on	
China’s	tap	water	consumers,	making	them	stratified	into	different	classes	on	the	basis	of	water,	the	most	
basic	physical	need	of	human	being,	as	highlighted	in	next	section.		
3.5.5 Consumer’s	stratification	from	Consumer	Coping	Strategy	
Matrix	
As	has	been	reviewed	in	section	2.4,	tap	water	is	commonly	served	as	public	welfare	in	urban	areas	and	
was	considered	as	‘ordinariness’	by	tap	water	consumers	(Harvey,	2015).	However,	what	is	masked	by	such	
commonality	and	ordinariness	is	the	striking	social	hierarchy	centring	around	Consumer	Coping	Strategy	
Matrix	 in	 the	 ‘consumer	 to	 sip’	 potable	 water	 production	 process.	 Note	 here	 that	 this	 consumer’s	
stratification	is	an	original	concept	of	this	thesis.	Since	it	 is	established	on	the	basis	of	another	original	
concept,	 namely	 the	 Consumer	 Coping	 Strategy	Matrix,	 currently	 there	 is	 no	 archival	 evidence	 either	
proving	 its	existence	or	describing	 its	 function	 in	 the	 real	world.	 In	other	words,	 this	 stratification	 is	a	
theoretical	assumption	derived	from	induction	associated	with	the	concept	of	Consumer	Coping	Strategy	
Matrix.		
Here,	 consumer’s	 capacity	 of	 adopting	 consumer	 coping	 strategies	 is	 defined	 as	 the	 Coping	 Capacity.	
Different	coping	strategies	bestow	consumer	different	Coping	Capacity.	Meanwhile,	the	more	these	coping	
strategies	 are,	 the	 stronger	 the	 Consumer	 Coping	 Capacity	 become.	 Since	 consumers’	 capability	 of	
adopting	consumer	coping	strategy	is	conditioned	by	their	political,	economic	and	social	status,	consumers	
can	be	stratified	into	four	classes,	as	demonstrated	in	Figure	3.10.	
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Figure	3.10:	Consumer's	stratification	from	Consumer	Coping	Strategy	Matrix	
As	shown	in	the	Figure	3.10,	consumers	in	the	fourth	class	can	only	adopt	the	certain	Low	Cost	Traditional	
Coping	 Strategy,	 either	 the	 boiled	 water	 or	 the	 self-built	 water	 supply	 facilities.	 Although	 their	 exact	
situations	are	unknown	and	required	more	in-depth	research	to	reveal,	a	certain	connection	between	their	
limited	 Consumer	 Coping	 Capacity	 and	 their	 limited	 income	 and	 their	 residence	 locations	 can	 still	 be	
presumed.	On	the	one	hand,	 if	 they	can	only	adopt	coping	strategy	of	self-built	water	supply	facilities,	
then	they	are	presumed	to	have	limited	incomes	and	live	in	areas	where	tap	water	is	not	available.	On	the	
other,	 if	 they	 can	only	adopt	 coping	 strategy	of	boiled	water,	 then	 they	are	presumed	 to	have	 limited	
income	and	 live	 in	areas	where	 tap	water	 is	 served.	No	matter	which	 coping	 strategy	 they	adopt,	 the	
limited	number	of	their	coping	strategies	decides	their	low	Consumer	Coping	Capacity,	making	them	the	
most	vulnerable	group	of	people	when	confronting	with	water	crisis.	This	has	been	evidenced	in	the	case	
study	of	Chapter	5.	They	are	presumed	to	be	the	largest	class	in	the	stratification.	
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Consumers	 in	 the	 third	 class	 can	 adopt	 all	 Low	 Cost	 Traditional	 Coping	 Strategy.	 Since	 boiled	 water	
becomes	their	main	coping	strategy,	they	are	presumed	to	have	limited	income	and	live	in	areas	where	
both	tap	water	and	self-built	water	supply	facilities	are	available.	Their	Consumer	Coping	Capacity	is	thus	
higher	than	the	fourth-class	consumers	in	the	water	crisis.		
Consumers	in	the	second	class	can	adopt	certain	Low	Cost	Traditional	Coping	Strategy	plus	certain	High	
Cost	Commercial	Coping	Strategy.	Since	boiled	water,	bottled	water	and	barrelled	water	are	available	for	
them,	they	are	presumed	to	have	a	higher	income	than	consumers	in	third	and	fourth	classes	and	live	in	
areas	where	tap	water	is	served.	Their	Consumer	Coping	Capacity	is	higher	than	consumers	from	both	the	
third	and	the	fourth	class.	However,	in	some	water	crises,	they	have	to	compete	for	each	other	to	adopt	
High	Cost	Commercial	Coping	Strategy,	as	evidenced	in	Chapter	5.	
Finally,	consumer	in	the	first	class	can	adopt	all	High	Cost	Commercial	Coping	Strategy.	They	are	presumed	
to	live	in	the	centre	areas	of	cities	with	higher	income	than	consumers	from	all	three	classes.	They	have	
the	 highest	 Consumer	 Coping	 Capacity,	 many	 of	 them	 can	 even	 get	 access	 to	 self-built	 water	 supply	
facilities,	which	means	that	they	can	adopt	all	coping	strategies	in	Consumer	Coping	Strategy	Matrix.	Their	
number	is	presumed	to	be	the	lowest	among	all	four	classes.	
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3.6 Normalisations	 and	 their	 mutual	 self-
reinforcement	
	
Figure	3.11:	The	mutual	self-reinforcement	of	normalisation	
Here,	it	is	worthwhile	to	introduce	two	concepts:	normalisation	and	the	re-enforcement	of	normalisation.	
Normalisation	is	defined	as	a	self-reinforcing	dynamic	that	sustains	the	‘normality’	of	certain	issues.	It	can	
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be	considered	as	a	social	issue	that	so	ingrained	in	people’s	minds	that	they	cannot	notice	its	existence.	In	
other	words,	normalisation	would	make	people	treat	certain	issues	as	‘ordinariness,'	whose	definition	has	
been	reviewed	in	section	2.4	in	the	literature	review.	This	concept	is	used	here	to	explain	how	something	
such	as	Consumer	Coping	Strategy	Matrix,	demanding	extra	responsibility	and	consumption	work	from	
consumers	who	purchased	a	commodity	that	supposedly	can	be	consumed	immediately,	can	be	socially	
accepted	with	no	complaints	at	all.	
In	a	closed	system,	the	normalisations	of	different	issues	can	reinforce	each	other	mutually.	This	is	defined	
as	mutual	self-reinforcement	of	normalisation.	Figure	3.11	demonstrates	the	mutual	self-reinforcement	
of	normalisation.	As	has	been	highlighted	before,	owing	to	seven	facilitating	factors,	Consumer	Coping	
Strategy	Matrix	has	been	normalised	by	the	consumer	as	an	ordinariness.	As	shown	in	this	Figure	3.11,	
such	normalisation	has	been	transformed	into	the	normalisation	of	the	supply	of	semi-potable	tap	water.	
Meanwhile,	 the	 normalisation	 of	 semi-potable	 tap	 water	 also	 transformed	 into	 the	 normalisation	 of	
Consumer	Coping	Strategy	Matrix.	Thus,	they	mutually	self-reinforce	each	other’s	existence.	Nowadays,	
people	can	observe	an	 interesting	phenomenon	regarding	this	transformation:	When	Chinese	travelers	
first	come	to	countries	where	potable	tap	water	is	available,	most	of	them	would	still	try	to	boil	the	tap	
water	to	drink.	This	phenomenon	reflects	how	deeply	the	normalisations	of	semi-potable	tap	water	and	
Consumer	Coping	Strategy	Matrix	have	been	embedded	in	Chinese	people’s	mind.		
Meanwhile,	the	normalisations	of	Consumer	Coping	Strategy	Matrix	and	semi-potable	tap	water	is	further	
transformed	into	the	normalisation	of	Hybrid	Institutional	Architecture,	and	vice	versa.	The	normalisation	
of	 Hybrid	 Institutional	 Architecture	 not	 only	 disguises	 the	 its	 own	 problems	 but	 also	 enables	 the	
production	responsibility	shift	in	the	achievement	of	potable	water.	Consequently,	a	vicious	circle	can	be	
observed:	Hybrid	Institutional	Architecture	produces	the	semi-potable	tap	water,	which	then	promotes	
Consumer	 Coping	 Strategy	 Matrix,	 and	 through	 mutual	 self-reinforcement,	 their	 existences	 are	 all	
normalised	 by	 the	 consumer,	 who	 have	 to	 bear	 the	 production	 responsibility	 to	 produce	 their	 own	
portable	 tap	 water	 through	 Consumer	 Coping	 Strategy	 Matrix.	 It	 would	 be	 difficult	 to	 query	 the	
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justification	of	either	one	of	them	because	their	justification	is	not	only	nourished	by	the	normalisation	of	
themselves,	but	also	the	normalisations	of	the	other	two.	
It	is	worthwhile	to	compare	such	normalisation	to	what	had	happened	in	UK’s	water	companies	in	the	late	
nineteenth	century.	At	that	time,	predicated	on	the	tension	between	private	water	companies	and	public	
sewerage	 system,	 consumer	 movements	 became	 a	 major	 stimulation	 for	 the	 transition	 of	 industrial	
configuration,	resulting	a	new	integrated	water-sewage	organisation	(Harvey,	2015).	In	China,	there	is	also	
a	tension	between	the	semi-potable	tap	water	supplied	by	‘source	to	consumer’	urban	semi-potable	tap	
water	 provision	 system	 and	 tap	 water	 consumers.	 However,	 such	 a	 tension	 did	 not	 give	 rise	 to	 any	
significant	 consumer	 movements	 for	 potential	 transition	 of	 industrial	 configuration,	 but	 fostered	
Consumer	Coping	Strategy	Matrix,	which	strengthened	in	further	the	consumer’s	normalisation	to	semi-
potable	 tap	water	and	Hybrid	 Institutional	Architecture.	 In	other	words,	 compare	 to	consumers	 in	UK,	
Chinese	 consumers	 did	 not	 turn	 the	 tension	 into	 stimulation,	 but	 choose	 to	 cope	 the	 tension	 by	
themselves,	which	makes	the	‘source	to	consumer’	urban	semi-potable	tap	water	provision	system	keep	
in	 a	 stable	 and	 self-balanced	 status.	 For	 many,	 such	 tension	 has	 transformed	 into	 another	 form	 of	
stimulation:	 the	 stimulation	 of	 increasing	 Consumer	 Coping	 Capacity	 through	 adopting	 high-cost	
commercial	coping	strategies.	
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3.7 China’s	‘source	to	sip’	urban	potable	tap	water	
provision	system	
	
Figure	3.12:	China’s	‘source	to	sip’	urban	potable	tap	water	provision	system	
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Previous	sections	have	introduced	four	key	concepts	and	their	interconnections:	Hybrid	Institutional	
Architecture	is	the	core	and	skeleton	of	‘source	to	consumer’	urban	semi-potable	tap	water	provision	
system;	Consumer	Coping	Strategy	Matrix	is	the	core	and	skeleton	of	‘consumer	to	sip’	potable	water	
production	process.	However,	when	observing	China’s	urban	tap	water	provision	from	holistic	
perspective,	it	appears	to	be	a	stable	and	self-balanced	potable	tap	water	provision	system.	It	is	just	
because	of	such	observation	that	academia	has	either	ignored	or	taken	for	granted	the	fundamental	
function	of	Consumer	Coping	Strategy	Matrix	and	‘consumer	to	sip’	potable	water	production	process.	
One	of	the	unique	contributions	of	the	thesis	is	to	open	up	this	idea	of	the	consumer	as	part	of	the	
potable	water	production	process.	In	fact,	what	people	have	observed	is	a	combination	of	‘source	to	
consumer’	urban	semi-potable	tap	water	provision	system	and	‘consumer	to	sip’	potable	water	
production	process,	demonstrate	in	Figure	3.12.		
The	aforementioned	combination	is	a	firm	but	unnoticeable	combination,	because	the	‘glues’	between	
‘source	to	consumer’	urban	semi-potable	tap	water	provision	system	and	‘consumer	to	sip’	potable	water	
production	 process	 are	 the	 mutual	 self-reinforcements	 of	 normalisation,	 which	 have	 normalised	 any	
potential	obstacles	of	combination,	especially	 the	consumer’s	possible	dissatisfaction	of	potable	water	
production	responsibility	and	their	reasonable	suspicions	of	tap	water	quality	and	their	query	of	Hybrid	
Institutional	 Architecture.	 However,	 it	 is	 important	 to	 emphasise	 that	 this	 system	 is	 only	 a	 seemingly	
potable	tap	water	provision	system.	It	cannot	be	seen	as	an	equivalent	to	the	genuine	potable	tap	water	
provision	system	in	developed	countries,	for	its	operation	and	function	is	fully	relying	on	the	connection	
between	the	‘source	to	consumer’	urban	semi-potable	tap	water	provision	system	and	‘consumer	to	sip’	
potable	water	production	process.	In	other	words,	once	there	is	a	problem	and/or	crisis	in	such	connection,	
it	would	 also	 paralyse	 the	 operation	 of	 this	 seemingly	 potable	water	 provision	 system.	 This	 has	 been	
demonstrated	in	the	case	study	in	Chapter	5.	
Here,	it	is	worthwhile	to	recapitulate	the	establishment	of	‘source	to	sip’	urban	potable	tap	water	provision	
system.	 First,	 Hybrid	 Institutional	 Architecture	 was	 established	 on	 the	 basis	 of	 complex	 circulation	 of	
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power/money/water	flows	between	several	agents	performing	as	power/money/water	nexus.	Because	of	
institutional	incoherencies	in	power/money/water	flows	circulating	between	various	nexuses,	a	‘source	to	
consumer’	urban	semi-potable	tap	water	provision	system	can	only	supply	semi-potable	tap	water	to	the	
consumer.	To	deal	with	semi-potable	tap	water,	consumer	establishes	Consumer	Coping	Strategy	Matrix	
with	the	help	of	seven	facilitating	factors.	During	this	process,	the	responsibility	of	producing	potable	tap	
water	was	shifted	from	Hybrid	Institutional	Architecture	to	the	consumer.	In	certain	scenarios	(for	example,	
the	 Harbin’s	 first	 sociogenic	 sustainability	 crisis	 introduced	 in	 section	 5.3),	 the	 Hybrid	 Institutional	
Architecture	also	shifted	certain	power	to	consumers	allowing	them	to	initiate	the	coping	strategy	of	self-
built	water	supply	facility.	Relying	on	Consumer	Coping	Strategy	Matrix,	a	‘consumer	to	sip’	potable	water	
production	process	is	established.	This	process	is	capable	of	supplying	potable	water,	either	potable	tap	
water	or	potable	non-tap-water,	 to	meet	consumer’s	potable	water	demands.	Meanwhile,	 since	seven	
facilitating	factors	make	consumer	normalise	the	Consumer	Coping	Strategy	Matrix,	self-reinforcement	of	
normalisation	 transforms	 such	normalisation	 into	 the	normalisation	of	 semi-potable	 tap	water	 supply,	
which	is	then	transformed	into	the	normalisation	of	Hybrid	Institutional	Architecture.	All	three	kinds	of	
normalisation	 are	mutually	 self-reinforced.	 Such	 normalisations	 become	 the	 glue	 between	 	 ‘source	 to	
consumer’	 urban	 semi-potable	 tap	 water	 provision	 system	 and	 ‘consumer	 to	 sip’	 potable	 tap	 water	
production	process,	turning	them	into	a	stable	and	self-balanced	‘source	to	sip’	urban	potable	tap	water	
provision	 system.	 Because	 its	 seemingly	 potable	 water	 provision	 capacity,	 this	 system	 disguises	 the	
existence	of	both	Consumer	Coping	Strategy	Matrix	and	Hybrid	Institutional	Architecture.	
3.8 Consumer's	 Institutional	 distrust	 in	 semi-
potable	tap	water	
This	section	aims	to	answer	 the	main	research	question:	What	 is	consumer’s	 institutional	 trust	and/or	
distrust	 in	 China’s	 tap	 water?	 To	 answer	 this	 question,	 this	 section	 coins	 the	 concept	 of	 consumer’s	
institutionalised	distrust	in	semi-potable	tap	water.	
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The	 understanding	 of	 China’s	 ‘source	 to	 sip’	 urban	 potable	 tap	 water	 provision	 system	 provides	 a	
foundation	for	the	discussion	of	consumer’s	trust	in	tap	water.	In	this	context,	three	factors	need	to	be	
highlighted:	First,	in	this	trust	relationship,	the	trustor	is	a	consumer,	and	the	trustee	is	tap	water.	Second,	
consumer’s	 trust	 in	 tap	water	should	be	 interpreted	within	the	two	systems,	 the	 ‘source	to	consumer’	
semi-potable	 tap	water	provision	 system	and	 the	 ‘consumer	 to	 sip’	potable	water	production	process,	
respectively.	 Third,	 the	 characteristic	 of	 consumer’s	 trust	 in	 tap	 water	 is	 neither	 in	 an	 individual	 nor	
organisational	level	(introduced	in	section	2.5),	because	if	so	it	would	be	influenced	by	too	many	disparate	
factors.	Based	on	previous	analyses,	the	discussion	of	consumer’s	trust	in	tap	water	needs	to	be	predicated	
on	an	institutional	level	to	achieve	a	comprehensive	understanding	of	China’s	‘source	to	sip’	urban	potable	
tap	water	provision	system.	
Consumer’s	powerlessness	in	‘source	to	consumer’	semi-potable	tap	water	provision	system		
As	 Harvey	 (2015,	 p.29)	 pointed	 out,	 compared	 to	 the	 economic	 arrangements	 engendered	 by	 other	
commodities,	the	entire	distribution	and	production	process	of	tap	water	is	characterised	by	‘technology	
monopoly’.	 For	 the	 consumer,	 what	 behind	 such	 ‘technology	 monopoly’	 is	 Hybrid	 Institutional	
Architecture	 as	 a	 whole.	 Consequently,	 a	 dependant	 relationship	 between	 consumer	 and	 Hybrid	
Institutional	Architecture	is	established.	In	other	words,	consumer’s	trust	in	tap	water	is	established	in	a	
particular	social	milieu	of	‘source	to	consumer’	semi-potable	tap	water	provision	system	that	trustor	has	
to	fully	depend	on	trustee.	In	the	interview	with	Professor	Tian	Yu	of	Harbin	Institute	of	Technology,	she	
also	pointed	out	that	consumer	is	extremely	powerless	when	they	confront	with	either	government	or	
water	company.	From	this	sense,	she	argued	that	government	is	more	crucial	in	tap	water	provision	system	
than	water	company	because	the	former	is	can	be	more	‘reasonable’	when	dealing	with	consumers.		
With	a	significantly	marginalised	position	in	‘source	to	consumer’	semi-potable	tap	water	provision	system,	
consumer’s	dependency	in	semi-potable	tap	water	is	based	on	consumer’s	powerlessness.	It	is	important	
to	note	here	that	the	such	powerlessness	derived	from	the	power	and	information	gap	between	Hybrid	
Institutional	Architecture	and	consumer.	This	power	and	 information	gap	cannot	be	bridged	effectively	
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regarding	 the	 dysfunction	 of	 NGO	 and	 industrial	 association.	 With	 such	 powerlessness,	 consumer’s	
institutional	 distrust	 in	 semi-potable	 tap	 water	 is	 hardly	 embodied	 and	 demonstrated	 into	 any	 overt	
emotion,	attitude	and	behaviour,	not	to	mention	movements.	It	looks	like	that	they	can	only	hold	a	small	
amount	of	power	of	choosing	and	adopting	coping	strategy	in	Consumer	Coping	Strategy	Matrix.	However,	
as	will	be	highlighted	in	the	case	study	in	section	5.4,	in	some	extreme	scenarios	they	would	even	lose	this	
power	and	become	extremely	powerlessness.	Such	extreme	powerlessnes	is	the	trigger	of	social	turmoil	
in	the	sociogenic	water	sustainability	crisis.	
Consumer’s	dual	identities	in	‘consumer	to	sip’	potable	water	production	process	
As	has	been	highlighted	in	section	3.5.1,	in	the	‘consumer	to	sip’	potable	water	production	process,	the	
power	that	attached	with	consumer	identity	was	deprived.	Meanwhile,	through	power	and	responsibility	
shift,	consumer	is	bestowed	with	another	identity:	potable	water	producer.	Their	self-awareness	of	their	
identities	 is	 changed	 from	the	 independent	 tap	water	consumer	 to	dual	 identities	of	 semi-potable	 tap	
water	consumer	and	potable	water	producer.	How	can	producers	doubt	the	quality	of	their	production?	
The	sense	of	distrust,	therefore,	was	repressed	by	consumers’	intertwined	identifications.	In	other	words,	
by	involving	in	the	production	process	of	potable	water,	consumers	lost	their	legitimate	senses	of	distrust	
in	semi-potable	tap	water	as	consumer.	As	a	result,	semi-potable	tap	water	is	normalised	by	the	consumer	
as	a	producer,	which	represses	consumer’s	distrust	as	a	consumer.	
The	problematic	public	propaganda	
In	the	interviews,	an	anonymous	expert	believed	that	consumer’s	distrust	in	tap	water	is	because	of	the	
problematic	public	propaganda.		
‘On	one	hand,	general	people	cannot	self-identify	the	developmental	stage	of	China.	This	developmental	
stage	is	by	itself	a	paradox	of	industrial	development	and	livelihood	improvement.	Living	in	the	current	
developmental	stage,	it	is	destined	for	us	to	have	an	uneasy	feeling	for	tap	water.	On	the	other,	general	
people’s	recognition	of	water	problems	is	in	a	shallow	degree.	For	example,	every	random	substance	in	
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the	water	can	make	them	nervous.	However,	if	you	ask	me,	what	substance	does	include	in	the	water?	I	
would	ask	 the	question:	what	 substance	does	not	 include	 in	 the	water?	 If	 you	ask	me	whether	water	
pollution	is	harmful,	I	would	answer	yes.	However,	if	you	ask	me	about	the	risk	of	this	harm,	I	would	say	it	
is	very	 low.	This	 is	a	 shift	of	 thinking.	The	 idea	of	 risk	 is	not	propaganda	 in	 the	society.	 […]	This	 is	 the	
problem	of	public	propaganda.	You	have	to	admit	that	China’s	water	is	one	of	the	worst	water	in	the	world,	
but	it	is	not	the	worst	water	in	the	world.	It	depends	on	the	countries	with	which	you	compare.’		
In	the	interview	with	Liu	Wenjun,	an	expert	in	tap	water	provision	and	a	professor	at	Tsinghua	University,	
he	declared	that	the	tap	water	in	Beijing	is	potable	tap	water,	but	with	the	absent	of	effective	government’s	
propaganda,	Beijing	tap	consumers	do	not	trust	its	quality.	
In	a	survey	of	30,000	consumers	of	100	Chinese	major	cities	also	demonstrates	that	among	other	services,	
consumers	have	the	lowest	satisfaction	in	water	company’s	public	communication15.	Regarding	the	public	
propaganda,	40%	of	consumers	thought	it	is	enough,	whereas	19%	thought	it	is	not	enough.	The	rest	41%	
has	no	attitude.	However,	 such	 figure	may	 constitute	a	 conflict,	 for	when	 it	 comes	 to	 the	 information	
consumers	received	from	water	company,	23%	chose	water	rates,	20%	chose	water	usage	amount,	and	
19%	chose	water	cut-off	notice.	Only	20%	chose	consumer	service	information,	only	12%	chose	tap	water	
knowledge.	Thus,	it	can	be	told	that	the	relatively	high	consumer’s	satisfaction	of	public	propaganda	is	not	
predicated	on	consumer’s	understanding	of	their	service	and	tap	water	knowledge.	The	problem	is	about	
consumer’s	understanding	of	the	meaning	of	 ‘public	propaganda’.	That	 is	to	say,	they	may	identify	the	
information	of	water	rates,	water	usage	amount	and	water	cut-off	notice	as	part	of	‘public	propaganda’.	
Consumer’s	institutionalised	distrust	in	semi-potable	tap	water	
In	 the	 context	 of	 consumer’s	 powerlessness,	 consumer’s	 dual	 identities,	 and	 the	 problematic	 public	
propaganda,	it	can	be	concluded	that	in	general,	China’s	tap	water	consumer	have	an	institutional	distrust	
in	 semi-potable	 tap	 water.	 Such	 an	 institutional	 distrust	 embodies	 in	 the	 form	 of	 Consumer	 Coping	
																																								 																				
15	http://zt.h2o-china.com/report/2014/2014gs_charts/	
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Strategy	 Matrix,	 becoming	 an	 unnoticeable	 but	 functional	 ‘entity’.	 In	 other	 words,	 the	 existence	 of	
Consumer	Coping	Strategy	Matrix	is	already	persuasive	enough	to	reflect	the	fact	that	China’s	tap	water	
consumers	have	no	expectation	at	all	on	tap	water’s	potable	quality,	although	given	China’s	national	tap	
water	quality	standard,	tap	water	should	be	potable.		
In	the	context	of	the	China’s	‘source	to	sip’	urban	potable	water	provision	system,	it	is	important	to	note	
that	 the	 institutional	distrust	was	not	 raised	either	between	 the	consumer	and	 the	water	company	or	
between	 the	 consumer	 and	 the	 government,	 but	 between	 the	 consumer	 and	 the	Hybrid	 Institutional	
Architecture.	What	is	behind	consumer	is	‘consumer	to	sip’	tap	water	production	process,	what	is	behind	
the	 Hybrid	 Institutional	 Architecture	 is	 ‘source	 to	 consumer’	 urban	 semi-potable	 tap	 water	 provision	
system.	In	essence,	the	institutionalised	distrust	is	the	reflection	of	the	gap	between	these	two	systems.	
It	is	so	fundamental	that	few	people	have	noticed	and	realised	it.	The	more	this	distrust	is	deepened,	the	
more	solid	the	Consumer	Coping	Strategy	Matrix	would	be,	and	vice	versa.		
With	 the	 institutional	 distrust	 in	 semi-potable	 tap	 water	 being	 so	 fundamentally	 embedded	 into	
consumer’s	mind,	when	consumers	are	talking	about	their	trust	in	tap	water,	the	trustee	is	not	tap	water’s	
quality	but	tap	water’s	manageability.	The	tap	water’s	manageability	can	be	defined	as	consumers’	self-
evaluations	 on	 whether	 they	 can	 treat	 semi-potable	 tap	 water	 with	 their	 available	 consumer	 coping	
strategies.	 In	other	words,	 the	expectation	consumer	bestowed	onto	tap	water	 is	not	to	that	 it	can	be	
drunk	directly,	but	 it	can	be	coped	and	managed	with	certain	coping	strategies	from	Consumer	Coping	
Strategy	Matrix.	The	tap	water’s	manageability	is	a	dynamic	concept	that	depends	on	each	consumer’s	
respective	financial	capacity.	On	the	one	hand,	consumers	with	higher	 income	can	always	rely	on	High	
Cost	Commercial	Coping	Strategy,	whereas	other	consumers	with	low	income	can	only	rely	on	Low	Cost	
Traditional	Coping	Strategy.	On	the	other,	when	tap	water	is	suspended	or	severely	polluted,	such	as	what	
has	happened	in	the	case	study	of	Chapter	5,	only	those	consumers	who	have	stronger	financial	capacity	
can	afford	 the	only	available	consumer	coping	strategy,	namely	 the	bottled	water	and	barrelled	water.	
Thus,	what	is	behind	the	tap	water’s	manageability	is	various	Consumer’s	Coping	Capacities	(Introduced	
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in	section	3.5.5).	What	is	behind	various	Consumer’s	Coping	Capacities	is	latent	social	injustice	(See	section	
3.5.5	for	detailed	analysis).	
Meanwhile,	 since	 there	 is	 a	 huge	 potential	 commercial	 interest	 existing	 behind	 the	 consumer’s	
institutionalised	distrust	in	semi-potable	tap	water,	in	Consumer	Coping	Strategy	Matrix	the	market	has	
offered	High	Cost	Commercial	Coping	Strategy	as	an	alternative	of	Low	Cost	Traditional	Coping	Strategy.	
Besides,	market	starts	to	consolidate	Consumer	Coping	Strategy	Matrix	by	stigmatising	the	quality	of	tap	
water.	Today,	it	can	be	said	that	there	are	several	huge	industries,	such	as	the	industry	of	barrelled	water	
and	domestic	tap	water	filtration	equipment,	established	their	business	solely	on	consumer’s	institutional	
distrust	in	semi-potable	tap	water.	
Finally,	 an	 ironic	 vicious	 circle	 is	 formed	by	consumer’s	 institutional	distrust:	whereas	 consumers	have	
institutional	distrust	in	semi-potable	tap	water,	the	Consumer	Coping	Strategy	Matrix	they	implemented	
further	counteracts	the	possibility	of	any	bottom-up	consumer’s	movements,	making	this	system	more	
stable	and	more	self-balanced,	This	will	then	intensified	the	institutionalised	distrust	again.	
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3.9 Sociogenic	water	sustainability	crisis	
	
Figure	3.13:	The	balance	of	sociogenic	water	sustainability	crisis	
Previous	 sections	 have	 outlined	 the	 composition	 of	 ‘source	 to	 sip’	 urban	 potable	 tap	water	 provision	
system.	 Its	 operation	 relies	 on	 two	 essential	 systems:	 Hybrid	 Institutional	 Architecture	 and	 Consumer	
Coping	Strategy	Matrix.	This	section	aims	to	present	the	concept	of	sociogenic	sustainability	water	crisis.	
Given	 the	 Oxford	 Dictionary,	 sociogenic	 is	 defined	 as	 ‘originating	 in	 society	 or	 social	 interaction’ 16	.	
Following	 this	 definition,	 a	 sociogenic	 sustainability	 crisis	 can	 be	 defined	 as	 a	 sustainability	 crisis	 that	
mainly	triggered	by	motivations	from	both	the	natural	environment	and	the	social	fabrics	of	certain	society.	
																																								 																				
16	Source:	https://en.oxforddictionaries.com/definition/sociogenic	
Chapter	3	Theoretical	Framework																																																																																																																								|	88	
	
In	 other	 words,	 like	 Harvey	 (2015,	 p.6)	 has	 claimed,	 the	 crisis	 is	 the	 outcome	 of	 the	 interaction	 of	
sociogenic	and	the	naturogenic,	motivations,	‘neither	causal	series	being	reducible	to	the	other’.	
As	Figure	3.13	shows,	the	aforementioned	two	systems	have	formed	a	dialectical	relationship	with	the	
water	crisis.	On	the	one	hand,	they	keep	a	balance	with	each	other;	on	the	other,	they	mutually	stimulate	
the	development	of	each	other.	A	sociogenic	water	sustainability	crisis	will	outbreak	when	they	lose	their	
balance.	From	this	sense,	the	outbreak	of	sociogenic	water	sustainability	crisis	can	also	be	considered	as	
the	outcome	of	consumer’s	institutional	distrust	in	tap	water.		
Since	‘source	to	consumer’	urban	semi-potable	tap	water	provision	system	is,	to	a	large	extent,	immune	
from	any	stimulations	either	from	its	internal	Hybrid	Institutional	Architecture	or	its	external	consumer	
and	 Consumer	 Coping	 Strategy	 Matrix,	 its	 development	 is	 stagnant.	 Many	 incoherencies	 in	
power/money/water	flows	are	either	invisible	or	being	disguised	by	the	complicity	of	the	system.	Thus,	
the	accumulation	of	these	incoherencies	would	foster	the	potential	risk	of	water	crises	in	various	forms.	
Meanwhile,	the	outbreak	of	various	water	crises	performs	as	the	possibly	only	strong	external	stimulation	
for	 the	development	of	Hybrid	 Institutional	Architecture.	 It	 is	 the	eruption	of	various	water	crises	that	
exposes	 the	 incoherencies	 and	 problems	 in	 Hybrid	 Institutional	 Architecture,	 which	 would	 then	 be	
rectified,	modified,	or	disguised	by	the	government	and	the	water	company.		
Contrary	to	the	Hybrid	Institutional	Architecture,	Consumer	Coping	Strategy	Matrix	is	also	exposed	to	too	
many	stimulations,	both	internal	or	external.	Consumers	always	single-handedly	rely	on	Consumer	Coping	
Strategy	Matrix.	Once	the	balance	between	the	Hybrid	Institutional	Architecture,	the	Consumer	Coping	
Strategy	Matrix	and	water	crisis	changed,	consumer	will	try	their	best	to	either	secure	their	old	consumer	
coping	strategies	or	develop	new	ones.	During	this	process,	their	unmanaged	behaviours	can	become	the	
trigger	of	new	sociogenic	sustainability	crises.	For	example,	as	will	be	presented	in	the	case	study	in	section	
5.3,	without	effective	control	and	management,	the	self-built	water	supply	facilities	as	consumer’s	coping	
strategy	for	fragmented	tap	water	supply	have	caused	the	groundwater	scarcity	crisis	in	Harbin.	Another	
example	is	the	huge	production	of	bottled	water,	which	in	effect	generate	huge	amount	of	plastic	waste	
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pollution	to	water	resources.	Note	there	that	rather	than	criticising	consumers	as	the	trigger	of	crisis,	this	
argument	is	aiming	to	clarify	the	roots	of	those	seemingly	consumer-lead	sociogenic	sustainability	crises	
are	their	over-dependence	on	Consumer	Coping	Strategy	Matrix.	
As	 has	 been	 analysed	 in	 section	 3.5.3,	 the	 outbreak	 of	 these	 sociogenic	 sustainability	 crisis	 and	 its	
associated	 social	memory	 are	 in	 turn	 functioning	 as	 one	 of	 the	 seven	 facilitating	 factors	 that	 further	
promote,	justify	and	normalise	the	development	of	Consumer	Coping	Strategy	Matrix.	
As	Harvey	(2015)	pointed	out,	a	sustainability	crisis	emerges	from	the	interaction	between	certain	societal	
characteristics	and	its	natural	resource	environment.	Different	from	general	water	sustainability	crisis,	the	
outbreak	 of	 sociogenic	 sustainability	 crises	 entails	 a	 contingent	 combination	model	 composed	 by	 five	
interconnected	 conditions:	 history	 condition,	 geography	 condition,	 political	 condition,	 environmental	
condition,	and	culture	condition.	This	sociogenic	sustainability	crises	would	trigger	a	series	of	uncontrolled	
and	unexpected	domino	effects	 in	 the	social	 sphere,	which	would	 then	 intensify	 the	damage	of	water	
sustainability	crisis	and	social	turmoil.	For	example,	when	Songhua	River	experienced	water	sustainability	
crisis	of	toxic	spill,	a	sociogenic	water	sustainability	crisis	outbreak	in	the	form	of	social	and	market	turmoil.	
Realising	the	ineffectiveness	of	Low	Cost	Traditional	Coping	Strategy,	many	people	rushed	to	market	and	
emptied	the	shelves	of	bottled	water.	Two	specific	cases	of	sociogenic	water	sustainability	crisis	will	be	
presented	in	later	chapters.		
3.10 Conclusion	
The	new	concepts	and	conceptual	framework	coined	and	developed	in	this	chapter	is	a	necessary	effort	
to	address	the	distinctiveness	and	complexity	of	China’s	urban	tap	water	provision	system.	Its	complexity	
mirrors	the	reality,	evidencing	the	fact	that	there	is	no	simple	and	parsimonious	model	that	could	explain	
the	paradox	of	a	seemingly	potable	tap	water	provision	system	and	consumer’s	institutional	distrust	in	tap	
water.	
Chapter	3	Theoretical	Framework																																																																																																																								|	90	
	
Such	distinctiveness	and	complexity	is	illustrated	in	three	aspects:	the	distinctiveness	and	complexity	of	
tap	water	is	elaborated	through	coining	the	concept	of	semi-potable	tap	water;	the	distinctiveness	and	
complexity	 of	 tap	 water	 provision	 system	 is	 elaborated	 through	 introducing	 the	 concept	 of	 Hybrid	
Institutional	Architecture;	the	distinctiveness	and	complexity	of	consumer	reactions	is	elaborated	through	
presenting	 the	 concept	 of	 Consumer	 Coping	 Strategy	 Matrix;	 the	 distinctiveness	 and	 complexity	 of	
consumer’s	 trust	 in	 tap	water	 is	developed	by	highlighting	 the	concept	of	 consumer’s	 institutionalised	
distrust	in	tap	water;	the	distinctiveness	and	complexity	of	water	sustainability	crisis	is	elaborated	through	
revealing	the	concept	of	sociogenic	water	sustainability	crisis.	
Taking	 all	 these	 distinctiveness	 and	 complexity	 into	 consideration,	 China’s	 urban	 tap	 water	 provision	
system	can	be	 seen	as	 the	 combination	of	 two	 systems:	 ‘source	 to	 consumer’	 semi-potable	 tap	water	
provision	system	and	‘consumer	to	sip’	potable	water	production	process.	This	combination	functions	as	
a	 ‘source	 to	 sip’	 urban	 potable	 tap	 water	 provision	 system,	 which,	 to	 a	 large	 extent,	 disguises	 the	
distinctiveness	and	 complexity	 that	mentioned	above.	 To	have	a	 comprehensive	understanding	of	 this	
system,	next	Chapter	will	examine	three	institutional	incoherencies	existing	in	power/money/water	flows	
circulating	in	the	‘source	to	consumer’	semi-potable	tap	water	provision	system.	
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 Three	Institutional	
Incoherencies	in	China's	
Urban	Tap	Water	Provision	
System		
4.1 Introduction	
In	the	‘source	to	consumer’	semi-potable	tap	water	provision	system,	the	institutional	incoherencies	in	
the	 nexus	 of	 power/money/water	 flow	 is	 the	 foundation	 of	 Hybrid	 Institutional	 Architecture.	 The	
institutional	incoherency	in	power	flow	can	be	captured	in	three	relationships:	the	relationship	between	
government	 departments	 themselves,	 the	 relationship	 between	 government,	water	 company	 and	 the	
consumer,	and	the	relationship	between	consumer,	third	parties,	and	the	Hybrid	Institutional	Architecture.	
The	 institutional	 incoherencies	 in	money	 flow	 can	 be	 captured	 in	 the	 setting	 of	 water	 rates	 and	 the	
operation	of	water	companies.	Finally,	the	institutional	incoherencies	in	power	and	money	flow	leads	to	
the	institutional	incoherency	in	water	flow:	the	gap	between	the	strict	water	standard	and	semi-potable	
tap	water.	
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4.2 The	 grim	 situation	 of	 China's	 fresh	 water	
resources	
China	is	one	of	the	most	water-strapped	countries	in	the	world.	Fresh	water	resources	in	China	is	not	only	
scarce	 in	 quantity	 but	 also	 polluted	 in	 quality	 (Xie,	 2009;	 Crow-Miller,	 2015).	 Huge	 government	
investments	have	been	placed	to	prevent	fresh	water	pollution,	but	the	serious	situation	of	China’s	fresh	
water	resources	is	still	hardly	soothed,	if	not	even	worsened.	
The	scarcity	and	uneven	distribution	of	China’s	freshwater	resource	
Fresh	water	 resources	 in	China	accounts	 for	 just	6%	of	global	 freshwater	 resources.	 In	2014,	 the	 total	
renewable	internal	fresh	water	resources	in	China	was	2813	billion	cubic	meters,	ranking	5th	out	of	177	
countries	(The	World	Bank,	2017).	However,	as	shown	in	Figure	4.1,	from	1962	to	2013,	China’s	renewable	
internal	fresh	water	resources	per	capita	dropped	sharply	from	4225	to	2072	cubic	meters,	only	ranking	
102nd	out	of	177	countries.	The	average	world	figure	was	eight	times	higher	than	China’s.	As	a	result,	
China	is	in	the	group	of	‘water	scarcity’	countries,	whose	annual	fresh	water	availability	per	capita	is	under	
1000	cubic	meters	(Xie,	2009).	
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Figure	4.1:	China’s	renewable	internal	fresh	water	resources	per	capita	from	1962	to	201317	
Fresh	water	resources	in	China	is	not	only	scarce	in	its	amount	but	also	dispersed	unevenly,	which	caused	
unbalanced	 fresh	 water	 accessibility.	 Given	 the	 latest	 data	 of	 2015	 China	 Water	 Resources	 Bulletin	
(Ministry	of	Water	Resource,	P.	R.	China,	2017),	in	Northern	China,	the	Songhua,	Liao,	Hai,	Yellow,	Huai	
and	other	rivers	regions	contain	only	16.9%	of	China’s	total	fresh	water	resource.	The	other	83.1%	of	fresh	
water	resources	is	distributed	in	Southern	China,	including	the	Yangtze	(including	Tai	Lake),	Pearl	and	other	
rivers	regions.	It	also	pointed	out	that	the	average	rainfall	 in	Southern	China,	over	2,000	mm/year,	was	
five	 to	 ten	 times	 higher	 than	 in	Northern	 China.	 As	 a	 result,	 the	 fresh	water	 availability	 per	 capita	 in	
Northern	China	was	a	quarter	of	the	fresh	water	availability	per	capita	in	Southern	China,	one	eleventh	of	
the	world	average	fresh	water	availability	per	capita.	
	
																																								 																				
17	Source:	https://knoema.com/WBWDIGDF2015Oct/world-development-indicators-wdi-november-2015?tsId=1025060&origin=cn.knoema.com	Accessed:	7	April	2017	
Chapter	4	Three	Institutional	Incoherencies	in	China's	Urban	Tap	Water	Provision	System																		|	94	
	
Water	quality	of	China’s	major	rivers,	major	lakes,	major	reservoirs,	and	groundwater	
Water	quality	is	big	concern.	On	April	28,	2002,	NEPA	published	National	Environmental	Quality	Standards	
for	 Surface	Water	 (Ministry	of	Environmental	Protection	P.R.	China,	2002).	According	 to	 this	 standard,	
water	quality	is	classified	into	five	levels.	Note	here	that	such	classifcation	is	based	on	the	founctionality	
of	water	resource.	Grade	I	water	is	in	very	good	quality,	mainly	used	for	drinking	water	source	and	water	
in	natural	reserves;	Grade	II	water	is	in	good	quality,	primarily	used	for	drinking	water	source	and	animal	
habitats;	Grade	III	water	is	in	average	quality,	primarily	used	for	water	source,	aquaculture,	and	swimming	
zones;	Grade	IV	water	is	of	poor	quality,	primarily	used	for	industrial	production;	and	Grade	V	water	is	of	
very	 poor	 quality,	 primarily	 used	 for	 agriculture	 production.	 In	many	 contexts,	 there	 is	 another	 level,	
namely	lower	Grade	V,	representing	water	in	an	extremely	poor	quality.	Low	Grade	V	water	is	of	such	a	
bad	quality	that	it	lost	all	of	its	functionality.		
Given	the	official	data	published	by	MEP	(Ministry	of	Environmental	Protection,	P.	R.	China,	2015)	,	Figure	
4.2,	Figure	4.3,	and	Figure	4.4	demonstrate	the	water	quality	of	China’s	major	rivers,	major	lakes,	major	
reservoirs,	and	groundwater.	
Figure	4.2	demonstrates	the	water	quality	of	China’s	major	rivers	in	2014.	Given	their	remote	locations,	
the	water	quality	of	rivers	in	Southwest	and	Northwest	China	were	much	better	than	others.	The	water	of	
Pearl	 River	 and	 Yangtze	 River	 are	 also	 of	 a	 relatively	 good	 quality,	 though	 they	 both	 have	 a	 small	
percentage	of	water	in	extremely	poor	quality,	3.7%,	and	3.1%	respectively.	For	Yellow	River,	Songhua	River,	
Huai	River	and	Rivers	in	Zhe	and	Min	Areas,	most	of	their	water	was	of	average	quality,	which	means	that	
they	were	barely	used	as	water	sources.	For	the	Liao	and	Hai,	most	of	their	water	was	of	a	quality	below	
the	average	level,	which	meant	they	were	only	used	for	industrial	and	agriculture	production	purposes.	To	
conclude,	among	all	these	rivers,	only	2.8%	of	their	water	was	very	good	quality,	36.9%	of	good	quality,	
31.5%	of	average	quality,	15%	of	poor	quality,	4.8%	of	very	poor	quality	and	9%	of	extremely	poor	quality.	
It	means	that	only	71.2%	of	China’s	major	rivers’	water	can	be	used	for	tap	water	supply,	and	only	39.7%	
of	China’s	major	rivers’	water	could	be	considered	as	source	water	in	good	quality.	
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Figure	4.3	demonstrate	the	water	quality	of	China’s	major	lakes	and	reservoirs	in	2014.	Among	62	major	
lakes	and	reservoirs,	seven	had	water	in	very	good	quality,	11	had	water	in	good	quality,	20	had	water	in	
average	 quality,	 15	 in	 poor	 quality,	 4	 in	 very	 poor	 quality	 and	 5	 in	 extremely	 poor	 quality.	 The	main	
pollutant	was	phosphorus	from	the	intensive	usage	of	fertiliser	and	organic	pollution	derived	from	water	
eutrophication.	In	conclude,	only	61.3%	of	China’s	major	lakes	and	reservoirs’	water	can	be	used	for	tap	
water	supply,	and	only	29%	of	China’s	major	 lakes	and	reservoirs’	water	could	be	considered	as	source	
water	in	good	quality.	
Figure	 4.4	 demonstrates	 the	 water	 quality	 of	 China’s	 groundwater	 in	 2014.	 There	 was	 a	 significant	
difference	between	ground	water	quality	in	Northern	China	and	Southern	China.	In	Northern	China,	the	
groundwater	quality	was	much	worse	than	it	was	in	Southern	China.	Because	of	the	intermingling	between	
surface	water	and	ground	water,	 86.1%	ground	water	was	 from	surface	water,	which	 implied	 that	 the	
pollutions	in	both	the	groundwater	and	the	surface	water	were	transferable	(Ministry	of	Water	Resource,	
P.	 R.	 China,	 2014).	 Given	 the	 latest	 data	 published	 in	 2016,	 80%	 of	 groundwater	 resources	 has	 been	
polluted	by	 the	 transferred	agriculture	and	 industrial	 pollutant	existing	 in	 the	 surface	water	 resources	
(Shan,	 2016).	 Therefore,	 the	 pollution	 in	major	 rivers	 located	 in	 Northern	 China	 was	 transferred	 into	
groundwater.	The	monitoring	data	of	groundwater	in	the	Northern	17	provinces	showed	that	only	0.5%	of	
groundwater	 was	 very	 good	 quality	 and	 only	 14.7%	 of	 groundwater	 was	 in	 good	 quality,	 48.9%	 of	
groundwater	was	of	poor	quality,	and	35.9%	was	in	very	poor	quality.	The	main	pollutant	was	the	toxic	
organic	pollutant,	heavy	metal	pollution,	and	nitrogen	pollution.	
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Figure	4.2:	Water	quality	of	China’s	major	rivers	in	2014	
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Figure	4.3:	Water	quality	of	China’s	major	lakes	and	reservoirs	in	2014	
	
Figure	4.4:	Water	quality	of	China’s	groundwater	in	2014	
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The	rapid	expansion	of	China’s	water-served	population	
In	the	face	of	the	water	resource’s	poor	quality,	the	percentage	of	the	population	of	people	using	safely	
managed	drinking	water	services	(water-served	population)	increased	rapidly.	Given	WHO’s	definition18：	
Improved	drinking	water	source	is	a	source	that,	by	nature	of	its	construction,	adequately	
protects	the	water	from	outside	contamination,	in	particular	from	faecal	matter.	Common	
examples:	piped	household	water	connection,	public	standpipe,	borehole,	protected	dug	
well,	protected	spring	rainwater	collection.		
As	Figure	4.5	has	shown,	given	the	data	from	WHO/UNICEF	Water	Supply	Statistics	in	201519,	in	China	the	
proportion	of	total	population	served	with	piped	water	increased	from	28.3%	in	1990	to	73.07%	in	2015.	
It	surpassed	the	percentage	of	total	population	served	with	other	improved	water	in	1995,	which	means	
that	since	1995	there	are	more	Chinese	people	being	served	with	piped	water	than	those	who	fetched	
water	from	other	sources,	such	as	wells.	With	the	development	of	piped	water,	the	proportion	of	total	
population	served	with	other	improved	water	decreased	from	38.61%	in	1990	to	22.43%	in	2015.	In	urban	
areas,	the	change	was	not	as	significant	as	in	the	whole	country.	The	proportion	of	urban	tap-water-served	
population	increased	from	77.55%	in	1990	to	87.15%	in	2015,	whereas	the	percentage	of	the	urban	other-
improved-water-served	population	decreased	from	19.50%	in	1990	to	10.35%	in	2015.		
From	this	Figure	4.5,	two	crucial	facts	can	be	observed:	first,	the	government’s	efforts	of	developing	tap	
water	have	been	placed	on	expanding	piped	water	supply.	Second,	such	efforts	were	achieved	through	
replacing	the	other	improved	water	supply	with	piped	water	supply.	In	other	words,	during	the	25	years	
between	1990	and	2015,	the	tap	water	has	been	embedded	in	most	Chinese	people’s	lives	in	both	urban	
and	rural	areas.	Such	rapid	expansion	did	not	come	without	a	price.	As	Tao	Tao	and	Kunlun	Xin	 (2014)	
pointed	out,	diseases	caused	by	water	pollution,	such	as	liver	and	gastric	cancers,	lead	to	the	illness	of	190	
million	people	and	the	death	of	60,000	people	every	year	in	China.	The	catastrophic	outcomes	of	water-
borne	diseases	have	caught	the	government’s	attention.	In	the	same	paper,	they	indicated	that	as	much	
																																								 																				
18	Source:	http://www.who.int/water_sanitation_health/monitoring/jmp2012/key_terms/en/	
19	Source:	https://knoema.com/WHOWSS2014/who-unicef-water-supply-statistics-2015	Accessed:	7	April	2017	
Chapter	4	Three	Institutional	Incoherencies	in	China's	Urban	Tap	Water	Provision	System																		|	99	
	
as	four	trillion	RMB	has	been	invested	since	2011	as	part	of	the	central	government’s	Five-Year	Plan,	which	
aimed	to	upgrade	water	supply	facilities	such	as	pipelines	and	water	treatment	plants.		
	
Figure	4.5:	The	proportion	of	China’s	 total	and	urban	population	served	with	piped	water	and	other	
improved	water	from	1990	to	2015	
The	 grim	 situation	 of	 China’s	 fresh	 water	 resources	 has	 contributed	 to	 the	 formation	 of	 institutional	
incoherency.	On	one	hand,	the	serious	water	pollution,	especially	water	source	pollution,	has	formed	a	
difficult	challenge	to	both	water	administration	and	water	treatment	in	terms	of	power	and	money.	It	is	
also	directly	incoherent	with	the	strict	standards	of	tap	water	quality.	On	the	other,	the	rapid	expansion	of	
water-served	population	brings	up	a	huge	burden	to	every	agent	in	the	system,	making	them	prioritise	
stability	of	the	tap	water	provision	system	over	all	the	other	tasks,	including	the	task	of	produce	potable	
tap	water.	
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4.3 The	institutional	incoherency	in	power	flow	
Circulating	in	the	‘source	to	consumer’	urban	semi-potable	tap	water	provision	system	between	various	
power/money/water	 nexuses,	 the	 institutional	 incoherencies	 in	 power	 flow	 can	 be	 observed	 in	 three	
types	of	relationships.	In	respect	to	the	relationship	between	government	departments	themselves,	there	
is	an	institutional	incoherency	in	power	flow	of	the	transformation	of	administration	mechanism	and	the	
power	 redistribution	 between	 government	 departments.	 In	 respect	 to	 the	 relationship	 between	
government,	 water	 company	 and	 consumer,	 there	 is	 an	 institutional	 incoherency	 in	 power	 flow	 that	
demonstrates	in	the	water	supply	contract.	In	respect	to	the	relationship	between	consumer,	third	party	
and	Hybrid	 Institutional	 Architecture,	 there	 is	 an	 institutional	 incoherency	 in	 power	 flow	 leads	 to	 the	
dysfunction	of	the	third	party.	
4.3.1 China’s	legal	and	policy	framework	for	water	administration	
In	China,	legal	and	policy	documents	regarding	water	affairs	can	be	classified	into	a	nine-level	legal	and	
policy	 framework.	 As	 demonstrated	 in	 Figure	 4.6,	 in	 each	 administration	 level	 there	 are	 laws,	 rules,	
regulations	or	measures	of	managing	water	affairs	published	by	the	regulatory	department.	In	their	study,	
Liu	and	Speed	(2009)	did	not	integrate	measures	issued	by	the	municipal	government	and	its	subordinate	
department	into	their	water	management	policy	framework.	However,	these	measures	are	also	essential	
components	of	the	general	legal	system,	especially	given	the	fact	that	the	municipal	government	became	
the	main	administration	department	of	municipal	water	affairs	after	the	Super-Ministry	Reform.	As	a	result,	
it	is	departments	from	the	last	three	levels	in	Figure	4.6	that	implement	administration	of	water	affairs	at	
the	 local	 level,	 and	 measures	 published	 by	 them	 are	 always	 inspired	 and	 set	 by	 their	 local	 specific	
conditions.	As	a	contrast,	 legal	documents	issued	by	agents	of	the	first	six	administration	 levels	do	not	
include	 any	 details	 of	 tap	 water	 provision,	 but	 they	 have	 established	 a	 general	 legal	 context	 for	 the	
publication	of	detailed	legal	documents.	
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Figure	4.6:	China’s	nine-level	legal	and	policy	framework	of	water	affairs	
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China’s	five	major	government	plans	
Centring	around	a	nine-level	 legal	and	policy	 framework	of	water	affairs,	 there	are	 five	 types	of	major	
plans	associated	with	urban	tap	water	provision.	These	are	urban	comprehensive	plan,	water	resources	
allocation	plan,	water	resources	use	and	supply	plan,	drought	contingency	plan,	and	water	saving	plan.	
Given	 the	 fact	 that	 the	 administration	 power	 of	 urban	 water	 affairs	 has	 been	 separated	 from	 the	
administration	power	of	governments	and	departments	in	national,	provincial	and	river	basin	level	and	
bestowed	to	municipal	government	(this	will	be	revealed	 in	detail	 in	section	4.3.3),	these	plans	can	be	
roughly	classified	into	two	levels:	one	is	national,	provincial	and	river	basin	level,	the	other	is	municipal	
level,	as	demonstrated	in	Figure	4.7.	Cosier	and	Shen	(2009)	did	not	integrate	the	water	saving	plan	as	a	
major	component	of	the	policy	framework.	However,	the	proposal	of	constructing	a	water	saving	society	
is	a	crucial	interaction	between	the	government	and	the	consumer,	as	will	be	demonstrated	later.	For	this	
reason,	the	author	integrates	the	Water	Saving	Plan	into	this	system.	
	
Figure	4.7:	Five	types	of	government	plan	related	to	urban	tap	water	provision	
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The	Urban	Comprehensive	Plans,	including	the	national,	provisional	and	municipal	comprehensive	plan,	
constitutes	the	general	framework	to	decide	the	urban	development	in	the	next	one,	five	or	ten	years,	
which	includes	the	development	of	urban	tap	water	provision	system.		
The	 Water	 resources	 Allocation	 Plans	 are	 made	 on	 the	 catchment-based	 river	 basin	 level.	 They	 are	
constructed	 on	 the	 basis	 of	 water	 rights	 theory,	 a	 theory	 promoted	 by	 the	 central	 government	 and	
developed	rapidly	in	recent	years	and	a	mechanism	of	establishing	water	sharing	rights	in	and	between	
provincial	level,	especially	for	trans-provincial	river	(Sun,	2009,	p.190).	Given	both	the	Constitution	of	the	
People’s	Republic	of	China	and	the	2002	Water	Act,	water	resources	 in	China	is	owned	by	the	state	on	
behalf	of	the	people.	Thus,	what	is	controversial	is	not	the	ownership	of	water	resource,	but	the	right	of	
accessing	and	using	it.	The	power	of	managing	and	allocating	water	resources	in	a	national	scale	belongs	
to	central	government,	which	uses	Water	resources	Allocation	Plan	to	determine	the	distributed	amount	
of	water	resources	of	each	administrative	region	within	the	same	river	basin.		
The	Water	Use	and	Supply	Plans,	as	the	name	suggested,	are	plans	that	predict	water	demand	and	water	
usage	in	both	the	short-term	(annually)	and	long-term	(five	to	ten	years).		
In	periods	of	extreme	drought,	the	Drought	Contingency	Plans	function	with	the	priority	over	other	plans.	
It	aims	to	guarantee	the	basic	water	supply	to	urban	citizens.		
The	 Proposal	 of	 Constructing	Water-Saving	 Society	 is	 an	 essential	 developmental	 goal	 that	 has	 been	
claimed	for	more	than	30	years.	Since	it	has	a	deeper	connection	with	consumers	than	other	plans,	here	
it	is	worthwhile	to	elaborate	a	little	bit	about	the	analysis	of	this	plan.	
Hu	and	Wang	(2003,	p.464)	believes	that	it	is	the	fundamental	solution	for	China’s	water	resources	scarcity	
crisis.	The	goal	of	constructing	water-saving	society	is	to	‘reduce	the	cost	of	water	management	and	build	
up	 the	 incentive	 mechanism	 stimulating	 water-saving’	 (Hu	 and	 Wang,	 2003,	 p.464).	 This	 proposal	
demonstrates	that	the	central	government	is	trying	to	mould	the	consumer	to	a	certain	behavioural	mode.	
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China	initiated	its	water-saving	project	in	the	first	urban	water-saving	conference	in	1983.	This	is	also	the	
first	time	that	central	government	combines	the	water	affairs	with	society	in	the	form	of	a	political	slogan.	
Later	 in	1990,	the	term	‘water-saving	city’	was	coined	and	proposed	by	the	central	government,	which	
was	then	developed	into	‘water-saving	society’	in	the	10th	Five-Year	Plan	of	National	Development	in	2000	
(Hu	and	Wang,	2003,	p.470).	This	term	was	emphasised	from	time	to	time	in	the	later	11th,	12th	and	13th	
Five-Year	 Plan.	 This	 situation,	 on	 the	 one	 hand,	 demonstrates	 central	 government’s	 determination	 in	
achieving	 the	 goal	 of	 ‘water-saving’	 society.	 However,	 on	 the	 other,	 it	 also	 implicates	 the	 difficulty	 of	
reaching	this	goal.	In	December	2006,	Chinese	Minister	of	Water	resources	(MWR)	published	an	essential	
plan,	Water-Saving	 Society	 Eleventh	 Five-Year	 Plan,	 aiming	 to	 shift	 the	 whole	 society	 from	 the	 water	
consuming	 society	 to	 water	 saving	 society	 with	 the	 help	 of	 a	 series	 of	 water-saving	 and	 water-using	
technologies.	This	plan	asked	every	province	and	every	direct-controlled	municipality	to	publish	a	water	
saving	plan	on	the	basis	of	their	respective	water	condition	and	situation.	However,	the	implementation	
of	this	plan	is	problematic.	This	is	due	to	the	institutional	incoherency	in	power	flow,	particularly	in	respect	
to	the	communication	between	different	agents.	It	could	have	been	an	opportunity	for	the	government	
to	cooperate	with	third	parties,	such	as	NGOs	and	Industrial	Associations,	to	promote	the	administration	
of	tap	water.	However,	in	light	of	their	dysfunction,	demonstrated	in	section	4.3.5,	this	proposal	is	only	
implemented	in	the	governmental	and	departmental	level	rather	than	consumer	level.	The	only	regulation	
regarding	water	saving	was	published	by	MHURD	in	1988	and	has	never	been	revised	since	then.		
In	 sum,	 these	 five	 types	 of	 water	 plans	 have	 formed	 the	 legal	 basis	 for	 the	 circulation	 of	
power/money/water	flow	from	central	government	to	the	other	agents.	These	five	policy	frameworks	are	
updated	annually,	which	provides	the	latest	modifications	on	the	basis	of	the	condition	of	water	resources	
storage	and	usage.	
4.3.2 The	re-scaling	of	water	resources	governance	
Water	Law	has	been	considered	as	one	of	the	most	significant	milestones	in	the	developmental	trajectory	
of	legal	policies	over	China’s	water	affairs.	Located	in	the	second	most	senior	administration	level,	it	is	the	
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foundation	of	the	other	 legal	and	policy	documents.	However,	 in	respect	to	the	issues	regarding	urban	
water	 provision,	 a	 legal	 incoherency	 can	 still	 be	 observed	 in	 its	 development	 trajectory.	 The	 English	
translation	of	the	articles	of	the	laws	analysed	in	this	section	is	from	the	official	website	of	the	China’s	
Ministry	of	Commerce20.	
Aiming	to	discipline	chaotic	water	usage	and	flood	prevention	work	at	that	time,	on	21	January	1988,	the	
Standing	Committee	of	the	National	People’s	Congress	published	China’s	first	water	law,	the	1988	Water	
Law,	which	constituted	the	core	system	of	China’s	water	affair	management.	Regarding	this	law,	four	main	
points	are	worth	mentioning	here.	First,	water	resources	was	defined	as	the	combination	of	surface	water	
resources	 and	groundwater	 resource.	 Second,	 it	 regulated	 that	 all	 activities	 regarding	water	 resources	
development,	utilisation,	protection,	and	management	must	comply	with	this	law.	Third,	it	clarified	the	
ownership	of	China’s	water	resources	in	its	article	three:	‘water	resources	is	owned	by	the	state,	that	is,	
by	whole	people.’	Fourth,	it	clarified	the	administration	mode	of	China’s	water	resources	in	its	article	nine:	
‘The	 State	 shall,	 on	water	 resources,	 adopt	 a	 system	which	 combines	 unified	 administration	with	 the	
administration	 at	 various	 levels	 and	by	 various	 departments.	 The	department	of	water	 administration	
under	the	State	Council	shall	be	in	charge	of	the	unified	administration	of	water	resources	throughout	the	
country.	Other	relevant	departments	under	the	State	Council	shall,	by	the	duties	assigned	to	them	by	the	
State	Council,	be	in	charge	of	the	administration	of	water	resources	related	to	them	in	coordination	with	
the	department	of	water	administration	under	the	State	Council.	The	departments	of	water	administration	
and	other	relevant	departments	of	the	local	people’s	governments	at	or	above	the	county	level	shall	be	in	
charge	of	the	administration	of	water	resources	related	to	them	in	accordance	with	the	duties	assigned	to	
them	 by	 the	 people’s	 governments	 at	 the	 corresponding	 level.’	 This	 administration	mode	 had	 caused	
numerous	 conflicts	 over	 the	 power	 of	 water	 resources	 administration	 between	 different	 government	
																																								 																				
20	Source:	http://english.mofcom.gov.cn/article/lawsdata/chineselaw/200211/20021100053796.shtml	Accessed:	17	April	2017	
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departments.	 Many	 departments,	 such	 as	 the	 environmental	 protection	 department	 and	 forestry	
department,	claimed	that	they	had	been	bestowed	with	the	‘legal	power’	to	administrate	water	resource.	
The	catastrophic	flood	disaster	outbreak	in	Yangtze	River	in	1998	can	be	seen	as	the	turning	point	of	the	
development	of	China’s	Water	Law.	Being	considered	as	the	worst	Northern	China	flood	in	the	recent	40	
years,	 it	 resulted	 in	3,704	dead,	15	million	homeless	and	26	billion	dollars	of	economic	 loss.	After	 this	
tragedy,	China	entered	 into	 the	epoch	of	 constructing	extensive	 large-scale	hydraulic	 facilities.	 Experts	
from	the	Ministry	of	Water	Resources	Development	Research	Centre	presented	the	following	data	(h2o-
china.com,	2003):	 from	1998	 to	2002,	 the	 total	 investment	 from	 the	 central	 government	on	hydraulic	
projects	reached	178.6billion	Yuan,	which	was	2.36	times	higher	than	the	total	amount	of	government	
investments	in	hydraulic	projects	between	1949	and	1997.	125.8	billion	Yuan	state	treasury	bonds,	one-
fifth	of	its	total	value,	were	specifically	spent	on	the	hydraulic	project.	As	a	result,	dozens	of	thousands	of	
hydropower	plants,	water	 reservoirs,	 and	other	hydraulic	 facilities	have	been	built	 across	 the	 country.	
Between	2010	and	2012,	China’s	central	government	conducted	its	first	national	survey	of	water,	including	
the	survey	of	hydraulic	facilities	(Bulletin	of	First	National	Census	for	Water	(Text	in	Chinese)).	According	
to	 its	 result,	 there	were	98002	water	 reservoirs	 in	China	with	a	 total	 capacity	of	932.312	billion	 cubic	
meters.	There	were	46,758	hydropower	plants	with	the	total	installed	capacity	of	333	million	kilowatts.	
There	are	268,476	water	gates	along	rivers,	 lakes,	and	ponds,	which	are	surrounded	by	dams	of	a	total	
length	of	413,679	kilometres.	
In	the	face	of	such	massive	and	unprecedented	investments,	the	1988	Water	Law	was	calling	for	a	new	
revision.	Meanwhile,	to	straighten	the	unified	administration	of	the	MWR,	the	State	Council	adjusted	the	
duties	and	powers	of	a	 series	government	departments	 in	1998,	aiming	 to	 transfer	 the	administrative	
power	over	water	resources	from	several	other	departments	to	the	MWR.	This	reform	paved	the	path	for	
the	 incoming	2002	Water	 Law.	On	 29	August	 2002,	 the	 Standing	 Committee	 of	 the	National	 People’s	
Congress	passed	the	2002	Water	Law.	Purposed	on	October	1	in	the	same	year,	it	replaced	the	previous	
1988	Water	Law.	Only	two	articles	with	two	clauses	in	the	1988	Water	Law	were	retained	in	2002	Water	
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Law,	whereas	the	other	40	articles	with	61	clauses	were	revised	and	the	rest	of	the	16	articles	and	23	
clauses	were	deleted.	Another	43	articles	with	63	clauses	are	added	in	the	2002	Water	Law.	The	chapter	
about	flood	control	was	deleted	in	the	2002	Water	Law	since	there	is	another	law	covering	it.	Two	new	
chapters	regarding	water	resources	plan	and	water	dispute	resolution,	supervision	and	inspection	were	
added.	This	can	be	seen	as	a	re-scaling	of	governance	of	water	resources,	a	 transition	to	new	political	
structures.	
Several	major	changes	in	the	2002	Water	Law	are	worth	noting.	First,	the	new	water	law	puts	the	water	
conservation	and	water	protection	in	prominent	positions.	Three	new	essential	concepts	were	added	in	it:	
water	conservation,	sustainable	use	of	water	resources	and	water-saving	society.	All	of	them	were	derived	
from	National	Economic	and	Social	Development	Plan	for	Tenth	Five-Year	Period	2000-2005,	a	strategic	
and	fundamental	guidance	for	China’s	government	administration	published	on	11	October	2000.	In	this	
seminal	guidance,	 it	emphasised	the	 importance	of	sustainable	use	of	water	resources,	highlighting	 its	
strategic	position	in	China’s	economic	and	social	development.	Also,	it	pointed	out	that	the	core	means	to	
achieve	this	goal	is	to	improve	the	efficiency	of	water	use,	to	promote	water	conservation	measures,	to	
develop	water-saving	agriculture,	industry,	and	services,	and	to	establish	a	water-saving	society.	This	is	the	
first	time	for	central	government	to	officially	present	a	concept	combining	water	and	social	development,	
representing	the	intricacy	between	them.	
Here,	there	are	another	two	changes	that	deserve	to	be	highlighted.	First,	 in	the	2002	Water	Law,	 the	
description	of	water	resources	ownership	was	changed:	 ‘Water	resources	are	owned	by	the	State.	The	
State	Council,	on	behalf	of	the	State,	exercises	the	right	of	ownership	of	water	resources.’	The	word	‘people’	
was	omitted	from	the	law.	This	means	that	no	people	in	China	have	any	legal	right	to	claim	the	ownership	
of	water	resource.	The	state’s	power	over	water	resources	is	further	strengthened	and	clarified.		
Second,	the	old	water	resources	administration	mode	from	the	1988	Water	law	was	deleted.	The	2002	
Water	Law	presented	a	new	administration	mode	to	replace	the	administration	mode	of	a	combination	of	
unified	 administration,	 hierarchical	 administration	 and	 departmental	 administration	 presented	 in	 the	
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1988	Water	Law.	Due	to	the	ambiguity	of	the	previous	administration	mode,	in	1997	the	National	People’s	
Congress	 organised	 an	 inspection	 over	 the	 implementation	 of	 the	1988	Water	 Law.	 As	 a	 result,	 they	
concluded	 that	 ‘the	 appropriate	 water	 resources	 administration	 mode	 is	 the	 combination	 of	 unified	
administration	 and	 hierarchical	 administration	 but	 not	 departmental	 administration.	 It	 is	 necessary	 to	
constitute	 the	 administration	 structure	 in	 accordance	with	 river	 basin.	 The	 new	 administration	mode	
should	 make	 river	 basin	 as	 the	 unit	 to	 implement	 unified	 planning,	 configuration,	 supervision,	 and	
administration.’	(Huang	and	Chen,	2000,	p.218).	As	a	result,	article	12	of	the	2002	Water	Law	defined	the	
new	water	resources	administration	mode:	‘For	water	resources,	the	State	applies	the	system	under	which	
management	of	river	basins	is	combined	with	management	of	administrative	regions.’	In	its	article	13,	it	
also	 redefined	 the	 duties	 and	 responsibilities	 of	 related	 departments,	 emphasising	 that	 ‘the	 relevant	
departments	under	the	State	Council	shall,	in	conformity	with	the	division	of	their	duties,	be	responsible	
for	work	relating	to	the	development,	utilisation,	conservation	and	protection	of	water	resources.’	The	
1988	Water	Law	allowed	other	relevant	departments	to	be	integrated	into	the	administration	of	water	
resources,	 resulting	 in	 the	 power	 conflict.	 The	 2002	 Water	 Law	 clarified	 that	 the	 powers	 of	 other	
government	 departments	 over	 water	 resources	 were	 limited	 in	 the	 scope	 of	 exploration,	 utilisation,	
conservation	and	protection.	
The	2002	Water	Law	confirmed	the	legal	position	of	the	MWR	and	its	sub-department.	Seven	major	sub-
departments	 were	 established	 to	 administrate	 seven	major	 river	 basins:	 Changjiang	Water	 Resources	
Commission;	The	Yellow	River	Conservancy	Commission;	Huaihe	Conservancy	Commission;	Haihe	River	
Water	 Conservancy	 Committee;	 Pearl	 River	 Water	 Resources	 Commission;	 Songliao	 water	 resources	
commission;	and	Taihu	River	Basin	Management	Bureau.	All	of	 those	seven	sub-departments	have	the	
power	to	manage	and	supervise	the	water	resources	within	their	administrative	regional	scope.	They	are	
also	responsible	for	making	related	plans	in	river	basin	level,	as	has	been	demonstrated	in	figure	4.7.	
In	general,	the	2002	Water	Law	is	China’s	key	water	legislation	and	provides	a	comprehensive	framework	
for	 integrated	 water	 management.	 It	 defines	 and	 strengthens	 the	 power	 of	 river	 basin	 commissions,	
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replacing	the	old	water	resources	administration	mode	with	the	combination	of	administration	of	river	
basins	and	administration	of	administrative	regions.	It	also	paves	the	way	for	the	establishment	of	water	
resources	ownership,	water	abstraction	rights,	water	resources	plan,	water	resources	development	and	
utilisation,	the	conservation	of	water	resources	and	dispute	settlement.	
However,	the	departmental	administration	is	hard	to	replace.	Some	departments	are	reluctant	to	hand	
over	their	administration	power.	Some	departments	still	have	significant	influences	on	the	administration	
of	certain	fields	even	after	they	handed	over	their	administration	power.	As	will	be	revealed	in	next	section,	
in	the	case	of	the	administration	of	urban	tap	water,	the	MHURD,	though	has	been	asked	to	hand	over	all	
its	 power	 to	 municipal	 government	 by	 the	 central	 government,	 still	 keeps	 its	 influences	 through	
regulations,	 standards,	 and	 Industrial	 Associations,	 which	 brings	 inconsistency	 to	 the	 power	 flows	
circulating	in	Hybrid	Insitutional	Architecture.	
4.3.3 The	institutional	incoherency	in	administration	of	urban	water	
affair	
One	important	aspect	of	the	power/money/water	nexus	is	the	way	various	agents	have	been	affected	by,	
and	 the	 extent	 to	 which	 they	 have	 tried	 to	 implement,	 three	 important	 government	 administration	
reforms	-	the			Institutional	Reform	of	the	State	Council	in	1998,	the	Integrated	Water	Affair	Administration	
Reform	in	2000,	and	the	Super-Ministry	Reform	in	2008.	Some	studies	discussed	the	effects	of	the	first	
reform,	but	few	have	analysed	the	effects	of	the	second	reform,	not	to	mention	examining	the	combined	
effects	of	the	two	reforms	together.	This	section	aims	to	analysis	the	effects	of	two	reforms	together,	so	
as	 to	 reveal	 the	 internal	 institutional	 incoherency	 in	 the	 administration	 of	 urban	 tap	 water	 provision	
system.	
From	1998	to	2008,	these	three	administration	reforms	of	urban	tap	water	provision	system	have	triggered	
two	institutional	incoherencies	in	power	flow	between	three	departments	in	ministry	level.	The	first	one	
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is	between	the	MWR	and	the	MHURD,	and	the	second	one	is	between	MWR	and	MEP.	These	incoherent	
power	flows	dramatically	complicate	the	administration	mechanism	of	urban	tap	water	provision	system.	
As	has	been	highlighted	in	the	previous	section,	given	the	article	9	of	the	1988	Water	Act,	‘the	state	shall,	
with	 respect	 to	 water	 resources,	 adopt	 a	 system	 which	 combines	 unified	 administration	 with	
administration	at	various	levels	and	by	various	departments’	(Water	Act	of	the	People's	Republic	of	China	
1988	 (Text	 in	 Chinese)).	 Since	 then,	 China	 has	 gradually	 established	 a	 hierarchy	 and	 departmental	
administration	mechanisms	to	manage	all	water	affairs,	including	urban	tap	water	provision.	Before	2000,	
urban	tap	water	provision	system	was	mainly	administrated	by	municipal	construction	department	instead	
of	water	resources	department.	This	is	due	to	the	fact	that	the	operation	of	this	system	depends	on	the	
construction	of	water	treatment	plant	and	pipeline,	which	is	the	responsibility	of	municipal	construction	
department.		
A	hierarchy	and	departmental	administration	mechanism	is	also	emphasised	in	the	National	Urban	Water	
Supply	Regulation.	Published	by	the	State	Council	on	19	July	1994,	this	regulation	is	still	valid	until	now.	It	
claims	 in	 article	 7	 that	 ‘In	 the	 national	 level,	 the	 urban	 tap	 water	 provision	 is	 administrated	 by	 the	
construction	 department	 of	 State	 Council;	 In	 provincial	 and	 autonomous	 level,	 the	 urban	 tap	 water	
provision	is	administrated	by	the	construction	department	of	provincial	and	autonomous	government;	In	
municipal	 level,	 the	 urban	 tap	 water	 provision	 is	 administrated	 by	 the	 urban	 water	 provision	
administrative	department	decided	by	the	local	municipal	governmen’	(translated	by	the	author)	(National	
Urban	Water	Supply	Regulation	(text	in	Chinese)).	From	this	regulation,	this	hierarchy	and	departmental	
administration	 mechanism	 contains	 three	 levels:	 the	 top	 level	 demonstrates	 the	 administration	
mechanism	 of	 central	 government.	 The	 middle	 level	 demonstrates	 the	 administration	 mechanism	 of	
provincial	 government.	 The	 bottom	 level	 demonstrates	 the	 administration	 mechanism	 of	 municipal	
government.	Note	here	that	even	in	municipal	level	the	administrative	department	is	decided	by	the	local	
municipal	 government,	 the	 latter	 would	 usually	 rely	 on	 municipal	 construction	 department	 in	 the	
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administration	of	urban	tap	water	provision	system,	so	as	to	connect	this	department	with	its	superior	
departments	in	provincial	and	national	level.	
	
Figure	 4.8:	 The	 hierarchy	 and	 departmental	 administration	 mechanism	 of	 China’s	 urban	 tap	 water	
provision	system	before	Super-Ministry	Reform	
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As	shown	in	Figure	4.8,	 in	the	national	 level,	the	central	government	can	be	considered	as	the	original	
source	of	flow	of	power	circulating	in	the	urban	tap	water	provision	system.	Within	each	administration	
mechanism,	there	are	five	major	departments	involved	in	the	administration	of	urban	tap	water.	In	the	
national	level,	they	are	the	Ministry	of	Health	(MH),	Ministry	of	Housing	and	Urban-Rural	Development	
(MHURD),	Ministry	of	Water	resources	(MWR),	National	Environmental	Protection	Administration	(NEPA),	
and	National	Development	and	Reform	Commission	(NDRC).	They	were	all	managed	by	the	State	Council,	
which	bestowed	flows	of	power	to	each	of	them	respectively.	These	ministries	then	bestow	their	flows	of	
power	to	their	subordinate	departments	at	the	provincial	level,	which	then	bestow	flows	of	power	to	their	
subordinate	departments	at	the	municipal	level.		
Note	 here	 that	 the	money	 flow	 is	 not	 circulating	 in	 a	 same	 top-down	manner	 as	 the	 power	 flow.	On	
December	27,	2002,	MC	published	the	Opinion	on	Promoting	Marketisation	Process	of	Municipal	Public	
Utility	Industry		(Opinion	on	Promoting	Marketisation	Process	of	Municipal	Public	Utility	Industry	（Text	
in	Chinese）),	which	permitted	the	franchise	of	urban	tap	water	provision.	It	claimed	distinctly	that	the	
franchised	public	utility	companies	should	 ‘assume	sole	responsibility	 for	 its	profits	or	 losses’.	Also,	on	
October	30,	2003,	MWR	published	 the	Provisional	Regulation	of	 Investment	 in	Capital	Construction	of	
Water	Conservancy	(Provisional	Regulation	of	Investment	in	Capital	Construction	of	Water	Conservancy	
（Text	 in	 Chinese）).	 In	 its	 article	 5,	 it	 classified	urban	 tap	water	 provision	 as	 one	of	 the	 commercial	
projects	of	water	conservancy.	In	its	article	13,	it	claimed	that	‘the	capital	of	central	government’s	water	
conservancy	 would	 be	 mainly	 invested	 in	 public	 welfare	 and	 semi-public	 welfare	 projects	 of	 water	
conservancy.	 For	 commercial	 projects	 of	water	 conservancy,	 the	 central	 government	may	 arrange	 the	
proper	amount	of	initial	capital	in	accordance	with	specific	policies	to	promote	the	development	of	water	
conservancy.’	In	other	words,	the	central	government	would	not	invest	heavily	in	the	construction	project	
of	urban	tap	water	provision	system,	since	its	attribution	is	‘commercial	project	of	water	conservancy'.	For	
example,	 in	1988,	 the	capital	of	 constructing	Huaya	 tap	water	 treatment	plant	 in	Henan	province	was	
partially	 from	 the	 loan	 of	 Canada	 government	 and	 partially	 collected	 by	 the	 local	 municipal	 utility	
Chapter	4	Three	Institutional	Incoherencies	in	China's	Urban	Tap	Water	Provision	System																		|	113	
	
department	 and	 municipal	 tap	 water	 company	 (Jia,	 2000,	 p.105).	 There	 was	 no	 capital	 from	 central	
government	investing	in	this	project.		
Regarding	water	resources	administration,	the	most	powerful	ministry	is	the	MWR,	but	before	2000,	its	
administration	only	covers	hydraulic	construction,	flood	control	and	drought	control	and	cannot	expand	
to	administration	of	urban	tap	water	provision.	Thus,	it	did	not	publish	any	standards	regarding	urban	tap	
water	in	its	name.	In	contrast,	since	the	quality	of	tap	water	demands	certain	supervisions,	MH	and	MEP	
are	 involved	 in	 the	 administration	of	 urban	 tap	water	provision.	 The	 former	has	published	a	 series	of	
significant	 regulations,	 rules,	 and	 standards	 regarding	 the	quality	 of	 tap	water	 (introduced	 in	 detail	 in	
section	 4.5).	 The	 latter	 is	mainly	 in	 charge	of	 the	 protection	of	 the	 environment	 of	 tap	water	 source.	
Meanwhile,	NDRC	and	its	subordinated	departments	in	provincial	and	municipal	level	are	responsible	for	
setting	urban	water	rates.		
As	 shown	 in	 Figure	 4.8,	 in	 the	 hierarchy	 and	 departmental	 administration	 mechanism,	 superior	
departments	have	a	strong	influence	on	their	subordinate	departments,	to	which	they	can	directly	assign	
flow	of	power.	Meanwhile,	as	shown	in	three	squares	of	dotted	line	in	the	figure,	in	each	level,	government	
council	also	play	a	pivotal	role	in	administration.	In	some	research	on	Chinese	political	science,	these	two	
different	administration	modes	have	a	metaphorical	jargon:	‘the	stripe	and	block	pattern’	(Xu,	1996;	Ma,	
1998;	 Liu,	 2002;	Wu,	 2003;	 Zhou,	 2005).	 This	 is	 because	 the	 former	 administration	mode	makes	 the	
departments	from	national	 level	to	municipal	 level	composing	a	‘stripe’	of	administration,	whereas	the	
latter	administration	mode	makes	the	departments	at	each	level	composing	a	‘block’	of	administration.	
The	inevitable	conflicts	between	these	two	administration	modes	is	named	as	‘the	segmentation	of	stripe	
and	block’	(ibid.).	
Therefore,	 for	 the	 central	 government,	 the	 most	 serious	 problem	 in	 administrating	 urban	 tap	 water	
provision	is	to	reconcile	the	dispersed	flows	of	power	between	‘stripes’	and	‘blocks’.	Given	this	situation,	
the	central	 government	and	 the	MWR	attempted	 to	 initiate	an	 Integrated	Water	Affair	Administration	
Reform.	In	1998,	the	First	Plenary	Session	of	the	Ninth	National	People’s	Congress	of	CPC	granted	the	plan	
Chapter	4	Three	Institutional	Incoherencies	in	China's	Urban	Tap	Water	Provision	System																		|	114	
	
of	Institutional	Reform	of	the	State	Council,	which	redefined	the	functions	of	each	ministry.	In	this	reform,	
the	administration	power	of	urban	water	groundwater,	urban	flood	control,	urban	water	usage	plans	and	
urban	water	saving	was	deprived	from	MHURD.	The	former	two	administration	power	was	bestowed	to	
MWR,	whereas	the	latter	two	was	bestowed	to	municipal	government.	As	a	result	of	this	reform,	MWR	
finally	had	a	chance	to	be	involved	in	the	administration	of	urban	water	affairs.	Meanwhile,	the	municipal	
government	was	also	for	the	first	time	to	be	the	main	administer	of	municipal	urban	water	affairs.	However,	
MHURD	still	keeps	certain	amount	power	in	administrating	urban	water	affairs	in	this	reform,	because	this	
reform	bestowed	MHURD	the	power	to	instruct	urban	tap	water	provision,	urban	water	saving,	and	urban	
groundwater	exploitation	and	protection.	Moreover,	since	this	 reform	did	not	overthrow	the	hierarchy	
and	departmental	administration	mechanism	established	in	the	aforementioned	National	Urban	Water	
Supply	 Regulation,	 construction	 department	 was	 still	 held	 the	 main	 power	 in	 urban	 water	 affair	
administration.		
The	Institutional	Reform	of	the	State	Council	also	bestowed	the	NEPA	the	political	position	of	a	ministry.	
However,	its	function	was	still	limited	in	many	areas,	hence	was	incapable	of	competing	with	MWR	and	
MHURD.	Not	until	the	Super-Ministry	Reform	in	2008	does	it	possess	enough	power	to	be	paralleled	with	
the	former	two	ministries.	
The	Institutional	Reform	of	the	State	Council	was	the	first	step	for	State	Council	and	MWR	to	launch	a	new	
water	resources	administration	system.	This	effort	was	finally	embodied	in	the	plan	of	Fifth	Plenary	Session	
of	the	15th	National	People’s	Congress	of	the	CPC	in	2000.	In	this	session,	the	central	government	for	the	
first	 time	 made	 a	 strategic	 decision	 to	 ‘reform	 the	 administration	 institution	 of	 the	 water	 resource’	
(Ministry	of	Water	Resource,	P.	R.	China,	2005,	p.1).	As	introduced	in	the	previous	section,	this	reform	was	
aiming	 to	 replace	 the	 hierarchy	 and	 departmental	 administration	 mechanism	 through	 establishing	 a	
combined	administration	mechanism	between	river	basins	administration	and	regional	administration.	In	
other	words,	it	attempts	to	modify	the	‘stripe	and	block	pattern’	of	water	affair	administration	(see	Figure	
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4.8)	into	a	more	integrated	administration	pattern,	centralising	all	related	power	into	one	department	in	
ministry,	provincial,	river	basin	and	municipal	level.		
As	has	been	highlighted	in	the	previous	section,	the	publication	of	2002	Water	Law	reflected	such	effort	
in	ministry,	provincial,	and	river	basin	level.	At	the	municipal	level,	State	Council	and	MWR	have	promoted	
the	Integrated	Water	Affair	Administration	Reform,	aiming	to	integrate	the	administration	power	of	urban	
water	affair	into	a	newly	established	municipal	department,	the	MWAB.		
Historically	speaking,	the	MWR	has	never	mastered	any	power	regarding	urban	tap	water	provision,	nor	
has	it	published	any	regulation	and	standard	on	this	field.	In	contrast,	the	other	ministries,	especially	the	
MHURD,	 had	 issued	 several	 regulations	 and	 standards.	 Besides,	 the	 National	 Urban	 Water	 Supply	
Regulation	 is	 still	 valid,	 which	 clearly	 confirms	 the	 administration	 power	 of	 MHURD	 in	 national	 and	
provincial	level.	Given	that,	the	MWR	initiated	the	Integrated	Water	Affair	Administration	Reform	not	from	
the	top-down,	but	from	bottom-up	direction.	In	other	words,	this	reform	is	not	undertaken	at	the	national	
and	the	provincial	 level,	but	at	the	municipal	 level.	Thus,	the	administration	power	of	municipal	water	
provision	becomes	the	arena	of	the	power	conflict	between	MHURD	and	MWR,	which	contributes	to	the	
form	of	the	Hybrid	Institutional	Architecture	introduced	in	section	3.4.		
In	fact,	the	Integrated	Water	Affair	Administration	Reform	was	initiated	much	earlier	than	2000	in	some	
large	cities.	In	July	1993,	Shenzhen	established	China’s	first	MWAB.	However,	its	function	did	not	extend	
much	from	the	urban	water	supervision	and	flood	control	(Pu,	2005).	Admittedly,	it	is	still	unclear	that	it	
was	 Shenzhen’s	 political	 reform	 that	 prompted	 the	 MWR	 to	 initiate	 the	 reform	 of	 Integrated	
Administration	of	Water	Affair,	or	 it	was	 the	MWR	who	chose	Shenzhen	as	 the	 first	 city	of	 its	 reform.	
However,	what	can	be	confirmed	is	that	there	are	numerous	political	considerations	behind	this	decision.	
Firstly,	 Deng	 Xiaoping,	 the	most	 significant	 political	 figure,	 and	 the	 ‘the	 architect	 of	 China’s	 economic	
transformation’	in	China	at	that	time,	visited	Shenzhen	city	in	1992	during	his	famous	political	tour,	the	
Southern	Tour	of	China.	This	provided	Shenzhen	the	political	environment	for	reform.	Secondly,	as	the	first	
of	 the	 five	 Special	 Economic	 Zones,	 Shenzhen’s	 innovative	 political	 reforms	 are	more	 acceptable	 and	
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tolerable	 for	 the	 central	 government	 than	 they	 were	 in	 other	 places	 of	 China.	 Following	 Shenzhen’s	
breakthrough,	another	important	city	in	China,	Shanghai,	established	its	MWAB	on	13	May	2000,	the	same	
year	of	Fifth	Plenary	Session	of	the	15th	National	People’s	Congress	of	the	CPC.	
However,	and	understandably,	since	this	reform	aimed	to	redistribute	the	power	flow,	it	confronted	with	
numerous	obstacles.	For	example,	an	urgent	notice	published	by	the	Organisation	Commission	of	Central	
Government	on	18	September	2002	impeded	the	momentum	of	reform.	In	the	third	article,	it	asked	that	
‘if	the	newly-established	water	affair	agencies	have	not	granted	by	their	superior	department,	they	shall	
be	 annulled’;	 In	 the	 fourth	 article,	 it	 asked	 that	 ‘those	 municipal	 governments	 who	 have	 not	 yet	
established	new	water	affair	agency	shall	not	establish	new	water	affair	agency’	(translated	by	the	author)	
(Organization	Committee	of	Central	Government,	2002,	p.1).	It	is	important	to	point	out	that	this	urgent	
notice	published	just	20	days	after	the	2002	Water	Law,	delivering	a	strong	political	signal	to	municipal	
governments	that	the	publication	of	the	2002	Water	Law	may	not	counteract	the	institutional	incoherency	
in	power	flow.	One	explanation	for	the	publication	of	this	abrupt	notice	is	that	on	27	December	2002,	as	
a	milestone	of	marketisation	 reform	of	 urban	public	 utility,	MHURD	published	Opinions	 on	Promoting	
Urban	 Public	 Utility	Marketisation	 Process,	 the	 first	 legal	 document	 in	 China’s	 history	 to	 advance	 the	
franchise	operation	in	urban	public	utility	industry.	Obviously,	the	promotion	of	Integrated	Water	Affair	
Administration	Reform	would,	to	some	extent,	counteract	the	 implementation	of	marketisation	reform	
promoted	 mainly	 by	 MHURD,	 because	 the	 former	 reform	 would	 negatively	 influence	 the	 MHURD’s	
administration	of	 urban	public	 utilities	 in	water	 provision	 system.	Consequently,	 there	 is	 a	 disjunction	
between	the	reform	in	power	flow	and	the	reform	in	money	flow.	
Until	 March	 24,	 2004,	 besides	 Tibet	 Autonomous	 Region,	 52%	 of	 administration	 areas	 in	 China	 has	
established	their	local	MWAB	(Shen	and	Jiang,	2005).	It	seems	like	an	impressive	record.	However,	another	
fact	needs	to	be	emphasised:	since	the	establishment	of	Shenzhen	Municipal	Water	Affair	Bureau	in	1993,	
the	MWR	has	spent	11	years	 in	promoting	this	reform.	This	 low	efficiency	 implicates	the	difficulties	of	
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redistributing	 the	 power	 flow.	 Moreover,	 many	 MWABs	 are	 still	 under	 the	 influence	 of	 construction	
department	in	provincial	and	national	level.		
Some	literatures	have	discussed	the	difficulties	on	the	municipal	level.	Given	the	data	of	a	survey	about	
China’s	1097	Municipal	Water	Affair	Bureaus,	only	68%	of	them	have	the	power	to	administrate	local	water	
provision	issues	(Zhang,	2004,	p.35).	For	example,	in	the	case	of	Chongqing,	many	county	governments	
subordinated	 to	Chongqing	only	 transferred	 the	power	of	administrating	water	 company	 to	 their	 local	
water	 affair	 departments,	 leaving	 many	 other	 powers,	 such	 as	 the	 power	 of	 administering	 sewage,	
drainage,	water	resources	protection	and	water	saving,	still	in	hands	of	other	departments	(Xu,	2006).	In	
another	case,	the	MWAB	of	Zibo	was	established	on	the	basis	of	its	former	water	resources	department,	
and	are	guided	by	the	local	construction	department	(Huang	et	al.,	2006).	Compared	with	these	studies,	
other	 types	 materials	 may	 present	 more	 information.	 For	 example,	 an	 anonymous	 government	
investigation	report21	about	the	implementation	of	the	reform	of	Integrated	Administration	of	Water	Affair	
in	an	unnamed	province	of	China	discussed	how	municipal	departments	resisted	the	reform22.	For	example,	
given	the	problem	happened	in	the	processes	of	the	pipeline	construction	and	road	construction,	 local	
MWAB	has	to	give	back	the	administration	power	of	tap	water	pipeline	to	the	local	MCHURD.		
However,	all	of	these	difficulties	in	municipal	level	are	merely	the	reflection	of	the	incoherencies	in	power	
flow	in	institutional	level	between	MWR	and	MHURD.	In	general,	four	incoherencies	can	be	noticed:	
First,	the	hierarchy	administration	mechanism,	which	has	been	developed	for	more	than	12	years	since	
1988,	functions	in	many	areas.	They	already	formed	a	system	where	every	department	was	assigned	with	
a	certain	power.	It	is	extremely	difficult	to	redistribute	the	power	flow.	
																																								 																				
21	Source:	http://blog.sina.com.cn/s/blog_425cff370100b842.html	Accessed:	22	December	2016	
22	This	report	was	published	in	a	blogger	on	15	December	2008.	The	publisher	noted	at	the	beginning	of	this	report	that	‘given	the	sensitivity	of	its	content,	all	names	and	data	
appeared	in	the	report	are	anonymous.’	
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Second,	 this	 reform	does	not	have	any	support	 from	the	current	 legal	 framework.	The	National	Urban	
Water	 Supply	 Regulation	 was	 still	 valid.	 Until	 today,	 the	 central	 government	 has	 not	 published	 any	
regulations	and	laws	to	support	the	Integrated	Water	Affair	Administration	Reform.	All	of	the	backing	of	
the	reform	is	from	government	notice,	guidance,	decision	and	other	types	of	document.	Many	of	them	
are	 published	by	 the	MWR	 itself.	 In	 2011,	 the	 State	 Council	 published	 the	State	 Council’s	Decision	 on	
Promoting	the	Hydraulic	Reform.	It	claimed	to	‘improve	the	administration	mechanism	of	water	resource’	
and	 ‘strengthened	 the	 integrated	administration	of	urban	and	 rural	water	 resource’	 (translated	by	 the	
author)	(The	State	Council’s	Decision	on	Promoting	the	Hydraulic	Reform	（Text	in	Chinese）,	p.4).	This	
statement	was	believed	to	be	evidence	supporting	the	reform	(Lv,	2015),	but	it	has	no	legal	power	as	the	
National	Urban	Water	Supply	Regulation.	
Thirdly,	the	administration	system	of	MWAB	is	problematic	at	the	provincial	level.	Given	the	data	of	2003	
(Zhang,	2004,	p.31),	in	total	there	were	912	MWAB	being	established	in	provincial,	municipal	and	county	
level.	Another	185	municipal	governments	just	transferred	the	power	of	administration	water	affairs	from	
the	other	departments	to	the	local	water	resources	bureau.	In	addition,	most	MWAB	is	established	only	
by	changing	the	name	of	local	water	resources	bureaus	(Zhang,	2004).	All	these	water	resources	bureaus	
were	previously	subordinate	to	the	administration	of	provincial	water	resources	department.	However,	
since	they	have	been	transformed	into	MWAB	and	responsible	for	administrating	urban	water	provision,	
given	 the	National	 Urban	Water	 Supply	 Regulation	 they	 should	 subordinate	 to	 the	 administration	 of	
provincial	 construction	 department.	 In	 other	 words,	 the	 MWAB	 has	 two	 conflicted	 administrators:	
provincial	water	resources	department	and	provincial	construction	department.	What’s	worse,	since	this	
reform	is	a	bottom-up	reform,	there	 is	no	corresponding	administration	arrangement	 in	provincial	and	
national	level.	As	a	result,	the	administration	power	of	urban	water	provision,	which	was	deprived	from	
construction	department	in	the	Institutional	Reform	of	the	State	Council	in	1998,	is	back	to	the	hand	of	
construction	department	again.	
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Fourth,	when	the	redistribution	of	flow	of	power	influences	departmental	interests,	some	departments	
would	have	resistance	to	the	reform.	The	redistributed	power	flow	enables	MWAB	to	take	over	the	power	
of	charging	different	fee,	which	previously	belongs	to	other	departments.	Thus,	such	redistribution	may	
trigger	departmental	conflicts.	For	example,	 in	Zibo,	 the	conflict	between	 the	MWAB	and	 the	MEPB	 is	
around	the	power	of	charging	pollution	discharge	fee	(Huang	et	al.,	2006).		
To	further	promote	the	reform,	in	February	2005,	the	MWR	published	a	notice,	the	Guidance	on	‘Deepen	
the	Water	Administration	Institution	Reform’.	It	defines	the	water	affair	administration	as:	
In	the	context	of	integrated	administration	of	water	resource,	water	affair	administration	
is	an	 integrated	administration	of	all	water	associated	affairs.	 It	 includes	the	integrated	
administrations	of	water	 resources	 in	both	 the	urban	and	rural	areas,	of	 flood	control,	
water	resource,	water	supply,	water	usage,	water	saving,	sewage,	waste	water	treatment	
and	recycle,	farming	hydraulic	construction,	conservation	of	water	and	soil	and	even	the	
affairs	of	rural	hydropower	(The	guidance	on	‘deepen	the	water	administration	institution	
reform'	（Text	in	Chinese),	p.2).	
Given	this	definition,	the	MWR	attempts	to	seize	the	administration	power	from	the	hands	of	several	other	
departments,	especially	the	MHURD,	who	has	been	in	charge	of	the	administration	of	urban	water	supply	
and	waste	water	treatment.	The	publication	of	this	guidance	intensifies	the	power	conflict	between	the	
MWR	and	MHURD.	As	a	response,	in	the	same	year,	the	latter	published	at	least	three	legal	documents	
regarding	urban	tap	water	supply	to	strengthen	its	power,	including	two	standards,	the	Urban	tap	water	
Quality	Standard	and	the	Water	Quality	Standards	for	Fine	Tap	Water,	and	one	plan,	the	2010	Urban	Water	
Supply	 Sector	Development	and	Technological	 Progress	Plan.	 The	power	 conflict	 over	urban	 tap	water	
supply	seems	to	have	reached	a	stalemate.	
However,	 this	 confrontation	 did	 not	 last	 for	 long.	 In	 2008,	 the	 central	 government	 initiated	 another	
institutional	reform,	the	Super-Ministry	Reform,	which	redefines	the	administration	areas	of	each	major	
ministry	again.	Different	from	the	Institutional	Reform	of	the	State	Council	in	1998,	this	reform	deprived	
power	of	administration	urban	water	affairs	from	both	MWR	and	MHURD.	Given	the	article	of	the	Notice	
of	the	General	Office	of	the	State	Council	on	Issuing	the	Provisions	on	the	Main	Functions,	Internal	Bodies	
and	Staffing	of	the	Ministry	of	Water	Resources,	published	on	10	July	2008,	the	MWR	needs	to	‘[…]	hand	
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over	the	administration	of	urban	water	affair	to	the	local	municipal	government,	who	is	in	charge	of	the	
administration	of	water	supply,	water	saving,	sewage	treatment,	and	waste	water	treatment.	The	relevant	
ministries	 and	 departments	 are	 only	 responsible	 for	 providing	 operational	 guidance’	 (Notice	 of	 the	
General	Office	of	the	State	Council	on	Issuing	the	Provisions	on	the	Main	Functions,	Internal	Bodies	and	
Staffing	of	the	Ministry	of	Water	Resources	（Text	in	Chinese),	p.3).	Given	the	article	of	the	Notice	of	the	
General	Office	of	the	State	Council	on	Issuing	the	Provisions	on	the	Main	Functions,	Internal	Bodies	and	
Staffing	of	the	Ministry	of	Housing	and	Urban-Rural	Development,	the	MHURD	needs	to	‘[..]	hand	over	the	
specific	 administration	 responsibilities	 regarding	 urban	 administration	 to	 municipal	 government,	 who	
shall	decide	the	administration	mechanism	on	municipal	public	utilities,	afforestation,	water	supplying,	
sewage,	waste	water	treatment’	(Notice	of	the	General	Office	of	the	State	Council	on	Issuing	the	Provisions	
on	 the	 Main	 Functions,	 Internal	 Bodies	 and	 Staffing	 of	 the	 Ministry	 of	 Housing	 and	 Urban-Rural	
Development	（Text	 in	Chinese),	p.1).	Both	notices	have	clearly	described	the	power	that	needs	to	be	
handed	over,	which	highlighted	the	central	government’s	determination	in	promoting	this	reform.	Both	
MWR	 and	MHURD	 now	 only	 have	 the	 power	 to	 offer	 guidance	 on	municipal	water	 affairs.	Municipal	
government	becomes	the	only	administrator	of	municipal	water	affairs.		
In	this	reform,	the	MH	keeps	its	power	of	supervising	the	quality	of	tap	water,	but	has	to	hand	over	the	
power	 of	 evaluating	 the	 technology	of	 products	 associated	with	 tap	water,	 domestic	water	 treatment	
equipment	 and	 other	 new	 material	 and	 chemical	 compound	 in	 touch	 with	 tap	 water	 to	 the	 public	
institutions	 (Notice	 of	 the	 General	 Office	 of	 the	 State	 Council	 on	 Issuing	 the	 Provisions	 on	 the	Main	
Functions,	 Internal	 Bodies	 and	 Staffing	 of	 the	 Ministry	 of	 Health（Text	 in	 Chinese),	 p.1).	 Another	
department,	NEPA,	has	been	transformed	into	a	ministry,	namely	the	MEP	(Notice	of	the	General	Office	
of	the	State	Council	on	Issuing	the	Provisions	on	the	Main	Functions,	Internal	Bodies	and	Staffing	of	the	
Ministry	of	Water	Resources	（Text	in	Chinese),	p.3).	
The	integrated	administration	mechanism	is	shown	in	Figure	4.9.		
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Figure	4.9:	The	integrated	administration	mechanism	of	China’s	urban	tap	water	provision	system	after	
Super-Ministry	Reform	
As	 Figure	 4.9	 shows,	 compared	 to	 the	 hierarchy	 and	 departmental	 administration	mechanism	 before	
Super-Ministry	Reform,	the	new	 integrated	administration	mechanism	makes	all	of	 the	 flows	of	power	
concentrated	in	the	municipal	government.	The	other	departments	have	lost	their	administration	power.	
They	can	only	provide	guidance	to	the	work	of	municipal	government,	as	shown	by	dotted	arrows	in	the	
figure.		
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In	general,	the	influence	of	Super-Ministry	Reform	on	the	administration	of	municipal	water	affairs	can	be	
summarised	into	three	points:	
First,	this	reform	can	be	seen	as	an	attempt	to	solve	the	institutional	incoherencies	in	power	flow	between	
MWR	and	MHURD.	The	central	government	has	observed	the	problematic	power	flow	in	administration	
system	of	MWAB	 in	provincial	 level.	 This	 level	 is	 the	mediation	 level	between	 the	municipal	 level	 and	
national	level.	Taking	into	account	the	dynamic	of	inertia	of	hierarchy	and	departmental	administration	
mechanism,	 if	 central	 government	 bestows	 the	 administration	 power	 of	 municipal	 water	 affairs	 to	
provincial	department,	 the	hierarchy	and	departmental	administration	 system	would	 still	 survive.	As	a	
result,	it	would	be	extremely	difficult	to	promote	the	Integrated	Water	Affair	Administration	Reform	from	
municipal	level.	Therefore,	since	the	provincial	level	of	administration	has	been	proved	problematic,	the	
Super-Ministry	Reform	directly	deprived	the	administration	power	from	provincial	departments.	
Second,	owing	to	this	reform,	many	problems	at	the	municipal	water	affair	administration	can	be	solved.	
For	example,	the	cooperation	problem	between	various	departments	in	the	municipal	level	now	can	be	
settled	by	municipal	government.	
Third,	 this	 reform	 paves	 the	 way	 for	 promoting	 the	 marketisation	 of	 urban	 public	 utility.	 With	 the	
centralised	administration	power,	the	municipal	government	now	is	capable	of	attracting	private	capital	
to	 invest	 in	 tap	water	 supply	 system	and	 sewage	 treatment	 system.	 In	 fact,	 in	 the	 interview	with	 the	
investment	 officer	 of	 BEWG,	 he	 admitted	 that	 private	 capital	 is	more	 interested	 in	 sewage	 treatment	
system	than	tap	water	supply	system.	
However,	 the	Super-Ministry	Reform	also	 transferred	many	problems	 from	 the	national	 and	provincial	
level	 to	 the	 municipal	 level.	 It	 is	 now	 municipal	 government’s	 responsibility	 to	 answer	 the	 difficult	
questions	as	followed:	how	to	deal	with	the	problem	of	departmental	interests	in	the	process	of	promoting	
Integrated	Water	Affair	 Administration	Reform?	How	 to	 differentiate	 the	 ‘guidance’	 from	 the	 superior	
department	 and	 the	 ‘administration’	 from	 the	 municipal	 government?	 How	 to	 prevent	 the	 potential	
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conflict	between	the	local	interests	and	the	national	interests?	These	new	problems,	in	some	senses,	are	
even	more	challenging	than	the	old	ones.		
Also,	since	the	goal	of	the	Integrated	Water	Affair	Administration	Reform	has	yet	been	thoroughly	achieved,	
a	new	dramatic	reform	in	water	affairs	administration	have	triggered	new	incoherency	in	power	flow.	For	
example,	in	this	reform,	MWR	is	asked	to	be	‘responsible	for	water	resources	protection,'	whereas	MEP	is	
asked	to	be	‘responsible	for	water	environment	quality	and	water	pollution	control’	(Notice	of	the	General	
Office	of	the	State	Council	on	Issuing	the	Provisions	on	the	Main	Functions,	Internal	Bodies	and	Staffing	of	
the	Ministry	 of	Water	 Resources	（Text	 in	 Chinese),	 p.3).	 Here,	 the	 power	 boundary	 between	 water	
resources	protection,	water	environment	quality,	and	water	pollution	control	is	ambiguous.	When	water	
resources	 is	 polluted,	 the	 responsibility	 can	 be	 assigned	 to	 either	 ministry.	 This	 new	 institutional	
incoherency	in	power	flow	leads	to	the	incoherency	in	power	flow	between	MEPB	and	MWAB	in	water	
administration,	which	will	be	highlighted	in	Chapter	6.	
In	conclusion,	to	some	extent,	all	of	the	three	reforms,	the	 Institutional	Reform	of	the	State	Council	 in	
1998,	the	Integrated	Water	Affair	Administration	Reform	in	2000,	and	the	Super-Ministry	Reform	in	2008,	
share	 the	 same	 goal:	 they	 all	 try	 to	 redistribute	 the	 power	 from	 construction	 department	 to	 other	
departments,	either	water	resources	department	or	municipal	government.	What	is	behind	this	process	
is	 the	 fact	 that	 administration	 mechanism	 has	 been	 transformed	 from	 hierarchy	 and	 departmental	
administration	mechanism	to	integrated	administration	mechanism.	In	the	second	reform,	the	power	is	
integrated	 into	 the	 hand	 of	 water	 resources	 department,	 whereas	 in	 the	 third	 reform,	 the	 power	 is	
integrated	into	the	hand	of	municipal	government.	However,	from	a	legal	sense,	this	power	redistribution	
conflict	with	the	National	Urban	Water	Supply	Regulation.	In	a	practical	sense,	MHURD	has	published	a	
series	of	tap	water	standards.	All	these	documents	are	still	valid	now,	which	means	that	MHURD	still	can	
impose	 its	 influence	on	urban	water	affairs.	Moreover,	 as	will	 be	highlighted	 in	 section	4.4.2,	MHURD	
became	 the	 leading	 department	 in	 the	 marketisation	 reform,	 which,	 to	 a	 large	 extent,	 further	
strengthened	its	control	of	and	influence	on	public	water	supply	utilities.		
Chapter	4	Three	Institutional	Incoherencies	in	China's	Urban	Tap	Water	Provision	System																		|	124	
	
Meanwhile,	 in	 respect	 to	 the	 administration	of	water	 source,	 the	MEP	 and	 the	MWR	now	has	 a	 new	
institutional	 incoherency.	These	two	institutional	 incoherencies	reveal	an	essential	weakness	of	China’s	
central	 command	mode	 of	 economy	 and	 administration:	 once	 there	 is	 an	 institutional	 incoherency	 in	
departmental	administration	at	the	Ministry	level,	it	would	transmit	to	departmental	administration	at	the	
municipal	level,	resulting	in	the	constitute	of	Hybrid	Institutional	Architecture	of	semi-portable	tap	water	
provision	system.	
4.3.4 China’s	urban	water	supply	contract	
In	the	Hybrid	Institutional	Architecture,	water	company	occupies	a	special	position:	it	is	the	intermediator	
between	the	government	and	the	consumer.	It	helps	the	government	in	fulfilling	its	obligation	of	providing	
tap	water	to	its	citizens.	It	charges	water	rates	from	the	consumer	as	its	income	to	sustain	the	operation	
of	water	treatment	plants	and	the	company.	During	these	processes,	the	water	company	established	two	
different	relationships	with	government	and	consumer	respectively.	Their	different	characteristics	reflect	
the	 institutional	 incoherency	 in	 power	 flow	 in	 China’s	 urban	 tap	 water	 provision	 system.	 To	 further	
illustrate	this	incoherency,	it	is	worthwhile	to	examine	China’s	urban	water	supply	contract.	
China’s	urban	water	 supply	 contract	 is	 a	 legal	document	 signed	by	 the	water	 company	and	consumer,	
which	lists	their	responsibilities	and	obligation.	It	can	be	seen	as	a	nexus	between	the	government,	the	
water	company,	and	the	consumer.	By	signing	this	contract,	the	consumer	and	water	company	officially	
establish	a	reciprocal	balanced	flow	of	power	and	money	between	each	other.	Such	flows	are	rarely	be	
seen	in	the	consumers’	relationships	with	other	agents	in	the	tap	water	provision	system.	
In	 this	balance,	both	 sides	have	 the	 certain	power	 to	 influence	 the	other’s	behaviours.	Accompanying	
these	influences,	the	money	can	flow	from	the	consumer	to	the	water	company	as	either	water	rates	or	
fines,	or	from	water	company	to	consumer	as	the	compensation	for	inconsistent	water	supply.	In	some	
cities,	 such	 as	 Beijing	 and	 Shanghai,	 this	 contract	 is	 legally	 mandatory	 for	 tap	 water	 service.	 The	
government	plays	the	role	of	intercessor	in	the	conflict	between	the	water	company	and	the	consumer.	
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Although	 it	 is	 a	 crucial	 component	 of	 the	 relationship	 between	 the	water	 company	 and	 consumer,	 in	
China’s	academia,	the	study	of	water	supply	contract	is	absent	for	long	time.	Given	the	searching	result	in	
China	National	 Knowledge	 Infrastructure23	(CNKI),	 the	 largest	 academic	 publication	 database	 in	 China,	
only	a	handful	papers	regarding	tap	water	supply	contract	have	been	published.	Such	neglect	is	another	
piece	of	evidence	reflecting	the	dominance	of	physical	and	managerial	research	on	water	affairs	in	China	
(see	Swyngedouw,	2009).	 It	 also	exposes	 the	 lack	of	 considerations	of	 relationships	between	different	
agents	in	current	urban	tap	water	provision	system.	
For	water	supply	contract	itself,	some	articles	are	unequal	to	the	consumer.	The	fact	behind	these	articles	
is	that	water	companies	try	to	take	advantage	of	their	monopoly	in	water	provision	to	infringe	consumer’s	
legal	rights,	either	through	the	mean	of	exempting	themselves	from	their	legal	obligations	or	through	the	
mean	of	strengthening	the	obligations	of	the	consumer.	A	typical	example	of	this	is	the	abolishment	of	
Beijing’s	water	supply	contract.		
On	November	1	1999,	the	MHURD	and	the	State	Administration	for	Industry	and	Commerce	published	a	
template	of	urban	water	supply	contract,	asking	their	subordinated	departments	to	adopt.	However,	this	
template	 triggered	 the	 conflict	 between	 Beijing	 Waterworks	 Group	 (BWG)	 and	 Beijing	 Consumer	
Association	(BCA).	In	2001,	the	BCA	delivered	their	critical	opinions	through	pointing	out	five	problems	in	
the	 contract.	 First,	 this	 template	 is	 only	 for	 the	 contract	 between	 the	 water	 company	 and	 other	
organisations,	but	BWG	adopted	it	as	a	contract	between	the	water	company	and	tap	water	consumer.	
Second,	the	contract	claimed	that	it	was	‘[…]	building	on	the	basis	of	negotiation	between	water	supplier	
and	consumer’	(Beijing	Consumer	Association,	2001).	However,	there	is	no	room	for	negotiation	between	
the	water	company	and	the	consumer	at	all.	Third,	it	did	not	mention	the	consistency	of	the	tap	water	
flow	and	quality,	which	should	be	the	obligation	of	every	water	company.	Fourth,	it	asked	the	consumer	
to	install	the	water	meter	but	did	not	mention	the	quality	and	other	relevant	issues	about	it.	Fifth,	it	asked	
																																								 																				
23	Source:	http://www.cnki.com.cn/index.htm	Accessed:	1	March	2017	
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the	consumer	to	pay	the	overdue	fine	on	the	daily	basis	if	they	failed	to	pay	the	water	rates	on	time.	It	
also	bestowed	the	water	company	the	improper	right	to	stop	supplying	water	after	the	water	users	fail	to	
pay	the	water	rates	for	four	months,	which	violated	the	basic	right	for	a	citizen	to	have	water.	Given	all	
these	 criticisms,	 the	 Beijing	 Municipal	 Commission	 of	 City	 Administration	 and	 Environment,	 the	
administrator	of	BWG,	abolished	the	water	supply	contract	on	May	30	2001.	
What	can	be	observed	from	this	case	is	that	the	establishment	and	implementation	of	the	water	supply	
contract	were	both	problematic.	This	is	due	to	the	hybrid	characteristic	of	the	water	company	as	being	a	
semi-commercial	and	semi-government	entity.	Although	BWG	was	trying	to	transform	itself	from	such	an	
entity	into	a	company	in	marketization	reform	of	urban	public	utility,	which	will	be	introduced	in	section	
4.4.2,	it	still	kept	certain	dynamic	inertia	of	power	flow	that	influenced	its	attitude	towards	the	consumer.		
Taking	a	closer	look	about	the	relationship	between	government	and	water	company,	this	thesis	believes	
that	 it	 is	 still	 by	and	 large	 command-driven,	even	 though	 it	may	not	be	as	direct	 as	 it	was	before	 the	
marketisation	reform	of	urban	public	utility	(introduced	in	section	4.4.2).	For	instance,	water	companies	
have	to	undertake	the	supervision	of	at	 least	 five	government	departments:	 the	MWAB,	which	 is	 their	
direct	 superior;	 the	MEPB,	which	monitors	 the	quality	 of	water	 source;	 the	MHB,	which	oversees	 the	
quality	of	 tap	water;	 the	MCHURB,	which,	 in	some	cities,	supervises	 the	operation	of	water	 treatment	
plants	and	pipeline;	and	the	PDRC,	which	is	in	charge	of	the	modification	of	water	rate.	Thus,	although	the	
water	companies	can	enjoy	a	certain	degree	of	independence	as	being	an	independent	company,	they	still	
have	 to	 be	 subjected	 to	 the	 government	 commands	 and	 supervision,	 functioning	 to	 some	 extents	 as	
external	government	departments.	In	the	case	above,	although	BWG	was	trying	to	transform	itself	from	a	
hybrid	entity	into	a	company	in	marketisation	reform	of	urban	public	utility,	it	still	kept	certain	dynamic	
inertia	of	power	flow	that	influenced	its	attitude	towards	the	consumer.	Thus,	to	a	water	company,	the	
water	contract	template	they	received	from	MHURD	is	not	only	a	commercial	document	but	more	like	a	
government	protocol.	Due	to	their	dynamic	inertia	of	power	flow	of	being	SOE,	water	companies	is	not	as	
sensitive	as	the	other	companies	to	the	legal	and	ethical	risks	behind	the	water	contract.	
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Meanwhile,	this	thesis	believes	that	the	relationship	between	the	water	company	and	consumer	is	semi-
command-driven	and	semi-commercial-driven.	This	is	due	to	two	factors:	the	water	company’s	monopoly	
of	tap	water	provision	in	the	certain	area,	and	the	consumer’s	confusions	on	the	characteristics	of	both	
the	water	company	and	its	service.	They	have	mutually	affected	each	other.		
Without	the	stimulation	from	free	market	competition,	water	company	 is	mainly	focusing	on	financing	
and	construction	but	not	improving	the	quality	of	their	water	supply	service	(China	Water	Supply	Service	
Promotion	Alliance,	2013).	From	the	consumer’s	perspective,	water	company’s	monopoly	is	recognised	as	
a	 defining	 characteristic	 of	 governmental	 department	 rather	 than	 a	 commercial	 entity.	 Thus,	 few	
consumers	can	distinguish	the	business	characteristic	from	governmental	characteristic.	Such	a	confusion	
also	 influences	 their	 recognition	 of	 the	 governance	 of	 urban	 tap	water	 provision.	 For	 consumers,	 this	
service	can	be	seen	either	as	a	public	service	provided	by	the	government	department	or	as	a	commercial	
service	provided	by	the	commercial	entity.		
Taking	a	closer	inspection,	it	can	be	observed	that	this	confusion	is	nourished	by	two	facts:	
First,	 in	China’s	academia,	 little	attention	has	been	paid	to	the	theoretical	analysis	of	 individual’s	water	
right.	Most	of	the	discussions	around	water	right	are	predicated	on	a	national,	provincial	and	municipal	
level	 regarding	 the	 allocation	 and	 trade	 of	water.	 Therefore,	 the	 question	 of	 ‘who	 should	 control	 and	
manage	the	water	resource’	is	not	as	pivotal	as	it	is	in	many	western	scholars’	works	(Swyngedouw,	2009;	
Bakker,	2013;	Harvey,	2015).	The	central	government	has	been	legally	appointed	and	widely	accepted	as	
the	only	legitimate	controller	and	manager	of	China’s	water	resource.	Although	in	many	remote	areas	of	
China	people	can	enjoy	free	groundwater	from	self-built	water	supply	facilities	without	considering	much	
about	 the	 water	 right,	 in	 general	 level	 the	 water	 right	 is	 so	 tightly	 controlled	 in	 the	 hands	 of	 the	
government	that	few	would	call	on	the	water	right	at	an	individual	level.	As	has	been	introduced	in	section	
4.3.1,	in	China,	the	awareness	of	property	right	on	the	water	resources	is	established	only	in	a	national	
level	(Wang,	2000;	Shen	and	Chen,	2002;	Sun,	2009).	It	has	never	has	been	fully	established	at	an	individual	
level.	
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Second,	most	consumers	are	not	well-informed	by	either	the	government,	the	media	or	the	third	parties	
about	the	institutional	and	marketization	reform.	As	a	result,	they	still	believe	that	the	water	company	is,	
as	it	used	to	be,	a	department	of	the	government.	Moreover,	both	the	water	company	and	the	government	
have	no	intention	of	clarifying	this	confusion.	For	the	water	companies,	this	confusion	helps	them	to	take	
advantage	of	the	power	and	money	flows	circulated	between	water	companies	and	the	consumer.	For	the	
government,	this	confusion	can	strengthen	their	regulation	on	the	water	company.	On	the	one	hand,	this	
confusion	makes	 the	 water	 company	 rely	more	 on	 the	 government.	 On	 the	 other,	 even	 if	 the	 water	
company	triggers	some	troubles,	the	government	can	easily	escape	from	taking	responsibilities	by	claiming	
that	the	water	company	is	an	independent	commercial	entity.		
The	 ineffective	 communication	 and	 the	 resulted	 knowledge	 gap	 between	 the	 government,	 the	water	
company	and	the	consumer	have	sustained	for	a	long	time.	As	will	be	demonstrated	in	the	next	section,	
the	third	parties	are	also	dysfunctional	in	either	promoting	the	communication	or	bridging	such	knowledge	
gap	between	these	agents,	making	 it	become	one	of	the	seven	facilitating	factors	of	Consumer	Coping	
Strategy	Matrix	introduced	in	section	3.5.3.	In	this	sense,	it	can	be	said	that	this	confusion	contributes	to	
the	form	of	Consumer	Coping	Strategy	Matrix.	
In	 sum,	 this	 confusion	 strengthens	 consumers’	 powerlessness	 in	 their	 relationship	 with	 the	 Hybrid	
Institutional	 Architecture.	 The	 monopoly	 of	 water	 company	 means	 that	 consumers	 cannot	 have	
alternative	access	to	water	if	they	refuse	to	sign	their	name	on	the	water	supply	contract.	In	other	words,	
even	 being	 conditioned	 by	 a	 series	 of	 water	 resources	 and	 provision	 management	 regulations,	
monopolisation	has	bestowed	a	dramatic	bargaining	power	to	the	water	company.	Consumers	have	no	
power	to	choose	another	water	company	 if	 their	current	water	company	violate	certain	articles	 in	 the	
contract.	In	contrast,	the	water	company	has	the	power	to	refuse	to	provide	water	service	to	consumers	
if	the	latter	violate	certain	articles	in	the	contract.	In	most	cases,	the	cost	of	legal	action	is	unaffordable	
for	consumers	to	enforce	the	water	company	to	pay	compensation,	but	water	company	has	the	power	to	
enforce	the	consumer	to	pay	the	fine	by	cutting	off	 the	water	supply.	Thus,	with	the	absent	of	certain	
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neutral	and	external	supervisions	on	water	company,	this	contract	can	be	seen	as,	by	and	large,	a	reflection	
about	the	imbalanced	power	between	the	Hybrid	Institutional	Architecture	and	the	consumer,	making	the	
relationship	 between	 the	water	 company	 and	 consumer	 semi-command-driven	 and	 semi-commercial-
driven.	
4.3.5 The	dysfunction	of	the	third	party	
One	serious	problem	of	the	Hybrid	Institutional	Architecture	of	the	urban	tap	water	provision	system	in	
China	is	the	problematic	information	disclosure	between	the	agents	in	the	system	and	consumers.	What	
is	behind	this	problem	is	the	institutional	incoherency	in	power	flow	in	the	relationship	between	consumer,	
third	party	and	Hybrid	Institutional	Architecture.	
Tap	water	consumers	who	wish	to	seek	answers	to	their	concerns	regarding	the	water	supply	always	have	
to	interact	with	the	powerful	Hybrid	Institutional	Architecture.	This	reveals	the	fact	that	there	is	an	absent	
of	 neutral	 and	 independent	 institutional	 representation	 for	 tap	 water	 consumer.	 This	 representation	
ideally	would	be	provided	by	a	third	party	separate	from	the	government	and	water	company	that	could	
operate	with	some	independence	from	the	influences	of	both	the	water	company	and	the	government.	
Such	an	independent	third	party	would,	if	it	existed,	play	a	pivotal	role	in	monitoring	and	regulating	the	
system,	as	well	as	in	representing	the	consumer’s	interests.	
Examples	exist	in	other	countries.	A	third	party	can	be	an	independent	regulator	in	the	government,	such	
as	the	DWI24	(Drinking	Water	Inspectorate)	in	the	UK;	it	can	be	an	NGOs,	such	as	those	that	are	deeply	
involved	in	the	construction	of	water	provision	system	in	some	towns	in	African	countries25;	it	can	be	an	
industrial	associations,	such	as	the	IWA	(The	International	Water	Association).	
																																								 																				
24	Source:	http://dwi.defra.gov.uk/about/index.htm	Accessed:	10	March	2017	
25	Source:	http://www.unicef.org/somalia/wes_1069.htm	Accessed:	10	March	2017	
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However,	China	has	a	unique	situation:	it	would	be	extremely	hard,	if	not	impossible,	for	an	organisation	
such	 as	 DWI	 to	 function	 in	 China	with	 certain	 independence	 from	 Chinese	water	 companies	 and	 the	
various	government	bodies	involved	in	the	water	provision	system.	The	Red	Cross	Society,	one	of	the	most	
influential	independent	regulators,	is	operated	in	China	with	a	pattern	of	GONGO	(Government-Organized	
Non-government	Organization)	(Huang,	Deng,	Wang	and	Edwards,	2013).	Certainly,	it	cannot	operate	in	
China	as	a	‘third	party’	independent	from	the	water	company	and	government.	
Both	the	overseas	and	local	Chinese	NGOs	have	made	some	efforts	to	monitor	Chinese	tap	water	provision	
systems,	but	their	efforts	are	limited	(as	discussed	below),	and	their	findings	and	information	about	their	
work	 are	 not	 available	 to	 the	 public.	 As	 for	 industrial	 associations,	 they	 receive	political	 and	 financial	
supports	 from	various	government	ministries	and	water	companies.	As	a	 result,	 their	 independence	 is	
doubtful.	
This	section	explores	in	detail	these	limitations	in	the	monitoring	and	representation	for	the	consumer	by	
NGOs	and	Industrial	Associations.	It	argues	that	the	consumer	has	been	alienated	in	the	system	and	has	
no	information	sources	to	inform	them	of	any	changes	to	the	tap	water	provision	system.	This	alienation	
deprives	the	consumer	of	power	they	should	have	by	national	law,	municipal	regulations	and	water	supply	
contract.	The	interview	materials	of	two	interviewees,	one	from	NGO	and	one	from	Industrial	Association,	
are	 integrated	 into	 the	 analyses.	 For	 confidentiality,	 the	 interviewee	 from	 Industrial	 Association	 is	
anonymous	and	is	referred	to	and	quoted	as	he/she.	All	interview	quotations	in	this	section	are	translated	
by	the	author	from	Chinese	into	English.	
The	dysfunction	of	NGO	
China’s	tap	water	NGOs	have	to	confront	two	troubles.	On	the	one	hand,	the	development	of	NGOs	 is	
restricted	by	government	regulations.	On	the	other,	their	developments	are	limited	by	little	publicity	and	
social	support.	82%	of	China’s	NGOs	are	established	after	2000,	56%	of	them	have	fewer	than	10	staff,	72%	
of	NGOs’	annual	budget	is	less	than	100,000	US	dollars,	39%	did	not	register	as	NGOs	but	either	as	‘Private	
Non-enterprise’	or	did	not	register	at	all	 (Shieh	and	Brown-Inz,	2013,	p.4).	This	phenomenon	occurs	 in	
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China	 because	 the	 registration	 standard	 for	 Social	 organizations	 is	 much	 higher	 compared	 to	 the	
registration	standard	for	Enterprises.	Only	those	who	have	connections	with	 local	registration	agencies	
can	be	registered	as	social	organizations	(Shieh	and	Brown-Inz,	2013,	p.12).		
The	threshold	for	registration	of	overseas	tap	water	NGOs	is	gradually	getting	higher.	 In	May	2015,	the	
government	published	a	controversial	draft	of	China’s	Overseas	NGOs	Management	Law	(National	Peoples	
Congress	Standing	Committee,	P.	R.	China,	2015).	It	required	that	overseas	NGOs	have	to	be	registered	
and	supervised	by	the	Ministry	of	Public	Security	rather	than	the	Ministry	of	Civil	Affairs	as	they	previously	
were	 (Article	 7).	 These	NGOs	 also	 have	 to	 be	managed	 by	 the	 ‘related	 agencies’	 on	 the	 national	 and	
provincial	 level	 (Article	 7).	 Permission	 for	 all	 their	 temporary	 activities	 has	 to	 be	 granted	 by	 their	
supervisory	agencies	unless	they	are	labeled	as	China’s	official	cooperative	NGOs	(Article	19).	Besides	the	
restricted	government	regulations,	oversees	NGOs	face	other	problems	as	well.	Even	though	many	NGOs	
have	 done	numerous	works	 on	 issues	 regarding	 tap	water	 security,	 their	 research	 is	 to	 a	 large	 extent	
inaccessible	for	most	of	China’s	tap	water	consumers.	For	example,	an	overseas	NGO	based	in	Hong	Kong,	
China	Water	Risk,	does	not	even	have	a	full	Chinese	version	of	its	research	resources	on	its	website.	At	the	
same	time,	those	few	reports	that	have	been	translated	into	Chinese	are	not	widely	publicised	on	China’s	
web	search	engines	at	all.	
The	situation	of	 local	 tap	water	NGOs	 is	much	more	complicated.	For	example,	 in	 the	 interview	of	Liu	
Chunlei,	 the	 founder	 and	 leader	 of	 Qingyun	 Environmental	 Information	 Technology	 Service	 Centre	
(QEITSC),	 a	 small	 local	 NGO	 based	 in	 Shanghai,	 he	 admitted	 that	 to	 have	 a	 legal	 identity,	 he	 had	 to	
registered	his	organisation	as	‘Private	Non-enterprise’.	Organisations	so	registered	are	required	to	have	a	
supervision	agent	from	the	government.	Their	supervision	agent	is	the	Environmental	Protection	Bureau	
of	Minxing	District	of	Shanghai	Liu	explained.		
’This	 situation	 is	 conditioned	 by	 the	 policy	 and	 laws.	 Before	 2014,	 if	 you	want	 to	 be	 registered	 as	 an	
organisation	you	have	to	find	a	supervision	agent.	Many	organisations	cannot	find	supervision	agents,	so	
they	failed	in	registering.’		
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Liu	further	admitted	that	this	supervision	agent	must	be	the	government	agent	and	it	‘has	certain	impacts’	
on	 QEITSC’s	 activities.	 The	 supervision	 agent	 must	 review	 and	 approve	 the	 annual	 inspection	 of	 the	
organisation,	as	well	as	all	of	the	procedures	of	the	organisation’s	activities.	While	emphasising	that	this	
kind	of	interference	is	‘relatively	infrequent’,	Liu	Chunlei	at	the	same	time	pointed	out	that	organisation	
would	have	to	compromise	when	finding	out	any	problems	associate	with	Shanghai	City.	Liu	explained	
that	 if	QEITSC	 identify	a	problem	 in	 the	water	of	 Shanghai	City,	 the	organization	would	not	 conduct	a	
further	investigation	of	the	problem.	
Under	such	government	supervision,	QEITSC	has	still	managed	to	collect,	organise	and	publish	existing	
government	data	on	urban	tap	water	provision	systems.	In	this	way,	the	organisation	has	sought	to	make	
this	data	more	widely	accessible.	They	have	also	established	an	environmental	data	centre	offering	public	
access	 to	data	 about	 various	 themes,	 such	 as	 tap	water,	 sewage,	 and	hazardous	waste.	However,	 few	
people	have	accessed	these	reports	and	data.	For	example,	 in	2014,	QEITSC	published	a	report	named	
Research	on	the	Situation	of	Information	Disclosure	of	Beijing’s	Domestic	tap	water.	This	report	focuses	on	
the	relatively	low	transparency	of	information	regarding	tap	water	in	Beijing.	However,	when	searching	for	
the	title	of	this	report	in	article	titles	in	Baidu,	China’s	biggest	internet	search	engine,	it	shows	zero	results,	
which	means	that	no	web	news	articles	have	the	title	of	this	report	in	their	titles.	Repeating	the	search	by	
looking	up	 the	 title	of	 this	 report	 in	 article	 content,	Baidu	 shows	 three	 results,	 the	 first	one	 is	 from	a	
website	which	 advertises	water	 filtration	 equipment,	whereas	 the	 other	 two	 results	 are	 from	 articles	
analysing	the	stocks	of	the	water	utility	industry.	Only	the	first	result	introduces	the	general	situation	of	
the	research	project	and	mentions	the	name	of	QEITSC.	In	the	information	listed	on	its	website,	there	is	
only	one	news	report	about	this	research	by	any	major	media,	which	does	not	show	in	the	results	in	Baidu’s	
search.	Meanwhile,	some	of	their	data	has	only	been	downloaded	less	than	ten	times,	among	which	80%	
are	 from	different	universities,	academic	 institutes	and	even	government	departments	such	as	Central	
Meteorological	Administration	Bureau	of	China.	
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Besides	the	fact	that	their	activities	are	supervised	by	the	government,	their	research	is	also	not	accessible	
to	 the	public.	 This	 situation	 results	 in	 an	even	bigger	problem:	 local	NGOs	 can	hardly	 earn	any	public	
financial	support	(which	may	not	be	a	major	issue	for	overseas	NGOs).	Some	of	the	most	well-known	NGOs	
in	China	have	not	given	much	attention	to	tap	water	affairs.	For	example,	Friends	of	Nature,	one	of	the	
earliest	and	largest	NGOs	in	China,	does	not	integrate	the	tap	water	affair	 in	its	agenda	even	though	it	
sometimes	holds	 activities	 regarding	hydraulic	 facilities	 and	water	pollution26	.	 Small	NGOs	 like	QEITSC	
which	have	conducted	remarkable	research	on	tap	water	cannot	receive	much	public	attention,	not	to	
mention	support.	This	may	explain	the	reason	why	this	kind	of	research	is	rarely	funded	by	general	people:	
no	public	attention,	no	public	funding.	In	fact,	the	QEITSC’s	research	on	information	disclosure	was	funded	
by	 two	 charities,	 both	 of	which	 have	 certain	 commercial	 backgrounds,	 one	 is	 from	e-commerce	 giant	
Alibaba	and	another	is	from	Beijing	Entrepreneur	Environmental	Protection	Foundation.		
Taken	together,	these	results	highlight	the	reciprocal	causation	of	the	problems	for	NGOs	and	tap	water	
consumers.	 On	 one	 hand,	 there	 is	 a	 dysfunction	 of	 both	 overseas	 and	 local	 NGOs	 in	 bridging	 the	
information	gap	between	the	tap	water	consumer	and	the	tap	water	provision	system;	and	on	the	other,	
since	tap	water	consumers	have	not	been	informed	about	the	work	of	NGOs	through	the	media,	they	may	
not	offer	them	much	support.	
Here,	it	is	essential	to	point	out	that	the	root	of	this	reciprocal	causation	is	the	flawed	power	circulation,	
which	 in	 turn	 triggers	 the	 inadequate	 money	 and	 information	 circulation.	 The	 power	 of	 managing	
environmental	issues	is	still	centralised	in	the	hands	of	the	government,	who	is	unwilling	to	share	it	with	
other	organisations.	As	pointed	out	by	 a	Chinese	expert,	when	 it	 comes	 to	 the	propaganda	of	 ‘public	
participation’,	 there	 is	 a	 cognitive	 dissonance	 between	 the	 government	 and	 the	 NGOs:	 from	 the	
government’s	 perspective,	 the	meaning	 of	 public	 participation	 should	 be	 the	 public’s	 participation	 in	
specific	activities	without	playing	a	role	in	decision	making;	from	the	NGOs’	perspective,	the	meaning	of	
																																								 																				
26	Source:	http://www.fon.org.cn/index.php/Index/topic/id/12	Accessed:	11	March	2016	
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public	participation	should	be	the	public’s	participation	not	only	in	specific	activities	but	also	in	decision-
making	 and	 management	 processes	 (Liu,	 2015).	 However,	 since	 the	 positions	 of	 NGOs	 have	 been	
consistently	marginalised	in	the	general	power	circulation,	their	activities	are	either	gradually	restricted	
to	certain	fields	or	being	ignored	by	the	media	and	the	public.	The	flawed	power	circulation	leads	to	the	
problematic	money	circulation,	which	results	in	the	fact	that	only	26%	of	environmental	protection	NGOs	
have	a	stable	income,	of	which	78.9%	are	an	industrial	association	and	student	societies	(Liu,	2015).		
The	Dysfunction	of	Industrial	Association	
Differing	from	tap	water	NGOs,	which	are	relatively	alienated	from	the	government	and	the	market,	tap	
water	Industrial	Associations	are	situated	at	the	intersection	between	the	interests	of	the	government	and	
the	market.	They	are	backed	by	the	government	and	financed	by	the	market,	but	to	a	large	extent	remain	
uncommitted	 to	 the	 public	 issue	 of	 tap	 water.	 This	 has	 significantly	 undermined	 their	 capacities	 in	
connecting	 themselves	 with	 the	 tap	 water	 consumer,	 pushing	 them	 gradually	 to	 embrace	 the	
government’s	and	market’s	positions.	
In	 an	 interview	 with	 a	 staff	 member	 of	 the	 Drinking	 Healthy	 Committee	 of	 China	 National	 Health	
Association	 (DHCCNHA),	 an	 Industrial	 Non-profit	 Social	 Association	 subordinate	 to	 the	 China	National	
Health	Association,	which	is	directly	regulated	by	the	MH,	the	interviewee	clarified	that	the	constitution	
of	 China’s	 industrial	 water	 associations	 is	 different	 from	 the	 constitution	 of	 industrial	 associations	 in	
western	countries.	He/she	pointed	out	that	traditionally,	many	government	ministries	in	China	had	set	up	
their	official	industrial	associations.	Only	recently	these	industrial	associations	became	independent	from	
their	superiors	by	registering	in	the	Ministry	of	Civil	Affairs	as	independent	organisations.	They	are	now	
‘as	a	company’.	Founded	on	3	March	2010,	the	World	Water	Day,	the	DHCCNHA’s	remit	covers	all	types	of	
‘package	water,'	which	includes	bottled	water,	barrelled	water	and	other	drinking	water	production	with	
commodity	packaging.	It	is	also	in	charge	of	the	domestic	water-related	equipment,	such	as	domestic	tap	
water	filtration	equipment.	‘Because	the	name	of	our	association	is	health	water,'	the	interviewee	said,	
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‘so	everything	that	relates	to	the	water	you	drink,	as	well	as	every	production	chain	regarding	the	water	
you	drink,	is	within	our	remit.’		
‘The	motivations	for	establishing	the	DHCCNHA	were	to	disseminate	knowledge	of	healthy	drinking	water	
among	the	public,	and	to	develop	the	industry	standard	to	help	our	country	regulate	the	water	industry,’	
he/she	said.	Meanwhile,	he/she	also	admitted	that	‘the	aim	of	the	Association	is	to	serve	its	members’.	
Here,	member	means	those	water	companies	that	joined	DHCCNHA	by	paying	membership	fee	annually.	
The	DHCCNHA	has	five	major	areas	of	interest:	high-end	bottled	water,	standard	bottled	water,	barrelled	
water,	water	purification	equipment,	and	rural	water	supply.	Within	these,	it	functions	as	a	research	and	
technology	organisation,	a	mediator	between	the	government	and	the	market,	and	a	consulting	agency	
that	provides	technical	training	for	its	members.	
The	DHCCNHA	has	conducted	several	research	projects	initiated	by	its	former	superior,	the	MH.	Its	working	
pattern,	however,	is	not	the	same	as	the	NGOs’,	for	it	is	highly	dependent	on	the	cooperation	between	its	
members.	For	example,	as	the	interviewee	reported:	
’The	water	in	Tongzhou	(a	district	of	Beijing)	contains	a	remarkable	amount	of	fluoride,	
which	can	cause	deceases	such	as	dental	fluorosis	and	skeleton	fluorosis.	Older	people	
are	especially	vulnerable	 in	 the	 face	of	 these	decreases.	Many	elderly	members	of	 the	
public,	suffering	from	deformed	joints,	have	drunk	such	water	for	their	whole	lives.	It	is	
the	 government’s	 obligation	 to	 guarantee	 them	 the	 healthiest	 water.	 The	MH	 always	
claimed	that	they	want	to	do	something	to	amend	the	water	condition	in	rural	areas,	but	
they	 do	 not	 have	 any	 technology,	 so	 they	 turned	 to	 our	 association	 with	 an	 inquiry	
regarding	what	technology	can	be	used	to	eliminate	the	fluoride	in	the	water.	There	are	
many	members	of	our	association,	and	they	tried	to	provide	answers	in	cooperation	with	
each	other.	Finally,	they	found	a	technology	that	can	eliminate	the	fluoride.’		
From	 this	 description,	 it	 can	 be	 seen	 that	 the	 Industrial	 Association	 here	 has	 functioned	 as	 an	
intermediator	 between	 the	 government	 and	 the	 market.	 It	 becomes	 a	 consulting	 platform	 that	 can	
organise	the	resources	from	different	market	actors	and	connect	them	with	the	government	projects.		
Functioning	as	an	intermediator,	the	DHCCNHA	also	shares	some	power	with	the	government.	For	example,	
it	participates	 in	 the	work	of	establishing	 the	national	 and	 industrial	 standards	of	bottled	water	as	an	
intermediator	between	the	government	and	the	drinking	water	 industry.	The	DHCCNHA	has	also	been	
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involved	in	initiating	and	establishing	the	industrial	standard	of	high-end	bottled	water,	an	idea	derived	
from	western	countries.	 It	held	a	national	expert	committee	to	construct	China’s	national	definition	of	
high-end	water	production.	After	five	meetings,	the	experts	finally	reached	a	conclusion	that	this	standard	
must	 include	 several	 factors,	 such	 as	 the	 source	 of	 the	water,	 the	 production	 process,	 and	 the	 brand	
reputation.	They	also	designed	a	series	of	detailed	specifications	for	each	factor.	Companies	can	apply	for	
an	evaluation	from	The	DHCCNHA	to	earn	the	certificate	of	high-end	water	production.		
The	DHCCNHA	also	provides	consulting	services	for	its	members,	such	as	industrial	training	courses.	For	
instance,	the	interviewee	mentioned	a	training	project	conducted	by	the	DHCCNHA	-	the	water	school.	In	
his/her	 words,	 ‘since	 many	 employees	 who	 deliver	 barrelled	 water	 are	 not	 well	 educated,	 […]	 the	
DHCCNHA	established	a	special	school	for	to	inform	them	about	industrial	and	sanitary	standards.’		
To	conclude,	 from	the	perspective	of	power	circulation,	 the	 tap	water	 Industrial	Associations	does	not	
receive	much	extra	power	from	the	government,	especially	given	that	they	have	been	officially	separated	
from	 the	 government	 systems.	 However,	 compared	 to	 NGOs,	 their	 position	 is	 much	 closer	 to	 the	
government,	which	 enables	 them	 to	play	 a	 role	 as	 a	mediator	 and	negotiator	 between	 the	 tap	water	
market	and	the	government.	This	unique	position	helps	them	to	win	some	special	powers,	such	as	the	
right	to	participate	in	the	process	of	establishing	national	and	industrial	tap	water	standards.	From	the	
perspective	of	money	circulation,	most	of	the	DHCCNHA’s	work	is	closely	connected	to	specific	problems	
in	the	tap	water	industry,	such	as	providing	paid	industrial	training	to	its	members,	which	brings	it	a	much	
more	stable	income	compared	to	NGOs.	From	the	perspective	of	information	circulation,	DHCCNHA	has	
focused	its	main	attention	on	drinking	water	industry,	but	it	has	not	undertaken	any	independent	research	
on	sensitive	problems	regarding	tap	water	like	what	some	NGOs	have	done.	Additionally,	even	though	it	
possesses	a	significant	amount	of	information	that	directly	relates	to	tap	water	affairs,	it	does	not	take	the	
initiative	to	make	it	accessible	to	the	public	in	the	same	way	as	NGOs.		
Another	comparison	between	the	DHCCNHA	and	the	QEITSC	can	reveal	more	details	of	 the	difference	
between	Industrial	Associations	and	NGOs.	From	November	2015	to	March	2016,	the	DHCCNHA	initiated	
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a	large-scale	investigation	project	named	The	Blue	Book	of	Chinese	People’s	Healthy	Water	Drinking.	There	
were	 extensive	 online	 promotion	 campaigns	 for	 this	 project,	 especially	 in	 March	 2016	 when	 the	
publication	of	 this	book	was	announced.	Given	 these	promotion	campaigns,	 this	project	has	 collected	
hundreds	of	thousands	validated	questionnaires	about	tap	water.	In	Baidu	News	Search	the	relevant	news	
can	be	seen	in	dozens	of	mainstream	websites.	In	reference	to	the	news	reports,	this	project	was	hosted	
by	 government	 organisations	 such	 as	 the	 Regulation	 Committee	 of	 Jilin	 Changbaishan	 Conservation	
Developing	Zone	and	the	Baishan	Municipal	Government,	and	People’s	Government	of	Antu	County	of	
Yanbian	 Korean	 Autonomous	 Prefecture.	 It	 was	 co-organized	 by	 the	 Evergrand	 Group,	 a	 large	 natural	
spring	bottled	water	production	company	in	China.	However,	the	investigation	and	data	analysis	were	not	
conducted	by	the	DHCCNHA,	but	by	the	Kaidi	Data	Research	Centre.		
However,	even	though	these	news	reports	claimed	that	the	book	was	published,	there	is	no	online	access	
or	publication	details	provided	for	it.	When	the	author	of	this	thesis	consulted	the	DHCCNHA	about	the	
problem	of	accessing	the	book,	they	provided	two	pieces	of	information:	firstly,	they	did	not	participate	in	
the	 investigation	 and	data	 analysis	 of	 the	book	 project;	 and	 secondly,	 the	 Kaidi	Data	 Research	Centre	
claimed	 that	 the	 book	 data	 is	 not	 open	 to	 public	 access.	 This	 information	 directly	 contradicts	 the	
statements	in	the	media,	which	claimed	that	DHCCNHA	is	one	of	the	main	hosts	of	the	investigation	and	
the	book	has	been	officially	published.	However,	when	taking	a	closer	look	at	these	news	sources,	nearly	
all	of	them	use	the	same	quotation	from	the	book	stating	that	‘46%	participants	choose	natural	spring	as	
their	primary	 tap	water’.27	This	 statement	 is	 immediately	 followed	with	a	complementary	 reference	 to	
natural	spring	bottled	water	production	from	the	Evergrand	Group.	This	scheme	demonstrates	that	the	
book	investigation	project	is,	in	fact,	a	successful	public	relations	marketing	event	held	by	the	Evergrand	
Group,	as	pointed	out	in	an	online	article	(TOM,	2015).	The	reason	for	the	Evergrand	Group	to	invite	the	
DHCCNHA	and	government	organisations	to	lead	the	project	is	to	use	their	names	to	make	it	appear	less	
																																								 																				
27	Source:	http://news.cjn.cn/gnxw/201603/t2799891.htm;	http://bjcb.morningpost.com.cn/html/2016-03/23/content_392197.htm;	
http://house.njdaily.cn/2016/0322/1352312.shtml	Accessed:	1	July	2016	
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commercial	but	more	official.	The	main	aim	of	this	project,	therefore,	was	not	to	publish	the	book,	but	to	
highlight	a	specific	piece	of	 information	(46%	people	in	the	investigation	choose	natural	spring	as	their	
primary	 tap	 water)	 with	 the	 backing	 of	 ‘dozens	 of	 thousands	 of	 questionnaires’.	 This	 constitutes	 a	
successful	public	relation	marketing	event	advertising	the	natural	spring	bottled	water	production,	rather	
than	a	genuine	initiative	to	publish	tap	water	data	available	for	public	access.	
A	comparison	between	NGO	and	Industrial	Association	
Compared	 with	 the	 QEITSC’s	 case,	 five	 points	 of	 difference	 can	 be	 highlighted.	 Firstly,	 there	 was	 a	
differentiation	in	focus	point.	QEITSC	focused	on	the	systematic	flaws	of	the	tap	water	provision	system,	
whereas	 DHCCNHA	 focused	 on	 the	 marketing	 of	 tap	 water	 production.	 Secondly,	 there	 was	 a	
differentiation	 in	 their	 roles	 in	 the	 investigations	 they	 conducted.	QEITSC	 led	 the	whole	 ‘Research	 on	
Beijing’s	Disclosure	of	Domestic	Tap	Water	Information’	investigation	by	itself,	whereas	DHCCNHA	was	the	
host	of	‘The	Blue	Book	of	Chinese	People’s	Healthy	Water	Drinking’	investigation	only	in	name.	It	did	not	
participate	in	the	investigation	and	data	analysis	but	instead	devised	various	advertising	campaigns.	Thirdly,	
there	was	a	differentiation	in	support.	The	QEITSC	earned	limited	financial	and	media	support,	whereas	
the	 DHCCNHA	 attracted	 much	 more	 support	 from	 the	 government,	 the	 companies,	 and	 the	 media.	
Fourthly,	the	data	of	QEITSC’s	investigation	was,	and	continues	to	be,	open	to	public	access,	whereas	the	
data	of	DHCCNHA’s	 investigation	was	closed	for	public	access.	Fifthly,	the	QEITSC’s	 investigation	gained	
more	credibility	than	the	DHCCNHA’s,	since	the	former	was	independently	conducted,	whereas	the	latter	
cooperated	with	several	agencies	whose	interests	were	closely	associated	with	the	investigation.	
Here,	it	is	important	to	point	out	that	both	the	QEITSC	and	the	DHCCNHA	to	some	extent	failed	to	bridge	
the	general	 information	gap	between	the	tap	water	consumer	and	the	tap	water	provision	system.	For	
QEITSC,	 their	 investigation	 was	 not	 widely	 publicized	 in	 the	 media,	 and	 given	 the	 concern	 regarding	
financial	and	public	support,	their	investigation’s	scope	was	limited.	For	the	DHCCNHA,	their	investigation	
was	not	accessible	 to	 the	public,	and	given	 its	commercial	 links,	 the	credibility	of	 its	 investigation	was	
questionable.	
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This	 forms	a	sharp	comparison	to	what	happened	 in	the	UK.	The	Metropolitan	Parochial	Water	Supply	
Association,	a	water	consumer	association	established	during	the	cholera	outbreak	period	and	developed	
into	 a	 powerful	 association	 that	 attracted	 representatives	 from	ninety	 parishes	who	 represented	 1.25	
million	people,	played	a	pivotal	role	in	not	only	connecting	water	consumers,	mostly	middle-class	citizens,	
and	the	government,	but	also	integrating	the	former	into	the	administration	of	tap	water	provision	system	
with	 the	 latter	 in	 1855	 (Trentmann	 and	 Taylor,	 2005).	Moreover,	 during	 this	 process	 of	 connecting,	 it	
promoted	 the	 citizen’s	 transformation	 from	water	 users,	 those	who	used	 tap	water,	 to	modern	water	
consumers,	those	who	were	willing	to	confront	with	the	social	conflicts	triggered	by	tap	water.	In	China,	
however,	both	the	QEITSC	and	the	DHCCNHA	did	not	manage	to	build	a	connection	between	consumer	
and	government,	not	to	mention	triggering	a	transformation	between	water	users	and	water	consumers.		
Another	problem	for	NGOs	and	Industrial	Associations	is	their	dysfunction	in	urging	cooperation	between	
the	 tap	 water	 consumer	 and	 the	 government,	 particularly	 regarding	 supervising	 tap	 water	 data	 and	
promoting	 information	disclosure	of	 tap	water	provision	 system.	 For	example,	QEITSC’s	website	offers	
open	environmental	monitoring	data	about	the	quality	of	urban	tap	water	in	10	major	cities.	However,	
none	of	these	data	have	been	downloaded	more	than	ten	times28.	On	the	DHCCNHA’s	website,	there	is	no	
content	associated	with	tap	water	quality	data;	the	main	news	is	all	about	the	commercial	activities	it	has	
held	recently29.		
Furthermore,	 NDRC	 (Guidance	 on	 experimental	work	 of	water	 rates	 cost	 disclosure	 (Text	 in	 Chinese))	
published	 a	 legal	 document	 to	 promote	 the	 disclosure	 and	 supervision	 of	 the	 urban	 tap	 water	 rates	
adjustment,	the	Guidance	on	Experimental	Work	of	Water	Rates	Cost	Disclosure.	However,	no	NGOs	and	
Industrial	 Associations	 have	 published	 any	 articles	 to	 advocate	 these	 legal	 documents,	 nor	 do	 they	
participate	in	disclosing	and	supervising	the	water	rates	adjustment.	All	of	the	relevant	information	about	
these	legal	documents	comes	from	local	government	websites	or	research	papers	in	academic	journals.	
																																								 																				
28	Source:	https://data.epmap.org/drink_waters	Accessed:	22	June	2016	
29	Source:	http://www.chinadhc.org/	Accessed:	1	July	2016	
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Without	 the	 effective	 contribution	 of	 NGOs	 and	 Industrial	 Associations,	 the	 cooperation	 mechanism	
between	government	and	tap	water	consumer	is	paralysed.	As	a	result	of	this	situation,	even	though	the	
government	 may	 have	 disclosed	 the	 information	 regarding	 tap	 water	 affairs	 and	 advocated	 public	
supervision	 of	 the	 tap	 water	 provision	 system,	 the	 tap	 water	 consumer	 neither	 has	 any	 access	 to	
information	nor	has	a	chance	to	participate	in	any	activities	to	implement	their	supervision.	It	is	possible	
that	some	NGOs	and	Industrial	Associations	have	done	some	work,	but	their	efforts	are	still	largely	invisible	
to	consumers.		
In	 sum,	 from	 the	 analysis	 above,	 currently,	 in	 China	 the	 ‘third	 party’	 can	 be	 seen	 as	 a	 dysfunctional	
component	 of	 the	 ‘source	 to	 consumer’	 urban	 tap	 water	 provision	 system.	 NGOs	 and	 Industrial	
Associations	in	China,	to	a	large	extent,	have	failed	in	playing	a	role	of	monitoring	the	system,	promoting	
the	communication	between	different	entities,	and	bridging	the	knowledge	and	information	gat	between	
consumer	and	the	Hybrid	Institutional	Architecture.	Meanwhile,	there	is	no	institutional	representation	
for	the	consumer	to	protect	their	legal	right.	They	have	to	solely	dependent	on	themselves	to	deal	with	all	
the	problems	in	the	tap	water	provision,	which	stimulates	the	emergence	of	Consumer	Coping	Strategy	
Matrix.	
4.4 The	institutional	incoherency	in	money	flow	
As	has	been	highlighted	in	the	previous	section,	the	incoherency	in	power	flow	is	 intertwined	with	the	
incoherency	in	money	flow.	Therefore,	the	institutional	incoherency	in	money	flow	is	mainly	demonstrated	
in	 the	 political,	 economic	 and	 social	 variations	 of	 setting	 water	 rate,	 and	 the	 disconnection	 between	
money	flow	and	water	flow	in	marketization	reform.	
4.4.1 China's	tap	water	rates	and	its	composition	
In	China,	water	rates	has	been	officially	fixed	at	a	level	so	low	that	it	nearly	makes	water	treatment	plants	
operate	at	a	loss.	Given	the	data	from	Research	Report	on	Pricing	Policies	for	Water	Pollution	Prevention	
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&	Control,	a	national	research	project	held	by	MEP	and	Remin	University	of	China,	the	average	water	rates	
of	36	large	and	medium	sized	China’s	cities	in	2009	is	around	0.42	US	dollars	per	ton	(Ma	et	al.,	2014).	
Meanwhile,	this	project	also	pointed	out	that	water	rates	varies	dramatically	by	provinces	and	cities.	The	
highest	water	rate,	0.574	US	dollars	per	ton	in	Tianjin,	is	5.6	times	higher	than	the	lowest	water	rate,	0.164	
US	dollars	per	ton	in	Lasa.	Such	variation	is	due	to	the	fact	that	there	are	numerous	political,	economic	
and	social	considerations	behind	the	water	rates,	which	further	complicate	its	formation.		
There	are	four	factors	that	need	to	be	taken	into	account.	First,	tap	water	is	a	commodity	with	a	price	but	
also	a	public	necessity.	Second,	tap	water	rates	has	a	close	 link	with	water	resources	conservation	and	
environmental	 protection.	 Third,	 tap	 water	 provision	 system	 is	 a	 monopoly	 system	 without	 the	
competitive	mechanism	to	determine	its	water	rate.	Fourth,	since	water	is	the	raw	material	of	industrial	
production,	the	water	rates	will	influence	the	costs	of	numerous	other	commodities.	All	these	four	factors	
make	water	rates	one	of	the	most	complicated	rates	in	China.	
Measures	for	Price	Administration	of	Urban	Water	Supply	
Although	tap	water	rates	 is	 important	for	both	social	and	 industrial	development,	 its	relevant	research	
was	 only	 initiated	 in	 the	 late	 1990s	 in	 China.	 Before	 the	 publication	 of	 the	 Measures	 for	 Price	
Administration	of	Urban	Water	Supply	on	23	September	1998,	China’s	water	rates	was	set	according	to	
the	principal	of	low	profit.	The	publication	of	this	measure	signals	the	change	of	this	principal.	It	replaced	
the	water	rates	that	was	driven	fully	by	social	welfare	to	the	water	rates	that	were	driven	partially	by	the	
market	and	partially	by	government	regulation.		
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Figure	4.10:	The	National	Departmental	Regulations,	Notice	and	Guidance	on	Urban	water	rate	
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As	shown	in	Figure	4.10,	this	measure	was	explained	and	promoted	in	another	four	public	notices	between	
1999	and	2009.	They	were	issued	by	three	bodies:	NDRC,	whose	work	is	to	regulate	market	prices	in	China,	
MHURD,	whose	work	is	to	regulate	construction	activities,	and	State	Council.	Their	involvement	illustrates	
two	 important	 facts:	 first,	 the	water	 rates	 is	 crucial	 for	 the	central	 government’s	political	 agenda;	and	
second,	since	it	 is	highly	connected	with	the	industrial	development,	any	change	of	water	rates	was	so	
difficult	that	it	required	three	important	government	departments	to	promote.		
According	to	article	4	of	the	measures,	the	water	rates	is	set	by	the	local	branch	of	the	NDRC,	which	is	
under	the	administration	of	local	government.	This	article	highlights	the	fact	that	in	China	the	water	rates	
is	varied	by	provinces,	cities,	and	counties.	This	is	because,	unlike	electricity	which	can	be	transferred	at	a	
low	cost,	water	transfer	is	not	only	costly	but	also	risky.	Therefore,	it	is	impossible	to	have	a	uniform	rates.	
The	water	rates	is	set	by	the	local	government	on	the	basis	of	their	circumstances.		
Here,	several	articles	are	worth	mentioning.	According	to	articles	6	to	9	of	the	measures,	water	rates	is	a	
terminal	price,	composed	of	four	elements:	the	cost,	fee,	tax	and	profit.	The	cost	includes	the	cost	of	the	
water	 source,	 electricity,	material,	maintenance,	 salary,	water	monitoring	and	 testing,	 asset	 and	other	
relevant	costs.	The	fee	includes	selling	fee,	regulation	fee,	and	transaction	fee.	It	also	includes	the	sewage	
treatment	fee,	the	water	resources	fee	and	the	fee	for	transferring	water	through	hydraulic	projects.	The	
tax	is	the	tax	that	the	water	company	has	to	pay	to	the	government.	The	profit	is	the	legally	limited	profit	
the	water	company	earned	from	its	tap	water	supply	service.		
According	to	article	11	of	the	measures,	the	profit	margin	has	to	be	confined	in	a	range	between	8%	and	
10%	of	 the	net	 asset.	 For	 those	water	 companies	mainly	 relying	on	government	 funds,	profit	margins	
cannot	go	above	6%	of	the	net	asset.	For	those	water	companies	mainly	relying	on	non-government	funds	
such	as	bank	loans,	foreign	capital,	bonds	and	stocks,	profit	margins	cannot	go	above	12%	of	the	net	asset	
during	their	repayment	period.	The	sewage	treatment	fee	and	the	water	resources	fee,	though	being	part	
of	the	water	rates,	would	be	assigned	to	other	government	departments	but	water	companies,	hence	the	
latter	cannot	use	these	fees	as	their	income	to	cover	operational	costs.		
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The	composition	of	tap	water	rate	
Figure	4.10	demonstrates	 that	 the	development	of	water	 rates	 reflects	 the	development	of	 the	water	
provision	system.	At	the	initial	stage,	the	water	rates	only	accounted	for	the	operational	cost	of	the	water	
company.	Later,	since	water	resources	began	to	dwindle,	 its	value	became	more	obvious	and	thus	was	
transformed	into	water	resources	fee	and	became	a	part	of	water	rate.	In	addition,	with	the	advance	of	
industrial	development,	sewage	pollution	has	repressed	water	body’s	capacity	for	self-cleaning,	resulting	
in	 the	 emergence	 of	 sewage	 treatment	 fee	 (different	 from	 water	 resources	 fee).	 When	 local	 water	
resources	storage	cannot	meet	the	urban	water	demand,	the	local	government	begins	to	transfer	water	
resources	from	other	areas,	making	the	fee	for	transferring	water	through	hydraulic	water	projects	a	part	
of	water	rate.	
Besides	 visible	 cost,	 fee,	 tax	 and	profit,	 the	water	 rates	 is	 also	 influenced	by	 some	 invisible	 economic	
concerns.	Since	water	is	the	raw	material	of	industrial	production,	any	abrupt	water	rates	increase	would	
cause	a	chain	reaction	that	simultaneously	increases	the	general	cost	of	nearly	every	commodity,	resulting	
in	the	increase	of	CPI	(Consumer	Price	Index)	and	the	trigger	of	cost-push	inflation.	This	would	damage	
the	national	economy	as	a	whole.	Therefore,	CPI	is	one	of	the	major	concerns	in	water	rates	adjustment	
in	China.	NDRC	request	 local	municipal	governments	 to	supervise	 the	correlation	between	water	 rates	
with	the	CPI	so	as	to	prevent	any	CPI	increase	led	by	water	rates	increase.	From	2009	onward,	owing	to	
the	decreased	CPI	caused	by	the	global	 financial	crisis,	 the	cost-push	 inflation	triggered	by	water	rates	
increase	could	be	counteracted.	Many	cities	took	this	chance	to	increase	their	water	rates,	such	as	Beijing	
and	Harbin	(Ji,	2010).	
To	the	consumer,	the	water	rates	are	measured	by	two	models:	the	two-part	pricing	model	and	the	ladder	
water	pricing	model.	The	two-part	pricing	model	is	composed	of	the	volume	price	and	the	measurement	
price.	 The	 volume	 price	 is	 measured	 by	 the	 value	 of	 the	 fixed	 assets	 of	 local	 water	 companies.	 The	
measurement	price	 is	 set	depending	on	 the	 local	water	 company’s	operational	 cost.	 The	 ladder	water	
pricing	mode	includes	three	levels	with	two	factors	each:	the	elementary	index	and	the	level	price.	The	
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first	and	second	levels	have	a	standard	tap	water	consumption	amount	respectively.	At	every	level,	the	
price	is	the	result	of	the	elementary	index	multiplied	by	the	level	price.	When	the	consumed	water	amount	
surpasses	the	standard	tap	water	consumption	amount	of	the	first	level,	the	surplus	part	would	be	priced	
at	the	second	level,	and	the	same	process	repeats	in	the	third	level,	the	consumed	water	amount	surpasses	
the	standard	tap	water	consumption	amount	of	the	second	level.	The	total	water	rates	would	be	the	sum	
of	all	three	levels.	The	price	of	the	first	level	is	set	in	the	consideration	of	social	welfare,	the	price	of	the	
second	level	is	set	on	the	consideration	of	improving	people’s	lives,	and	the	price	of	third	level	is	set	on	
the	 consideration	 of	 special	 requirements	 of	 some	 businesses,	 such	 as	 car-washing,	 SPA	 and	 golfing	
facilities.	 The	 1998	measures	 only	 set	 the	price	 of	 the	 first	 level:	 it	 equals	 the	number	of	 households	
multiplied	by	the	average	water	consumption	per	person	per	month.	The	prices	of	the	second	and	third	
level	are	set	by	local	municipal	governments	on	the	basis	of	their	respective	situations.	
Six	reasons	for	the	low	tap	water	rate	
With	the	integration	of	waste	water	rate,	water	resources	fee,	hydraulic	project	fee	and	the	cost	of	the	
water	company,	in	reality	tap	water	rates	is	still	kept	at	a	low	level.	The	reason	for	this	is	that	tap	water	
rates	has	been	detached	from	the	market	for	many	years	in	six	aspects.	First,	it	is	set	by	both	the	central	
and	local	government	instead	of	the	market.	Second,	its	adjustment	is	not	decided	by	the	water	company	
or	market	demand	and	supply,	but	by	government	departments.	Third,	its	adjustment	concerns	not	only	
the	operational	cost	of	the	water	company,	but	also	other	factors	such	as	social	welfare	and	CPI,	making	
every	adjustment	lag	behind	or	even	violate	market	fluctuation.	Fourth,	its	regulation	is	on	the	basis	of	
the	 special	 situation	of	every	province,	 city	and	county.	 Fifth,	numerous	 invisible	political	 factors	have	
imposed	 their	 influences	 on	 the	 adjustment	 of	 tap	 water	 rate,	 such	 as	 political	 events,	 personnel	
arrangement,	and	capital	attraction	policy.	Sixth,	since	the	tap	water	rates	has	been	kept	at	a	low	level	for	
a	 long	 time,	 every	 increase	 of	 it	 would	 trigger	 a	 strong	 social	 resistance,	 which	 would	 damage	 the	
relationship	between	the	consumer,	local	tap	water	company	and	local	government.	According	to	all	six	
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concerns	above,	it	can	be	said	that	tap	water	rates	is	economical,	politically	and	socially	‘fixed’	at	a	low	
level.	
The	disorder	in	water	company’s	cost	management	
Given	the	aforementioned	analyses,	for	the	water	company,	their	only	income	from	tap	water	rates	is	the	
part	associated	with	their	operational	cost	and	profit.	Since	the	latter	is	fixed	by	policy,	the	operational	
cost	becomes	the	only	‘manageable’	factor	for	the	water	company	to	increase	their	income.	In	other	words,	
for	the	water	company,	with	a	higher	operational	cost	comes	a	higher	income	from	the	tap	water	rate.		
This	fuels	the	disorder	in	water	company’s	cost	management.	To	achieve	a	higher	income	from	the	water	
rate,	 the	water	 company	 needs	 to	 demonstrate	 a	 higher	 operational	 cost	 to	 local	 government,	which	
makes	them	try	their	best	to	boost	their	expenditure	through	different	financial	operations	such	as	income	
transfer,	depreciation	acceleration,	and	improving	staff	welfare.		
The	water	company’s	problematic	operational	cost	is	a	difficult	problem	for	governments	to	solve.	From	
2006	to	2007,	NDRC	had	published	two	administration	documents	regarding	the	evaluation	of	a	company’s	
operational	cost.	However,	these	two	documents	only	targeted	those	companies	who	offered	items	and	
services.	 They	 had	 no	 articles	 for	 addressing	 the	 problematic	 operational	 cost	 in	 water	 companies.	
Moreover,	since	the	water	provision	system	has	 intricate	political	and	economic	connections	with	 local	
government,	the	information	on	local	water	company’s	cost	is	often	obscured.	For	example,	since	most	of	
China’s	local	water	companies	are	State-Owned-Enterprise	(SOE),	some	municipal	governments	used	the	
water	company’s	income	as	a	guarantee	to	apply	for	bank	loans	for	their	other	projects,	such	as	urban	
construction	projects.	In	other	cases,	to	save	funds,	some	other	municipal	governments	forced	the	local	
water	companies	to	afford	all	of	their	operational	costs.	All	of	these	would	make	the	local	tap	water	rates	
be	set	on	the	basis	of	inaccurate	operational	cost	information	from	the	water	company.		
As	 Figure	 4.10	 shows,	 on	 January	 1	 2011,	 another	 two	 administration	 documents	 regarding	 public	
monitoring	 and	 supervision	 of	 the	 water	 company’s	 costs	 were	 published.	 However,	 due	 to	 the	
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dysfunction	of	NGOs	and	Industrial	Association,	analysed	in	section	4.3.5,	there	was	a	stark	information	
gap	between	two	administration	documents	and	tap	water	consumers.	Most	people	are	not	even	aware	
that	they	have	been	bestowed	the	right	to	supervise	tap	water	rates	and	operational	costs	of	the	water	
company.	In	fact,	given	the	disclosed	information	of	the	water	company’s	operational	cost,	many	water	
companies	 have	 been	 operating	 at	 a	 loss	 or	 barely	 covering	 their	 costs	 for	 many	 years.	 Since	 such	
information	was	not	widely	recognised	by	tap	water	consumers,	it	did	not	help	with	relieving	the	water	
company’s	stress	from	the	consumer’s	occasional	criticisms	and	complains	about	tap	water	quality.	Such	
information	gap	in	the	interaction	between	the	consumer	and	the	water	company	also	contributes	to	the	
construction	 of	 both	 the	 Hybrid	 Institutional	 Architecture	 of	 urban	 tap	 water	 provision	 system	 and	
Consumer	Coping	Strategy	Matrix.		
In	general,	since	semi-potable	tap	water	has	become	an	everyday	reality	for	more	than	90%	of	China’s	
urban	citizens,	the	low	water	rates	has	imposed	a	profound	influence	on	consumer’s	behaviour.	For	many	
urban	residents,	the	supply	of	tap	water	was	always	sufficient	and	cheap,	making	them	hardly	notice	the	
scarcity	of	water	resources	and	the	deficit	of	the	water	company.	Therefore	for	them,	the	water	rates	was	
no	worth	supervising.	By	failing	to	do	so,	they	are	alienated	from	the	flow	of	power	and	money	running	in	
the	urban	tap	water	provision	system.	Meanwhile,	a	low	water	rates	to	a	large	extent	justifies	the	semi-
potable	quality	of	tap	water.	Rather	than	focusing	on	the	situation	of	urban	tap	water	provision	system,	
consumers	began	to	place	more	attention	on	establishing	a	Consumer	Coping	Strategy	Matrix	to	deal	with	
the	semi-potable	tap	water.	
4.4.2 China’s	marketisation	reform	of	urban	public	utility	
In	 the	 context	 of	 uneven	water	 resources	 storage	 and	 distribution,	 the	marketization	 reform	 in	water	
industry	 initiated	 in	 1990s.	Qin	Hong	and	Qian	Pu	 (2008)	 classified	 the	development	of	 China’s	 urban	
public	 utility	 into	 three	 periods.	 The	 first	 period	 is	 from	 1978	 to	 1992.	 It	 is	 a	 period	 for	 public	 utility	
enterprise	to	explore	their	operation	modes.	The	second	period	is	from	1992	to	2001.	It	is	the	period	for	
public	utility	enterprise	to	establish	modern	enterprise	operation	mechanism,	as	well	as	the	period	for	
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foreign	and	private	capital	to	invest	in	these	enterprises.	The	third	period	is	from	2001	until	now.	It	is	the	
period	for	the	central	government	to	promote	the	marketization	reform	for	urban	public	utility.	
In	the	first	period,	water	companies	began	to	adjust	its	operation	mechanism	to	attract	more	funds	other	
than	government	funds.	On	16	July	1992,	the	Decision	of	the	Central	Committee	of	the	Communist	Party	
of	China	and	the	State	Council	On	Accelerating	Development	of	Tertiary	 Industry	was	published	by	 the	
central	government.	It	asked	the	urban	public	utility	industry	to	implement	independent	operation	and	
enterprise-oriented	management.	This	transformation	paves	the	way	for	the	later	reform.	
In	 the	 second	 period,	 water	 companies	 attempted	 to	 separate	 from	 the	 government	 departmental	
administration	 and	 began	 to	 operate	 independently	 as	 SOE.	 On	 29	 December	 1993,	 China	 published	
Company	Law	of	the	People’s	Republic	of	China.	In	1994,	Shenzhen	water	supply	companies	established	a	
hybrid	operation	mechanism;	its	property	is	administrated	by	SOE,	its	business	is	administrated	by	MWAB.	
In	the	third	period,	the	marketization	reform	of	urban	public	utility	was	implemented	on	the	basis	of	the	
publication	of	a	series	of	important	government	documents.	On	1	December	2001,	the	State	Development	
Planning	Commission	published	Several	Opinions	on	Promoting	and	Guiding	Private	Capital,	which	opened	
the	market	of	urban	public	utility.	On	27	December	2002,	MHURD	published	Opinions	on	Promoting	Urban	
Public	Utility	Marketization	Process.	For	the	first	time	in	history,	this	document	claimed	to	establish	China’s	
franchise	 system.	 In	 March	 2003,	 the	 Third	 Plenary	 Session	 of	 the	 16th	 Central	 Committee	 of	 the	
Communist	Party	of	China	made	the	official	decision	to	promote	the	marketization	of	urban	public	utility.	
On	19	March	2004,	MHURD	published	the	Franchise	Operation	Measure	of	Urban	Public	Utilities,	which	
further	 strengthened	 the	 implementation	 of	 franchise	 operation	 in	 urban	 public	 utilities.	 Later	 on	 12	
August,	the	State	Council	published	the	Several	Opinions	of	the	State	Council	on	Encouraging,	Supporting	
and	 Guiding	 the	 Development	 of	 the	 Individual,	 Private	 and	 Non-Public	 Ownership	 Economy.	 This	
document	can	be	seen	as	the	final	brick	to	build	the	foundation	of	marketization	reform.	
Here,	it	can	be	seen	that	one	of	the	main	promoters	of	the	marketization	reform	of	urban	public	utility	is	
MHURD.	Owing	to	its	effort	in	promoting	marketization	reform	of	urban	public	utility,	it	at	the	same	time	
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took	 back	 some	 of	 its	 power	 in	 urban	 tap	 water	 provision	 system	 that	 had	 been	 deprived	 in	 the	
government	administration	reforms	(introduced	in	section	4.4.2).	
In	general,	the	marketization	reform	of	urban	public	utility	was	promoted	with	the	expectation	of	effective	
administration,	finance,	and	management.	The	operation	and	management	of	water	facilities	have	been	
separated	 by	 private	 companies	 that	 claimed	 to	 deliver	 a	 more	 efficient	 service.	 Meanwhile,	 water	
companies	 as	 SOE	 began	 to	 try	 to	 transform	 their	 characteristics	 from	 the	 hybrid	 of	 government	
department	 and	 enterprise	 to	 independent	 commercial	 entities.	 One	 remarkable	 example	 of	 such	
transformation	is	the	changing	name.	Around	90%	water	companies	in	the	capital	cities	and	60%	water	
companies	in	the	large	and	middle	size	cities	changed	their	name	from	the	‘Water	Company’	to	‘Water	
Group	Ltd’	(Zhou,	2014,	p.3).		
With	the	strong	support	from	the	central	government,	this	marketization	reform	made	urban	public	utility	
a	capital	hotspot.	Many	water	companies	were	listed	or	even	back-door	listed	in	Hong	Kong	stock	market.	
They	 injected	a	significant	amount	of	 ‘quick	money’	 to	 the	government,	who	then	used	 this	money	to	
invest	water	provision	projects	or	other	infrastructure	projects.	Those	who	are	backed	by	abundant	capital	
began	to	purchase	or	merge	the	other	smaller	water	companies’	assets,	such	as	the	water	treatment	plants	
and	the	sewage	treatment	plants.	For	private	water	companies,	their	service	is	directly	associated	with	
full-cost	 recovery	 (sustainable	 cost	 recovery).	 Thus,	 water	 rates	 became	 the	 arena	 between	 local	
government	and	water	company.	As	a	result,	those	water	companies	who	have	certain	connections	with	
government	are	the	fast-growing	ones,	especially	those	based	on	and	backed	by	developed	cities.	Among	
them,	Beijing	Enterprises	Water	Group	Limited	(BEWG)	is	a	typical	case.	
BEWG	 introduces	 itself	 as	 ‘a	 large-scale	 group	 that	 provides	 a	 broad	 range	 of	 water	 services	 and	
environmental	protection	services	in	China’.30	It	is	subordinated	to	the	Beijing	Enterprises	Holdings	Limited	
(BEHL),	the	most	 influential	public	utilities	and	facilities	enterprises	 in	China.	 Its	main	businesses	range	
																																								 																				
30	Source:	http://www.bewg.com.hk/eng/global/home.htm	Accessed:	11	March	2017	
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from	the	investment	of	environmental	protection	technologies	and	facilities	to	consulting	service	of	water	
engineering.	 Through	 the	 investment	 models	 such	 as	 TOT	 (Transfer-Operate-Transfer),	 BOT	 (Build-
Operate-Transfer),	entrusted	management	and	service	concession	arrangement,	the	BEWG	has	managed	
282	water	treatment	plants	in	total	in	21	provinces	of	China,	Malaysia,	and	Portugal.	There	are	226	plants	
of	sewage	treatment,	51	plants	of	water	supply,	four	plants	of	reclaimed	water	treatment	and	one	plant	
of	seawater	desalination.		
However,	the	limitation	of	BOT	and	TOT	is	that	they	only	target	water	and	sewage	treatment	plants.	In	an	
interview	with	 the	 investment	 officer	 of	 BEWG,	 he/she	 admitted	 that	 the	 focus	 of	most	water	 utility	
companies	in	China	is	‘water	treatment	instead	of	water	distribution	and	water	provision’.	As	the	China’s	
biggest	private	manager	of	water	 treatment	plant,	BEWG	has	no	plan	 to	expand	 its	business	 to	other	
sections	in	urban	tap	water	provision	system,	such	as	pipeline	and	secondary	water	supply	facilities.	
However,	the	separation	between	water	company	and	its	governmental	characteristic	is	difficult.	Before	
this	reform,	the	water	company	is	a	government-affiliated	department,	their	cost	 is	covered,	to	a	 large	
extent,	by	the	government	finance.	Moreover,	it	has	monopolised	the	tap	water	provision	in	certain	areas.	
Thus,	the	water	company	has	no	motivations	to	modify	its	service	and	improve	its	efficiency.	During	the	
marketization	reform,	water	companies	began	to	be	gradually	independent	of	the	government.	It	has	its	
legal	representatives	and	has	to	be	registered	in	government	to	achieve	a	business	license	now.	However,	
given	 their	 public	 utility	 characteristic,	 they	 also	 have	 to	 be	monitored	 by	 a	 government	 department,	
whose	 position	may	have	been	 retreated	 from	 the	 front-stage	 to	 the	 backstage.	 Therefore,	 the	water	
company’s	characteristic,	as	well	as	its	management	framework,	become	a	hybrid	between	government	
department,	SOE,	and	private	company.		
Such	a	hybrid	nature	has	triggered	a	series	of	troubles.	As	has	been	analysed	before,	the	only	income	of	
water	company	 is	the	water	rates	from	tap	water	consumer,	which	barely	covers	the	cost	of	tap	water	
production.	For	some	water	companies,	they	are	sponsored	by	the	local	government	to	cover	the	loss	in	
their	operation.	For	many	other	water	companies,	there	is	a	paradox	in	their	operations:	on	one	hand,	
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given	the	goal	of	marketization	reform,	they	have	to	be	responsible	for	their	management,	profits,	and	
losses	by	themselves.	On	the	other,	they	have	no	power	in	setting	the	price	of	their	only	product.	Therefore,	
even	if	they	are	a	monopoly	in	the	certain	city	regions,	their	incomes	are,	to	a	large	extent,	restricted	by	
the	local	water	management	agencies.	As	a	result,	the	insufficient	funding	is	another	important	dimension.	
The	revenue	sources	coming	to	most	water	companies	are	insufficient.	Water	rates	is	below	its	cost,	which	
makes	water	company	rely	on	government	subsidies.	Meanwhile,	they	have	no	control	over	the	money	
flow	which	would	enable	them	to	invest	in	infrastructure,	which	would	be	able	to	produce	the	potable	tap	
water.	A	more	serious	problem	is	that	given	the	latest	data,	the	majority	of	China’s	water	company	was	
still	relying	on	government	subsidy,	which	means	that	there	is	a	disconnection	between	money	flow	and	
water	flow.	In	other	words,	on	the	cost	basis,	the	flow	of	money	fails	to	directly	secure	the	flow	of	water.	
Given	the	2014	data	from	China’s	Economic	and	Social	Big	Data	Research	Platform31,	there	are	1047	water	
companies	in	China	in	total.	Among	them,	292	are	running	in	loss,	accounting	for	27.89%	of	the	total	water	
companies.	 Their	 total	 annual	 losses	 are	 only	 46,800	 Yuan,	 which	 looks	 like	 a	 not	 significant	 figure.	
Meanwhile,	the	total	annual	profit	for	rest	water	companies	is	as	small	as	only	59,200	Yuan.	However,	a	
problem	emerges	in	the	other	data:	for	all	water	companies,	their	total	annual	debt	loads	are	3,899,400	
Yuan,	but	their	total	annual	bank	interests	are	as	high	as	6.53	billion	Yuan.	This	sharp	comparison	may	
reflect	the	fact	that	there	is	a	huge	amount	of	bank	loan	functioning	as	government	subsidy	rather	than	
debt	of	water	companies.	However,	they	still	need	to	pay	back	the	interests	of	these	loans.	With	such	small	
profit,	its	impossible	for	water	companies	to	pay	back	their	bank	interest,	not	to	mention	the	huge	loan	
they	are	bearing.	Water	companies	have	to	keep	running	in	a	paradoxical	situation	that	on	the	one	hand	
they	have	earned	small	profits	and	losses	every	year,	on	the	other,	they	have	to	bear	huge	bank	interests	
and	loan	at	the	same	time.	This	data	proved	the	disconnection	between	money	flow	and	water	flow.	The	
marketization	reform	did	not	solve	the	serious	financial	problems	in	China’s	water	companies.		
																																								 																				
31	Source:	http://data.cnki.net	Accessed:	11	April	2017	
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With	 the	 problematic	marketization	 reform	of	 urban	 public	 utility,	 some	 political	 cautiousness	 on	 the	
development	 of	 franchise	 operation	 in	 urban	 public	 utility	 has	 been	 highlighted	 in	 some	 government	
documents.	On	10	September	2005,	MHURD	published	another	document,	the	Opinions	on	Strengthening	
the	Regulation	of	Municipal	Public	Utilities.	It	stresses	that	the	public	water	service	was	an	important	part	
of	 public	 welfare.	 Thus	 the	 marketization	 reform	 should	 not	 replace	 the	 responsibility	 of	 municipal	
government.	It	also	highlighted	the	importance	of	public	participation.	Other	documents	emphasised	the	
increased	 quality	 of	 tap	 water	 provision	 and	 the	 enforced	 monitoring	 system.	 However,	 even	 the	
information	of	public	participation	and	water	quality	monitoring	was	published	both	online	and	offline,	
most	of	 them	had	not	been	updated	 for	a	 long	 time.	For	example,	MHURD	established	a	government	
website	called	‘China’s	urban	tap	water	quality	supervision	website’.32	It	claims	to	disclose	the	tap	water	
quality	in	China’s	36	cities.	However,	the	last	update	date	for	these	data	October	2002.		
In	sum,	the	marketization	reform	was	triggered	by	the	demands	of	more	efficient	water	service.	However,	
such	 reform	 only	 covers	 certain	 sections	 in	 the	 whole	 urban	 tap	 water	 provision	 system.	 With	 the	
disconnection	between	money	flow	and	water	flow,	and	with	the	water	rates	being	fixed	at	a	certain	level,	
there	 is	 a	 dilemma	 to	 construct	 the	 adequate	 flow	of	money	 to	 support	water	 company.	Meanwhile,	
information	disclosure	and	public	participation	are	also	problematic.	Such	institutional	incoherencies	in	
money	flow	make	the	existing	urban	tap	water	provision	system	inadequate	to	present	potable	tap	water.		
4.5 The	institutional	incoherency	in	water	flow	
In	2006,	the	central	government	published	a	new	national	tap	water	standard	to	replace	the	old	standard	
published	in	1986.	In	contrast	with	the	old	standard	that	only	has	35	indices,	the	new	standard	includes	
106	indices,	which	makes	it	nearly	as	strict	as	those	water	standards	in	developed	countries.	The	tap	water	
should	be	potable	once	its	quality	reaches	the	new	standard.	However,	11	years	have	passed	since	the	
																																								 																				
32	Source:	http://www.nwqc.gov.cn	Accessed:	3	March	2017	
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publication	 of	 the	 new	 national	 tap	 water	 standard,	 even	 citizens	 of	 Beijing	 and	 Shanghai,	 the	 most	
developed	 cities	 in	 China,	 are	 still	 treating	 their	 tap	water	with	 the	Consumer	Coping	 Strategy	Matrix	
before	drinking.	This	fact	reflects	the	institutional	incoherency	between	the	strict	water	standards	and	tap	
water’s	semi-potable	quality.	
This	section	uses	the	tap	water	standard	to	demonstrate	the	institutional	incoherency	in	water	flow.	Few	
studies	 have	 investigated	 and	 delineated	 the	 development	 of	 China’s	 tap	 water	 standard	 from	 the	
perspective	of	 power/money/water	nexus.	 From	 this	 perspective,	 the	developmental	 trajectory	of	 tap	
water	standard	is	also	the	developmental	trajectory	of	power	and	money	flow	from	different	government	
departments	in	the	urban	tap	water	provision	system.	Moreover,	since	the	water	standard	can	function	in	
the	long	run,	their	documentation,	modification,	and	publication	also	function	as	the	symbols	of	the	power	
and	money	flow	in	these	departments.		
The	 three	 government	 administration	 reforms	 (introduced	 in	 section	 4.3.3)	 failed	 in	 taking	 the	water	
standards	into	consideration,	resulting	in	the	fact	that	the	power	of	producing	and	implementing	water	
standards	 is	 dispersed	 in	 the	 hands	 of	 different	 ministries,	 causing	 a	 series	 of	 administration	 and	
cooperation	problems.	In	this	sense,	the	flow	of	power	and	money	is	circulating	in	the	urban	tap	water	
provision	 system	 in	 a	 patchy	 way.	 To	 demonstrate	 this	 problem,	 it	 is	 worthwhile	 to	 illustrate	 the	
developments	of	China’s	major	water	standards.	
China	is	adopting	a	four-level	standard	system33.	The	highest	level	is	National	Standard,	which	refers	to	
standards	that	have	national	economic	and	technological	influence.	These	standards	are	required	to	be	
applied	throughout	the	country.	Other	standards	at	all	levels	may	not	conflict	with	them.	The	second	level	
is	 Industrial	 Standard,	 which	 refers	 to	 standards	 about	 uniform	 technical	 requirements	within	 certain	
industries	which	do	not	have	national	standards.	They	are	complementary	to	national	standards	but	more	
professional.	They	should	not	be	inconsistent	with	National	Standard	and	would	be	abolished	once	there	
																																								 																				
33	Source:	http://www.bjjs.gov.cn/bjjs/xxgk/zthg/bzjs/xgzl/373686/index.shtml	Accessed:	12	April	2017	
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are	National	Standard	being	published.	The	third	level	is	Local	Standard,	referring	to	standards	published	
in	certain	administrative	regions	 in	the	absence	of	National	and	Industrial	Standard.	The	fourth	 level	 is	
Enterprise	 Standard,	 referring	 to	 standards	 published	 by	 enterprises	 to	 organise	 their	 production	 and	
operation	in	the	absence	of	all	three	higher	level	standards.	In	all	four	levels,	standards	are	also	divided	
into	compulsory	standard	and	recommend	standard.	Here,	a	certain	power	hierarchy	can	be	concluded	
from	this	system:	the	power	of	National	Standard	outweighs	the	power	of	Industrial	Standard,	and	the	
power	 of	 compulsory	 standard	 outweighs	 the	 power	 of	 recommend	 standard.	 The	 water	 standards	
discussed	in	this	section	are	all	from	the	first	two	levels	of	the	four-level	standard	system.	
In	 September	 1927,	 Shanghai	 published	 the	 first	 tap	water	 standard	 in	 China,	 the	Water	 Standard	 of	
Shanghai	City.	This	 standard	 included	21	 indices	 in	 the	beginning.	One	year	 later,	 it	added	coliform	as	
another	 index.	 Shanghai	 is	 also	 the	 city	 that	 published	 the	 first	 urban	 tap	 water	 standard	 after	 the	
foundation	of	People’s	Republic	of	China	in	1949.	In	1950,	it	published	the	Shanghai	City	Water	Quality	
Standard.	Compared	to	the	previous	standard,	this	standard	only	had	16	indices,	but	it	is	stricter	on	several	
indices,	such	as	residual	chlorine,	bacteria	count	and	coliform	count.	
In	May	1955,	the	central	government	published	China’s	first	national	tap	water	standard,	the	Interim	Water	
Quality	Standard.	It	was	set	exclusively	by	the	MH	and	only	applied	to	12	large	and	medium-sized	cities.	
In	December	1956,	a	new	National	Compulsory	Standard,	the	15	Indices	Standard	of	Water	Quality	was	
published.	This	standard	was	published	by	both	the	State	Infrastructure	Commission	and	the	MH.	This	is	
the	first	time	for	construction	department	to	be	involved	in	the	setting	of	water	standard.		
In	the	same	year,	the	first	tap	water	source	regulation	was	published	as	well,	the	Interim	Regulation	on	
Collective	 Water	 Source	 and	 Water	 Quality	 Evaluation.	 However,	 this	 regulation	 did	 not	 clarify	 the	
responsibility	 for	 tap	water	 source	 regulation	among	different	government	departments.	This	problem	
remains	until	today.		
In	November	1959,	the	State	Infrastructure	Commission	and	the	MH	co-operated	with	each	other	at	the	
first	time	to	publish	another	tap	water	regulation.	However,	their	cooperation	ended	in	1976,	when	they	
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issued	another	interim	tap	water	standard	with	23	indices	together.	From	then	on,	these	two	departments	
initiated	a	covert	‘standard	conflict’	with	one	other	through	publishing	overlapping	tap	water	standards	
under	 their	 separate	names	until	 2006.	 In	1988,	 the	State	 Infrastructure	Commission	was	 replaced	by	
Ministry	of	Construction	(MC),	the	predecessor	of	MHURD.	In	the	Super-Ministry	Reform	in	2008,	MC	was	
replaced	 by	 MHURD,	 but	 it	 is	 still	 in	 charge	 of	 setting	 tap	 water	 standards,	 especially	 for	 standards	
regarding	water	treatment	plants.	
In	October	 1985,	 the	MH	published	 its	 first	National	 Compulsory	 Standard,	 the	Standard	 for	Drinking	
Water	 Quality.	 This	 standard	 included	 five	 sections:	 the	 principal,	 the	 water	 quality	 and	 hygienic	
requirement,	the	choice	of	the	water	source,	the	protection	of	water	source,	and	the	water	quality	test.	It	
had	35	indices	and	was	adopted	for	21	years	until	2002.	Two	changes	can	be	observed	in	this	standard:	
first,	the	MH	began	to	preside	over	the	setting	and	publication	of	national	tap	water	standard	with	other	
departments	except	for	MC.	Second,	it	has	expanded	its	power	to	the	regulation	of	tap	water	source.	Since	
then,	the	other	ministries	began	to	publish	their	industrial	and	departmental	standards.	
The	publication	of	the	1985	Standard	for	Drinking	Water	Quality	signals	the	power	shift	between	the	MH	
and	MC:	 the	 power	 of	 the	 former	 has	 overshadowed	 the	 power	 of	 later	 in	 tap	water	 administration.	
However,	in	November	1992,	MC	published	a	plan	named	Urban	Water	Supply	Sector	Development	and	
Technological	Progress	Plan	In	2000.	In	this	plan,	it	asked	first-class34	water	companies	to	follow	88	water	
quality	 indices,	 second-class	 water	 companies	 to	 follow	 51	 indices	 and	 third	 and	 fourth-class	 water	
companies	 to	 follow	 35	 indices.	 The	 publication	 of	 this	 plan	 demonstrates	 that	 MC	 was	 trying	 to	
strengthen	 its	 power	 through	 publishing	 industrial	 standards	 that	 overlapped	 with	 MH’s	 universal	
standard.	On	 January	 1	 1993,	MC	published	 another	 industrial	 tap	water	 standard,	 the	Water	Quality	
Standard	for	Water	Source.	This	standard	specifies	five	issues	regarding	water	source:	its	quality	indicators,	
																																								 																				
34	The	daily	water	supply	capacity	has	been	used	by	the	government	to	classify	the	water	company.	For	the	first	class	water	company,	they	can	supply	more	than	one	million	tons	
per	day;	the	second	class	water	company	can	supply	500	thousand	to	one	million	tons	per	day;	the	third	class	water	company	can	supply	100	thousands	to	500	thousand	tons	per	
day;	the	fourth	class	water	company	can	supply	less	than	100	thousand	tons	per	day.	
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its	 classification,	 its	 limits,	 its	 quality	 testing	 and	 its	monitoring.	 It	 is	 obvious	 here	 that	 this	 standard	
overlapped	with	the	MH’s	national	tap	water	standard	in	respect	to	tap	water	source	regulation.		
The	publication	of	this	standard	once	again	highlights	the	institutional	incoherency	in	power	flow	between	
government	 departments.	Moreover,	MC	was	 trying	 to	 achieve	 new	 power	 through	 publishing	water	
standard	on	potable	water.	On	28	September	1999,	MC	published	an	Industrial	Compulsory	Standard,	the	
Water	Quality	Standards	 for	Fine	Water.	 This	 is	 the	 first	 standard	 for	potable	water	and	 its	associated	
water	supply	 facilities.	Note	here	that	 in	1999,	only	a	 few	facilities	 in	China	were	capable	of	supplying	
potable	water.	Hence,	the	aim	of	publishing	this	standard	is	not	to	deal	with	practical	problems,	but	to	
pave	the	way	for	MC	to	achieve	the	power	of	administrating	potable	water	in	the	future.	
Noticing	its	power	has	been	weakened	by	MC’s	publication	of	a	series	of	industrial	standards,	the	MH	took	
its	 actions.	 In	 2000,	 it	 tried	 to	 revise	 the	 1985	 national	 tap	 water	 standard	 through	 holding	
interdepartmental	 meetings	 (Luo,	 2014).	 However,	 due	 to	 the	 disagreement	 between	 different	
departments,	this	revision	version	of	standard	failed	to	be	published	as	a	National	Standard.	As	a	result,	
on	June	7	2001,	MH	published	this	revised	standard	as	a	departmental	regulation	with	the	name	of	the	
standard,	which	was	only	adopted	by	the	subordinated	departments	of	MH	such	as	local	health	monitor	
centres.	This	standard	includes	96	indices,	62	among	which	are	organic	pollutant	indices.	However,	these	
62	 indices	 are	 irregular	 test	 indices,	 and	 many	 health	 monitor	 centres	 even	 did	 not	 equip	 with	 the	
equipment	 as	 advanced	 as	 the	water	 company	 to	 test	 these	 indices.	 The	 publication	 of	 this	 standard	
signals	the	emergence	of	the	institutional	incoherency	between	water	standard	and	water	flow.	
At	the	same	time,	the	power	of	the	MC	also	increased.	On	January	1	2002,	it	published	another	National	
Recommend	Standard,	the	Standard	of	Water	Quantity	for	City’s	Residential	Use.	 It	 is	the	first	National	
Standard	regarding	tap	water	affairs	that	published	by	the	MC	but	not	the	MH.		
Meanwhile,	other	government	departments	began	to	be	involved	in	the	standard	competition	between	
MC	 and	 MH.	 On	 April	 28	 2002,	 the	 National	 Environmental	 Protection	 Administration	 (NEPA),	 the	
predecessor	of	MEP,	published	 its	third	revision	of	Environmental	Quality	Standards	for	Surface	Water.	
Chapter	4	Three	Institutional	Incoherencies	in	China's	Urban	Tap	Water	Provision	System																		|	157	
	
This	is	a	powerful	National	Compulsory	Standard	that	published	in	1983.	It	was	revised	twice	in	1988	and	
1999	respectively.	Differing	from	its	previous	versions,	the	third	revision	added	the	new	standards	on	tap	
water	source	quality.	This	change	signals	that	the	NEPA	was	expanding	its	power	from	the	regulation	of	
aquatic	condition	for	the	fishery	to	the	regulation	of	tap	water	source	for	people.			
About	the	groundwater	regulation,	on	October	1,	1994,	the	Ministry	of	Geology	and	Mineral	Resources,	
the	 predecessor	 of	 Ministry	 of	 Land	 and	 Resources	 (MLR),	 published	 the	 first	 and	 the	 only	 National	
Recommended	Standard	of	ground	water	quality,	 the	Quality	Standard	 for	Ground	Water.	 Today,	even	
though	 the	 power	 in	 administrating	 groundwater	 has	 been	 transferred	 from	 MLR	 to	 MWR	 in	 the	
government	administration	reform	in	1998,	this	standard	is	still	valid	now,	demonstrating	the	institutional	
incoherency	in	power	flow.	
In	2005,	MC	published	three	legal	documents	on	water	affairs:	a	new	tap	water	standard,	a	revised	tap	
water	standard,	and	an	urban	tap	water	supply	planning.	On	June	1,	2005,	MC	published	an	 Industrial	
Recommend	Standard,	the	Urban	Tap	Water	Quality	Standard.	The	number	of	the	index	in	this,	103,	was	
more	than	the	index	number	of	1985	standard	and	2001	standard,	both	published	by	MH.	Some	indices	
limits	of	this	standard	were	even	more	stricter	than	the	water	standards	from	developed	countries	such	
as	 Japan.	 This	 standard	 is	 applied	 to	 all	 water	 treatment	 plants	 in	 China.	 However,	 even	 though	 this	
standard	has	103	indices,	the	water	treatment	plant	did	not	test	every	index	in	its	outlet	water	every	day.	
They	only	tested	nine	regular	indices	on	the	daily	base:	turbidity,	colour,	smell	and	taste,	visible	matter,	
CODMn,	residual	chlorine,	the	total	bacteria	number,	the	coliform	and	the	thermotolerant	coliform	(Wang,	
2012).	The	qualified	rate	of	these	nine	indices	is	95%	but	not	100%.	In	a	practical	sense,	given	that	many	
water	treatment	plants	lack	the	relevant	treatment	technologies	and	equipment,	the	implementation	of	
this	standard	is	full	of	problems.	
On	May	16,	2005,	the	MC	published	the	revised	potable	tap	water	standard.	In	October,	it	published	the	
2010	Urban	Water	Supply	Sector	Development	Plan	and	Technological	Progress	Plan.	In	this	plan,	it	set	a	
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series	of	new	developmental	targets	of	water	quality	for	the	water	companies.	From	then	on,	this	plan	has	
been	revised	every	five	to	ten	years.	
On	December	29,	2006,	the	MH	published	the	revised	Standards	for	Drinking	Water	Quality.	This	National	
Compulsory	Standard	replaced	its	predecessor	published	in	1985	and	became	the	most	authoritative	tap	
water	standard	in	China.	The	number	of	indices	in	the	standard	was	increased	from	35	in	the	1985	standard	
to	106.	This	increase	is	mainly	due	to	the	consideration	of	the	transformation	of	pollutants	in	water	bodies	
(Gong	and	Liu,	2012).	In	1985,	the	water	sources	in	China	were	not	as	polluted	as	they	were	in	2006.	The	
main	pollutant	has	been	transformed	from	the	microbial	pollution	in	1985	to	the	soluble	organic	pollutants	
and	heavy	metal	 ion	pollutants	 in	2006.	As	a	 result,	59	out	of	71	new	 indices	are	 toxicity	 indices.	The	
number	 of	 organic	 pollutant	 indices,	 such	 as	 CODMn,	 has	 been	 expanded	 from	 5	 to	 53.	 11	 inorganic	
pollutant	 indices,	 such	 as	 antimony	 and	 thallium,	 have	 been	 added	 as	 well.	 Generally	 speaking,	 this	
standard	is	the	strictest	water	quality	standard	in	the	history	of	China,	which,	given	the	description	of	the	
government	official	media,	was	as	strict	as	water	standard	in	the	European	Union	(Xinhua	Daily	Telegraph,	
2014).	
The	publication	of	the	2006	national	tap	water	standard	is	an	outcome	of	cooperative	work.	It	was	led	by	
the	MH,	who	cooperated	with	the	China	National	Standardisation	Management	Committee,	MC,	MWR,	
MLR,	and	NEPA.	This	long	overdue	cooperation	also	reflects	the	difficulties	of	cooperation	between	these	
departments.	It	has	been	21	years	since	the	publication	of	the	1985	national	tap	water	standard.	Due	to	
its	strict	standards,	the	central	government	did	not	ask	the	local	government	to	adopt	this	new	standard	
immediately.	The	local	government	can	decide	by	themselves	the	time	to	adopt	the	new	standard,	but	
they	must	adopt	it	before	1	July	2012.	However,	since	the	new	standard	did	not	come	with	any	penalty	
policies	and	regulations,	it	was	not	taken	seriously	by	local	governments	and	water	companies	(Gong	and	
Liu,	2012).	Similar	to	what	has	happened	after	the	publication	of	MC’s	2005	standard,	the	adoption	of	this	
2006	standard	is	problematic.	In	2008	and	2009,	MHURD	adopted	a	national	survey	among	4457	urban	
water	treatment	plants.	They	found	that	only	58.2%	of	all	surveyed	water	treatment	plants	can	produce	
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standardised	tap	water	under	the	new	tap	water	standard.	This	figure	was	so	low	that	the	government	
even	worried	that	its	disclosure	might	trigger	social	turmoil.	Hence,	this	figure	was	only	disclosed	by	the	
government	official	media,	Xinhua	News,	in	2012	(Xinhuanet,	2012).	The	survey	result	demonstrates	the	
institutional	incoherency	in	water	flow:	on	one	hand,	there	are	several	water	standards	that	strict	enough	
to	produce	potable	tap	water;	on	the	other,	given	the	limited	water	treatment	capacity	for	many	water	
treatment	 plants	 in	 China,	 they	 still	 are	 only	 able	 to	 supply	 semi-potable	 tap	 water	 quality	 to	 their	
consumers.	
It	is	important	to	note	here	that	the	low	standardised	rate	is	also	due	to	the	fact	of	serious	pollution	of	the	
water	source	(introduced	in	detail	in	section	4.2),	which	is	always	beyond	the	treatment	capacity	of	water	
treatment	plants.	Thus,	this	has	formed	another	institutional	incoherency	between	of	water	flow,	namely	
the	incoherency	between	the	strict	water	quality	standard	and	the	serious	pollution	in	water	sources.	As	
a	result,	the	government’s	attention	shifted	to	the	protection	of	water	sources.	In	2007	and	2008,	the	MEP	
published	 two	 recommended	 technical	 guidelines	 about	 the	 protection	 of	 the	 tap	water	 source.	 This	
evidenced	the	fact	that	without	enough	power,	MEP’s	work	is	 limited	in	pollution	control.	 It	cannot	be	
integrated	into	the	water	source	protection	effectively.	On	January	1	2014,	the	MWR	published	its	first	
and	 only	 plan	 about	water	 source,	 Guidelines	 for	 Urban	Water	 Supply	 Sources	 Plan.	 Since	 they	 both	
published	 legal	 documents	 regarding	 water	 source,	 the	 power	 boundary	 between	 MEP	 and	 MWR	
becomes	ambiguous,	which	also	reflects	in	the	case	study	in	Chapter	6.	
4.6 Conclusion	
With	an	introduction	of	the	situation	of	China’s	freshwater	resource,	this	chapter	 introduced	the	three	
existing	 institutional	 incoherencies	 in	 power,	 money	 and	 water	 flow	 respectively.	 Their	 circulation	
between	the	different	agents	in	the	‘source	to	consumer’	urban	semi-potable	tap	water	provision	system	
forms	 the	 foundation	 of	 Hybrid	 Institutional	 Architecture.	 In	 order	 to	 illustrate	 the	 institutional	
incoherency	 in	 power	 flow,	 this	 chapter	 highlighted	 the	 incoherencies	 in	 three	 relationships:	 the	
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relationship	between	government	departments	themselves,	the	relationship	between	government,	water	
company	 and	 consumer,	 and	 the	 relationship	 between	 consumer,	 third	 party	 and	Hybrid	 Institutional	
Architecture.	In	order	to	illustrate	the	institutional	incoherency	in	money	flow,	this	chapter	analysed	the	
composition	of	China’s	water	rates	and	the	ineffective	marketization	reform	of	urban	public	utility.	Finally,	
the	 institutional	 incoherency	 in	 water	 flow	 was	 stressed	 in	 light	 of	 a	 analyses	 of	 the	 developmental	
trajectory	of	China’s	water	standards	published	by	different	departments,	which	demonstrates	the	gap	
between	strict	water	standard	and	semi-potable	tap	water.		
In	the	next	chapter,	a	case	study	of	Harbin	will	be	presented	to	illustrate	the	sociogenic	sustainability	crises	
as	the	outcome	of	the	unbalance	between	Hybrid	Institutional	Architecture,	Consumer	Coping	Strategy	
Matrix,	and	water	crises.	
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 Harbin's	Sociogenic	Water	
Sustainability	Crises	
5.1 	Introduction	
As	Figure	5.1	shows,	Harbin	 is	 the	capital	city	of	Heilongjiang	Province.	 In	2010	 its	population	reached	
10,635,971,	making	it	one	of	the	most	populous	cities	in	China.	However,	its	water	resources	per	capital	
is	 1350	 cubic	meters,	 formulating	 a	 sharp	 contrast	 to	 the	 state’s	 average	 level,	 2173	 cubic	meter	 per	
capital(Xinhuanet,	2015).		
All	of	the	rivers	near	the	urban	areas	of	Harbin	belong	to	the	Songhua	River	system	and	the	Mudan	River	
system.	There	are	two	rivers	that	wind	through	the	downtown	area	of	Harbin,	Songhua	River,	and	Ashi	
stream.	They	are	the	primary	water	resources	for	the	metropolis.	Several	small	streams	also	flow	through	
the	periphery	of	the	city,	including	Lalin	stream	and	Feiketu	stream.	The	distribution	of	the	city’s	water	
resources	is	uneven.	The	Eastern	regions	are	enjoying	relatively	abundant	water	resource,	whereas	the	
central	and	western	regions	are	hit	by	severe	water	scarcity.	As	a	city	with	a	river	passing	through,	Harbin	
is	on	the	list	of	‘Ten	Most	Water	Shortage	Cities	in	China’	(Li,	2012).	In	2013,	Harbin	possessed	11	public	
water	treatment	plants.	Their	total	water	supply	capacity	was	1.376	million	cubic	meters	per	day.	The	total	
length	of	the	pipeline	was	2114.3	kilometres.	The	year’s	total	volume	of	water	supply	was	357.31	million	
cubic	meters,	including	150.7	million	cubic	meters	of	domestic	water	consumption.	The	total	water-served	
population	was	4.12	million.	
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Figure	5.1:	The	location	of	Harbin	
This	chapter	aims	to	demonstrate	the	developmental	trajectory	of	Harbin’s	tap	water	provision	system,	
including	three	developmental	phases	of	Harbin’s	urban	tap	water	provision	system	and	two	sociogenic	
sustainability	crises	that	have	influenced	the	development	of	this	system.	With	an	analysis	of	archival	data	
and	 interview	 materials,	 a	 contingent	 combination	 model	 of	 sociogenic	 water	 sustainability	 crisis	 is	
presented	in	the	following	sections	to	explain	the	emergences	of	two	sociogenic	water	sustainability	crises.	
All	quotations	citied	in	this	chapter	are	translated	by	the	current	author	from	Chinese	into	English.	
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5.2 Three	developmental	phases	of	Harbin's	urban	
tap	water	provision	system	
Before	moving	 into	 the	phase	of	modern	 tap	water	 supply,	Harbin’s	urban	 tap	water	provision	 system	
experienced	 three	main	developmental	 phases:	 the	phase	of	well	water	 supply	 (960-1932),	 combined	
water	supply	(1932-1953),	and	primary	modern	tap	water	supply	(1953-1980).	This	historical	trajectory	
has	 had	 a	 significant	 impact	 on	 people’s	 social	 memory	 about	 water,	 which	 paved	 the	 way	 for	 the	
constitution	of	the	Hybrid	Institutional	Architecture	of	the	urban	tap	water	provision	system	that	supplies	
semi-potable	 tap	water	 to	 the	 consumer,	 and	 the	 emergence	 of	 Consumer	 Coping	 Strategy	Matrix	 in	
dealing	with	the	semi-potable	tap	water.		
In	the	first	two	developmental	phases	of	Harbin’s	tap	water	provision	system,	two	special	technological	
transitions	 can	 be	observed.	 They	 are	 special	 due	 to	 four	 characteristics.	 First,	 they	were	 both	 led	 by	
exogenous	 drivers,	 that	 is,	 the	 Russian	 and	 Japanese	 colonists.	 Second,	 the	 flow	 of	 power	 that	 was	
associated	with	 these	 two	 technological	 transitions	 did	 not	 serve	 the	majority,	 but	 rather	 the	 specific	
interests	 of	 colonists.	 This	 divergence	 of	 interests	 alienated	 the	 majority	 of	 consumers	 from	 the	
administration	mechanism	of	the	tap	water	provision	system.	Third,	they	developed	so	rapidly	that	they	
left	little	time	for	the	public	to	become	accustomed	to	the	new	changes.	Fourth,	at	the	same	time,	both	
demonstrated	the	systematic	scaling	up	of	the	tap	water	provision	system,	which	resulted	in	water	quality	
improvement	in	Harbin.	They	also	ushered	in	other	big	scale	developmental	processes	led	by	the	central	
government	 and	 local	 municipal	 government	 as	 endogenetic	 drivers.	 These	 two	 rapid	 technological	
transitions	can	be	seen	as	part	of	the	scaling	up	of	the	Hybrid	Institutional	Architecture	of	the	tap	water	
provision	system.		
In	the	third	phase,	another	technological	transition,	driven	mainly	by	the	endogenetic	power	of	municipal	
government,	can	be	identified.	However,	this	technological	transition	was	also	influenced	by	the	flow	of	
power	from	central	government,	who	have	a	specific	political	goal	of	turning	Harbin	into	a	major	industrial	
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zone	of	China.	As	a	result	of	this	technological	transition,	the	priority	was	still	not	to	address	the	citizens’	
tap	water	needs.		
All	three	transitions	happened	during	a	relatively	short-term,	which	left	almost	no	time	for	the	consumer	
to	adapt	to	the	concept	of	tap	water	provision.	Moreover,	all	stages	were	led	by	political	power	instead	of	
business	 power,	which	 formed	 a	 social	memory	 that	 it	 is	 always	 the	 government	 but	 any	 commercial	
entities	 that	 operate	 the	 tap	 water	 provision	 system.	 	 This	 can	 be	 seen	 as	 the	 origin	 of	 the	 Hybrid	
Institutional	 Architecture.	 Accordingly,	 major	 consumers’	 alienation	 from	 the	 system	 became	 a	 social	
memory	and	social	reality.	As	a	result,	this	contributed	to	consumer	normalisation	towards	semi-potable	
tap	water.		
Given	the	limited	historical	record	of	Harbin’s	water	provision	system	through	these	three	phases,	the	data,	
if	not	marked	as	cited	from	another	source,	is	cited	from	two	main	data	sources:	The	Harbin	Municipal	
Record	Book:	The	Urban	Planning;	and	The	Harbin	Municipal	Chronicle:	The	Construction	of	Municipal	
Public	Facilities.		
5.2.1 The	phase	of	well	water	supply	(960-1932)		
In	Harbin,	 for	 hundreds	 of	 years,	well	water	was	 the	 sole	water	 source	 for	most	 citizens.	 The	 earliest	
records	 of	well	 water	 supply	were	 acquired	 from	 the	 ancient	 city	 ruins	 dated	 back	 to	 the	 early	 Song	
Dynasty	 (960-1276).	 In	 1115,	 Harbin	was	 chosen	 as	 the	 capital	 city	 of	 Jin	 Dynasty,	 a	minority	 regime	
composed	mainly	of	the	Jurchen	ethnic	group	(Harbin	Municipal	Government,	1999).	Several	well	relics	
evidenced	 the	 usage	 of	well	water.	Meanwhile,	 it	 is	 highly	 possible	 that	 a	 few	 people	 living	 near	 the	
Songhua	 River	 may	 have	 drunk	 and	 used	 the	 river	 water,	 although	 their	 number	 is	 too	 small	 to	 be	
statistically	relevant	to	the	water	supply	system	at	large.	
During	the	reign	of	the	Jiaqing	Emperor	and	Daoguang	Emperor	(1795-1850),	the	water	provision	system	
was	integrated	into	the	general	urban	plan	of	Harbin.	13	Qitun	(旗屯	urban	administrative	districts)	had	
been	planned.	Within	every	Qitun,	there	were	three	avenues,	six	lanes,	and	twelve	wells	(Harbin	Municipal	
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Government,	1998b).	Such	design	was	partially	based	on	the	convenience	of	fetching	water.	Since	then,	
the	usage	of	well	water	has	become	ingrained	in	peoples’	minds,	being	culturally	recognised	as	a	tradition	
embedded	within	the	social	fabric	and	material	infrastructure.	
One	reason	 for	 the	 long-lasting	well	water	supply	phase	 is	 the	 fact	 that	urban	population	 level	always	
remained	too	low	to	enable	the	construction	of	facilities	that	utilised	river	water.	Since	Harbin	is	located	
in	the	far	Northeast	of	China	where	the	weather	is	always	extremely	cold,	it	was	never	a	populous	city	
until	the	end	of	the	Qing	dynasty.	During	the	reign	of	the	Qing	Dynasty,	the	dominant	race	of	the	ruling	
class,	 the	Manchu,	was	an	ethnic	minority	group	derived	 from	 the	 far	Northeast	areas	of	China.	 They	
believed	that	this	area	was	their	‘hometown’	and	‘the	place	of	blessing,'	as	well	as	considering	it	to	have	
remarkable	strategic,	cultural	and	military	value.	Therefore,	the	first	emperor	of	the	Qing	Dynasty,	Shunzhi	
Emperor,	issued	an	apartheid	decree,	resulting	in	the	building	of	a	long	guarded	fence	that	separated	the	
areas	of	Northeast	China	from	Central	China,	where	the	majority	of	the	Han	population	lived.	From	then	
on,	Han	people	were	prohibited	from	going	into	Northeast	China	unless	they	have	permission	issued	by	
the	authorities.	Before	the	19th	century,	Harbin	was	only	a	small	city	surrounded	by	large,	empty	lands.		
During	the	19th	century,	the	population	of	Central	China	grew	rapidly,	causing	the	deficiency	of	both	the	
housing	and	farming	land.	A	series	of	floods	and	droughts	further	worsened	this	situation.	At	the	end	of	
the	 19th	 century,	 the	 Guangxu	 Emperor,	 the	 eleventh	 emperor	 of	 the	 Qing	 dynasty,	 abolished	 the	
apartheid	decree	and	facilitated	a	mass	migration	to	the	Northeast	of	China,	historically	called	‘Chuang	
Guan	Dong	(Rush	of	Northeast	China).	Until	the	end	of	the	19th	century,	there	were	30,000	people	living	
in	 ten	villages	of	Harbin	 (Harbin	Municipal	Government,	2007a).	 It	 can	be	seen	as	 the	 first	 substantial	
population	growth	in	the	history	of	Harbin,	which	paved	the	way	for	the	expansion	of	the	city.	However,	
given	the	abundant	groundwater	storage,	owing	much	to	the	decree	from	the	Qing	dynasty,	such	abrupt	
population	growth	did	not	contribute	to	the	development	of	river	water	provision	system.		
The	first	modern	tap	water	provision	system	was	introduced	by	Russian	engineers,	who	were	permitted	
to	construct	the	China	Eastern	Railway	in	Northeast	China,	according	to	the	Sino–Ruswellsian	Secret	Treaty	
Chapter	5	Harbin’s	Sociogenic	Water	Sustainability	Crisis																																																																													|	166	
	
signed	on	3	June	1896.	They	built	several	deep	wells	to	supply	water	for	the	trains.	In	1903,	when	this	train	
line	began	to	operate,	some	associated	water	facilities	surrounded	the	train	station,	the	pier	and	the	new	
city	 districts,	 including	 the	 water	 tower,	 water	 extractor,	 pump	 house	 and	 pipelines	 (Harbin	 Statistic	
Bureau,	2014).	Later	in	the	Russo-Japanese	War	(1904-1905),	the	water	supply	facilities	associated	with	
the	train	line	underwent	a	dramatic	expansion	(Tan,	2016,	p.308).	However,	with	the	defeat	of	Russia,	their	
reign	over	the	China	Eastern	Railway	came	to	an	end	gradually	with	the	Japanese	colonists	taking	over	the	
city.	
This	development	can	be	seen	as	the	first	rapid	technological	transition	driven	by	an	exogenous	power,	
the	Russian	colonists.	Even	though	their	main	purpose	was	railway	construction,	they	realised	that	the	
added	water	facilities	could	also	be	a	good	source	of	income.	However,	this	system	only	served	a	limited	
number	 of	 consumers,	mainly	 consisting	 of	 Russians	 and	 other	 foreigners,	who	were	 charged	 by	 The	
Middle	East	Railway	Group.	The	majority	of	citizens	were	completely	alienated	 from	this	 technological	
transition	since	hand-pressed	wells	were	still	the	dominant	method	for	Chinese	people	to	fetch	water	in	
old	urban	districts.	To	them,	this	modern	tap	water	provision	system	was	something	strange	introduced	
by	 foreigners.	 Predictably,	 many	 had	 doubts	 about	 it.	 However,	 their	 doubts	 were	 either	 ignored	 or	
repressed	 by	 the	 Russian	 colonists,	 yet	 when	 it	 came	 to	 developing	 the	 tap	 water	 business,	 those	
oppositions	had	a	significant	impact.	For	example,	in	1916,	a	businessman	from	Tianjin,	the	first	city	in	
China	 to	be	equipped	with	modern	 tap	water	 facilities,	 came	to	Harbin	with	a	goal	of	 raising	 funds	 to	
initiate	 the	 local	 tap	water	 provision	business	 (Harbin	Municipal	Government,	 1998a).	 This	 is	 the	 first	
record	 of	 the	 modern	 tap	 water	 business	 in	 Harbin.	 Unfortunately,	 he	 failed,	 as	 did	 all	 the	 other	
subsequent	businessmen	with	similar	attempts.		
The	main	reason	for	these	failures,	as	mentioned	before,	was	that	the	local	people	were	so	accustomed	
to	fetching	water	from	their	self-built	water	supply	facilities,	mainly	the	self-drilled	wells,	that	they	refused	
to	 accept	 and	 support	 any	 innovative	 idea	 of	 supplying	 tap	 water.	 Another	 reason	 was	 the	 lack	 of	
centralised	political	and	economic	power	to	support	this	business,	due	to	ethnic	diversity.	On	15	May	1903,	
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the	Middle	 East	 Railway	 launched	 the	 first	 census	 of	 Harbin.	 The	 figures	 showed	 that	 its	 population	
consisted	 of	 28,228	 Chinese,	 15,579	 Russians	 and	 462	 Japanese,	 and	 200	 representatives	 of	 other	
countries	(Li,	2000).	In	1917,	the	population	of	Harbin	reached	100,000,	only	11.5%	of	whom	were	born	
locally	(Bakich,	2000).	It	was	impossible	for	people	from	such	different	backgrounds	to	form	a	centralised	
flow	 of	 political	 and	 economic	 power	 to	 promote	 the	 development	 of	 a	 tap	 water	 provision	 system.	
Moreover,	two	conflicting	flows	of	power	were	in	operation,	one	was	driven	by	the	entrenched	interests	
of	Russian	colonists	and	other	foreigners	as	exogenous	power	and	the	other	was	driven	by	the	established	
traditional	believers	of	local	people	as	endogenetic	power.	This	resulted	in	a	peculiar	situation.	On	the	one	
hand,	from	1903	to	1926,	the	prototype	of	urban	tap	water	provision	system	in	Harbin	was	constructed	
and	controlled	by	the	Middle	East	Railway	Group	(Harbin	Municipal	Archives	Bureau,	2014);	on	the	other,	
the	majority	of	 citizens	were	 still	 cut	off	 from	 this	new	 technology,	which	 fuelled	 their	existing	 strong	
resistance	to	it.	In	fact,	the	development	of	the	modern	tap	water	provision	system	was	not	relaunched	
until	the	Japanese	colonial	government	took	over	the	city.		
5.2.2 The	phase	of	the	combined	water	supply	(1932-1953)	
In	February	1932,	the	Japanese	military	seized	Harbin.	In	the	same	year,	the	military	government	published	
the	 ‘Urban	Plan	of	Harbin’	and	 initiated	the	first	 long-term	water	management	plan,	which	signals	 the	
second	rapid	technological	transition	driven	by	another	exogenous	power.	For	the	first	time	in	Harbin’s	
history,	it	focused	on	the	interconnections	between	hygiene,	increasing	water	demands	and	pipeline.	It	
was	the	first	urban	plan	for	Harbin	to	construct	a	formal	urban	tap	water	provision	system.	In	this	plan,	
the	military	government	planned	to	channel	river	water	from	the	Songhua	River	into	the	city	to	replace	
the	well	water,	for	the	latter	was	always	vulnerable	to	different	types	of	pollution.	 It	was	the	first	time	
using	river	water	as	the	main	water	source	for	the	city’s	tap	water	provision	system.	Therefore,	this	second	
technological	 transition	 is	 also	 the	 beginning	 of	 the	 second	 phase	 of	 water	 supply	 in	 Harbin	 -	 the	
combination	of	well	water	supply	and	river	water	supply.	
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From	 1936	 to	 1945,	 several	 tap	 water	 facilities	 had	 been	 constructed	 and	 launched	 by	 the	 Japanese	
colonial	government.	According	to	the	records	from	the	Municipal	Record	Book,	 in	1934,	the	Japanese	
colonial	 government	 established	 the	 Urban	 Construction	 Bureau,	 within	 which	 there	 was	 an	 agency	
responsible	 for	 administering	 urban	 tap	 water	 provision.	 The	 first	 urban	 tap	 water	 source	 project,	
Wenmiao	Water	 Source	Project,	was	 completed	 in	1935.	 Similar	 to	 the	water	 facilities	built	up	by	 the	
Russians	in	the	first	phase,	this	project	only	served	tap	water	to	a	certain	group	of	people,	the	Japanese	
Army.	
In	1936,	the	colonial	government	established	two	water	treatment	plants:	Guxiang	water	treatment	plants,	
whose	supply	capacity	was	2,000	tons	per	day;	and	Nangang	Deep	Well	water	treatment	plants,	whose	
supply	capacity	was	3,000	tons	per	day.	It	also	built	the	Harbin’s	earliest	pipeline	in	the	same	year,	which	
covered	13.8%	of	the	total	urban	population.	Identical	to	the	Wenmiao	Water	Source	Project,	among	the	
drinking	consumers	of	this	pipeline,	94.73%	are	foreigners	(Dongbeinet,	2009).	In	1939,	5,000	families	had	
connected	to	the	tap	water	supply	(Harbin	Municipal	Government,	1998b),	most	of	whom	were	either	
foreigners	or	businessmen	from	an	elite	class.	In	1942,	the	Xinyang	Water	Treatment	Plant	was	launched,	
the	last	water	facility	the	colonial	government	built	in	Harbin.	
After	1939,	the	expansion	of	Harbin’s	tap	water	provision	system	stopped	due	to	the	Pacific	war	between	
Japan	 and	 the	 US.	Many	 construction	 plans	 of	 water	 facilities	 remained	 on	 paper.	 Later,	 some	water	
facilities	were	destroyed	during	 the	Anti-Japanese	War,	which	resulted	 in	a	sharp	decline	of	urban	tap	
water	provision.	In	1945,	the	urban	water	supply	capacity	was	reduced	to	less	than	10,000	tons	per	day	
(Harbin	Municipal	Government,	1998b).	
The	 Japanese	 colonial	 government	 brought	 about	 an	 all-round	 technological	 transition	 to	 the	
development	of	Harbin’s	urban	tap	water	provision	system.	On	the	basis	of	the	Russian	colonisers’	heritage,	
it	dramatically	scaled	up	the	system,	introduced	a	series	of	new	technologies	and	ideas	regarding	hygiene,	
pipeline	and	water	treatment,	particularly	the	technology	of	treated	river	water,	which	initiated	the	usage	
of	river	water	of	the	Songhua	River.	However,	this	scaling	up	only	benefited	a	small	group	of	privileged	
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people.	In	general,	people	still	neither	had,	knew	about,	nor	had	a	chance	to	access	the	urban	tap	water	
provision	system.	In	other	words,	the	technology	of	modern	tap	water	provision	was	not	‘socially	digested’	
by	the	majority,	who	still	relied	solely	on	well	water.	
The	case	of	Taiwan,	mentioned	in	Harvey’s	work,	forms	a	stark	contrast	to	Harbin	(Harvey,	2015).	Under	
the	ruling	of	the	Japanese	colonial	government	for	around	fifty	years,	Taiwan’s	tap	water	provision	system	
also	experienced	technological	transition.	Compared	to	Harbin	citizens’	oppositional	attitude	toward	the	
development	 of	 tap	 water	 provision	 system,	 people	 in	 Taiwan	 accepted	 the	 new	 technology.	 This	
difference	may	partially	be	attributed	to	the	relative	long-term	ruling	of	the	Japanese	colonial	government,	
which	was	from	the	end	of	the	19th	century	until	1945.	During	this	process,	despite	a	brutal	genocide	
implemented	by	 the	 Japanese	army	to	 the	aboriginal	 inhabitants	aimed	at	seizing	 local	water	sources,	
many	average	people,	especially	children,	were	educated	in	school	on	the	concept	of	modern	tap	water	
and	showed	their	support	for	it.	In	Taiwan,	there	is	a	memorial	and	a	statue	for	Yoichi	Hatta,	a	Japanese	
engineer	who	 contributed	 to	 the	 development	 of	 hydraulic	 engineering	 in	 Taiwan	 during	 the	 colonial	
period.	 However,	 in	 Harbin,	 the	 impacts	 of	 technological	 transitions	 are	 essential	 only	 regarding	
constructing	 water-associated	 infrastructures	 and	 facilities.	 The	 benefits	 of	 the	 modern	 tap	 water	
provision	system	were	neither	visible	nor	accessible	to	the	majority.	
On	28	April	1946,	The	CPC’s	Army	retook	Harbin.	One	of	their	prioritized	tasks	was	to	restore	the	urban	
water	 supply	 system.	 At	 the	 end	 of	 this	 year,	 The	 CPC’s	 Harbin	Municipal	 Government	 took	 over	 the	
severely	damaged	water	treatment	plants	and	the	pipeline.	Due	to	the	shortage	of	funding,	the	colonial	
government	 left	 two	water	 treatment	plants	unfinished:	Sifangtai	Water	Source,	 later	 renamed	by	 the	
municipal	government	as	The	First	water	treatment	plants,	Shamantun	Water	Purification	Plant,	renamed	
as	The	Third	water	treatment	plants,	and	Xinyang	Water	Purification	Plant,	renamed	as	the	Fourth	Water	
Treatment	Plant.	These	facilities	eliminated	much	of	the	hardship	in	establishing	the	new	urban	tap	water	
provision	 facilities,	as	well	as	 reducing	 the	 time	overhead	that	might	normally	be	associated	with	 that	
process.	At	the	end	of	1949,	the	urban	water	supply	capacity	had	not	only	been	fully	restored,	but	also	
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increased	 from	5,000	 cubic	meters	 per	day	 in	 the	war	period	 to	 20,000	 cubic	meters	 per	day	 (Harbin	
Municipal	Government,	1998b).		
5.2.3 The	phase	of	primary	modern	tap	water	supply	(1953-1980)	
After	 the	 founding	 of	 the	 People’s	 Republic	 of	 China	 on	 1	 October,	 1949,	 the	 Harbin’s	 municipal	
government	made	a	decision	to	increase	the	urban	water	supply	capacity.	In	1953,	the	Harbin’s	municipal	
government	 published	 the	 first	 Urban	 Long-term	 General	 Plan,	 including	 the	 first	 Urban	 Water	
Management	 Guidelines.	 From	 then	 on	 until	 1965,	 they	 launched	 several	 water	 projects,	 including	 a	
construction	project	 to	build	 a	new	water	 treatment	plant,	 The	 Second	Water	 Treatment	Plant,	 and	a	
pipeline	expansion	project	aiming	to	expand	the	pipeline	from	150	kilometres	to	407	kilometres.	All	of	
these	projects	 exponentially	 increased	 the	urban	water	 supply	 capacity	 from	20,000	 to	 155,000	 cubic	
meters	per	day	(Harbin	Municipal	Government,	1998b).	This	is	also	the	first	rapid	technological	transition	
driven	by	endogenous	power,	which	has	no	other	interests	but	the	public	welfare.	This	was	the	first	time	
the	majority	of	Harbin	citizens	accessed	tap	water.	However,	similar	to	what	has	happened	in	the	first	two	
technological	 transitions,	 this	 technological	 transition	developed	too	 fast	 for	Harbin	citizens	 to	be	well	
informed	and	educated	about	the	characteristics	of	tap	water.	As	a	result,	there	are	no	records	of	their	
habit	shift	in	water	consumption	at	that	time,	but	two	things	can	be	confirmed:	first,	few	people,	including	
government	officials,	knew	how	to	manage	the	modern	tap	water	provision	system;	and	second,	given	the	
rapid	growth	in	industrial	development,	the	substandard	pipe,	and	the	flawed	administration,	the	quality	
of	 tap	 water	 deteriorated.	 Consequently,	 it	 could	 not	 be	 considered	 as	 ‘potable	 water’	 at	 all	 by	 its	
consumers.	
Accompanied	by	the	scaling	up	of	the	tap	water	provision	system,	there	 is	a	significant	 increase	 in	the	
water-served	population	(people	who	can	access	to	the	water	supply)	in	this	period.	In	1952,	the	figure	
was	280,000,	but	only	two	years	later,	it	reached	406,148.	Obviously,	such	remarkable	population	increase	
imposed	huge	pressure	on	the	urban	tap	water	supply.	Therefore,	three	plans	were	proposed,	one	was	
short-term,	the	other	two	long-term	(Harbin	Municipal	Government,	1998b).		
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However,	three	exponential	mistakes	can	be	observed	during	this	primary	developmental	period,	which	
forms	three	disjunctions	between	Harbin’s	urban	plan	and	social	reality.	It	was	those	three	disjunctions	
that	made	the	urban	tap	water	provision	system,	to	a	large	extent,	incompetent	in	proper	functionality.	
The	first	is	a	disjunction	between	the	Urban	Water	Management	Guidelines	and	the	phenomenal	growth	
of	urban	population.	First,	 the	predicted	population	growth	 in	both	the	short-term	plan	and	 long-term	
plan	was	the	same.	In	other	words,	the	long-term	plan	did	not	take	into	account	the	population	growth	
beyond	the	short-term	plan.	Meanwhile,	the	scale	of	population	growth	in	the	coming	years	surpassed	
the	predicted	figure	dramatically.	A	year	after	the	publication	of	Urban	Long-term	General	Plan,	Harbin’s	
population	reached	its	highest	growth	rate,	23.8%.	In	the	next	ten	years,	between	1950	to	1960,	Harbin	
experienced	a	baby	boom,	during	which	its	total	population	grew	to	1.242	million	with	an	annual	growth	
rate	 of	 9%.	 At	 the	 end	 of	 1960,	Harbin’s	 population	 topped	 2	million	 (Harbin	Municipal	Government,	
1998b).	
The	 second	 disjunction	 is	 between	 the	 urban	 water	 management	 guidelines	 and	 the	 ineffective	
administration	of	urban	tap	water	provision	system.	It	 includes	several	aspects:	first,	 in	this	period,	the	
usage	rate	of	equipment	was	low.	Given	the	figure	in	1952,	only	26.10%	of	the	water	extraction	equipment,	
32.72%	of	the	water	treatment	equipment	was	in	use.	These	figures	increased	to	54.66%	and	63.54%	in	
1954.	However,	similar	to	the	prediction	of	the	population,	 in	the	Urban	Long-term	General	Plan,	they	
were	also	predicted	inaccurately.	In	the	first	short	industrial	planning,	both	figures	would	be	increased	to	
95%,	while	in	the	second	short	plan	they	would	be	increased	to	59%.	
Another	 aspect	 is	 the	 high	 leakage	 rate	 of	 the	 water	 pipeline,	 which	 was	 mainly	 caused	 by	 illegal	
connections	and	water	stealing.	In	1952,	the	water	leakage	rate	reached	31.20%.	It	reduced	to	13.60%	in	
1954.	In	1972,	the	total	water	leakage	amount	reached	7,820,000	cubic	meters,	occupying	13.3%	of	the	
total	water	sailed	amount	in	that	year.	However,	there	is	no	prediction	of	leakage	rate	in	the	urban	plan	at	
all	(Harbin	Municipal	Government,	1998a).	This	was	possibly	because	the	associated	work	on	reducing	this	
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rate	would	be	so	difficult	that	the	municipal	government	was	unable	to	set	any	goal	or	make	any	promises	
on	it.	
The	third	aspect	was	the	disorder	in	setting	rates	of	various	water	services.	Because	of	the	political	impact	
of	the	Cultural	Revolution,	the	water	rates	dropped	dramatically.	In	1955,	the	water	rates	for	672	public	
water	 supply	 booths	 was	 0.007	 Yuan	 per	 40	 kilograms.	 It	 was	 adjusted	 in	 the	 period	 of	 the	 Cultural	
Revolution	 to	an	extremely	 low	rate,	0.05	Yuan	per	person	per	month.	Predictably,	 the	monthly	water	
consumption	amount	doubled	after	the	adjustment.	Meanwhile,	the	service	rates	decreased	from	8	Yuan	
for	 industrial	 facilities	 and	 4	 Yuan	 for	 domestic	 residents,	 to	 0.5	 Yuan	 for	 every	 applicant.	 All	 these	
adjustments	further	stimulated	the	water	consumption	to	a	higher	degree.	
The	third	disjunction	is	between	urban	water	management	guidelines	and	political	turmoil.	It	distracted	
from	and	deprived	the	attention	that	should	have	been	paid	to	the	development	of	the	urban	tap	water	
provision	system.	In	order	to	prevent	an	air	attack	from	the	Soviet	Union,	on	16	June	1956,	the	National	
Construction	Commission	requested	Harbin	to	‘take	a	long-term	account	for	the	hygiene	and	air	defence	
and	 increase	 the	 groundwater	 supply	 to	 meet	 the	 increased	 water	 demand	 in	 the	 future’.	 That	
requirement	impeded	the	development	of	surface	water	supply	facilities	in	Harbin.	It	requested	the	water	
facilities	to	be	designed	underground	or	semi-underground	and	painted	in	colours	that	would	camouflage	
with	bushes.	
Another	case	was	that	little	attention	may	have	been	spent	on	domestic	water	supply	plans,	because	it	
was	overshadowed	by	the	industrial	water	supply	plan,	the	priority	task	for	Harbin’s	municipal	government	
at	 that	 time,	given	that	Harbin	was	seen	as	one	of	 the	most	essential	 industrial	cities	 in	north-eastern	
China.	 Generally	 speaking,	 in	 the	 periods	 of	 the	 Great	 Leap	 Forward	 and	 Cultural	 Revolution,	 the	
development	of	the	urban	tap	water	provision	system	nearly	stagnated,	which	contrasted	sharply	with	
Harbin’s	unreasonable	industrial	plan	aiming	to	build	‘dozens	of	Chemical	Factories’.	From	1960	to	1962,	
Harbin	did	not	initiate	any	new	water	provision	projects.	The	water	coverage	rate	also	increased	at	a	slow	
pace.	In	1965,	the	coverage	of	urban	water	supply	was	71%,	with	1.17	million	people	consuming	2663	tons	
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of	water	for	domestic	usage	per	year.	With	seven	years	passing,	it	only	slightly	improved	to	76%	in	1972	
(Harbin	Municipal	Government,	1998b).	
As	a	result,	all	three	disjunctions	constituted	a	chaotic	aggregation.	In	light	of	the	low	income	from	water	
rates	and	service	rates,	there	was	insufficient	funding	for	the	government	to	maintain	the	operation	of	
water	facilities,	not	to	mention	lack	of	funding	to	construct	the	new	ones.	As	a	result,	in	1977,	233,000	
residents	who	lived	on	a	first	floor	had	no	water	supply	in	the	daytime,	occupying	77.5%	of	all	residents	
living	 in	 first	 floors	 in	Harbin.	83,000	residents	who	 lived	on	ground	 floors	had	no	water	supply	 in	 the	
daytime,	occupying	3.2%	of	all	residents	living	on	ground	floors	in	Harbin.	These	residents	had	to	store	tap	
water	during	the	night	for	the	next	day’s	consumption.	There	were	another	8000	residents,	3%	of	total	
water	consumers,	who	had	no	water	supply	in	both	the	daytime	and	at	night.	510,000	residents	had	no	
tap	water	connection.	These	residents	had	to	fetch	water	from	the	public	water	supply	booths,	where	the	
queue	was	always	long.	
Owing	to	the	 increased	political	stabilization,	during	the	period	from	1973	to	1980,	Harbin’s	urban	tap	
water	 provision	 system	 expanded	 rapidly,	 which	 signals	 the	 coming	 of	 the	 contemporary	 tap	 water	
provision	system	(Harbin	Municipal	Government,	1998a).	In	1973,	the	construction	project	of	the	Seventh	
Water	Treatment	Plant	was	initiated,	and	completed	in	December	1975	with	the	water	supply	capacity	of	
55,000	tons	per	day.	However,	due	to	its	inferior	quality,	the	water	from	this	water	treatment	plant	could	
only	be	used	for	industrial	production.	In	1977,	the	expansion	project	of	Fourth	Water	Treatment	Plant	
was	completed,	which	increased	the	water	supply	capacity	from	15,000	tons	per	day	to	45,000	tons	per	
day.	In	October	1978,	National	Construction	Committee	granted	13.72	million	Yuan	as	dedicated	funding	
for	the	expansion	project	of	both	the	First	Water	Treatment	Plant	and	the	Third	Water	Treatment	Plant.	In	
1980,	Harbin	developed	eight	groundwater	sources	and	four	surface	water	sources.	The	domestic	water	
consumption	 reached	 41,860,000	 tons	 per	 day,	 consumed	 by	 1.47	 million	 people,	 72%	 of	 urban’s	
population.	At	 the	same	 time,	 two	new	problems	emerged,	 the	shortage	of	 the	groundwater,	and	 the	
pollution	of	the	surface	water,	which	worsened	gradually	in	the	urban	tap	water	provision	system.	
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To	conclude,	the	three	developmental	phases	of	Harbin’s	urban	tap	water	development	is	full	of	political	
and	 economic	 turbulence	 (Sultana	 and	 Loftus,	 2012;	 Harvey,	 2015).	 Three	 short-term	 technological	
transitions	 have	 brought	 out	 the	 rapid	 development	 in	 the	 technology	 of	 urban	 tap	 water	 provision.	
However,	 all	 of	 them	have	 their	 problems.	 The	 first	 two	 technological	 transitions	were	 driven	 by	 two	
different	exogenous	powers	with	their	certain	political	and	economic	 interests.	The	third	technological	
transition,	 which	 was	 to	 a	 large	 extent	 triggered	 on	 the	 basis	 of	 the	 heritages	 of	 the	 previous	 two	
technological	transitions,	was	also	driven	by	a	political	and	economic	goal	rather	than	the	welfare	of	the	
majority	of	citizens.	Consumers,	in	this	sense,	were	passive	consumer	rather	than	activate	consumer	of	
technology	transitions.	As	a	result,	the	consumers	of	tap	water	neither	have	the	time	nor	the	chance	to	
become	familiar	with	this	modern	‘innovation’.	Their	domestic	traditions	of	disinfecting	water	by	boiling	
it,	were	to	a	large	extent	retained.	
Because	 of	 these	 short-term	 technological	 transitions,	 the	 government	 barely	 had	 any	 experience	 of	
administering	the	urban	tap	water	provision	system.	As	a	result,	three	disjunctions	can	be	observed:	the	
first	disjunction	is	between	the	urban	plan	and	the	phenomenal	growth	of	urban	population;	the	second	
disjunction	 is	between	 the	urban	plan	and	 the	 ineffective	administration	of	urban	 tap	water	provision	
system.	The	third	disjunction	is	between	the	urban	plan	and	the	political	turmoil.	As	a	result,	a	‘chaotic	
aggregation’	in	urban	tap	water	development	happened	between	the	late	1960s	and	lasted	until	the	1980s.	
During	this	period,	it	was	impossible	for	the	tap	water	provision	system	to	cover	the	majority	of	Harbin	
citizens.	For	those	who	could	get	access	to	this	service,	the	quality	of	tap	water	was	questionable.	As	a	
result,	as	analysed	in	section	3.5,	two	types	of	consumer	coping	strategies	can	be	widely	observed.	The	
self-built	water	supply	facilities	as	Non-Tap-Water	Coping	Strategy,	which	aims	to	cope	with	the	problem	
of	fragmented	water	provision;	and	boiled	water	as	Tap	Water	Coping	Strategy,	which	aims	to	cope	with	
the	problem	of	semi-potable	tap	water.	Therefore,	the	three	short-term	technological	transitions	failed	to	
reconcile	the	citizen	to	the	concept	of	modern	tap	water.	At	the	same	time,	they	paved	the	way	for	the	
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occurrences	of	three	disjunctions,	which	further	stimulated	the	development	of	two	types	of	consumer	
coping	strategies,	transforming	them	into	an	ingrained	social	memory	for	every	citizen	in	Harbin.	
5.3 The	first	sociogenic	sustainability	crisis:	water	
scarcity	and	overexploitation	
The	signal	of	Harbin’s	contemporary	tap	water	provision	was	the	publication	of	Harbin	Urban	Overall	
Plan	in	1980.	It	presented	for	the	first	time	the	general	urban	water	supply	situation	in	Harbin,	along	
with	the	first	official	records	of	the	Non-Tap-Water	Coping	Strategy	for	the	fragmented	tap	water	
provision	system,	the	self-built	water	supply	facilities	as	Non-Tap-Water	Coping	Strategy,	which	not	only	
includes	the	self-drilled	water	well,	but	also	the	large-scale	water	supply	facilities	built	by	companies,	
factories,	hospitals,	schools,	factories,	and	other	facilities	where	the	current	tap	water	provision	system	
could	not	reach.	In	the	context	of	five	conditions	and	the	dysfunction	of	hybrid	whole	tap	water	
production,	this	coping	strategy	led	to	the	over-exploitation	of	groundwater	resource,	the	first	sociogenic	
water	sustainability	crisis	of	Harbin.	
5.3.1 Water	scarcity	and	fragmented	tap	water	distribution	
From	the	mid-1990s	to	the	beginning	of	2000s,	Harbin	faced	prolonged	water	scarcity	due	to	the	dwindling	
water	quality	of	Songhua	River	and	the	overexploitation	of	groundwater	resources.	Such	a	water	shortage	
culminated	in	2001,	when	Harbin	was	hit	by	its	most	severe	drought	since	1949.	1.086	million	hectares	of	
agriculture	planting	was	affected,	accounting	for	77.9%	of	the	total	planting	in	Harbin.	The	water	table	of	
Songhua	River,	the	main	water	source	of	Harbin	at	that	time	dropped	to	its	lowest	level	in	history.	Different	
from	the	case	of	Athens	(Kaika,	2003),	where	the	water	scarcity	was	socially	constructed	and	used	as	the	
mean	to	achieve	privatisation	and	other	neoliberal	agenda,	in	Harbin	water	scarcity	has	triggered	a	series	
of	social	and	environmental	sustainability	crises.		
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This	situation	worsened	by	the	fragmented	tap	water	distribution.	Given	Harbin’s	Urban	Overall	Plan,	tap	
water	could	not	be	supplied	to	the	city’s	north	and	western	areas	due	to	two	main	reasons.	First,	given	
the	low	income	of	water	company	(introduced	in	section	5.2.3),	 the	construction	funding	of	pipeline	is	
insufficient.	As	a	result,	the	pipeline	could	not	reach	these	areas.	Moreover,	this	problem	was	worsened	
by	the	geographical	conditions	of	Harbin’s	terrain.	Harbin	is	located	in	a	hilly	area.	The	average	height	of	
its	south	and	west	terrains,	160	to	170	meters,	was	much	higher	than	the	average	height	of	its	north	and	
eastern	 terrains,	 117	 meters.	 The	 city’s	 uneven	 terrain	 dramatically	 increased	 the	 cost	 of	 pipeline	
construction.	Second,	water	treatment	plants	and	equipment	was	over-concentrated	in	only	one	water	
treatment	plant,	Shamantun	Water	Treatment	Plant.	It	handled	80%	of	urban	water	supply	and	74%	of	
surface	 water	 treatment	 work	 with	 five	 pipelines	 connecting	 water	 source	 sites	 and	 six	 pipelines	
connecting	the	urban	hub.	One	explanation	of	such	over-concentration	is	that	many	other	pipelines,	such	
as	the	gas	pipeline,	heating,	and	sewage	pipeline,	were	constructed	in	the	same	area	where	the	tap	water	
supply	pipeline	was	located.	Hence,	it	was	difficult	to	make	any	change	to	the	current	water	supply	pipeline	
without	interfering	with	the	other	pipelines.	
5.3.2 The	 Non-Tap-Water	 Coping	 Strategy	 with	 fragmented	 tap	
water	distribution	
Under	the	circumstance	of	fragmented	tap	water	provision,	consumers	and	facilities	in	the	northern	and	
western	areas	of	the	city	had	to	develop	their	Non-Tap-Water	Coping	Strategies.	Since	bottled	water	and	
barrelled	water	were	not	available	at	that	time,	the	only	Non-Tap-Water	Coping	Strategy	for	the	consumer	
to	adopt	was	self-built	water	supply	facilities.	It	is	important	to	note	here	that	this	coping	strategy	was	not	
a	novelty.	In	the	developmental	phase	of	the	tap	water	supply	(1953-1980),	which	has	been	discussed	in	
the	previous	section,	a	self-drilled	well	had	already	been	widely	adopted	by	numerous	Harbin	citizens	who	
suffered	from	the	chaotic	aggregation	as	a	result	of	three	disjunctions	in	urban	tap	water	provision	system.		
In	1980,	216	facilities	(such	as	school,	hospital,	factory,	government	department	and	so	on)	installed	620	
groundwater	wells.	531,000	citizens,	up	to	28%	of	the	urban	population,	depended	on	their	water	supply	
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from	these	self-built	water	supply	facilities,	which	supplied	42,000	tons	of	water	for	domestic	consumption	
per	day.	Meanwhile,	the	urban	tap	water	provision	system	supplied	118,000	tons	of	water	for	domestic	
consumption	per	day.	If	taking	into	account	the	industrial	water	consumption,	the	self-built	water	supply	
facilities	extracted	580,000	tons	of	groundwater	per	day,	whereas	the	urban	tap	water	provision	system	
only	supplied	228,000	tons	of	water	per	day,	226,300	tons	of	which	was	surface	water.	This	demonstrated	
that	 industrial	 facilities	used	more	water	 from	self-built	water	 facilities	 than	 from	the	urban	tap	water	
provision	system.	The	surface	water	source,	the	Songhua	River,	was	also	a	source	of	the	self-built	water	
supply	facilities,	but	mainly	for	industrial	consumption.	Four	factories	had	consumed	65,000	tons	of	river	
water	per	day	through	their	self-built	water	supply	facilities	(Harbin	Municipal	Government,	1998b).		
In	essence,	these	self-built	water	facilities	are	an	illegal	private	appropriation	of	the	public-owned	water	
resource.	However,	 their	 number	was,	 to	 a	 large	 extent,	 grown	with	 the	 tacit	 consent	 of	 the	Harbin’s	
municipal	government.	These	attitudes	also	demonstrated	in	the	developmental	goals	of	the	urban	overall	
plan.	In	the	plan,	these	self-built	water	supply	facilities	were	allowed	to	exist	in	the	industrial	facilities	for	
another	20	years	until	2000.	They	were	recognised	by	 the	municipal	government	and	entitled	with	an	
official	 name,	 the	 urban	 emergency	 water	 source.	 As	 will	 be	 shown	 later,	 the	municipal	 government	
published	a	regulation,	clarifying	the	application	procedures	of	drilling	a	new	self-built	water	well.	It	was	
expected	to	function	as	a	complementary	water	source	to	those	who	lived	in	the	peripheral	areas.	These	
facts	demonstrated	that	the	government	had	been	involved	in	the	construction	of	a	Non-Tap-Water	Coping	
Strategy	with	fragmented	tap	water	distribution.	
The	Harbin’s	municipal	government	had	its	difficulties	in	expanding	the	pipeline.	As	mentioned	earlier,	the	
geographical	 conditions	 of	 Harbin	 are	 complex.	 The	 south-western	 areas	 gradually	 inclined	 to	 north-
eastern	areas	with	a	height	gap	of	up	to	43	meters.	This	area	is	full	of	the	floodplain,	river	terrace,	and	
uneven	tableland.	As	a	result,	those	buildings	located	in	the	five	low-pressure	water	supply	areas	could	
not	always	have	a	consistent	tap	water	supply.		
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However,	no	matter	how	difficult	it	was,	the	government	failed	to	take	responsibility	for	expanding	the	
pipeline	to	reach	the	consumers	and	facilities.	With	tacit	consent	of	the	Non-Tap-Water	Coping	Strategy	
with	fragmented	tap	water	distribution,	the	government	accepted	the	existence	of	these	self-built	water	
supply	facilities.	For	example,	in	the	record	of	Harbin	Year	Book	1986	(Harbin	Yearbook	Editing	Committee,	
1987,	 p.309)	 ,	 ‘Harbin’s	water	 supply	 departments	 are	 composed	 of	municipal	water	 company	 (80%),	
enterprises,	government	departments,	schools	(all	three	of	them	occupied	19%),	and	residents	(1%).’	Here,	
residents	 have	 been	 considered	 as	 water	 suppliers	 parallel	 with	 the	 water	 company	 and	 other	
departments.	When	the	government	endorsed	the	Non-Tap-Water	Coping	Strategy,	even	temporarily,	it	
was	accompanied	with	an	invisible	cost:	there	would	be	invisible	power	and	responsibility	shifts	between	
the	government	and	the	consumer.	In	this	case,	the	Harbin’s	municipal	government	shifted	its	power	of	
extracting	the	public-owned	groundwater	resource,	as	well	as	the	associated	responsibility	of	supplying	
tap	water,	to	the	consumer,	expecting	the	latter	to	supply	themselves	the	groundwater	in	terms	of	self-
build	water	supply	facilities.	As	a	result	of	such	power	and	responsibility	shift,	the	process	of	extracting	
groundwater	became	uncontrolled.	
Note	here	that,	in	Harvey’s	study	of	Delhi	(Harvey,	2015),	where	over	a	million	self-drilled	wells	functioned	
as	 a	 Non-Tap-Water	 Coping	 Strategy	 to	 fetch	 groundwater,	 such	 tacit	 consent	 can	 also	 be	 observed.	
However,	these	two	tacit	consents	are	different	in	many	ways.	Delhi’s	way	of	tacit	consent	is	underpinned	
by	the	chaotic	agglomeration	without	any	plan.	It	was	not	integrated	into	the	general	administration	of	
urban	water	resources	at	all.	Therefore,	the	Delhi	official’s	tacit	consent	cannot	be	considered	as	same	as	
the	 Harbin	 government’s	 tacit	 consent,	 which	 is	 a	 temporary	 compromise	 dedicated	 to	 alleviate	 the	
imminent	pain	caused	by	undeveloped	water	supply	system.	Furthermore,	no	matter	how	much	the	self-
built	water	supply	facility	is	out	of	control	in	general,	the	Harbin’s	municipal	government	still	attempted	
to	integrate	them	into	its	overall	urban	plan.	Their	effort	was	reflected	in	the	fact	that	data	of	self-built	
water	supply	facility	is	available	in	different	sources	since	the	1980s.		
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It	can	be	concluded,	therefore,	that	in	this	period,	the	Non-Tap-Water	Coping	Strategy	with	fragmented	
tap	 water	 distribution	 had	 developed	 rapidly	 with	 the	 tacit	 encouragement	 from	 the	 municipal	
government,	which	tried	to	integrate	this	coping	strategy	into	its	overall	urban	plan.	Here,	it	is	important	
to	note	three	characteristics	of	this	coping	strategy:	First,	it	was	by	nature	an	illegal	private	appropriation	
of	 the	public	water	 resource.	 Second,	 its	 construction	 involved	 the	 tap	water	 consumer,	 the	 industrial	
facilities,	and	the	municipal	government.	The	other	important	agent,	especially	the	market,	did	not	have	
a	significant	 involvement.	This	forms	a	sharp	comparison	with	the	Non-Tap-Water	Coping	Strategy	that	
will	be	 introduced	 in	the	next	section,	 the	bottled	water	and	barrelled	water.	Third,	 in	 this	period,	 the	
power	and	responsibility	had	been	shifted	from	the	municipal	government	to	the	consumers.	However,	
such	a	shift	did	not	happen	in	the	other	coping	strategy.	Also,	from	the	anthropological	stance,	this	coping	
strategy	 also	 reflects	 a	 whole	 process	 production/distribution	 process,	 which	 has	 been	 introduced	 in	
section	3.3.1.	
5.3.3 The	three	disjunctions	of	Urban	Overall	Plan	
In	Harbin’s	Urban	Overall	Plan,	the	problems	of	disjunction	remained	and	became	interwoven	with	the	
aforementioned	 Non-Tap-Water	 Coping	 Strategy	 with	 fragmented	 tap	 water	 distribution,	 and	 the	
authority’s	connivance	and	complicity	with	this	strategy.		
The	first	disjunction	was	between	the	urban	plan	prediction	and	the	phenomenal	growth	of	the	urban	
population.	Given	the	plan,	in	2000,	the	total	number	of	water	consumers	in	urban	areas	would	be	2.5	
million,	300,000	of	whom	would	still	depend	on	the	self-drilled	wells	for	water	supply.	In	fact,	in	1980	the	
total	population	in	Harbin	was	already	2,418,954,	which	reached	2,551,782	in	1982,	just	two	years	after	
the	publication	of	this	overall	plan	(Harbin	Municipal	Government,	1999).	The	data	of	the	Fifth	Population	
Census	implemented	in	2000	revealed	that	the	urban	population	of	Harbin	at	the	time	was	5,37	million	
(National	Bureau	of	Statistics,	P.	R.	China,	2011),	more	than	twice	the	predicted	number.		
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The	second	disjunction	was	between	the	urban	plan	and	the	ineffective	administration	of	the	urban	tap	
water	provision	system.	From	1949	to	1980,	the	industrial	scale	of	Harbin	expanded	40	times.	In	contrast,	
water	supply	capacity	was	increased	only	ten	times	and	the	efficiency	for	supplying	surface	water	was	low.	
In	1980,	the	real	tap	water	supply	capacities	of	the	four	surface	water	treatment	plants	were	much	less	
than	their	designed	capacity.	For	example,	The	First	Water	Treatment	Plant,	with	a	designed	water	supply	
capacity	of	100,000	tons	per	day,	supplied	only	41,300	tons.	The	Seventh	Water	Treatment	Plant,	with	
designed	water	supply	capacity	of	480,000	tons	per	day,	supplied	only	40,000	tons.	This	situation	further	
intensified	the	consumption	of	groundwater	though	self-built	water	supply	facilities.		
The	third	disjunction	is	between	the	urban	plan	and	the	water	resources	protection.	The	predicted	figure	
of	the	annual	amount	of	surface	water	these	self-built	water	supply	facilities	would	supply	kept	the	same	
from	 1980	 to	 2000.	 This	 means	 that	 such	 prediction	 did	 not	 take	 into	 account	 any	 essential	 factors	
including	population	growth,	urban	expansion,	industrial	development,	environmental	protection,	water	
resources	administration,	and	so	on.	The	municipal	government	had	no	plans	for	either	charging	water	
rates	 on	 the	 basis	 of	 groundwater	 consumption	 volume	 from	 these	 facilities	 or	 claiming	 their	
administration.	Neither	did	it	propose	to	cap	the	number	of	self-built	water	supply	facilities	to	control	the	
overexploitation	of	groundwater	resources.	Several	goals	were	established	to	‘control’	the	number	of	new	
self-drilled	water	wells.	For	example,	one	of	them	was	to	supply	the	same	amount	of	water	from	the	urban	
tap	water	provision	system	to	the	industrial	facilities	as	from	the	self-built	water	supply	facilities.	
5.3.4 The	controversial	official	data	in	water	administration	
Facing	 the	 three	 disjunctions	 mentioned	 above,	 the	 municipal	 government	 published	 a	 series	 of	
controversial	data	in	its	two	different	types	of	yearbooks	in	an	attempt	to	avoid	talking	direct	responsibility.		
For	example,	there	are	two	sets	of	contradictory	data	showing	the	percentage	of	Harbin’s	water-served	
population,	as	demonstrated	in	Figure	5.2.	One	is	from	the	Harbin	Statistic	Yearbook,	the	other	is	from	the	
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Harbin	Yearbook.	However,	in	eight	out	of	the	ten	years	from	1985	to	1995,	these	two	sets	of	data	are	in	
conflict	with	each	other,	especially	in	the	four	years	from	1986	to	1990.	
	
Figure	5.2:	Percentage	of	Harbin’s	water-served	population	from	two	data	sources:	from	1985	to	1995	
Given	 the	 data	 from	 the	 Harbin	 Statistic	 Yearbook,	 in	 1985,	 the	 percentage	 of	 Harbin’s	 water-served	
population	was	78%.	Just	one	year	later,	it	suddenly	reached	98%.	However,	in	the	Harbin	Yearbook,	the	
latter	 figure	 was	 only	 81.5%.	 Moreover,	 since	 then	 until	 1989,	 in	 the	 Harbin	 Statistic	 Yearbook	 the	
percentage	of	water	served	population	was	abnormally	high:	it	is	97%	in	1987,	97.1%	in	1988,	and	96.2%	
in	1989.	Meanwhile,	in	the	Harbin	Yearbook,	these	figures	were	81.5%	in	1987,	no	data	in	1988,	and	80.5%	
in	1989.	
Here,	one	obvious	question	emerges:	which	data	source	is	more	plausible?	This	answer	can	be	arrived	at	
by	 scrutinising	 other	 data.	 If	 the	 data	 of	 such	 rapid	 growth	 in	 the	 percentage	 of	 the	 water-served	
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population	in	the	Harbin	Statistic	Yearbook	is	correct,	then	it	must	correspond	to	a	rapid	expansion	in	the	
urban	 water	 supply	 pipeline.	 According	 to	 The	 Harbin	 Municipal	 Record	 Book:	 The	 Construction	 of	
Municipal	Public	Facilities,	in	1986	the	municipal	government	put	in	place	a	new	pipeline,	5,448	meters	in	
length	and	800	millimetres	in	calibre,	connecting	The	Second	water	treatment	plants	to	the	Fourth	Water	
Treatment	Plant.	Another	pipeline	construction	record	can	be	found	in	the	Harbin	Yearbook.	It	recorded	
that	 through	 the	 refurbishment	of	an	old	pipeline,	7909	 families	were	connected	 to	 tap	water	 supply,	
which	increased	the	percentage	of	Harbin’s	water-served	population	by	3%.	Neither	of	these	records	can	
explain	the	dramatic	growth	in	the	percentage	of	the	water-served	population	from	78%	to	98%	reported	
in	 the	Harbin	 Statistic	 Yearbook.	 The	 only	 plausible	 explanation	 of	 such	 growth	 is	 that	 the	 number	 is	
incorrect.		
In	fact,	on	December	20,	1986,	before	the	publication	of	the	data	(as	a	routine	it	was	published	one	year	
later	in	1987),	the	State	Council	issued	the	Harbin’s	municipal	government	a	document,	the	Reply	to	the	
Harbin’s	General	Urban	Plan.	 The	 State	 Council	 advised	 the	municipal	 government	 that	 ‘[…]	 attention	
should	be	paid	to	increasing	the	domestic	water	coverage.’	Hence	it	seems	that	the	abnormally	increased	
rate	of	Harbin’s	water-served	population	in	1986	was	just	a	response	to	the	State	Council’s	criticism.		
The	aforementioned	explanation	raises	another	question:	why	has	the	data	in	the	Harbin	Yearbook	not	
been	affected?	The	answer	is	clear:	in	the	Harbin	Yearbook,	this	data	set	was	not	listed	as	clearly	as	it	was	
in	the	Harbin	Statistic	Yearbook,	but	was	‘hidden’	in	the	content	introducing	the	state	of	Harbin’s	water	
supply.	 Therefore,	 the	 editors	 of	 the	 Harbin	 Yearbook,	 deliberately	 or	 not,	 did	 not	 change	 the	 data	
regarding	the	percentage	of	Harbin’s	water-served	population.	However,	since	2010,	this	data	has	stopped	
showing	in	the	content	of	the	Harbin	Yearbook.	Since	2012,	given	the	sole	record	of	the	Harbin	Statistic	
Yearbook,	the	percentage	of	Harbin’s	water-served	population	has	reached	and	remained	100%.		
This	data	implies	something	more	serious	than	the	controversy	itself.	It	unveils	the	general	attitude	of	the	
local	government,	at	least	in	that	specific	period,	was	not	to	solve	the	existing	problems,	but	to	disguise	
them	even	in	its	most	authoritative	official	data	source,	the	Harbin	Statistical	Yearbook.	Meanwhile,	it	also	
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reduces	the	trustworthiness	of	the	other	data	in	this	data	source.	This	municipal	government’s	attitude,	
to	some	extent,	can	also	be	seen	as	another	type	of	tacit	encouragement	for	the	implementation	of	the	
Non-Tap-Water	Coping	Strategy	with	fragmented	tap	water	distribution.		
5.3.5 The	legal	framework	of	Harbin’s	water	management	
After	the	period	of	the	Cultural	Revolution,	Harbin	began	to	construct	a	top-down	model	of	a	legal	system	
regarding	the	water	resources	management.	The	main	focus	was	paid	on	water	conservation.	The	central	
government	always	leads	the	local	government	to	implement	the	new	idea	concerning	water	protection	
by	publishing	the	relevant	laws	and	regulations.	However,	the	implementation	of	these	ideas	and	concepts	
are	 always	 inefficient	 on	 a	 local	 level,	 which	 demonstrates	 that	 the	 political	 influence	 from	 central	
government	to	the	local	government,	especially	in	issues	of	nature	resource	management,	may	not	be	as	
strong	as	many	people	have	presumed.		
Figure	5.3	shows	the	historical	development	of	Harbin’s	regulation	on	water	conservation	and	urban	water	
supply.	In	general,	Harbin’s	regulations	on	water	conservation	are	republished	or	revised	five	times	every	
2	to	7	years	since	1992.	These	republications	and	revisions	were	in	line	with	the	changing	situation	of	the	
urban	tap	water	provision	system.	Figure	5.4	shows	the	historical	development	of	Harbin’s	regulation	on	
water	supply.	This	regulation	has	been	republished	and	revised	four	times	every	six	to	fourteen	years	since	
its	first	publication	in	1983.	
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Figure	5.3:	The	historical	development	of	Harbin’s	local	regulation	on	water	conservation	
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Figure	5.4:	The	historical	development	of	Harbin’s	local	regulation	on	urban	water	supply	
Figure	5.3	 and	Figure	5.4	demonstrate	 several	 features	of	China’s	water	 resources	management.	 First,	
there	 is	 a	 top-down	 model	 of	 water	 administration.	 This	 demonstrates	 that	 the	 central	 and	 local	
government	 constituted	 a	 flexible	 responsibility	 distribution	 system.	 The	 regulations	 published	 by	 the	
central	government	perform	as	both	the	principle	and	the	guidance	for	the	regulations	published	by	the	
local	 government,	 whose	 responsibility	 is	 to	 elaborate	 these	 principles	 and	 guidance	 into	 details.	
Meanwhile,	the	local	government	can	either	adjust	or	abolish	their	regulations	more	often	than	the	central	
government,	which	enables	 them	 to	publish	 local	 regulations	 according	 to	 the	 changing	environment.	
However,	this	also	evidences	that	the	central	government	has	no	‘direct’	control	over	local	water	resources	
administration.	Therefore,	a	second	feature	emerges.	
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The	central	government,	in	many	senses,	is	not	only	preforming	the	role	of	‘leader’	but	also	the	role	of	
‘teacher’	in	terms	of	introducing	new	ideas	in	water	administration	to	the	local	government.	However,	the	
local	government,	being	both	the	‘student’	and	the	implementer	of	such	ideas,	does	not	always	manage	
to	keep	in	pace	with	the	central	government.	A	stark	example	is	the	process	of	 introducing	the	idea	of	
water	abstraction	licensing.	This	caused	the	risk	of	disjunction	in	the	policy	implementation	between	the	
central	and	the	local	government.		
Since	the	State	Council	published	the	Regulation	on	the	Administration	of	Water	Abstraction	Licensing	on	
September	1	1993,	the	idea	of	water	property	has	been	considered	as	an	effective	way	of	controlling	the	
water	 resource.	 This	 regulation	 was	 later	 replaced	 by	 Regulations	 on	 the	 Administration	 of	 Water	
Abstraction	 Licensing	and	Collection	of	Water	Resources	Charges	 in	2006,	as	 Figure	5.3	demonstrates.	
According	to	that	regulation,	‘each	organisation	or	individual	that	abstracts	water	resources	shall,	except	
for	the	circumstances	specified	 in	Article	4	of	this	Regulation,	apply	for	and	obtain	a	water	abstraction	
license	and	pay	water	resources	charges.’	
However,	the	Standing	Committee	of	the	People’s	Congress	of	the	Harbin	Municipality,	published	a	local	
regulation	on	water	resource,	the	Regulation	on	Urban	Water	Conservation	on	31	August	1996,	three	years	
after	the	central	government	presented	the	idea	of	water	abstraction	licensing.	However,	it	did	not	adopt	
the	idea	of	‘water	abstraction	license’	in	its	articles	at	all.		
Quite	ironically,	in	this	urban	water	conservation	regulation,	the	first	article	stated	that	‘these	regulations	
are	formulated	in	accordance	with	the	Regulation	on	the	Administration	of	Water	Abstraction	Licensing	
[…]	 by	 taking	 into	 account	 the	 particular	 circumstances	 of	 this	 Municipality,	 for	 the	 purpose	 of	
strengthening	 the	administration	of	urban	water	conservation,	protecting	and	properly	developing	 the	
urban	groundwater	resource,	promoting	the	economic	and	social	development.’	In	article	27,	it	is	stated	
that	‘any	unit	and	individual	who	needs	to	abstract	groundwater	should	apply	for	the	approval	from	the	
urban	water	 resources	 office.’	 Clearly,	 the	 idea	 of	 ‘water	 abstraction	 license’	was	 not	 adopted	 by	 the	
Harbin’s	municipal	government.	It	was	not	until	2002,	nine	years	after	the	idea	of	the	water	abstraction	
Chapter	5	Harbin’s	Sociogenic	Water	Sustainability	Crisis																																																																													|	187	
	
license	was	first	proposed	by	the	central	government,	that	Harbin	published	a	new	version	of	Regulation	
on	Urban	Water	Conservation	that	integrated	this	idea.	In	article	28,	it	is	stated	that	‘any	unit	and	individual	
who	needs	to	abstract	groundwater	should	apply	for	the	approval	from	the	water	resources	management	
authority	in	the	county	or	municipal	level.	Only	after	getting	the	water	abstraction	license	can	the	water	
abstracted,	 except	 for	 the	 circumstances	 specified	 in	 other	 laws	 or	 regulations.	 The	 developments	 of	
spring	water	and	geothermal	water	entail	the	other	approval	procedures	for	exploitation.’		
Given	the	analysis	above,	a	question	arises:	why	did	it	take	nine	years	for	Harbin’s	municipal	government	
to	adopt	the	idea	of	‘water	abstract	license’	proposed	by	central	government?	The	answer	is	that	at	the	
time	when	 this	 idea	was	proposed,	 the	Harbin’s	municipal	government	was	not	 fully	prepared	 to	 take	
effective	control	of	its	groundwater	consumption.	The	local	government	needs	time	to	adjust	the	water	
supply	 system.	Meanwhile,	 interests	 needed	 to	 be	 redistributed	 among	 different	 agents	 of	 tap	water	
provision	system.	In	conclusion,	the	practice	of	water	abstraction	license	demonstrates	the	institutional	
incoherency	in	flow	of	power	between	the	central	and	local	government,	as	introduced	in	section	4.3.	
5.3.6 The	sociogenic	water	sustainability	crisis:	the	overexploitation	
of	groundwater	
Between	the	1980s	and	2000s,	Harbin	has	undergone	a	sociogenic	water	sustainability	crisis	-	the	over-
exploitation	of	groundwater.	Since	the	1980s,	 the	groundwater	resources	has	been	the	main	source	of	
Harbin’s	tap	water	supply.	In	1980,	groundwater	made	up	65%	of	the	total	urban	water	supply	of	the	whole	
city.	There	was	a	heavy	groundwater	consumption	from	unmanaged	self-built	water	supply	facilities.	Given	
Harbin’s	groundwater	storage,	the	maximum	annual	groundwater	extraction	amount	should	be	below	11	
million	tons	to	guarantee	sustainability.	However,	the	total	annual	extraction	amount	of	groundwater	in	
Harbin	was	27.5	million	tons,	over	two	times	that	of	the	recommended	extraction	amount,	which	harmed	
the	groundwater	environment	(Harbin	Municipal	Government,	1998b).	The	groundwater	table	of	Harbin	
was	plummeting	one	meter	per	year	in	average.	In	some	places,	it	plummeted	1.5	meters	per	year.	This	is	
caused	by	the	overexploitation	of	groundwater	up	to	330,000	cubic	meters	per	day.	Later,	owing	to	stricter	
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administration,	 the	extraction	volume	decreased	to	120,000	cubic	meters	per	day	 (Li,	2012).	The	 long-
term	 overexploitation	 also	 caused	 the	 catastrophic	 land	 subsidence,	 forming	 more	 than	 500	 square	
kilometres	of	a	groundwater	depression	cone.	In	this	region	of	the	groundwater	depression	cone,	some	
buildings	had	cracked	(The	People	Net,	2000).	The	river	water	also	flowed	back	 into	these	regions	and	
polluted	the	groundwater.	This	situation	only	took	a	turn	for	the	better	in	recent	years	after	a	rectification	
campaign	of	self-built	water	supply	facilities	was	launched	by	the	municipal	government	(introduced	in	
section	5.3.7).	The	water	table	of	groundwater	has	increased	continuously	since	2004.	However,	when	the	
Songhua	River	was	polluted	by	a	benzene	spill,	many	self-built	water	supply	facilities	went	back	to	work	
again.	
Here,	it	is	important	to	demonstrate	how	the	different	agents	and	conditions	analysed	above	constitute	a	
contingent	combination	model	that	triggered	the	sociogenic	water	sustainability	crisis.	As	Figure	5.5	shows,	
there	is	a	contingent	combination	model	integrating	the	hybrid	production	of	tap	water	with	three	agents,	
the	local	government,	the	consumer	and	the	water	company	in	the	context	formed	by	five	conditions,	the	
cultural	 condition,	 the	 historical	 condition,	 the	 geographical	 condition,	 the	 political	 condition	 and	 the	
environmental	condition.	The	five	conditions	have	certain	interconnections	with	each	other	as	shown	in	
the	five	double-headed	arrow	lines.	Given	the	definition	of	sociogenic	sustainability	crisis	(introduced	in	
section	3.9),	a	sociogenic	sustainability	crisis	is	a	sustainability	crisis	that	mainly	triggered	by	motivations	
from	both	 the	natural	environment	and	 the	social	 fabrics	of	certain	society.	 In	 the	case	of	Harbin,	 the	
geographical	condition	and	the	environment	condition	contributes	to	the	form	of	motivations	from	natural	
environment,	whereas	the	cultural	condition,	the	historical	condition,	the	political	condition	contributes	
to	the	form	of	motivations	from	social	fabrics.	All	together,	they	lead	to	the	outbreak	of	the	sociogenic	
water	sustainability	crisis.	
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Figure	5.5:	The	contingent	combination	model	of	Harbin’s	first	sociogenic	water	sustainability	crisis	
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In	respect	to	the	pentacle	composed	by	the	five	conditions,	the	cultural	condition	is	the	ingrained	tradition	
of	using	well	water.	The	history	condition	 is	 the	three	rapid	technology	transitions	and	the	heritage	of	
water	 facilities	 left	 by	 the	 Japanese	 colonists.	 As	 mentioned	 in	 the	 previous	 section,	 the	 heritage	
significantly	prompted	the	development	of	Harbin’s	urban	tap	water	provision	system.	However,	in	winter	
seasons,	 these	 old	 facilities	 always	 malfunctioned,	 causing	 problems	 in	 tap	 water	 turbidity,	 residual	
chlorine	and	fluoride.		
The	geographical	condition	is	the	hilly	and	uneven	terrain	of	urban	areas,	which	dramatically	increased	
the	expenditure	of	pipeline.	The	political	condition	is	the	political	turmoil	of	the	Culture	Revolution	at	that	
period.	The	environment	condition	has	two	facets:	the	urban	environment	and	the	natural	environment.	
For	the	urban	environment,	there	is	an	unexpected	and	unplanned	rapid	population	growth,	which	has	
been	analysed	in	the	previous	section.	
Here,	it	is	worthwhile	elaborating	on	the	natural	environment	condition	in	two	points:	First,	being	located	
in	 the	north-east	 of	 China,	Harbin	has	 long-term	winter	 seasons	 compared	 to	other	 cities.	During	 the	
winter,	 it	has	a	 low	temperature,	which	increases	the	viscosity	of	river	water.	Thus,	some	solids	do	not	
precipitate	as	they	normally	would	in	general	temperature,	resulting	in	the	increased	turbidity	of	the	water.	
Connecting	the	historical	condition	of	the	old	facilities	mentioned	above,	this	causes	Harbin’s	citizens	to	
build	self-built	water	supply	facilities	to	extract	groundwater	as	their	Non-Tap-Water	Coping	Strategy	in	
the	period	when	bottled	and	barrelled	water	was	not	fully	developed.	Even	today	this	problem	still	exists.	
On	February	5,	2015,	a	Chinese	magazine,	Oriental	Outlook,	published	a	report,	in	which	the	quality	of	29	
cities’	tap	water	was	checked	by	the	third	party	with	no	commercial	and	government	background	(China	
Water	Safety	Charity	Fund,	2015).	According	to	the	national	standard,	the	turbidity	of	Harbin’s	tap	water	
was	sub-standardised.	
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Second,	there	is	also	serious	pollution	in	the	surface	water	source	of	Harbin’s,	Songhua	River.	A	significant	
case	 is	 the	 chronic	Minamata	Disease	35	which	 appeared	 in	 the	 Songhua	 river	 between	 1958	 to	 1982,	
caused	by	poison	effluents	discharged	by	the	Jilin	Petrochemical	Corporation	(Wang,	2010).	Meanwhile,	
the	 surface	water	 still	 occupied	82%	of	Harbin’s	 tap	water	provision.	 It	was	highly	possible	 that	many	
Harbin	citizens	had	noticed	the	problem	of	tap	water	and	thus	turned	to	groundwater	from	self-built	tap	
water	supply	facilities.	
In	 respect	 to	 cultural	 conditions,	 Harbin	 citizens’s	 tradition	 of	 drinking	 well	 water	 contributed	 to	 the	
establishment	of	self-built	tap	water	supply	facilities.	This	has	been	discussed	in	the	previous	section.	
The	local	government	and	the	water	company	are	tied	with	each	other	by	the	flow	of	power,	establishing	
a	Hybrid	Institutional	Architecture.	They	both	shifted	certain	power	and	responsibilities	to	the	consumer.		
As	Figure	5.5	shows,	 if	we	ignore	this	Hybrid	Institutional	Architecture,	 it	would	seem	that	 it	 is	the	tap	
water	 consumers	who	 single-handedly	 triggered	 Harbin’s	 first	 sociogenic	water	 sustainability	 crisis	 by	
building	self-built	water	supply	facilities	and	overexploiting	the	groundwater	resource.	However,	the	root	
of	this	crisis	is	the	dysfunction	of	Hybrid	Institutional	Architecture	in	producing	semi-potable	tap	water,	
showing	in	Figure	5.5	by	the	dotted	line	between	the	hybrid	institutional	architecture	and	consumer.	
In	the	context	of	the	five	conditions,	both	the	water	company	and	the	government	had	their	problems	in	
tap	 water	 provision.	 The	 water	 company	 has	 two	 problems,	 the	 insufficient	 water	 supply	 and	 the	
insufficient	pipeline	coverage,	as	analysed	previously.	The	local	government	has	four	problems:	first,	they	
had	three	disjunctions	between	urban	plan	and	realities.	Second,	they	had	problematic	and	paradoxical	
data.	 Third,	 they	 kept	 a	 tacit	 encouragement	 attitude	 towards	 the	 implementation	 of	 Non-Tap-Water	
Coping	Strategy	 in	 the	context	of	 fragmented	tap	water	distribution,	and	 later	 legalised	these	 facilities	
without	 taking	 into	 account	 the	 amount	 of	 groundwater	 resource.	 The	 fourth	 problem	 is	 their	
																																								 																				
35	Minamata	Disease,	named	after	Minamata	city	in	Japan	as	where	this	disease	was	firstly	being	identified,	is	a	neurological	syndrome	caused	by	severe	mercury	poisoning.	It	
leads	to	several	symptoms,	such	as	ataxia,	numbness,	insanity,	paralysis,	coma,	and	even	death.	
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procrastination	in	adopting	the	policy	from	the	central	government.	Both	the	water	company	and	local	
government	shifted	certain	power	and	responsibility	to	the	consumer	-	the	power	of	extract	groundwater	
and	 responsibility	 to	 produce	 portable	 tap	 water.	 Holding	 that	 power	 and	 responsibility,	 consumers	
developed	Non-Tap-Water	Coping	Strategy	to	deal	with	the	fragmented	tap	water	distribution,	the	self-
built	water	supply	facilities.	With	the	government’s	tacit	consent	and	the	power	and	responsibility	shift	
from	government	 to	consumer,	 the	uncontrolled	Non-Tap-Water	Coping	Strategy	 finally	ended	up	as	a	
sustainability	crisis	of	groundwater	over-exploitation.		
Note	 here	 that	 this	 combination	 has	 four	main	 characteristics.	 First,	 this	 combination	 is	 a	 contingent	
combination	model.	 It	means	that	few	can	predict	the	whole	picture	of	both	this	combination	and	the	
sustainability	 crisis	 before	 it	 really	 happened.	 Such	 unpredictability,	 being	 one	 of	 the	 general	
characteristics	 of	 nearly	 every	 sociogenic	 water	 sustainability	 crisis,	 challenged	 the	 scientific	
methodologies	 as	 being	 recognised	 traditionally	 as	 the	most	 effective	way	 of	 predicting	 sustainability	
crises.	 Second,	 a	 series	 of	 casual	 connections	 can	 be	 built	 between	 every	 single	 condition	 and	 agent,	
another	general	feature	for	sociogenic	sustainability	crises.	For	example,	the	social	condition	of	political	
turmoil	 may	 have	 contributed	 to	 the	 emergence	 of	 insufficient	 water	 supply	 and	 pipeline	 coverage.	
However,	even	though	to	tease	out	these	casual	connections	would	constitute	promising	research,	the	
first	step	should	be	the	demonstration	of	their	combined	action	in	fostering	the	catastrophic	sustainability	
crisis.	Third,	in	this	contingent	combination	model,	the	bottled	and	barrelled	water	market	did	not	play	
any	pivotal	role	in	this	combination.	This	is	possibly	due	to	the	underdeveloped	tap	water	market	at	that	
time.	 However,	 in	 another	 combination	 of	 the	 consumer	 coping	 strategy	 and	 the	 Hybrid	 Institutional	
Architecture	of	tap	water	provision	system,	introduced	in	the	next	section,	the	market	will	play	a	significant	
role.	Consequently,	this	second	combination	had	caused	more	profound	sociogenic	influences	on	urban	
tap	water	provision	system	and	peoples’	daily	lives,	which	will	be	analysed	in	detail	later.	Fourth,	in	this	
sociogenic	 water	 sustainability	 crisis,	 both	 power	 and	 responsibility	 had	 been	 shifted	 from	 the	 local	
government	and	the	water	company	to	the	consumer.	This	does	not	happen	in	the	second	combination,	
since	it	only	shifted	the	responsibility	of	water	production	but	not	the	power.	
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5.3.7 The	 domino	 effect	 of	 Harbin’s	 first	 sociogenic	 water	
sustainability	crisis	
Moreover,	this	sociogenic	water	sustainability	crisis	has	a	domino	effect:	it	triggered	more	social	and	public	
health	accidents.	For	example,	later	when	the	pipeline	reaches	those	areas	where	self-built	water	supply	
facilities	were	widely	used,	the	municipal	government	found	that	it	was	difficult	to	move	their	consumers	
from	relying	on	‘free	groundwater’	to	paying	for	‘tap	water’.	First,	their	usages	of	groundwater	had	been	
legalised	by	the	local	regulation,	as	shown	before.	Second,	many	factories	had	invested	a	large	amount	of	
money	in	their	self-built	water	supply	facilities.	Third,	given	the	analysis	above,	it	was	possible	that	some	
of	Harbin’s	citizens	began	to	doubt	the	quality	of	tap	water.	The	Harbin’s	municipal	government	had	to	
enforce	some	consumers	to	install	a	water	meter	in	their	self-built	water	supply	facilities	so	as	to	charge	
water	rates.	In	this	sense,	it	can	be	said	that	the	Non-Tap-Water	Coping	Strategy	had	developed	to	a	high	
degree	that	 this	coping	strategy	was	not	only	a	social,	but	also	an	official	 recognised	way	of	accessing	
water,	paralleling	with	the	urban	tap	water	provision	system.	Therefore,	Harbin’s	municipal	government	
had	to	publish	several	strict	regulations	to	control	the	usage	of	these	facilities.		
The	 implementation	 of	 this	 control	 was	 in	 accordance	with	 the	 expansion	 of	 the	 pipeline.	When	 the	
pipeline	reached	new	areas,	numerous	self-drilled	wells	would	be	abandoned.	Moreover,	the	groundwater	
scarcity	crisis	also	caused	the	decrease	of	the	water	table,	which	exhausted	numerous	self-drilled	wells.	
Most	 of	 these	 wells	 were	 abandoned	 without	 proper	 treatment	 such	 as	 sealing	 or	 refilling,	 which,	
predictably,	caused	a	series	of	accidents.	In	1980,	56%	of	Harbin’s	self-drilled	wells	were	abandoned.	In	
the	Nangang	Distract,	one	of	Harbin’s	most	populous	distracts,	72%	of	self-drilled	wells	were	abandoned.	
Many	of	these	wells	were	not	refilled	or	sealed	properly.	Since	they	were	located	in	populous	areas,	even	
until	recent	years,	there	were	still	many	accidents	concerning	people,	especially	children,	falling	into	these	
abandoned	wells	(Heilongjiang	News	Net,	2006).	Moreover,	in	2005,	when	the	Songhua	River	was	severely	
contaminated	by	the	spill	of	a	poison	pollutant,	the	municipal	government	relaunched	these	facilities	and	
drilled	109	new	groundwater	wells.	From	then	on,	the	government’s	attitude	towards	the	self-built	water	
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supply	 facilities	shifted	again.	Today,	Harbin	still	kept	7167	water	wells,	which	supplies	90.2305	million	
cubic	 meters’	 groundwater	 for	 urban	 domestic	 consumption	 and	 71.228	 million	 cubic	 meters’	
groundwater	for	industrial	production	(Kong,	Gu	and	Jia,	2011,	p.3).		
Another	example	is	the	public	health	accidents.	According	to	the	data	in	1967,	in	those	industrial	distracts	
where	tap	water	provision	system	had	not	yet	reached,	nearly	all	self-drilled	wells	were	polluted	by	sewage	
water.	Workers	and	staff	in	these	areas	did	not	dare	to	drink	the	water	supplied	from	their	working	places	
and	had	to	take	the	water	they	took	and	treated	from	homes	to	work.	Later	even	these	industrial	factories	
stopped	using	the	local	groundwater	and	transferred	water	from	other	areas	by	trucks.	In	one	case,	the	
Harbin	 Chemical	 Corporation	 owned	 dozens	 of	 trucks	 just	 for	 carrying	 tap	 water	 (Harbin	 Municipal	
Government,	1998b).		
Confronting	 the	 sociogenic	 water	 sustainability	 crisis,	 Harbin’s	 municipal	 government	 proposed	 three	
principals	in	water	usage:	water	quota,	water	recycling	and	water	conservation.	The	water	quota	was	a	
method	to	control	the	industrial	water	usage.	Factories	consuming	more	than	one	thousand	tons	of	water	
per	day	were	assigned	a	water	quota	on	a	monthly	basis.	They	would	be	fined	 if	they	use	more	water	
above	the	quota.	Meanwhile,	Harbin’s	municipal	government	set	a	goal	to	increase	water	recycling	rates	
from	30%	to	59%.	Note	here	that	this	goal	was	mainly	targeting	industrial	zone	rather	than	household	with	
a	promotion	of	increasing	industrial	technological	efficiency	of	water	usage	and	developing	water	reuse	
technology	and	apparatus.	In	respect	of	water	conservation,	the	water	rates	became	a	major	means	of	
controlling	the	domestic	water	consumption.	This	was	in	line	with	the	policy	of	installing	domestic	water	
meters.	
Another	 possible	 positive	 aspect	 of	 this	 crisis	 is	 that	 it	 may	 have	 prevented	 a	 more	 catastrophic	
environmental	disaster	from	happening.	If	the	tap	water	consumer	in	Harbin	relied	too	much	on	the	tap	
water,	sourcing	from	the	polluted	Songhua	River,	it	is	possible	that	the	chronic	Minamata	Disease	could	
have	 had	 a	 much	 more	 destructive	 effect	 in	 general.	 Between	 1957	 to	 1982,	 the	 PetroChina	 Jilin	
Petrochemical	 Company	 had	 discharged	 its	 sewage	 poisoned	 by	 methyl	 mercury	 for	 25	 years	 to	 the	
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Songhua	River	(Wang,	2010).	By	depending	on	groundwater,	many	Harbin	citizens	escaped	from	the	risk	
of	being	infected	with	this	disease.		
The	last	domino	effect	of	the	first	sociogenic	water	sustainability	crisis	is	that	given	the	severe	scarcity	of	
groundwater	storage,	the	Songhua	River	became	the	major	water	source	of	the	city.	In	2001,	80%	of	the	
city’s	tap	water	was	from	river	water.	This	paved	the	way	for	the	emergence	of	its	second	sociogenic	water	
sustainability	crisis.		
To	 conclude,	 a	 certain	 connection	 can	 be	 observed	 from	 these	 historical	 records:	 three	 short-term	
technology	transitions	introduced	the	modern	tap	water	provision	technology	in	Harbin.	However,	they	
not	only	failed	in	cultivating	the	local	citizen	with	the	concept	of	this	technology	but	also	alienated	them	
from	being	integrated	into	its	development.	
The	tradition	of	using	and	treating	water	was	retained.	For	the	period	of	CPC’s	administration	of	tap	water	
provision	system,	the	social	and	political	turmoil	and	the	inexperienced	administration	led	to	three	types	
of	disjunction	between	the	urban	plan	and	social	realities.	Because	of	the	problematic	tap	water	provision	
regarding	its	quality	and	quantity,	the	traditions	of	using	and	treating	water	were	integrated	into	Consumer	
Coping	Strategy	Matrix	to	deal	with	fragmented	tap	water	distribution	and	semi-potable	tap	water.	When	
self-built	 water	 supply	 facility	 was	 combined	 with	 the	 inefficient	 water	 administration,	 together	 they	
caused	 a	 ‘sociogenic	 water	 sustainability	 crisis’,	 namely	 the	 overexploitation	 of	 Harbin’s	 groundwater	
resource.	 This	 crisis	 also	had	a	domino	effect	 that	 triggered	 a	 series	of	 other	 social	 and	public	 health	
accidents.	Moreover,	 since	 this	 scandal	 lasted	 for	 around	20	 years	 (from	1980s	 to	2000s),	 it	 has	been	
normalised	by	the	consumer	in	their	life,	being	memorised	as	a	social	memory	and	a	coping	strategy	of	
fragmented	water	distribution	rather	than	a	scandal	that	needed	to	be	solved	immediately.	Such	attitudes	
formulate	a	sharp	contrast	to	what	had	happened	in	the	Songhua	River	Toxic	Spill	Crisis.	
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5.4 The	 second	 sociogenic	 sustainability	 crisis:	
Songhua	River	Toxic	Spill	Crisis	
In	the	previous	section,	the	contingent	combination	model	triggered	the	over-exploitation	of	groundwater	
resource,	the	first	sociogenic	water	sustainability	crisis	in	Harbin.	This	section	aims	to	analyse	the	second	
sociogenic	water	sustainability	crisis,	the	Songhua	River	Toxic	Spill	Crisis.		
Over	the	past	hundreds	of	years,	the	Songhua	River,	with	its	moderate	hardness	and	low	turbidity	of	water,	
was	the	main	tap	water	source	of	tap	water	for	Harbin	residents.	However,	after	the	foundation	of	PRC,	
due	to	the	pollution	from	both	the	domestic	and	industrial	sewage,	the	water	quality	of	the	Songhua	River	
plummeted	severely.	The	chronic	Minamata	Disease	appeared	in	the	Songhua	River	between	1958	to	1982,	
as	mentioned	in	the	previous	section,	was	a	remarkable	case	(Wang,	2010).	However,	for	many	years,	little	
sociological	 research	 had	 been	 conducted	 on	 this	 accident.	 Not	 until	 2010	 did	Wang	 Leina	 present	 a	
conference	paper	discussing	that	 long-term	environmental	disaster.	This	neglect	might	partially	explain	
why	23	years	after	this	accident,	on	13	November	2005,	the	same	company	triggered	another	notorious	
sociogenic	water	sustainability	crisis	-	the	Songhua	River	Toxic	Spill	Crisis		
In	fact,	besides	this	pollution	incident,	the	Songhua	River	had	already	been	polluted	for	a	long	time.	It	took	
4.6	million	tons	of	effluent	from	upstream	with	264	varieties	of	organic	compounds	being	identified	in	the	
water,	 11	out	of	which	 carcinogenic(Kong,	Gu	and	 Jia,	 2011).	 Since	 the	 Songhua	River	 crossed	 several	
administrative	regions,	 the	pollution	 from	upstream	areas	could	not	be	controlled	by	a	single	city,	say,	
Harbin	(Dongbeinet,	2009).	Meanwhile,	Harbin	by	itself	discharges	around	770,000	tons	of	wastewater	to	
the	Songhua	River	every	day,	 including	9,400	tons	of	wastewater	from	hospitals,	which	was	either	raw	
sewage	or	untreated	with	the	national	sewage	treatment	standard	(Deng,	2002;	Kong,	Gu	and	Jia,	2011).	
In	 light	of	these	ineffectual	supervisions	on	sewage	discharge,	the	outbreak	of	the	Songhua	River	Toxic	
Spill	Crisis	is	inevitable.	
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5.4.1 The	timeline	of	Songhua	River	Toxic	Spill	Crisis	
It	is	important	to	first	note	that	although	11	years	have	passed	since	this	incident,	there	has	still	not	been	
an	official	investigation	report	available	for	public	access.	The	data	in	different	news	reports	sometimes	
even	conflict	with	each	other.	Thus,	to	secure	the	validity	of	the	data	and	information,	this	thesis	compared	
data	 and	 information	between	different	 reports	 and	 various	 sources.	 Contrary	 to	 the	 lack	of	 concrete	
information	 and	 data	 from	 official	 channels,	 some	 online	 documents	 and	 reports	 have	 detailed	
information	regarding	this	pollution	accident.	The	author	will	mark	the	sources	of	these	details.	
	
Figure	5.6:	The	key	locations	of	the	Songhua	Songhua	River	Toxic	Spill	Crisis	
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Figure	5.7:	The	explosion	scenario	of	No.	101	petrochemical	plant	of	Jilin	Petrochemical	Corporation36	
It	is	important	to	first	note	that	although	11	years	have	passed	since	this	incident,	there	has	still	not	been	
an	official	investigation	report	available	for	public	access.	The	data	in	different	news	reports	sometimes	
even	conflict	with	each	other.	Thus,	to	secure	the	validity	of	the	data	and	information,	this	thesis	compared	
data	 and	 information	between	different	 reports	 and	 various	 sources.	 Contrary	 to	 the	 lack	of	 concrete	
information	 and	 data	 from	 official	 channels,	 some	 online	 documents	 and	 reports	 have	 detailed	
information	regarding	this	pollution	accident.	The	author	will	mark	the	sources	of	these	details.	
As	shown	in	Figure	5.6	and	5.7,	the	incident	occurred	between	13:30	to	13:45,	13	November	2005.	Two	
fuel	 towers	 in	 the	 second	 aniline	 workshop	 the	 No.	 101	 petrochemical	 plant	 of	 Jilin	 Petrochemical	
																																								 																				
36	Source:	http://news.sina.com.cn/c/2005-12-07/09408513566.shtml	Accessed:	18	May	2016	
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Corporation,	located	in	Jilin	of	Jilin	Province	and	380	kilometres	away	from	Harbin,	exploded.	Eight	people	
were	killed,	59	people	were	injured,	and	ten	thousand	evacuated	(The	UNEP	mission	team,	2005;	Su,	Xu,	
Wu	and	Wu,	2005;	China	Youth	Daily.,	2005;	Liang	and	Yang,	2006;	Kirschner	and	Grandy,	2006).	Given	an	
online	document37,	the	blast	site	was	a	new	workshop	that	launched	in	September	2004.	In	fact,	No.	101	
petrochemical	plant	had	experienced	another	explosion	accident	on	30	December	2004,	one	year	before	
this	incident.	
There	was	a	spill	of	approximately	100	tons	of	toxic	chemical	compounds	of	benzene,	aniline	and	nitrogen	
into	No.2	Songhua	River	(in	Jilin	Province,	the	river	is	called	No.2	Songhua	River;	in	Heilongjiang	Province,	
where	Harbin	located,	the	river	is	called	Songhua	River),	whose	flow	was	just	hundreds	of	meters	away	
from	the	exploded	plant,	as	shown	in	Figure	5.6	(China	Youth	Daily.,	2005).	
	
Figure	5.8:	Dead	fish	on	the	bank	of	the	Songhua	River	in	Jilin38	
																																								 																				
37	Source:	http://www.chinadmd.com/file/optxvcrie3tuaercwsai6ues_2.html	Accessed:	17	May	2016	
38	Source:	http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/english/doc/2005-11/24/content_497399.htm	Accessed:	18	May	2016	
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All	three	main	pollutants	in	this	explosion,	benzene,	the	nitrobenzene,	and	the	aniline,	are	not	likely	to	
bio-accumulate	 in	 aquatic	 organisms,	 but	 both	 benzene	 and	 nitrobenzene	 are	 likely	 to	 remain	 in	
groundwater	if	rainfall	brings	them	to	underground	aquifer	(The	UNEP	mission	team,	2005).	However,	as	
Figure	5.8	shows,	on	22	November,	there	were	still	numerous	dead	fish	lying	on	the	bank	of	the	Songhua	
river	in	Jilin	(China	Youth	Daily.,	2005).		
Just	15	days	before	this	explosion,	the	Jilin	Petrochemical	Corporation	was	awarded	the	honorary	title	of	
‘National	Environmental	Friendly	Facility’	by	the	director	general	of	NEPA,	Xie	Zhenhua,	who	resigned	on	
30	November	because	of	this	incident	(Su	et	al.,	2005).		
Figure	5.6	demonstrates	the	close	distance	between	the	river	and	chemical	plant,	plus	the	locations	of	
two	cities.	Jilin	is	situated	upstream	of	the	river,	whereas	Harbin	is	located	downstream.	Thus,	the	plume	
of	pollutants	would	flow	from	Jilin	to	Harbin	along	the	Songhua	River	after	the	explosion.	However,	on	the	
day	of	the	explosion,	both	the	leaders	of	the	petrochemical	plant	and	Jilin	officials	disguised	this	crucial	
information	by	only	admitting	to	the	pollution	in	the	air	(Su	et	al.,	2005;	Liang	and	Yang,	2006).	A	news	
report	published	on	27	December	disclosed	that	an	environmental	protection	engineer	of	Jilin	told	the	
journalist	that	they	noticed	the	water	pollution	of	the	Songhua	River	on	the	day	of	the	explosion,	but	Jilin	
did	not	disclose	this	situation	to	the	media	and	public	(Su	et	al.,	2005).	Another	news	report	quoted	the	
words	 from	 an	 interviewee	 and	 argued	 that	 in	 fact	 the	 environmental	 protection	 bureau	 of	 Jilin	 was	
excluded	from	the	on-site	investigation	task	force	on	the	day	of	explosion	(Liang	and	Yang,	2006).	On	14	
November,	in	the	press	conference	of	Jilin,	a	vice	mayor	announced	that	the	explosion	would	not	generate	
a	large	scale	pollution.	The	air	quality	matched	the	standard.	No	poison	gas	was	observed	and	there	were	
no	changes	in	the	water	body	(China	Youth	Daily.,	2005).	In	news	reports	published	on	15	November,	a	
local	environmental	protection	official	claimed	that	the	pollution	in	the	air	could	be	cleared	within	one	or	
two	days	(Liang	and	Yang,	2006).			
On	21	November,	the	Harbin’s	municipal	government	issued	its	first	announcement	claiming	to	suspend	
the	tap	water	provision	for	four	days	between	22	to	24	November	with	the	excuse	of	pipeline	maintenance	
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(The	UNEP	mission	team,	2005;	Liang	and	Yang,	2006;	Kirschner	and	Grandy,	2006).	However,	numerous	
Harbin’s	citizens	began	to	rush	to	purchase	bottled	water	with	panic	because	of	the	‘rumour’	of	water	
pollution.	Later,	another	rumour	about	an	earthquake	was	widely	spread	and	people	either	tried	to	escape	
from	the	city	by	jamming	in	the	train	stops,	airport	and	main	roads,	or	to	panic	buy	flour,	food	oil	and	salt.	
On	the	midnight	of	21	November,	the	Harbin’s	municipal	government	issued	the	second	announcement.	
It	was	also	an	urgent	announcement,	which	revealed	the	reality	of	the	explosion	and	its	resulting	pollution	
of	the	Songhua	River	(Liang	and	Yang,	2006).	
Even	on	22	November,	a	leader	of	the	petrochemical	plant	of	Jilin	Petrochemical	Corporation	still	claimed	
that	‘the	explosion	only	generated	water	and	carbon	dioxide.	It	would	never	pollute	water.	We	had	our	
own	sewage	treatment	plant	and	we	would	not	discharge	substandard	sewage	into	the	Songhua	River’	
(China	Youth	Daily.,	2005).		However,	this	argument,	is	only	valid	under	the	condition	that	the	pollutants	
were	all	combusted	sufficiently	in	the	explosion.	But	in	fact,	around	100	tons	of	pollutant	did	not	burn	at	
all	and	was	spilled	into	the	pipeline	that	conveyed	the	rainwater	and	clean	water.	
On	23	November,	ten	days	after	the	explosion,	through	its	website,	NEPA	issued	its	first	announcement	
regarding	this	pollution	scandal,	the	News	Announcement	No.84.	It	acknowledged	the	existence	of	water	
pollution	 of	 the	 Songhua	 River	 and	 briefed	 the	 emergency	 response:	 ‘Experts	 have	 been	 assigned	 to	
corporate	with	 the	 local	 government	 in	 preventing	 the	 pollution	 from	 spreading.	 The	water	 quality	 is	
monitored	on	an	hourly	basis.’	(Liang	and	Yang,	2006,	p.35).	It	is	not	until	that	moment	that	this	pollution	
incident	is	formally	disclosed	to	the	public.	
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Figure	5.9:	The	pollution	plume	in	Songhua	River39	
As	shown	in	Figure	5.9,	with	the	average	speed	of	3	kilometres	per	hour,	an	80km	long	plume	reached	
Harbin	 on	 25	 November	 2005.	 Its	 peak	 concentration	 of	 nitrobenzene	 was	 33.15	 times	 above	 the	
permissible	level	of	China’s	standard	of	tap	water	source,	0.017mg/L.	There	were	few	reports	about	the	
environmental	 impacts	 on	 the	 other	 dozens	 of	 cities	 and	 counties	 this	 plume	 had	 passed	 by	 before	
approaching	Harbin,	since	NEPA	claimed	that	Harbin	(with	a	population	of	4	million)	and	Dalianhe	town	(a	
town	of	Yilan	county	with	a	population	of	20,000)	were	the	only	two	places	using	Songhua	River	as	their	
tap	water	source.	However,	Songyuan,	located	in	the	middle	of	the	Songhua	River	between	Jilin	and	Harbin	
as	shown	in	Figure	5.6,	suspended	its	tap	water	provision	from	14	November	to	21	November	with	the	
																																								 																				
39	Source:	http://news.sina.com.cn/c/2005-12-07/09408513566.shtml	Accessed:	18	May	2016	
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same	 excuse	 as	 the	 first	 announcement	 of	 the	 Harbin’s	municipal	 government,	 pipeline	maintenance	
(Wang,	 Duan	 and	 Wang,	 2005).	 Compared	 to	 the	 media	 reports	 about	 Harbin’s	 tap	 water	 provision	
suspension,	 which	 evoked	 enormous	 pressure	 on	 the	 local	 government	 to	 reveal	 the	 reality	 of	 the	
pollution	incident,	few	media	have	reported	the	tap	water	provision	suspension	in	Songyuan.	This	may	
explain	why	it	was	not	until	the	pollution	incident	was	revealed	by	the	central	government	did	most	of	the	
Songyuan	citizens	know	the	genuine	reason	for	the	tap	water	suspension.		
On	26	November	the	Prime	Ministry	at	that	time,	Wen	Jiabao	arrived	in	Harbin	to	inspect	the	pollution	
situation	of	the	Songhua	River.		
On	1	December,	 in	 the	National	Video	and	Telephone	Conference	of	Environmental	Pollution	Accident	
Emergency	Processing,	the	deputy	director	general	of	NEPA,	Wang	Yuqing,	denounced	the	Jilin	municipal	
government	that	NEPA	did	not	receive	any	 information	regarding	this	pollution	 incident	 from	the	 local	
environmental	protection	agency	of	Jilin	during	November	14	to	17,	the	most	precious	three	days	after	
the	explosion	that	could	have	been	used	to	prevent	the	pollution	from	spreading.	Many	officials	of	NEPA	
endorsed	this	claim	(Liang	and	Yang,	2006).	However,	the	official	record	of	the	environmental	protection	
department	 of	 Jilin	 province	 showed	 that	 after	 five	 hours	 of	 the	 explosion	 the	 information	 had	 been	
delivered	to	the	duty	office	of	NEPA,	although	the	relevant	data	of	the	pollution	was	not	included	given	
the	 time	 limitation.	 This	 department	 also	 argued	 that	 on	 14	 November	 they	 reported	 the	 pollution	
situation	to	NEPA	again	and	the	latter	only	assigned	an	expert	task	force	to	the	blast	site.	‘All	the	reports	
have	been	recorded	and	we	have	committed	to	our	responsibility’	said	by	an	official	of	environmental	
protection	bureau	of	Jilin	province’	(Su	et	al.,	2005).	
On	5	December,	a	UNEP	(United	Nations	Environment	Programme)	mission	team	was	invited	by	NEPA	for	
an	on-site	visit,	but	their	investigation	was	restricted	since	they	could	only	get	access	to	the	second-hand	
information	offered	by	the	NEPA	(The	UNEP	mission	team,	2005).	
On	6	December,	the	investigation	team	of	the	State	Council	was	established,	led	by	the	director-general	
of	the	State	Administration	of	Work	Safety	and	including	eight	senior	officials	from	different	departments	
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(Xinhuanet,	2006).	However,	their	investigation	report	was	submitted	to	the	State	Council	and	not	open	
to	public	access	until	today.		
The	pollution	incident	had	been	escalated	into	an	international	dispute	between	China	and	Russia	after	
this	plume	of	pollutant	converged	with	the	Heilong	River,	the	border	river	between	China	and	Russia,	and	
may	have	affected	the	water	quality	of	Khabarovsk,	located	close	to	the	border	part	of	the	Heilong	river	
(the	Russian	name	is	Amur	River).	On	16	December,	China	and	Russia	had	constructed	a	dam	with	the	help	
of	3000	Chinese	and	the	equipment	supported	by	the	central	government	of	China	(Kirschner	and	Grandy,	
2006).	It	prevented	the	plume	of	pollutant	from	transgressing	the	border.	
On	26	December,	in	the	last	announcement	of	the	Songhua	River	Pollution	Incident,	the	NEPA	announced	
that	the	concentration	level	of	pollutant	detected	in	monitor	sites	of	the	Songhua	River	was	below	the	
national	standard.		
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5.4.2 The	sociogenic	water	sustainability	crisis:	Songhua	River	Toxic	
Spill	Crisis	
	
Figure	5.10:	The	contingent	combination	model	of	Harbin’s	second	sociogenic	water	sustainability	crisis	
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As	demonstrated	in	Figure	5.10,	the	contingent	combination	model	of	Harbin’s	second	sociogenic	water	
sustainability	crisis	is	composed	of	two	parts:	the	general	context,	which	consists	of	five	interconnected	
conditions,	and	the	dysfunctional	hybrid	production	process	of	tap	water.		
In	respect	 to	the	historical	condition,	 there	are	three	historical	conditions	worth	mentioning.	First,	 the	
water	pollution	of	 the	Songhua	River	has	 long	been	one	of	 the	most	controversial	 issues	between	the	
Harbin’s	municipal	government	and	Jilin	Petrochemical	Corporation.	Given	the	catastrophic	outcome	of	
the	first	sociogenic	water	sustainability	crisis,	Harbin’s	municipal	government	attempted	to	use	surface	
water	instead	of	groundwater	as	the	main	water	source	of	the	city.	Therefore,	in	the	1980s	they	built	up	
the	 Seventh	Water	 Treatment	Plant.	However,	 in	 light	 of	 the	 fact	 that	 this	water	 treatment	plant	was	
located	downstream	of	Jilin	Petrochemical	Corporation,	the	Songhua	River	was	polluted	by	the	industrial	
sewage	it	discharged.	As	a	result,	the	water	treatment	plant	was	never	 launched.	Presumably,	Harbin’s	
municipal	government	must	have	complained	about	this	situation	to	its	senior	departments,	Heilongjiang	
province	and	Jilin	province,	but	these	two	provincial	governments	could	not	cooperate	with	each	other	
effectively	to	treat	this	problem.	An	investigation	report	of	Heilongjiang	scientific	consultative	committee	
even	 described	 the	 Jilin	 petrochemical	 corporation	 as	 a	 ‘time	 bomb’	 for	 the	 Heilongjiang	 province	
(Heilongjiang	Scientific	Consultative	Committee,	2011).	
Second,	as	discussed	in	UNEP’s	report,	the	environmental	agency	always	lacked	the	necessary	authority	
to	implement	effective	evacuations,	rescue,	crowd	control	or	other	emergency	services	in	environmental	
disasters	(The	UNEP	mission	team,	2005).	Before	this	incident,	few	of	China’s	municipal	governments	had	
established	an	effective	partnership	 framework	 that	 coordinate	 various	 relevant	departments	 into	 the	
work	 of	 response	 to	 environmental	 emergencies.	 In	 this	 crisis,	 it	 can	 be	 observed	 that	 the	 Jilin	
environmental	agency	did	not	involve	itself	as	much	as	it	should	have	from	the	beginning.	This	incident	is	
the	most	serious	environmental	pollution	incident	since	the	foundation	of	the	People’s	Republic	of	China,	
which	may	explain	why	neither	the	municipal	government	nor	other	departments	had	any	experience	in	
how	to	deal	with	it	properly.		
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Third	there	was	not	any	community-level	emergency	response	framework	for	both	cities.	In	fact,	during	
the	period	of	water	suspension,	the	Harbin’s	municipal	government	had	to	organise	300	small	groups	to	
visit	every	citizen	community.	They	informed	the	local	people	of	the	crisis	and	prompted	them	to	store	tap	
water.		
Fourth,	the	earthquake	that	happened	in	Daqing	acted	as	a	catalyst	for	the	spread	of	rumour	and	anxiety	
among	Harbin	citizens.	On	25	July	2005,	the	Lindian	county	of	Daqing,	an	industrial	city	located	just	150	
kilometres	away	from	Harbin,	experienced	a	five	magnitude	earthquake.	Harbin	citizens	experienced	the	
tremor.	Therefore,	when	the	Harbin’s	municipal	government	issued	their	first	announcement	to	suspend	
all	tap	water	supply	in	the	city	with	the	excuse	of	pipeline	maintenance,	many	people	associated	it	with	
the	earthquake	that	had	happened	just	four	months	ago.	
In	respect	to	the	geographical	condition,	the	most	obvious	one	was	the	upstream	location	of	the	pollution	
site	 and	 the	 downstream	 location	 of	 Harbin.	 Another	 geographical	 condition	 was	 the	 close	 distance	
between	the	petrochemical	plant	and	the	river,	as	shown	in	Figure	5.10,	which	had	been	argued	by	some	
environmentalists	as	the	‘most	direct	reason’	of	the	toxic	spill	crisis	(Su	et	al.,	2005).	Finally,	the	Songhua	
River	 is	a	special	 river	since	 it	connects	two	powerful	countries:	Russia	and	China.	 It	 is	because	of	 this	
geographical	condition	that	 the	 level	of	crisis	 rose	 from	a	national	 level	 to	 international	 level.	 In	other	
words,	the	special	geographical	condition	of	the	Songhua	River	performs	as	a	fundamental	condition	that	
imposes	remarkable	extra	pressure	on	both	the	central	and	local	governments	to	resolve	it	 in	a	proper	
manner.		
In	reference	to	the	political	condition,	the	most	obvious	one	is	the	political	concern	from	Russia.	Russia	
asked	China	to	support	monitoring	equipment,	collectively	monitor	the	water	quality,	and	construct	a	dam	
in	Fuyuan	county,	a	county	near	the	Heilong	River.	Russia	closed	151	primary	schools,	136	kindergartens,	
and	536	 food	processing	 factories	 in	 three	 cities.	A	 compensation	was	 likely	 to	have	been	paid	 to	 the	
Russian	government,	but	its	details	were	never	revealed.	Meanwhile,	there	were	few	open	reports	about	
the	possible	destination	of	the	pollutant	plume	after	it	was	blocked	by	the	dam.	
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The	second	political	condition	is	the	limited	third	party	involvement.	As	the	UNEP	mission	team	argued	in	
its	report,	no	 independent	third	party	 laboratory	had	been	invited	 in	the	 investigation	of	this	pollution	
incident.	Meanwhile,	the	mission	team	could	not	get	access	to	either	the	water	sample	or	the	first-hand	
information.		
The	environmental	condition	can	be	drawn	 into	 two	categories:	 first,	 the	environment	of	 the	Songhua	
River.	Second,	the	environment	of	petrochemical	plant.		
In	general,	the	environment	of	the	Songhua	River	was	unfavourable	for	pollution	control.	The	toxic	spill	
crisis	occurred	 in	early	winter	during	the	dry	season,	therefore	the	Songhua	River’s	 flow	was	relatively	
slower	and	thinner	than	in	other	seasons.	Moreover,	some	surface	of	the	Songhua	River	was	frozen.	Given	
the	fact	that	benzene	and	nitrobenzene	decompose	in	water,	some	of	these	pollutants	had	been	captured	
by	the	 ice.	Given	the	test	result,	 the	concentration	of	nitrobenzene	 is	one	fourth	of	that	 in	water	 (The	
UNEP	mission	team,	2005,	p.7).	Those	trapped	pollutants	would	be	released	into	the	water	body	again	
when	the	ice	melted	in	the	spring	season,	causing	a	secondary	pollution	of	the	river.		
Another	 significant	 environmental	 change	 in	 the	 Songhua	 River	 was	 triggered	 artificially.	 The	 Jilin	
municipal	 government,	 through	 a	 negotiation	 with	 the	 State	 Grid	 Corporation	 of	 China,	 managed	 to	
persuade	 them	 into	 releasing	 the	water	 stored	 in	Fengman	and	Xiao	Fengman	 reservoirs	 to	dilute	 the	
pollutant	and	speed	up	its	movement	in	the	river.		
Few	 reports	 covered	 exactly	 how	 the	 pollutant	 was	 spilled	 into	 the	 river.	 The	 environment	 of	
petrochemical	plant	may	offer	a	deeper	understanding	of	this	question.	According	to	online	document40,	
there	were	two	types	of	pipelines	connecting	the	plant	with	the	Songhua	River.	One	is	the	sewage	pipeline,	
which	channelled	the	pollutant	to	the	sewage	treatment	plant.	This	pipeline	had	been	described	by	both	
the	officials	and	leaders	of	the	corporation	as	the	pipeline	that	should	convey	the	pollutant	to	a	sewage	
treatment	plant	instead	of	the	river.	However,	another	pipeline,	which	conveyed	the	rainwater	and	clean	
																																								 																				
40	Source:	http://www.chinadmd.com/file/tz3viaotvacvo3ueoscso6az_1.html	Accessed:	20	May	2016	
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water	directly	into	the	Songhua	River,	was	the	pipeline	that	spilled	the	pollutant	leaked	from	the	explosion	
and	 the	polluted	 fire-fighting	water	 into	 the	 river.	 Figure	 5.11	 shows	A	 simulation	of	 explosion	 scene.	
Another	news	report	further	pointed	out	that	the	fire	accident	like	this	case	should	have	readied	a	fence	
to	baffle	 the	polluted	 fire-fighting	water	 from	spreading	 (Wang,	Duan	and	Wang,	2005).	 Ironically,	 this	
pipeline	 was	 the	 same	 pipeline	 that	 spilled	 the	methyl	 mercury	 and	 caused	 the	 epidemic	 of	 chronic	
Minamata	Disease	25	years	ago.	This	demonstrated	that	 from	the	beginning	of	the	plant	construction,	
which	was	June	2002,	the	Jilin	Petrochemical	Corporation	had	paid	no	attention	to	preventing	the	possible	
pollution	crisis	associated	with	any	explosion	risk.	
	
Figure	5.11:	A	simulation	figure	of	explosion	scene41	
																																								 																				
41	Source:	http://www.creg.net.cn	Accessed:	20	May	2016	
Chapter	5	Harbin’s	Sociogenic	Water	Sustainability	Crisis																																																																													|	210	
	
As	cultural	condition,	cultural	adaptive	patterns	can	be	observed	in	the	municipal	government	and	among	
Harbin	 citizen	 respectively.	 The	 first	 cultural	 pattern	 was	 demonstrated	 in	 the	 seven-day	 tap	 water	
suspension	implemented	by	the	Songyuan	municipal	government.	To	a	large	extent,	this	news	was	ignored	
by	journalists	and	academia.	Songyuan	forms	a	sharp	comparison	to	Harbin.	They	both	tried	to	conceal	
the	 toxic	 spill	 crisis	 in	 their	 first	 announcement	with	 the	 same	 pipeline	maintenance	 excuse,	 but	 the	
Songyuan	municipal	government	succeeded,	whereas	Harbin’s	municipal	government	lost	both	its	credit	
and	face	to	the	public.	However,	it	is	due	to	this	comparison	that	we	realise	the	attempt	of	disguise	is	not	
just	a	single	mistake	made	by	Harbin’s	municipal	government,	but	a	culturally	adaptive	way	commonly	
adopted	 by	 various	municipal	 governments	 for	 disguising	 their	mistakes.	 In	 other	words,	 the	Harbin’s	
municipal	government’s	false	first	announcement	was	just	a	common	culture	adaptive	pattern	of	dodging	
potential	political	risks,	which	were	adopted	by	other	municipal	governments	as	well.		
Note	here	that	this	cultural	adaptive	pattern	was	not	a	‘collective	decision’	by	all	officials	in	the	municipal	
government.	There	are	always	opposite	voices,	though	they	were	ignored	by	senior	officials.		
In	an	interview	with	a	senior	official	of	a	Harbin’s	water	company,	some	vivid	details	about	the	how	he/she	
tried	to	suggest	his/her	leaders	to	disclose	the	information	can	be	seen.		
’After	being	informed	of	the	water	pollution	crisis,	we	knew	that	we	must	make	the	decision	of	suspending	
the	urban	water	provision	immediately.	However,	the	question	was	whether	to	inform	the	public	honestly	
about	the	reason	for	the	tap	water	suspension.	In	the	beginning,	we	reported	to	the	public	that	the	water	
supply	system	was	under	maintenance,	so	it	needed	to	be	suspended	for	three	to	four	days.	I	was	the	one	
who	represented	the	company	to	participate	in	the	meeting	held	by	Harbin’s	municipal	government.	Our	
general	 manager	 was	 on	 his	 business	 trip;	 our	 deputy	 general	 manager	 called	 him	 and	 he	 returned	
immediately.	When	discussing	the	problem	of	how	to	report	to	the	public,	I	suggested	to	our	leaders	that	
we	should	not	disguise	the	reality	by	using	the	excuse	of	pipeline	maintenance	to	suspend	tap	water.	I	told	
them	that	if	we	used	that	excuse,	it	might	cause	the	real	accident.	Some	people	went	to	the	Songhua	River	
directly	to	fetch	water.	Some	livestock	needed	to	drink	water	directly	from	the	river.	Farmers	were	using	
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water	from	the	Songhua	River	to	irrigate	their	crops.	These	people	and	livestock	were	all	taking	a	risk	if	we	
hid	the	fact	of	toxic	spill	crisis.	Moreover,	some	food	companies	were	using	the	river	water	to	process	their	
food	production.	However,	my	leaders	told	me	that	“we	understand	your	concern,	but	it	depends	on	the	
higher	 leaders	 to	 make	 the	 decision.”	 The	 leaders	 of	 the	 municipal	 government	 finally	 issued	 the	
announcement	using	the	excuse	of	pipeline	maintenance.	But	at	around	10	pm	on	that	night,	the	Prime	
Minister	Wen	Jiabao,	who	represent	the	stance	of	central	government,	informed	us	that	we	must	disclose	
the	 fact	 to	 the	 public.	 Thus,	 we	 changed	 our	 announcement	 on	 the	 second	 day	 of	 the	 tap	 water	
suspension.’	
His/her	statements	partially	explained	why	on	26	November	the	former	Prime	Minister	Wen	Jiabao	had	
to	set	foot	on	Harbin	by	himself	as	the	representation	of	central	government:	central	government	did	not	
trust	the	local	municipal	government	when	the	latter	was	solely	in	charge	of	the	administration	of	urban	
tap	water	provision	system.	This	has	been	pointed	out	in	section	4.3.	
’They	could	not	see	the	key	point,’	He/she	commented	on	the	leaders	of	Harbin’s	municipal	government.	
‘Sometimes	they	had	no	idea	about	how	to	deal	with	the	problems	they	encountered	for	the	first	time.’	
In	sum,	given	the	analyses	above,	it	was	obvious	that	the	five	conditions	were	interconnected	with	each	
other	in	a	much	closer	degree	than	in	the	first	sociogenic	water	sustainability	crisis.	This	is	partially	due	to	
the	fact	that	this	crisis	lasted	only	14	days,	far	shorter	than	the	first	sustainability	crisis	which	lasted	for	
years.	Thus,	the	chain	reactions	between	these	five	conditions	are	more	obvious.	Though	detailed	analyses	
of	the	exact	contents	of	these	reactions	would	be	useful,	they	are	not	the	priority	task	of	this	dissertation.		
In	 the	 context	 of	 these	 five	 conditions,	 the	 hybrid	 production	 process	 was	 dysfunctional	 again.	 The	
inconsistent	 flow	 of	 power	 between	 the	 central	 government	 and	 local	 municipal	 government	 was	
evidenced	in	the	NEPA’s	open	criticism	towards	the	Jilin	municipal	government.	Another	inconsistent	flow	
of	power	was	inter-departmental,	demonstrated	through	the	possible	marginalised	position	of	Jilin’s	MEPB	
in	the	investigation	of	this	crisis.	The	Harbin’s	municipal	government	underestimated	the	possible	public	
reaction	 to	 this	 crisis	 at	 first	 and	 tried	 to	 disguise	 the	 reality	 as	 the	 Songyuan	 and	 Jilin	 municipal	
Chapter	5	Harbin’s	Sociogenic	Water	Sustainability	Crisis																																																																													|	212	
	
governments	had	done	before.	However,	they	did	not	take	into	account	three	crucial	facts.	First,	eight	days	
had	passed	since	the	explosion	and	the	existence	of	toxic	spill	crisis	had	already	been	proved.	Second,	as	
the	capital	city	of	Heilongjiang	province,	there	were	numerous	citizens	who	either	worked	in	the	provincial	
and	municipal	 government	or	had	 their	 ‘information	 channel’	 to	 know	 the	 reality.	 Third,	 compared	 to	
Songyuan,	Harbin	have	more	citizens	with	high	education	level.	Many	did	not	believe	the	government’s	
first	announcement	of	pipeline	maintenance	for	they	knew	that	maintaining	work	of	that	scale	must	be	
implemented	area	by	area.	At	midnight,	the	Harbin’s	municipal	government	finally	disclosed	the	reality	in	
its	second	announcement	and	published	another	announcement	calling	for	storing	water	the	next	day.	It	
is	 the	 first	 time	 in	Harbin’s	history	 that	 the	municipal	 government	had	 to	 issue	 three	announcements	
within	two	days.		
Harbin	 was	 one	 of	 only	 two	 cities	 in	 the	 Heilongjiang	 province	 that	 had	 the	 capacity	 for	 monitoring	
nitrobenzene.	Without	any	experience	in	dealing	with	this	pollution,	the	Harbin’s	municipal	government	
spent	3	million	Yuan,	plus	another	10	million	Yuan	from	the	provincial	government,	to	purchase	equipment.	
100	environmental	experts	had	been	assigned	 to	Harbin	as	different	 task	 forces(Heilongjiang	Scientific	
Consultative	Committee,	2011).	From	24	November,	a	series	of	official	news	conferences	were	held	by	the	
municipal	 government	 to	 provide	 the	 latest	 important	 information.	 Experts	 began	 to	 broadcast	 TV	
programs	 to	 explain	 the	 situation.	 The	 price	 of	 bottled	 water	 was	 strictly	 monitored	 and	 controlled,	
whereas	 1300	 tons	 of	 bottled	water	were	 delivered	 from	 a	 nearby	 city,	 Shenyang,	 to	 Harbin;	 All	 918	
auxiliary	 groundwater	 wells	 in	 Harbin	 were	 re-launched	 and	 81	 new	 groundwater	 wells	 were	 drilled	
(Xinhuanet,	2005).	It	can	be	said	that	the	whole	country’s	power	had	been	mobilised	into	rescuing	the	city	
of	Harbin	from	the	water	crisis.	There	was	no	single	water	poisoning	case	reported	during	the	period	of	
water	suspension	(Xinhuanet,	2005).	
For	the	water	company,	the	main	problem	was	the	lack	of	technology	for	treating	the	polluted	river	water.	
Neither	 Harbin	 nor	 any	 other	 cities	 of	 China	 had	 equipment	 for	 treating	 nitrobenzene	 (Heilongjiang	
Scientific	Consultative	Committee,	2011).	On	24	November,	a	headquarters	had	been	established,	which	
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included	all	relevant	leaders	and	experts	in	different	departments,	with	the	leaders	from	the	Ministry	of	
Housing	and	Urban-Rural	Development	in	charge.	They	took	over	the	administration	right	of	Harbin’s	tap	
water	provision	system	from	the	Harbin	water	 supply	and	drainage	company.	Given	an	 internal	 report	
from	the	leading	expert	from	headquarters,	an	initial	plan	was	two-faceted:	on	one	hand,	Harbin	water	
company	added	an	extra	activated	carbon	filter	layer	directly	into	their	current	water	filter	pool	(Zhang,	
2005).	On	the	other,	they	mixed	the	activated	carbon	with	the	coagulant	in	the	source	water.	This	plan	
demanded	1400	tons	of	activated	carbon,	which	were	delivered	to	Harbin	from	other	cities	on	emergency	
trains	(Harbin	Railway	Yearbook	Edition	Comittee,	2006).	Experts	from	Beijing	modified	the	equipment	in	
water	treatment	plants	for	inputting	activated	carbon.	Extra	chlorine	was	added	into	the	source	water	as	
well.	 However,	 the	 effect	 was	 not	 satisfactory.	 The	 main	 problem	 was	 the	 inadequate	 reaction	 time	
between	activated	carbon	and	the	pollutant.	Special	attention	had	been	spent	on	the	intake	point	of	the	
tap	water	provision	system.	The	result	of	this	emergency	experiment	showed	that	in	one	to	two	hours	of	
the	 source	 water	 flowing	 in	 the	 5.3	 kilometres	 pipeline,	 40	 mg/L	 activated	 carbon	 could	 reduce	 the	
concentration	of	nitrobenzene	from	0.061mg/L	to	0.0034	mg/L	(Zhang,	2006).	As	a	result,	a	distinctive	
way	of	absorbing	pollution	was	developed	by	scientists	from	China	Academy	of	Environmental	Sciences	
(CAES).	An	underwater	cage	with	brooms	made	of	activated	carbon,	straw	and	maize	stocks	inside	could	
absorb	up	to	40%	of	the	nitrobenzene	from	the	water	flow	that	passed	through	it(The	UNEP	mission	team,	
2005).	However,	this	method	was	implemented	only	on	a	limited	scale	in	the	tap	water	intake	point,	since	
the	surface	of	the	Songhua	River	was	almost	all	frozen.	With	all	these	efforts,	on	27	November	when	the	
tap	water	provision	was	restored,	the	tap	water	quality	went	back	to	normal.	
Given	the	analysis	above,	it	can	be	said	that	during	the	crisis	period,	the	government	and	water	company	
were	 so	 closely	 linked	 that	 they	 had	 been	 integrated	 with	 each	 other.	 As	 Figure	 5.10	 shows,	 the	
government	 and	 the	 water	 company	 constituted	 a	 Hybrid	 Institutional	 Architecture	 with	much	more	
power	 than	 they	had	had	 respectively	before.	As	has	been	argued	 in	 section	3.8,	 the	 institutionalised	
distrust	was	 between	 the	 consumer	 and	 that	Hybrid	 Institutional	 Architecture.	 In	 other	words,	 in	 the	
context	of	the	five	conditions,	the	trilateral	relations	of	consumer,	government	and	water	company	had	
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been	transformed	into	bilateral	relations	between	consumer	and	Hybrid	Institutional	Architecture.	With	
the	huge	power	gap	between	the	two,	the	information	disclosure	became	problematic.	To	the	consumer,	
the	aforementioned	activities	of	 this	Hybrid	 Institutional	Architecture	were	 inaccessible.	Neither	could	
they	 be	 imparted	 with	 the	 vivid	 details	 of	 these	 activities.	 However,	 they	 had	 the	 basic	 capacity	 of	
discerning	the	‘suspicious	information’	from	the	government	announcement.	In	this	context,	powerless	
consumers	began	to	adopt	their	only	valid	Non-Tap-Water	Coping	Strategy	collectively,	namely,	purchasing	
bottled	water	and	barrelled	water.	
	
Figure	5.12:	The	empty	shelf	of	bottled	water	in	Harbin’s	shopping	mall42	
																																								 																				
42	Source:	http://news.sohu.com/20051122/n227564985.shtml	Accessed:	22	May	2016	
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Some	studies	blamed	the	NEPA	and	Harbin’s	municipal	government	for	their	inadequate	communication	
with	consumers	and	believed	that	the	public	panic	derived	from	ineffective	communication	(The	UNEP	
mission	team,	2005;	Rui-bo,	2007;	Wu,	2015).	Indeed,	the	social	memory	of	water	insecurity	(mentioned	
in	section	5.3.7)	was	fuelled	by	the	ineffective	public	communication	of	the	government.	However,	with	
one-side	focused	on	the	effectiveness	of	communication,	they	failed	to	answer	another	crucial	question:	
why	was	the	bottled	and	barrelled	water	market	so	important	to	reduce	the	panic?	Why	did	consumers	
not	panic	in	the	first	sociogenic	water	sustainability	crisis	when	they	were	served	with	semi-potable	tap	
water	and	even	could	not	access	public	tap	water?	As	Figure	5.12	shows,	panic	buying	happened	in	many	
shops,	and	as	a	consequence,	the	price	of	bottled	water	rocketed	at	the	beginning,	which	in	turn	escalated	
the	panic	buying.	The	deputy	vice	mayor	of	Harbin	admitted	that	the	people	could	only	be	soothed	by	
seeing	a	sufficient	bottled	water	supply	(Xinhuanet,	2005).	Obviously,	there	is	a	connection	between	the	
bottled	water	supply,	the	tap	water	supply,	and	consumers’	panic	buying	which	demands	an	explanation.	
Once	tap	water	supply	was	suspended,	water	supply	would	been	completely	cut	off	from	water	treatment	
plants,	there	would	be	no	water	at	all	in	every	area	of	the	house,	including	household	sanitation	services.	
Thus,	Harbin’s	‘source	to	consumer’	semi-potable	tap	water	provision	system	was	paralysed	as	Figure	5.10	
demonstrated.	In	the	first	sociogenic	water	sustainability	crisis,	pipelines	were	not	developed	enough	to	
cover	 most	 of	 the	 citizens,	 along	 with	 the	 problematic	 quality	 of	 tap	 water.	 Compared	 to	 this,	 the	
dysfunction	happened	in	the	second	sociogenic	water	sustainability	crisis	was	much	more	devastating	in	
two	 senses.	 First,	 the	 Tap	Water	 Coping	 Strategy	 was	 dysfunctional;	 Second,	 the	 Hybrid	 Institutional	
Architecture	 restrained	 the	 power	 of	 constructing	 self-built	 water	 supply	 facility.	 As	 a	 result,	 lacking	
effective	Consumer	Coping	Strategy,	consumer’s	coping	capacity	reduced	dramatically,	which	underlines	
their	extremely	powerlessness	(also	see	section	3.8	for	analysis	of	powerlessness).	Such	powerlessness	
also	intensified	by	temporality,	which	makes	citizens	unable	to	have	any	time	to	self-build	in	response	to	
crisis.	In	other	words,	they	could	neither	boil	tap	water	nor	build	their	self-built	water	supply	facilities	to	
cope	with	 the	water	 crisis.	 In	essence,	 such	powerlessness	 in	 the	confrontation	with	 semi-potable	 tap	
water	supply	was	the	root	of	their	panic.	As	Figure	5.10	shows,	with	the	dysfunction	of	Tap	Water	Coping	
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Strategy,	 the	only	 valid	 consumer	 coping	 strategy	was	Non-Tap-Water	Coping	 Strategy,	which	 includes	
bottled	water,	barrelled	water,	and	self-built	water	supply	facilities.	However,	given	the	temporality	and	
consumer’s	powerlessness	 in	building	 self-built	water	 supply	 facilities,	 the	bottled	water	and	barrelled	
water	became	consumer’s	only	coping	strategy.		
Since	bottled	water	and	barrelled	water	are	also	High	Cost	Commercial	Coping	Strategies,	they	were	only	
adopted	by	those	consumers	who	could	afford	their	cost.	In	other	words,	tap	water’s	manageability	(See	
Chapter	3	for	its	definition)	is	varied	by	consumer	when	they	confront	with	water	crisis	together,	reflecting	
the	fact	that	the	existed	social	injustice	was	further	intensified	in	this	sociogenic	water	sustainability	crisis.	
Moreover,	when	the	demands	of	this	two	coping	strategies	were	significant,	it	would	lead	to	competition	
among	consumers,	resulting	in	more	serious	panic	buying	campaigns	and	associated	social	turmoil.	The	
two	 conflicting	 government	 announcements	 in	 one	 day	 were	 definitely	 a	 problematic	 public	
communication	 between	 Hybrid	 Institutional	 Architecture	 and	 consumer,	 which	 further	 promote	 the	
social	 turmoil.	 Under	 this	 condition,	 the	 most	 vulnerable	 victims	 were	 those	 powerless	 citizens	 who	
neither	 could	 afford	 the	 bottled	 and	 barrelled	 water	 as	 coping	 strategies	 nor	 had	 access	 to	 genuine	
information.	
Actually,	 Harbin’s	municipal	 government	 tried	 to	 aid	 those	 vulnerable	 citizens	who	were	 incapable	 of	
affording	 the	 High	 Cost	 Commercial	 Coping	 Strategies.	Millions	 of	 Yuan	were	 assigned	 as	 the	 specific	
funding	 to	 purchase	 bottled	water	 for	 310,000	 low	 income	 families,	 disabled	 people,	 and	 retired	 old	
veterans	with	a	standard	of	three	bottles	of	water	(around	600	millilitre	for	each	bottle)	on	the	first	day	of	
water	suspension,	four	bottles	on	the	second	and	five	bottles	on	the	third	day	(Xinhuanet,	2005).	However,	
whether	this	policy	covered	all	of	the	vulnerable	citizens	was	still	a	question.	Moreover,	 if	the	Harbin’s	
municipal	government	kept	disguising	the	reality	like	Songyuan’s	municipal	government	managed	to	do	
during	the	crisis,	the	health	damage	those	people	might	suffer	would	be	dramatic.	The	official	claimed	in	
the	interview	that	‘it	is	the	first	time	for	China’s	government	to	disclose	the	information	of	a	significant	
water	pollution	crisis	honestly’.		
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In	fact,	some	damage	had	already	occurred.	A	fisherman	living	in	Songyuan	admitted	that	he	fished	in	the	
Songhua	River	as	usual	during	the	pollution	period	and	had	eaten	and	sold	the	fish	he	caught	(Wang,	Duan	
and	Wang,	2005).	No	one	had	told	him	that	these	fish	were	inedible.	
5.4.3 The	 domino	 effect	 of	 the	 second	 sociogenic	 water	
sustainability	crisis	
The	 most	 significant	 domino	 effect	 of	 Harbin’s	 second	 sociogenic	 water	 sustainability	 crisis	 is	 the	
enhancement	of	consumers’	institutional	distrust	in	Harbin’s	semi-potable	tap	water.	Given	the	analysis	
above,	it	can	be	perceived	that	their	social	memory	of	water	insecurity	had	been	dramatically	renewed	in	
this	notorious	water	crisis.	With	the	dysfunction	of	Non-Tap-Water	Coping	Strategy	 in	 this	crisis,	many	
consumers	 stopped	 consuming	 tap	water	 and	 turned	 to	 the	High	 Cost	 Commercial	 Coping	 Strategies,	
resulting	in	the	sheer	drop	of	the	tap	water	consumption	amount.	As	Figure	5.13	demonstrates,	the	drop	
of	domestic	tap	water	consumption	between	2004	to	2005	is	stark,	from	188.18	million	cubic	meters	to	
144.12	million	cubic	meters.	In	the	next	four	years	until	2009,	the	domestic	water	consumption	continued	
to	 decrease	 and	 reached	 its	 bottom	 at	 73.79	 million	 cubic	 meters	 in	 2009.	 Such	 a	 consecutive	 drop	
evidenced	Harbin	citizens’	boosting	institutional	distrust	in	semi-potable	tap	water.		
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Figure	5.13:	Harbin’s	domestic	water	consumption	between	2000	to	2013	
To	 turn	 the	 tide	of	 such	 strong	 consumer	 institutional	distrust	 in	 semi-potable	 tap	water,	 the	Harbin’s	
municipal	government	began	to	prompt	its	secondary	water	source	construction	project,	the	Mopanshan	
Reservoir,	a	5.312	billion	Yuan	invested	water	reservoir	that	conducted	water	175.5	kilometres	away	from	
Harbin.	The	water	quality	of	Mopanshan	is	much	better	than	both	the	groundwater	and	the	river	water.	
Its	 first-stage	 project	 began	 to	 conduct	 water	 in	 2006.	 However,	 it	 was	 not	 until	 2010	 that	 Harbin’s	
domestic	water	consumption	amount	began	to	bounce	back.	Even	so,	its	amount	was	still	much	less	than	
its	peak	amount	before	the	Songhua	River	Toxic	Spill	Crisis.	The	analysis	of	Mopanshan	Reservoir	will	be	
presented	in	detail	in	next	chapter.	
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5.5 Conclusion	
In	 the	 first	 sociogenic	water	 sustainability	 crisis,	 the	 scarcity	 and	 overexploitation	 of	 the	 groundwater	
resources	were,	to	a	large	extent,	stimulated	by	the	consumer	coping	strategy	for	fragmented	tap	water	
distribution.	In	the	second	sociogenic	water	sustainability	crisis,	the	problematic	water	quality	stimulated	
consumers	 to	purchase	bottled	water	and	barrelled	water	as	 the	only	available	Non-Tap-Water	Coping	
Strategy.	 In	both	cases,	 in	 the	context	of	 five	conditions,	 the	balance	between	the	Hybrid	 Institutional	
Architecture,	the	Consumer	Coping	Strategy	Matrix	and	water	crises	was	thrown	off,	which	triggered	two	
types	of	sociogenic	water	sustainability	crisis	in	their	respective	contingent	combination	model.		
For	 the	Harbin’s	municipal	 government,	 the	 pivotal	 point	 of	 these	 two	 sociogenic	water	 sustainability	
crises	 is	 different.	 In	 the	 first	 crisis,	 the	 pivotal	 point	 is	 the	 water	 problem.	 As	 a	 result,	 municipal	
government	 needs	 to	 recover	 groundwater	 resources	 and	 stop	 shift	 power	 of	 water	 production	 to	
consumer.	 This	 demands	 long-term	 and	 discreet	 plan.	 In	 contrast,	 in	 the	 second	 sociogenic	 water	
sustainability	crisis,	the	pivotal	point	is	consumer	coping	strategy.	The	municipal	government	must	have	a	
short-term	emergency	plan	to	tackle	the	social	turmoil	triggered	by	tap	water	suspension	and	panic	buying	
of	bottled	and	barrelled	water.	Both	long-term	discreet	plan	and	short-term	emergency	plan	demands	the	
development	of	Harbin’s	current	‘source	to	consumer’	semi-potable	tap	water	provision	system.	However,	
given	the	Hybrid	Institutional	Architecture	and	its	two	inevitable	outcomes,	semi-potable	tap	water	and	
Consumer	 Coping	 Strategy	 Matrix,	 there	 is	 no	 internal	 and	 external	 stimulation	 for	 the	 ‘source	 to	
consumer’	semi-potable	tap	water	provision	system	to	make	any	progress.	This	will	be	analysed	in	detail	
in	the	next	chapter.	
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 Harbin’s	Tap	Water	
Provision	System:	The	
Hybrid	Institutional	
Architecture	
6.1 Introduction	
The	previous	chapter	introduced	Harbin’s	three	developmental	phases	of	urban	tap	water	supply	and	its	
two	 sociogenic	 sustainability	 crises.	 Together,	 they	 constituted	 household	 consumer’s	 specific	 social	
memory	of	tap	water,	and	have	imposed	profound	influence	on	the	development	of	the	current	tap	water	
provision	system.		
This	chapter	presents	a	general	picture	of	the	Hybrid	Institutional	Architecture	of	Harbin’s	current	urban	
tap	water	provision	system	on	the	basis	of	interview	materials	and	archival	data.	With	detailed	analysis	of	
this	Hybrid	Institutional	Architecture,	this	chapter	aims	to	demonstrate	that	the	semi-potable	tap	water	
and	 the	 Consumer	 Coping	 Strategy	Matrix	 are,	 to	 a	 large	 extent,	 inevitable	 outcomes	 of	 the	 limited	
conditions	and	problems	of	main	agents	in	the	Hybrid	Institutional	Architecture	of	‘source	to	consumer’	
urban	tap	water	provision	system.		
To	achieve	these	two	goals,	in-depth	and	semi-structured	interview	materials	from	four	senior	officials	will	
be	 analysed.	 They	were	 from	 four	 key	 departments	 of	 Harbin’s	 urban	 tap	water	 provision	 system,	 all	
holding	senior	responsibility	positions.	For	confidentiality,	they	are	anonymous	and	are	referred	to	and	
quoted	as	he/she.	All	four	departments	are	mentioned	under	aliases:	water	company	A,	water	treatment	
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plant	B	that	subordinated	to	A,	municipal	tap	water	administration	department	C	and	municipal	health	
supervision	 department	 D.	 All	 interview	 quotations	 in	 this	 chapter	 are	 translated	 by	 the	 author	 from	
Chinese	into	English.	
6.2 The	 Hybrid	 Institutional	 Architecture	 of	
Harbin’s	tap	water	provision	system	
Figure	 6.1	 demonstrates	 the	 Hybrid	 Institutional	 Architecture	 of	 Harbin’s	 tap	water	 provision	 system.	
Three	agents,	Mopanshan	Reservoir,	Water	Company	A	and	its	subordinated	Water	Treatment	Plant	B,	and	
Municipal	Government	Departments	(C	and	D)	are	numbered	as	1,	2	and	3	respectively	in	the	diagram.		
According	to	the	interview	materials	and	archival	data,	each	agent	has	limited	conditions	which	caused	
problems.	These	problems	then	led	to	inevitable	outcomes.	These	three	subjects	were	demonstrated	in	
Figure	 6.1	 by	 three	 dotted-line	 frames	 in	 the	 figure.	When	 exploring	 three	 agents	 together,	 intricate	
interlacements	between	these	limited	conditions	and	problems	can	be	observed.	As	shown	in	the	diagram,	
the	Municipal	Government	Department	was	the	centre	of	all	three	agents.	It	assigned	power/money	flow	
to	the	water	company	and	water	treatment	plants	and	directly	administrates	Mopanshan	Reservoir.	Eight	
limited	conditions	of	three	agents	caused	nine	problems,	which	included	six	black-framed	hybrid	problems	
that	were	triggered	not	by	one	agent	but	two.	This	will	be	explained	in	detail	in	the	following	sections.	
Intensification	 and	 reinforcement	 of	 problems	 make	 semi-potable	 tap	 water	 and	 Consumer	 Coping	
Strategy	Matrix	the	inevitable	outcomes	of	Harbin’s	Hybrid	Institutional	Architecture	of	urban	tap	water	
provision	system.		
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Figure	6.1:	The	Hybrid	Institutional	Architecture	of	Harbin’s	urban	tap	water	provision	system	
In	order	to	have	a	comprehensive	understanding	of	this	Hybrid	Institutional	Architecture,	this	chapter	will	
adopt	 two	optic	 angles	 of	 analysis.	 A	 ‘zoom	 in’	 optic	 angle	would	 be	 helpful	 to	 examine	 each	 limited	
condition	and	problem	of	three	agents	respectively.	A	‘zoom	out’	optic	angle	will	then	be	employed	to	
probe	how	these	problems	lead	to	the	outcomes	of	semi-potable	tap	water	and	Consumer	Coping	Strategy	
Matrix.	Both	of	these	optic	angles	will	be	fully	elaborated	in	the	following	sections.		
6.3 Mopanshan	reservoir	
Harbin	has	three	small	local	reservoirs	with	the	total	designed	water	storage	capacity	of	5.51	million	tons	
and	total	actual	water	storage	capacity	of	4.2	million	tons	(Kong,	Gu	and	Jia,	2011,	p.3).	However,	their	
capacity	is	too	low	to	satisfy	the	city’s	increasing	water	demand.	Besides,	as	shown	in	Figure	6.2,	with	the	
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over-exploitation	of	the	local	groundwater	resources	in	Harbin’s	first	sociogenic	water	sustainability	crisis	
and	the	deteriorated	quality	of	the	Songhua	River	in	Harbin’s	second	sociogenic	water	sustainability	crisis.	
There	was	an	unprecedented	urgent	need	for	municipal	government	to	construct	a	new	water	source	for	
the	city.	Thus,	Mopanshan	Reservoir	became	Harbin’s	first	and	only	water	transfer	project.	
As	shown	in	Figure	6.2,	the	construction	of	Mopanshan	Reservoir	triggered	four	problems.	Three	of	them,	
Departmental	 Dispute	 and	 Settlement	 Procedure,	 Water	 Pollution	 in	 Reservoir	 and	 Local	 Villager	
Resettlement,	and	Wuchang	Gets	Water	From	Mopanshan	After	Harbin,	are	hybrid	problems.	This	means	
that	they	are	triggered	by	two	departments,	the	Mopanshan	Reservoir	and	Harbin	Municipal	Department.	
Together,	 these	 three	 problems	 led	 to	 the	 fourth	 problem	 of	Mopanshan	 Reservoir,	 the	 risk	 of	 long-
distance	water	transfer.	
	
Figure	6.2:	The	conditions	and	problems	of	Mopanshan	Reservoir	
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Locations	and	distance	of	key	targets	mentioned	in	this	section,	Harbin,	Wuchang,	Mopanshan	Reservoir	
and	Fenghuang	Wetland,	are	shown	in	Figure	6.3.	Note	here	that	since	the	distance	was	calculated	by	the	
ruler	tool	of	Google	Earth,	it	is	a	little	bit	different	from	official	data.	
	
Figure	6.3:	Locations	of	Harbin,	Wuchang,	Mopanshan	Reservoir	and	Fenghuang	Wetland	
6.3.1 The	construction	of	Mopanshan	Reservoir	
As	shown	in	Figure	6.3,	Mopanshan	Reservoir	is	situated	in	Shahezi	county	of	Wuchang	City.	Wuchang	is	a	
county-level	city	under	the	jurisdiction	of	the	latter.	The	main	water	sources	of	the	reservoir	are	Lalin	River	
and	Fenghuangshan	Wetland.	Their	flows	shape	a	river	valley	plain	near	the	reservoir.	Not	only	does	the	
reservoir	possess	abundant	groundwater	storage,	but	its	water	quality	also	reaches	the	first	class	of	the	
national	tap	water	standard,	which	means	that	its	water	is	potable	water.	
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The	 general	 water	 transfer	 project	 can	 be	 divided	 into	 three	 subordinate	 projects:	 the	water	 storage	
project,	the	water	distribution	project	and	the	water	treatment	project.	The	water	storage	project	was	to	
build	a	reservoir	in	Mopanshan	water	source	with	the	total	reservoir	capacity	of	5.23	×	108cubic	meters	
and	the	designed	reservoir	capacity	of	4.43	×	108	cubic	meters	(Lin	and	Han,	2007).	The	water	distribution	
project	was	to	build	two	water	supply	pipes,	each	of	which	is	175.5	kilometres	long	with	a	diameter	of	2.2	
meters.	The	water	treatment	project	was	to	build	Mopanshan	Water	Treatment	Plant,	and	a	corresponding	
194.5	kilometres’	urban	tap	water	supply	pipeline.	With	900,000	cubic	meters	of	treatment	capacity	per	
day,	its	primary	function	is	to	treat	the	water	channelling	through	the	two	pipes.	The	total	investment	of	
Mopanshan	Reservoir	is	5.312	billion	Yuan,	including	100	million	dollars’	loan	from	the	Asian	Development	
Bank,	2.4	billion	Yuan	long-term	loans	from	the	Heilongjiang	branch	of	Industrial	and	Commercial	Bank	of	
China,	and	the	self-raised	funds	and	national	subsidy	funds	for	up	to	300	million	Yuan.	
The	 construction	 proposal	 of	Mopanshan	 Reservoir	 was	 firstly	 submitted	 by	 two	members	 of	 Harbin	
Municipal	PCC	(People’s	Political	Consultative	Conference)	members	in	1997	(Hu,	2001).	On	July	28,	1998,	
the	members	of	Municipal	PCC	standing	committee	investigated	the	connection	between	the	urban	tap	
water	quality	and	tap	water	sources.	In	June	1999,	the	construction	proposal	including	three	alternative	
locations	 to	 construct	 Harbin’s	 secondary	 water	 source	 was	 submitted	 to	 the	 National	 Planning	
Commission.	Mopanshan	Reservoir	was	 selected	as	 the	 secondary	water	 source	of	Harbin	besides	 the	
main	major	source	of	the	Songhua	River.	Compared	to	the	other	two	options,	the	Xiquanyan	Reservoir	and	
Taoshan	Reservoir,	both	of	which	suffered	from	the	water	pollution	derived	from	the	rapid	development	
of	the	tourism	industry,	Mopanshan	reservoir	enjoyed	a	relatively	well-perserved	nature	environment.	Its	
perennial	vegetation	coverage	rate	reaches	95%	with	an	average	annual	precipitation	of	800	millimetres	
(Ji,	 2011).	 Another	 advantage	 of	Mopanshan	 Reservoir	 was	 that	 it	 did	 not	 have	 as	many	 surrounded	
villages	as	the	other	two	reservoirs.	However,	as	will	be	revealed	later,	the	problems	of	reservoir	migration	
and	 the	 tourism	 industry	 were	 to	 a	 large	 extent	 underestimated.	 This	 selection	 did	 not	 mean	 the	
confirmation	of	the	project;	given	the	massive	scale	and	the	vast	investment	of	this	project,	there	were	
other	political	procedures	ahead.		
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At	the	municipal	level,	this	proposal	did	not	proceed	until	2001.	The	municipal	government	kept	a	cautious	
attitude	towards	the	project,	reflecting	on	the	limited	number	of	the	relevant	news	reports.	However,	the	
outbreak	of	water	scarcity	crisis	enforced	the	municipal	government	to	launch	the	proposal	of	Mopanshan	
Reservoir.		
To	deal	with	water	scarcity,	on	2001	annual	PCC	conference,	two	municipal	PCC	members	submitted	two	
proposals	focusing	on	the	water	source	projects	of	Harbin	(Hu,	2001).	The	first	and	prioritised	proposal	
was	 not	 about	 Mopanshan	 Reservoir	 but	 another	 Reservoir,	 which	 had	 been	 granted	 by	 the	 central	
government	in	the	1990s.	In	contrast,	the	construction	proposal	of	Mopanshan	Reservoir	was	still	full	of	
uncertainties.	 The	 major	 focus	 of	 Mopanshan	 Reservoir	 project,	 therefore,	 was	 an	 environmental	
evaluation.	 A	 special	 team	 was	 established	 and	 assigned	 by	 municipal	 PCC	 to	 explore	 the	 upstream	
environment	 of	 Mopanshan	 Reservoir	 and	 collect	 the	 water	 data.	 This	 work	 paved	 the	 way	 for	 the	
legislation	for	protecting	Mopanshan’s	water	resource.	
The	first	stage	of	Mopanshan	Reservoir	was	granted	by	the	National	Development	Planning	Commission	
in	November	2002.	The	construction	project	launched	on	April	20	2003	and	completed	at	the	end	of	2005.	
It	finished	the	construction	of	Mopanshan	Reservoir,	one	175.5	kilometres	long	distance	water	supply	pipe,	
the	first	stage	of	Mopanshan	Water	Treatment	Plant	with	the	water	treatment	capacity	of	450,000	cubic	
meters	per	day	and	111	kilometres	urban	water	pipeline.	It	was	operated	on	23	December	2006,	occupying	
64%	of	Harbin’s	total	domestic	water	consumption	(Cheng,	2006).		
Owing	to	the	outbreak	of	Songhua	River	Toxic	Spill	Crisis,	 the	second	stage	of	 the	project	was	granted	
promptly	by	the	central	government	and	launched	in	2006.	After	the	crisis,	Harbin’s	municipal	government	
immediately	 decided	 to	 initiate	 the	 second	 stage	 project	 of	 Mopanshan	 Reservoir	 right	 after	 the	
completion	of	its	first	stage	project,	which	was	granted	nearly	immediately	by	the	central	government.	If	
the	second	sociogenic	water	sustainability	crisis	did	not	occur,	it	would	have	been	impossible	for	Harbin’s	
municipal	government	to	get	permission	from	the	central	government	for	second	stage	project	so	easily	
and	quickly,	as	it	had	borne	a	significant	financial	burden	from	the	first	stage	construction	of	the	project.	
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Given	that,	the	central	government’s	subsidy	rate	of	the	second	stage	project	increased	from	10%	to	35%	
(The	People	Net,	2006).	The	second	stage	of	the	project	included	the	construction	work	of	another	175.5	
kilometres	long	distance	water	supply	pipe,	the	second	stage	of	Mopanshan	Water	Treatment	Plant	with	
the	water	treatment	capacity	of	450,000	cubic	meters	per	day,	83.54	kilometres	urban	tap	water	pipeline.	
The	whole	project	was	completed	in	November	2009.	
In	 sum,	 the	 construction	 of	 Mopanshan	 Reservoir	 is	 not	 specifically	 aiming	 to	 deal	 with	 consumer’s	
plummeting	trust	in	Harbin’s	tap	water	after	the	Songhua	River	Toxic	Spill	Crisis,	but	the	latter	definitely	
prompted	the	development	of	the	former.	From	this	sense,	Mopanshan	Reservoir	can	be	deemed	as	a	
significant	 domino	 effect	 of	 the	 second	 sociogenic	water	 sustainability	 crisis.	 It	was	 the	 government’s	
effort	to	rebuild	the	consumer’s	trust	in	the	manageability	of	tap	water	by	shifting	the	water	source	from	
an	untrustworthy	one	(Songhua	River)	to	a	trustworthy	one	(Mopanshan	Reservoir).	In	2010,	all	citizens	
in	Harbin	were	supplied	with	tap	water	from	Mopanshan	Reservoir.	After	four	years	of	the	consecutive	
drop,	Harbin’s	domestic	water	consumption	for	began	to	recover	for	the	first	time.	
6.3.2 Departmental	dispute	and	settlement	procedure	
During	the	construction	process	of	the	reservoir,	several	departmental	disputes	emerged,	which	became	
one	of	the	most	troublesome	hybrid	problems	between	Harbin	government	departments	and	Mopanshan	
Reservoir.	 The	 first	 and	 most	 severe	 dispute	 was	 between	 two	 government	 departments	 from	 two	
different	institutions:	the	Shanhetun	State-Owned	Logging	Enterprise	(SSLE),	who	possessed	1151	square	
kilometre	forestation	areas	around	Mopanshan	Reservoir,	and	Harbin’s	municipal	government.		
SSLE	is	a	logging	enterprise	subordinate	to	Heilongjiang	Forestry	Bureau.	Contrary	to	the	administrative	
relationship	it	has	with	Wuchang’s	municipal	government,	Harbin’s	municipal	government	has	no	direct	
administrative	 relationship	with	 SSLE,	which	meant	 they	 had	 to	 negotiate	with	 the	 latter.	Mopanshan	
reservoir	was	just	located	inside	the	deforestation	areas	of	SSLE,	so	was	suffering	from	the	resultant	water	
reduction	 and	 soil	 erosion.	 Since	 2000,	 the	water	 storage	 volume	of	Mopanshan	Reservoir	 decreased	
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gradually	due	to	the	deforestation.	An	obvious	solution	to	this	problem	was	to	stop	deforestation,	which	
became	the	centre	of	the	dispute	between	the	two	government	departments.	
The	dilemma	was	about	the	interests	of	SSLE.	If	deforestation	stopped,	it	would	face	a	sharp	shortfall	in	
its	 revenue.	 According	 to	 the	 policy	 of	 Natural	 Forest	 Protection	 Project,	 the	 annual	 allowable	
deforestation	volume	for	SSLE	was	105,000	cubic	meters.	This	was	a	huge	amount	of	revenue.	It	was	also	
impossible	for	Harbin’s	municipal	government	to	take	over	all	the	nine	State-Owned	Logging	Enterprises	
that	 surrounding	 Mopanshan	 Reservoir,	 for	 it	 could	 not	 afford	 the	 cost	 of	 this	 option	 -	 there	 were	
thousands	of	staff	and	workers	in	these	State-Owned	Logging	Enterprises.		
SSLE	had	a	clear	understanding	of	their	plight.	The	water-connected	forestation	areas	occupied	half	of	the	
entire	forestation	areas	of	State-Owned	Logging	Enterprise.	In	2005,	their	average	gross	annual	personal	
income	was	only	4,560	Yuan43	(656	dollars).	Besides,	in	order	to	protect	the	water	quality,	the	forest	farm	
had	 transferred	 the	plants	 in	 the	upstream	of	Mopanshan	Reservoir	 to	 cash	 crops	 and	herbs	 so	 as	 to	
control	 the	 usage	 of	 pesticides	 and	 fertiliser.	 All	 these	 arrangements	 demanded	 significant	 initial	
investment.	Since	Mopanshan	Reservoir	might	not	be	a	revenue	source	anymore,	their	interest	moved	to	
a	high	mountain	wetland	function	as	the	water	source	and	‘natural	water	treatment	plant’	for	Mopanshan	
Reservoir,	the	Fenghuangshan	Wetland,	located	at	the	top	of	an	upstream	mountain	26.7	kilometres	away	
from	Mopanshan	Reservoir,	as	demonstrated	in	Figure	6.3.	
In	June	2000,	a	so-called	international	group,	China	Holiday	Paradise	International	Group,	claimed	a	will	
to	invest	850	million	dollars	on	Fenghuangshan	Wetland	in	constructing	the	largest	ski	holiday	resort	in	
Asia	continent	(Lin	and	Han,	2007;	Harbin	Daily,	2008).	However,	there	is	no	information	about	this	group	
on	the	Web.	Moreover,	this	investment	was	problematic.	There	were	no	construction	records	for	any	ski	
resorts	in	areas	around	Mopanshan	Reservoir.	With	such	a	high	rainfall	rate	every	year,	the	ski	resort	would	
not	be	able	to	operate	 for	enough	days	to	make	the	profit.	Besides,	 the	timing	of	 this	 investment	was	
																																								 																				
43	Source:	http://baike.baidu.com/item/%E5%B1%B1%E6%B2%B3%E5%B1%AF%E6%9E%97%E4%B8%9A%E5%B1%80	Accessed:	10	April	2016	
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suspicious.	It	came	after	the	Mopanshan	Reservoir	was	selected	as	the	secondary	water	source	for	Harbin.	
However,	SSLE	supported	the	 investment	project	at	 that	time,	whereas	Harbin	Municipal	Government,	
clubbing	together	with	several	other	departments,	opposed	it.	The	latter	initiated	a	strict	Environmental	
Impact	Scrutiny	and	Environmental	 Impact	Assessment	on	this	 investment	project.	 In	2003,	the	Harbin	
government	finally	decided	to	reject	this	investment	project.	
However,	 in	November	2002,	 the	Fenghuangshan	Wetland	was	 still	developed	as	a	 resort.	The	central	
government	approved	the	establishment	of	 ‘Fenghuangshan	National	Park’,	paving	the	way	for	SSLE	to	
plan	two	tour	routes	in	it,	along	which	were	dozens	of	public	toilets	draining	the	excretion	directly	into	the	
reservoir	 without	 treatment	 (Harbin	 Daily,	 2008).	 However,	 it	 insisted	 that	 the	 exploration	 of	 the	
Fenghuangshan	Wetland	was	only	a	win-win	developmental	cooperation	with	Mopanshan	Reservoir.	
In	 2011,	 the	 dispute	 between	 Harbin’s	municipal	 government	 and	 SSLE	 finally	 settled	 down	with	 the	
publishing	 of	 a	 legal	 document,	 The	 Agreement	 of	 Stopping	 Deforestation	 in	 Upstream	 Areas	 of	
Mopanshan	Reservoir.	Harbin’s	municipal	government	needed	to	compensate	Heilongjiang	Forest	Agency	
the	 loss	caused	by	stopping	deforestation	for	39	million	Yuan	every	year	 from	2011	to	2016	(Ji,	2011).	
Noted	here	that	the	compensation	was	not	paid	directly	to	SSLE,	but	its	senior	agency.	However,	the	issue	
of	compensation	distribution	is	still	unclear.	From	this	sense,	SSLE’s	concern	for	their	revenue	becomes	
understandable.	Without	the	revenues	from	logging,	the	SSLE	would	have	to	rely	on	the	compensation	
redistributed	from	its	senior	agency,	who	did	not	have	a	redistribution	scheme	open	for	scrutiny.	Thus,	
SSLE	was	unwilling	to	give	up	any	gains	they	made	through	the	developing	tourism	industry,	resulting	in	a	
new	concern	of	the	booming	tourism	development	of	Fenghuangshan	Wetland	evidenced	in	a	news	report	
in	2015	(Yan,	2015).	However,	the	development	of	tourism	industry	will	probably	last	for	many	years	in	
the	future.		
From	this	dispute,	a	conflict-settlement	procedure	between	different	government	departments	can	be	
perceived.	This	system	operated	when	there	were	no	clear	power	boundaries	between	different	agents,	
and	when	a	legal	solution	of	the	departmental	dispute	was	extremely	time-consuming.	In	this	case,	the	
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Harbin’s	 municipal	 government	 claimed	 the	 property	 rights	 of	 water	 resources	 in	Mopanshan,	 but	 it	
cannot	 prevent	 the	 SSLE	 from	 logging	 the	 timbers	 around	 the	water	 body	 and	 causing	 environmental	
pollution.	 Neither	 can	 it	 prevent	 the	 development	 of	 tourism	 industry	 near	 the	 water	 source	 of	
Mopanshan	Reservoir.	With	no	law	or	regulation	to	draw	a	clear	line	between	the	interests	of	agents	with	
equivalent	administration	levels,	a	negotiation	was	arranged	between	them	by	their	senior	department,	
Heilongjiang	 provincial	 government.	While	 rejecting	 all	 of	 the	 external	 interventions,	 this	 negotiation	
integrated	the	conflict	into	an	internal	administrative	framework.	At	the	same	time,	it	can	be	observed	
that	 the	 senior	 agencies	 kept	 its	 authority	 in	 the	 final	 resolution.	Without	 such	 a	 conflict-settlement	
negotiation,	the	conflict	could	be	developed	to	an	alarming	level.	After	all,	it	was,	in	essence,	a	conflict	
with	four	million	people’s	water	demand	on	one	side,	and	ten	thousand	people’s	incomes	on	the	other.	To	
conclude,	even	though	the	detail	of	such	kind	of	negotiation	is	not	open	to	the	public,	its	effectiveness	has	
been	proved,	at	least	in	conflicts	referring	to	government	departments.		
Note	that	this	procedure	has	many	defects.	The	most	obvious	one	is	the	lack	of	transparency	between	the	
enterprise	 and	 Forestry	 Bureau,	 and	 between	 SSLE	 and	 its	 subordinated	 enterprises.	 In	 2014,	 several	
employees	 in	 SSLE,	 including	 its	 former	main	 director,	 were	 punished	 for	 embezzling	 public	 funds	 by	
National	 Audit	Office44	.	 In	 general,	 this	 procedure	 has	 been	widely	 adopted	 by	many	 governments	 in	
dealing	with	their	disputes	with	other	government	departments.	As	a	result,	the	flow	of	power	and	the	
flow	of	money	running	through	this	procedure	are,	to	a	 large	extent,	behind	the	veil.	Since	there	is	no	
effective	public	supervision	on	the	operation	of	this	procedure,	a	series	of	similar	crimes	regarding	huge	
amounts	of	compensation	funding	can	occur.	
6.3.3 Water	pollution	in	reservoir	and	local	villager	resettlement	
Since	local	villagers	were	the	main	pollution	source	for	Mopanshan	Reservoir,	and	since	their	resettlement	
demanded	 the	 involvement	 of	 government	 department,	 there	 was	 an	 intricate	 correlation	 between	
																																								 																				
44	Source:	http://news.ifeng.com/a/20141224/42788494_0.shtml	Accessed:	18	April	2017	
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government	 department,	 Mopanshan	 Reservoir,	 water	 pollution,	 and	 local	 villager	 resettlement,	
generating	another	complicated	hybrid	problem.	
In	a	2007	news	report,	four	main	pollution	sources	of	Mopanshan	Reservoir	were	identified	(Dongbeinet,	
2007).	Three	of	them	were	either	caused	by	or	associated	with	the	local	villagers:	the	non-point	sources	
agricultural	pollution,	 the	 rural	 kitchen	waste	pollution,	and	 the	potential	environmental	 risk	of	petrol	
stations	 nearby	 villages.	 The	 fourth	 pollution	 source	 was	 the	 pesticide	 sprayed	 by	 Shanghetun	 State-
Owned	 Logging	 Enterprises,	 which	 was	 eliminated	 after	 the	 negotiation	 between	 Heilongjiang	 Forest	
Agency	and	Harbin’s	municipal	government.		
The	pollution	problems	are	intertwined	with	the	problem	of	reservoir	resettlement.	Many	local	villagers	
did	not	want	to	be	moved	from	their	homes	to	other	places.	However,	given	the	isolated	locations	of	their	
villages,	they	had	no	other	way	than	cultivating	the	 land	around	the	reservoir	to	feed	themselves.	The	
farm	lands	around	Mopanshan	Reservoir	are	fertile	with	reputation	for	its	yield.	Wuchang	Rice	has	become	
a	popular	rice	brand	in	the	national	market.	Thus,	many	villagers	chose	to	grow	rice	in	their	lands,	which	
demanded	 four	 to	 five	 times	 more	 fertiliser	 input	 than	 growing	 upland	 rice.	 What	 is	 more,	 rice	 is	
vulnerable	to	pests,	which	entails	the	usage	of	a	large	amount	of	pesticides.	As	a	result,	large	quantities	
of	fertiliser	and	pesticides	diluted	themselves	into	the	nearby	water	bodies	and	groundwater,	turning	into	
the	main	compositions	of	the	non-point	water	pollutant.	 In	the	total	1151	square	kilometres	upstream	
area	of	Mopanshan	Reservoir	there	were	seven	small	logging	enterprises,	11	villages,	14,100	people,	and	
80,000	livestock.	Each	year,	2179.6	tons	of	fertiliser	and	15.86	tons	of	pesticides	were	sprayed	in	farming,	
and	 10,000	 tons	 of	 untreated	 household	 sewage	 and	 100,000	 tons	 of	 untreated	 wastewater	 were	
discharged	to	the	environment	(Dongbeinet,	2011).	In	each	summer,	the	swollen	surface	flows	will	bring	
these	pollutants	to	Mopanshan	Reservoir.	The	result	of	water	quality	monitoring	indicated	that	the	organic	
pollutants	did	not	exceed	 the	standard	 limit,	but	 they	might	cause	possible	environmental	damage.	 In	
recent	years,	with	the	booming	economy	in	Fenghuangshan	Wetland,	villagers	may	have	more	reasons	to	
stay.		
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What	is	more	worrying	are	the	attitudes	of	local	villagers,	which	can	be	seen	as	a	typical	reflection	of	the	
tragedy	of	the	commons.	In	several	news	reports	(see	Dongbeinet,	2006;	2007;	2012),	the	local	villagers	
exclaimed	 that	 the	 water	 they	 drank	 was	 from	 self-drilled	 wells,	 so	 the	 water	 quality	 of	Mopanshan	
Reservoir	was	not	 their	business.	Similarly,	 they	had	no	awareness	of	environmental	protection.	Many	
villagers	dumped	their	garbage	beside	the	river.	Some	even	put	the	pesticide	bottle	into	the	river	to	dilute	
the	pesticide	and	then	threw	the	bottle	into	the	river.	There	was	a	government	propaganda	for	‘green	food	
technology	zone’.	In	this	zone,	no	pesticides	and	fertilisers	that	included	chemical	compositions	would	be	
permitted	in	cultivation.	However,	this	zone	was	never	established	on	a	significant	scale.	Those	relatively	
environmental-friendly	pesticides	and	fertilisers	came	with	a	high	cost,	and	local	villagers	did	not	have	any	
government	subsidisation	for	using	them.	Besides,	using	toxic	fertilisers	and	pesticides	would	increase	the	
crop	yields	more	than	using	the	relatively	environmental-friendly	pesticides	and	fertilisers	(Wang,	2008).	
With	the	natural	environment	being	‘controlled’	by	the	local	villagers,	and	with	no	effective	compensation	
mechanism	for	using	environmental-friendly	pesticides	and	fertilisers,	it	was	no	surprise	to	witness	such	a	
sharp	conflict	between	rural	and	urban	people:	the	former	refused	to	take	into	consideration	the	latter’s	
benefit.		
Given	the	situation	above,	a	villager	resettlement	was	arranged.	 In	2004,	4400	villagers	were	resettled	
from	the	flood	areas	of	Mopanshan	Reservoir.	In	2005,	in	order	to	protect	the	environment	of	the	water	
source,	another	2000	people	were	resettled	(Zhang,	2012).	Besides,	in	order	to	guarantee	the	construction	
of	 the	 urban	 pipeline	 network,	 the	 Harbin’s	municipal	 government	 had	 enacted	 two	 announcements	
about	land	acquisition	in	2003	and	2007,	corresponding	respectively	to	the	construction	period	of	the	first	
and	second	stage	of	the	project	of	Mopanshan	Reservoir	(Harbin	Municipal	Government,	2003;	2007b).	In	
both	 two	 announcements,	 there	were	 articles	 of	 compensation:	 ‘in	 requisitioning	 land,	 compensation	
should	be	made	to	those	who	own	legal	housing	related	deeds	according	to	the	‘Harbin’s	interim	measures	
on	urban	housing	demolition	and	management.’	They	asked	that	‘all	of	the	units,	individual	businesses,	
and	residents	positing	within	the	scope	of	land	acquisition	should	prioritise	the	overall	interests	against	
their	personal	interests	to	support	the	construction	project’.		
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Residents	within	200	meters’	radius	of	Mopanshan	Reservoir	were	all	resettled	before	2012,	when	the	
Harbin	Mopanshan	Reservoir	Water	Source	Conservation	Regulation	took	effect.	To	prevent	people	from	
intruding	on	 this	 area,	 a	 70	 kilometres	 long,	 2.2	meters	 high	 fence	 around	Mopanshan	Reservoir	was	
established	by	Harbin	Environmental	Protection	Bureau,	and	regulated	by	Mopanshan	Water	resources	
Protection	and	Management	Office	(Cui,	2008).	However,	with	only	five	employees	in	this	office,	effective	
management	was	a	huge	challenge.	
6.3.4 Wuchang	gets	water	from	Mopanshan	after	Harbin	
As	 shown	 in	 Figure	 6.3,	Wuchang	 is	 the	 nearest	 city	 of	Mopanshan	 Reservoir.	 It	 also	 held	 the	 direct	
administration	 power	 of	 Mopanshan	 Reservoir.	 As	 mentioned	 earlier,	 Wuchang	 is	 administrated	 by	
Harbin’s	municipal	government,	so	even	though	it	was	76.2	kilometres	away	from	Mopanshan	Reservoir,	
it	had	water	supplied	from	Mopanshan	Reservoir	later	than	Harbin.		
In	 the	 massive	 media	 coverage	 about	Mopanshan	 Reservoir,	 Wuchang	 received	 little	 attention,	 even	
though	Mopanshan	Reservoir	is	located	in	its	administrative	realm.	Since	2006,	it	administrated	a	reservoir	
that	supplied	water	not	to	its	citizen	but	citizens	of	another	city,	whereas	its	tap	water	was	mainly	sourced	
from	groundwater.	 In	2013,	a	nondescript	news	published	with	a	title	‘200,000	Wuchang	Residents	get	
Water	Supplied	from	Mopanshan	Reservoir’	(Wen,	2013),	confirmed	that	Wuchang	citizens	finally	got	tap	
water	supplied	from	the	nearby	water	reservoir,	seven	years	after	Harbin	citizens.	
In	this	case,	Wuchang	residents’	proximity	to	the	water	resources	did	not	justify	their	priority	of	accessing	
it.	Similarly,	Harbin	residents’	distance	to	water	resources	did	not	nullify	their	priority	of	enjoying	water	
from	this	source.	This	is	due	to	the	fact	that	Harbin	is	the	capital	city	of	Heilongjiang	Province.	Its	political	
power	 priority	 and	 privilege	 has	 been	 so	 huge	 that	 it	 even	 expanded	 to	 the	 very	 basic	 infrastructure	
projects	such	as	tap	water	supply,	surpassing	the	legitimacy	of	accessing	water	based	on	proximity.	This	
demonstrates	one	aspect	of	how	political	power	shaped	the	general	water	supply	structure	in	China:	the	
capital	city’s	demands	of	water	resources	always	surpass	the	non-capital	cities,	even	the	latter	is	closer	to	
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the	water	 resource.	A	 similar	 case	 can	be	observed	 in	China's	 South-to-North	Water	Diversion	project	
(Barnett	et	al,	2005).	
In	this	situation,	what	non-capital	cities	do	is	to	try	to	make	some	profits	from	the	capital	city’s	massive	
hydraulic	projects,	but	when	their	interests	conflict	with	the	interests	of	the	capital	city,	the	latter	would	
always	prevail	over	the	former.	For	example,	in	2004,	the	mayor	of	Wuchang	claimed	that	‘we	should	seize	
the	opportunity	of	the	Mopanshan	Reservoir	Water	Supply	project	to	encourage	our	citizens	to	participate	
in	 the	work	of	construction,	developing	 industries	of	 transportation,	 food	service,	pipeline	production,	
tourism,	 and	 aquaculture’	 (Liu,	 2004).	 Here	 it	 is	 obvious	 that	Wuchang	 tried	 to	 focus	 on	 the	 positive	
aspects	 of	 reservoir	 construction.	 In	 July	 2005,	 an	 official	 from	 Wuchang’s	 agriculture	 department	
announced	 that	Wuchang	 had	 designated	 the	 arable	 land	 around	 the	water	 catchment	 area	 into	 the	
‘Organic	Food	Base’.	Given	his	 statement,	 since	2006,	all	of	 the	 farming	within	 the	base	would	strictly	
follow	 the	 standard	 of	 organic	 food.	 In	 three	 years,	 pesticides	 and	 fertilisers	 that	 included	 chemical	
compositions	would	be	banned	in	cultivation.	The	goal	was	that	in	2008,	the	surrounding	arable	land	of	
Mopanshan	Reservoir	would	become	an	organic	food	base.	However,	in	April	2006,	only	one	hectare	of	
arable	land	was	cultivating	‘organic	rice’	without	using	fertiliser	and	pesticides	(Dongbeinet,	2007).	In	2008,	
the	fertilisers	and	pesticides	were	still	being	widely	used	in	farming	(Cui,	2008).	In	2012,	with	the	validation	
of	Mopanshan	Reservoir	Water	Source	Conservation	Regulation,	it	was	impossible	to	build	an	organic	food	
base	(or	any	other	buildings)	near	Mopanshan	Reservoir.	In	conclusion,	when	Wuchang’s	plan	of	making	
a	profit	from	Mopanshan	Reservoir	conflicted	with	Harbin’s	major	interest	of	water	protection,	the	former	
was	repressed	and	all	its	efforts	lost.		
6.3.5 Risk	of	long-distance	water	transfer		
From	Mopanshan	Reservoir	to	Harbin,	the	175	kilometres’	long-distance	water	supply	inevitably	triggers	
some	concerns.	First,	as	a	close	pipeline,	it	passed	two	mountains,	five	railways,	three	rivers	ten	highways	
and	six	towns	(Xinhuanet,	2011).	It	has	to	be	protected	by	a	certain	patrol	party	day	and	night.	Secondly,	
given	its	long	length,	the	changing	temperature,	and	the	complexity	of	its	surrounding	environment,	once	
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the	tap	water	supply	is	suspended	by	any	accident,	it	will	take	a	long	time	to	detect	the	problem	and	to	
restore	water	the	supply	(Xie,	2011).	Thirdly,	a	 long-distance	pipeline	 is	vulnerable	to	various	potential	
damage,	either	natural	disasters	or	human	construction	projects.	Fourthly,	a	long-distance	water	supply	
means	that	the	residual	chlorine	is	more	likely	to	evaporate	in	the	pipe,	and	bacteria	would	have	more	
time	to	grow	up.	Besides	 the	 risks	 listed	above,	once	 the	 long-distance	pipeline	connects	with	 the	old	
urban	pipeline,	the	tap	water	quality	would	still	be	reduced	from	a	potable	level	to	a	semi-potable	level.		
Given	that,	after	 the	 investigation	of	water	quality,	 in	November	2011,	Harbin’s	municipal	government	
launched	the	Songhua	River	Water	Source	Project,	which	aims	to	refurbish	the	three	old	water	treatment	
plants	and	build	two	new	water	treatment	plants	that	supply	the	river	water	(Tao	and	Ma,	2014;	Wang,	
2015).	At	the	end	of	2017,	the	tap	water	supplies	to	southern	areas	of	Harbin	will	come	from	two	water	
sources,	Mopanshan	Reservoir	and	Songhua	River.	
6.4 Water	company	A	and	water	treatment	plant	B	
Water	company	A	is	a	state-owned	enterprise	offering	municipal	public	service.	It	has	several	subordinated	
water	treatment	plants,	including	the	water	treatment	plant	B.	
As	 shown	 in	 Figure	 6.4,	 A	 and	B	 are	 in	 dire	 straits	 now.	A	 series	 of	water	 companies	merge	 and	 split	
impaired	 A’s	 administration.	 Both	 its	 direct	 and	 extra	 incomes	 were	 limited.	 Due	 to	 the	 construction	
project	of	Mopanshan	Reservoir,	it	was	running	with	a	huge	debt.	Since	they	were	strongly	opposed	to	
privatisation,	the	limited	conditions	made	it	incapable	of	either	updating	the	old	urban	tap	water	pipeline	
or	changing	old	water	 treatment	equipment,	not	 to	mention	 taking	over	 the	administration	of	 second	
water	supply	facilities.		
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Figure	6.4:	The	condition	and	problem	of	water	company	and	water	treatment	plant	
6.4.1 Low	water	rates	and	limited	income	
On	8	December	2009,	Harbin’s	municipal	government	held	a	hearing	to	discuss	the	price	of	tap	water	from	
Mopanshan	(Harbin	Municipal	Government,	2009).	In	this	hearing,	the	municipal	government	set	the	cost	
price	of	tap	water	at	3.75	Yuan	per	cubic	meter,	including	source	water	cost	for	1.93	Yuan	and	operation	
cost	 for	1.82	Yuan.	With	the	government	subsidy,	 the	domestic	water	rates	 for	Harbin	citizens	was	2.4	
Yuan,	which	 increased	from	previous	1.8	Yuan.	This	price	ranked	sixth	 in	27	capital	cities,	whereas	the	
Harbin’s	disposable	income	per	capita	in	2008	ranked	17th	among	them	(Heilongjiang	News	Net,	2009).	
Besides,	a	news	report	blamed	the	hearing’s	operation	as	‘full	of	doubt’.	It	claimed	that	some	consumer	
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representatives	attended	the	hearing	with	fake	identities	(Wang,	2009).	Harbin’s	municipal	government	
denied	this	claim	in	its	press	conference.		
In	 the	 interviews,	 regarding	 the	 problem	 of	 water	 rate,	 interviewees	 from	 different	 departments	
responded	with	different	attitudes.	The	interviewee	from	the	water	treatment	plant	B	commented	on	the	
water	rates	as	‘not	high’	given	its	cost.	 ‘For	citizens,	they	must	have	thought	this	water	rates	was	high,	
since	they	might	compare	it	with	the	water	rates	of	tap	water	from	Songhua	River.	However,	now	it	was	
from	Mopanshan,	180	kilometres	away	from	us,	and	we	need	to	supply	the	treated	water	to	the	city.	With	
all	of	these,	plus	the	cost	of	treatment	and	the	cost	of	operation,	I	think	the	water	rates	was	not	high.	
There	is	also	a	sewage	treatment	fee	in	the	water	rates,	not	only	the	fee	generated	from	water	production.’	
Obviously,	his/her	perception	of	the	current	water	rates	is	based	on	the	cost	of	water	transfer	and	water	
treatment.		
The	 interviewee	from	water	company	A,	however,	emphasised	the	necessity	of	 increasing	water	 rates.	
‘Our	group	barely	has	any	profits.	It	is	because	of	the	low	water	rate.	[…]	I	think	it	needs	to	be	increased,	
for	the	costs	of	raw	materials	and	labour	are	increasing	now.	Because	of	the	increasing	cost,	it	is	more	and	
more	difficult	for	our	group	to	undertake	the	urban	reformation	and	reconstruction	projects.’	But	at	the	
same	time,	he/she	also	admitted	that	water	rates	were	so	fundamental	that	they	had	to	be	kept	at	a	low	
level.	‘For	example,	when	the	price	of	oil	fluctuates,	the	price	of	electricity	fluctuates,	and	then	the	cost	
of	 labour	 rose.	 However,	 the	 price	 of	water	 is	 fixed	 no	matter	 how	much	 the	 price	 of	 the	 other	 raw	
materials	changed.	It	is	because	the	water	price	is	the	fundamental	basis	of	everything	in	the	market.	If	
the	 water	 price	 increases,	 then	 the	 price	 of	 everything	 will	 increase	 as	 a	 response.	 It	 is	 due	 to	 the	
consistent	use	of	water	that	leads	the	water’s	price	to	be	kept	at	a	relatively	low	level.’	His/her	perception	
of	current	water	rates	is	based	on	the	operation	situation	of	his/her	group,	which	is	running	in	huge	debt,	
as	will	be	revealed	later.	
Besides	the	major	income	from	the	water	rate,	the	interviewee	from	A	also	has	some	extra	income	from	
its	subordinated	construction	company.	However,	he/she	admitted	that	given	the	economic	recession	and	
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weather	 condition,	 it	 could	 not	 earn	 as	 much	 money	 as	 before.	 ‘In	 south	 areas,	 the	 construction	
companies	can	work	for	up	to	12	months,	but	in	north	areas,	because	of	the	cold	weather,	our	workers	
cannot	afford	to	work	for	12	months	a	year,’	He/she	said.	
6.4.2 Merge	and	split	
After	 being	 informed	 of	 the	 approval	 of	 Mopanshan	 Reservoir	 from	 central	 government,	 Harbin’s	
municipal	government	launched	a	series	of	complicated	capital	operations.	Given	the	explanation	of	the	
interviewee	from	A,	there	were	two	requirements	for	municipal	government	to	apply	for	a	loan	from	the	
central	government:	first,	it	must	have	a	fixed	asset;	and	second,	it	must	have	an	entity	that	is	financially	
strong	enough,	for	example	a	company,	to	sustain	the	project.	In	2003,	only	the	Water	Supply	Office,	a	
subordinate	department	of	Harbin’s	municipal	government,	was	qualified	for	applying	for	a	loan.	However,	
it	was	not	counted	as	an	entity	with	any	fixed	asset.	In	order	to	meet	these	two	requirements,	in	2003,	
the	Harbin’s	municipal	government	combined	three	water	companies,	the	Municipal	Tap	Water	Group,	
the	Municipal	Water	Drainage	Company	and	the	water	engineering	company	responsible	for	the	tap	water	
supply	from	Mopanshan	Reservoir,	to	establish	a	company	with	enough	capital.	‘You	have	to	have	enough	
fixed	assets	to	apply	for	the	funding	at	that	time.	The	best	solution	was	to	merge	the	small	companies	to	
establish	a	strong	entity	with	fixed	asset,’	he/she	said.		
As	a	result,	a	new	group	was	established,	the	Harbin	Water	Supply	and	Drainage	Group	(HWSDG).	Its	overt	
function	was	to	operate	the	tap	water	supply	and	sewage	for	the	whole	city.	However,	as	an	SOE,	it	also	
functioned	as	a	 financing	vehicle.	Up	 to	 July	2011,	 its	 total	 assets	were	8.18	billion	Yuan,	but	 its	 total	
liabilities	 were	 as	 high	 as	 5.83	 billion	 Yuan.	 In	 July	 2013,	 three	 years	 after	 the	 completion	 of	 the	
Mopanshan	Reservoir	project,	the	HWSDG	was	separated	into	two	groups:	the	Harbin	Water	Supply	Group	
(HWSG)	and	the	Harbin	Water	Drainage	Group	(HWDG).	 It	seems	 like	everything	was	restored	to	what	
they	had	been	before.	The	interviewee	from	A	thought	such	re-separation	was	positive.	‘Compared	to	the	
past,	they	are	more	focused.	One	group	was	focusing	on	the	water	supply,	whereas	the	other	was	focusing	
on	 the	drainage,’	he/she	said.	However,	how	the	 liabilities	of	HWSDG	were	separate	between	the	 two	
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groups	is	unclear.	What	can	be	confirmed	is	that	this	separation	marked	the	completion	of	the	mission	of	
the	HWSDG.	
This	internal	and	dynamic	change	in	HWSDG	demonstrated	the	close	link	between	the	water	company,	
the	government,	and	the	water	reservoir	in	the	Hybrid	Institutional	Architecture.	The	central	government	
planned	the	development	direction	and	water	companies	in	local	cities	would	follow	it	no	matter	what	
had	 happened	 before.	 Frequent	 changes	 in	 such	 scale	 would	 definitely	 lead	 to	 turbulences	 in	 the	
administration	system	of	the	two	companies,	and	it	would	be	expanded	to	their	subordinate	companies,	
costing	a	long	time	to	make	proper	adjustments.	
6.4.3 Huge	debt	and	expenditure	
Due	to	the	loan	HWSG	borrowed	from	the	central	government	for	constructing	Mopanshan	Reservoir,	it	
is	currently	in	huge	debt.	Given	Municipal	Year	Book	(Harbin	Yearbook	Edition	Committee,	2014),	in	2013	
its	 total	assets	was	9.65	billion	Yuan,	 its	 total	debt	was	6.71	billion	Yuan,	accounting	69.5%	of	 its	 total	
assets.	Both	interviewees	from	A	and	B	acknowledged	that	this	debt	was	a	huge	burden.	The	interviewee	
from	 B	 thought	 that	 the	 government	 should	 share	 some	 financial	 burdens,	 because	 the	 project	 of	
Mopanshan	Reservoir	is	a	municipal	public	project.	The	interviewee	from	health	supervision	department	
C,	 on	 the	 other	 hand,	 was	 aware	 of	 the	 huge	 debt	 of	 A,	 but	 he/she	 was	 cautious	 in	 delivering	 any	
comments.	
Besides	the	debt,	the	interviewee	from	A	admitted	that	as	an	old	SOE,	HWSG	also	has	to	afford	the	pension	
for	its	retired	employees.	The	interviewee	from	B	also	acknowledged	that	‘in	an	old	SOE	for	so	many	years,	
some	employees	may	have	sluggishness	and	dependence’.		
What	can	be	observed	here	is	that	all	of	three	interviewees	recognised	the	financial	troubles	confronted	
by	HWSG	as	SOE.	However,	at	the	same	time	they	all	clearly	opposed	the	idea	of	privatising	the	water	
company,	although	it	may	release	HWSG	from	its	troubles.	
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6.4.4 Opposition	to	privatisation	
Facing	such	harsh	realities	of	their	financial	situation,	both	interviewees	from	A	and	B	claimed	that	they	
opposed	any	attempts	of	privatising	the	urban	tap	water	supply	facilities.	The	interviewee	from	A	argued	
that	‘the	fundamental	problem	was	that	private	capitals	were	not	as	professional	as	us	in	operating	a	tap	
water	supply	system.	Thus,	they	could	not	ensure	the	quality	of	tap	water.	Their	pursuit	of	interests	would	
confine	their	service	quality.’	The	interviewee	from	B	was	worried	about	the	private	capital’s	control	over	
tap	water	treatment	plants	‘if	tap	water	treatment	plants	were	controlled	in	one	person’s	hands,	[…]	it	
would	make	this	person	take	advantage	of	us.’		
Obviously,	 both	 interviewees	 strongly	 opposed	 the	 attempt	of	 privatisation.	 Their	worries	were	 about	
security	 and	 operation	 of	 those	 privatised	 facilities,	 which	 formed	 a	 remarkable	 comparison	 to	 their	
attitudes	towards	their	financial	problems.	This	may	evidence	the	fact	that	even	though	holding	a	heavy	
burden	of	debt,	as	in	the	case	of	SOE,	they	were	not	worried	too	much	about	bankruptcy.	In	other	words,	
those	financial	problems	were	not	as	fatal	for	them	as	they	might	be	for	Non-SOE.	They	could	still	operate	
water	supply	facilities	without	making	any	changes,	even	with	such	huge	a	debt	and	high	interests.	How	
and	when	would	they	repay	the	debt	is	still	unknown.	
6.4.5 Old	urban	tap	water	pipeline	
Given	the	limited	income,	huge	debt	and	expenditure,	it	is	extremely	hard	for	HWSG	to	update	the	Harbin’s	
old	urban	tap	water	pipeline.	‘The	old	pipeline	could	not	be	modified	without	the	financial	support	from	
the	central	government.	This	was	the	only	funding	that	we	could	use	to	modify	the	pipeline.	We	were	not	
allowed	to	use	the	other	funding.’	He/she	also	admitted	that	most	of	Harbin’s	water	pipelines	were	made	
by	 cement,	 glass-reinforced	 plastic	 and	 foundry	 iron,	 which	 have	 different	 leaking	 rates.	 He/she	 also	
acknowledged	that	many	pipes’	service	life	had	expired.	‘HWSG	does	not	have	funding	to	modify	these	
pipes.	Thus,	it	has	no	other	choice	but	to	suffer	a	high	water	leakage	rate,’	he/she	said.		
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The	interviewee	from	B	also	admitted	that	‘I	can	guarantee	you	that	the	outlet	tap	water	from	our	plant	
is	potable,	but	given	Harbin’s	old	urban	tap	water	pipeline,	I	cannot	guarantee	you	the	quality	of	domestic	
tap	 water.’	 The	 interviewee	 from	 tap	 water	 administration	 department	 D	 emphasised	 that	 pipeline	
management	needed	the	cooperation	of	multiple	government	departments,	he/she	also	claimed	that	it	
was	the	construction	department	who	managed	the	pipeline.	However,	the	interviewee	from	A	pointed	
out	that	it	was	HWSG	in	Harbin	who	managed	and	maintained	the	pipeline.		
The	mistake	of	 the	 interviewee	 from	D	 implicates	a	problem	of	urban	 tap	water	administration	 in	 the	
Hybrid	Institutional	Architecture:	it	demands	effective	cooperation	between	multiple	parallel	departments,	
but	they	are	sometimes	unfamiliar	with	each	other’s	working	areas.	
6.4.6 New	 tap	 water	 national	 standard	 and	 old	 water	 treatment	
equipment	
The	interviewees	from	C	and	D	both	thought	the	new	national	domestic	tap	water	standard,	including	106	
indicators,	 was	 applicable.	 It	 only	 needed	 better	 administration.	 However,	 the	 interviewee	 from	 A	
admitted	that	since	publishing	in	2007,	this	standard	was	not	adopted	widely	because	of	the	old	water	
treatment	plant.	‘It	is	not	an	inapplicable	standard	at	all.	The	problem	of	its	limited	adoption	was	also	the	
lack	of	fund.	It	was	a	common	challenge	for	nearly	all	water	companies	in	China.	We	have	no	money	to	
upgrade	our	water	 treatment	equipment.	 Even	 capital	 cities	were	 in	 this	plight,	 not	 to	mention	 those	
secondary	and	third	tier	cities,’	he/she	said.	Moreover,	he/she	indicated	in	addition	that	‘from	what	I	know,	
no	city	in	North	China	possesses	the	equipment	of	advanced	water	treatment.	Such	equipment	is	not	only	
lacking	 in	Harbin,	but	also	 in	Shenyang,	Liaoning	and	Jilin	provinces.	 […]	Currently,	Harbin	also	has	the	
demand	for	such	equipment,	but	it	depends	on	whether	we	can	receive	enough	funds	to	purchase	them.’	
Without	an	advanced	water	 treatment	plant,	 the	 interviewee	 from	B	admitted	 that	without	advanced	
water	 treatment	equipment,	 they	only	 test	15	essential	 indicators	out	of	106	 indicators	 in	daily	water	
quality	test.	However,	he/she	had	confidence	in	the	water	quality	from	Mopanshan	Reservoir.	Similarly,	
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the	 interviewee	 from	C	 claimed	 that	 the	 reason	why	B	did	 not	 equip	with	 advanced	water	 treatment	
equipment	was	‘because	water	from	Mopanshan	Reservoir	was	in	good	quality’.	
6.4.7 Problematic	secondary	water	supply	facilities	
As	has	been	argued	in	Chapter	3,	the	administration	of	secondary	water	supply	facilities	was	a	‘gray	area’	
for	general	urban	tap	water	provision	systems.	Its	variable	and	complicated	status	made	all	relative	agents	
in	the	system	hesitate	to	take	over	its	administration.	As	a	result,	it	was	considered	the	most	vulnerable	
link	in	the	system	by	many	experts	and	another	troublesome	hybrid	problem.	
The	 interviewee	 from	 A	 admitted	 that	 Harbin’s	 secondary	 water	 supply	 facilities	 were	 regulated	 by	
MCHURD	 and	 property	 management	 company	 for	 every	 resident	 community.	 Without	 any	 national	
regulation,	its	regulation	differed	from	city	to	city.	He/she	thought	it	was	a	potential	loophole	for	urban	
tap	water	 regulation.	 ‘It	was	necessary	 for	 the	water	 company	 to	 take	over	 the	 administration	of	 this	
system,’	he/she	said,	‘the	water	tank	and	the	pipeline	of	the	secondary	water	supply	are	not	being	properly	
maintained	in	a	responsible	manner.	In	that	situation,	it	is	impossible	to	expect	tap	water	in	potable	quality.	
Many	resident	communities	are	suffering	from	sub-standardised	tap	water	service	from	their	old	pipeline	
and	old	secondary	water	supply	equipment.’	
However,	when	it	comes	to	the	question	of	whether	A	would	take	over	the	administration	of	secondary	
water	supply	facilities,	he/she	reiterated	the	problem	of	the	insufficient	fund.	‘It	will	be	our	group’s	burden	
to	modify	these	pipelines	and	equipment.	They	were	unaffordable,	especially	given	the	current	low	water	
price.’	 He/she	 also	 indicated	 that	 the	 property	management	 company	was	 in	 the	 same	 shoes.	 ‘These	
property	management	companies	also	lack	funds	to	modify	these	systems,	which	leads	to	a	questionable	
quality	of	tap	water.	According	to	the	regulation,	the	water	tank	of	every	resident	community	must	be	
cleaned	every	half	year,	but	without	sufficient	funds,	many	communities	just	washed	their	water	tanks	
once	a	year,	even	once	every	two	years.’	In	the	end,	he/she	admitted	that	‘it	was	very	difficult	to	modify	
the	secondary	water	supply,	and	it	was	not	our	developmental	goal’.	
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The	interviewee	from	B	claimed	that	he/she	had	no	idea	which	department	was	in	charge	of	secondary	
water	supply	facilities.	This	can	be	seen	as	further	evidence	revealing	the	fact	that	sometimes	different	
departments	of	the	urban	tap	water	provision	system	were	unfamiliar	with	each	other’s	work	in	the	Hybrid	
Institutional	Architecture.	But	at	the	same	time,	he/she	admitted	that	a	poor	management	of	secondary	
water	supply	facilities	would	damage	the	tap	water	quality.	He/she	once	again	emphasised	the	high	cost	
for	A	to	take	over	and	maintain	these	facilities.	
D	is	responsible	for	supervising	the	secondary	water	supply	facilities	in	Harbin.	The	interviewee	from	D	
had	an	entirely	different	attitude	on	the	administration	of	secondary	water	supply	facilities.	He/she	argued	
that	there	was	a	prejudiced	view	on	secondary	water	supply.	‘It	was	an	economic	problem.	It	related	to	
benefits	of	all	agents.’	He/she	claimed	that	‘every	health	department,	in	fact,	would	pose	more	attention	
to	the	management	of	water	than	their	management	of	the	canteen’.	Strongly	denying	the	criticism	about	
the	poor	management	of	secondary	water	supply	 facilities,	he/she	 insisted	that	their	supervision	work	
had	‘reached	the	very	fundamental	level	of	secondary	water	supply’.	
It	was	necessary	 to	 connect	D’s	 interviewee’s	 viewpoint	with	his/her	position.	 In	 fact,	 the	 core	of	 the	
secondary	water	supply	facility’s	problem	was	not	its	supervision	but	its	administration.	As	the	interviewee	
from	A	had	pointed	out,	an	effective	administration	entails	a	professional	and	responsible	manner,	which	
are	on	the	basis	of	sufficient	funds.	Without	any	radical	change	in	money	flow,	the	current	problem	is	likely	
to	persist	in	the	future.	
6.5 Harbin	municipal	government	departments	C	
and	D	
Given	 the	 outcome	 of	 the	 Super-Ministry	 Reform,	 all	 issues	 regarding	 tap	 water	 provision	 are	
administrated	by	the	Harbin	Municipal	Government.	However,	if	one	takes	a	closer	look,	even	in	municipal	
level,	 the	 administration	 of	 tap	water	 still	 involves	 at	 least	 seven	 different	 government	 departments,	
Chapter	6	Harbin's	Tap	Water	Provision	System:	The	Hybrid	Institutional	Architecture																									|	244	
	
including	the	Municipal	State-owned	Assets	Supervision	and	Administration	Commission,	Municipal	Water	
Affair	Bureau	(MWAB),	Municipal	Health	Bureau	(MHB),	Municipal	Commission	of	Housing	and	Urban-
Rural	Development	(MCHURD),	Municipal	Land	and	Resource	Bureau,	Municipal	Development	and	Reform	
Commission	 and	 Municipal	 Environmental	 Protection	 Bureau	 (MEPB).	 They	 are	 shown	 in	 Figure	 6.5.	
Among	 them,	 two	 departments	 are	 especially	 important:	 the	 MWAB,	 which	 is	 responsible	 for	 the	
administration	of	Harbin’s	water	companies;	and	MHB,	which	is	performing	the	role	of	supervisor	for	tap	
water	quality.	
	
Figure	6.5:	The	Harbin’s	municipal	government	departments	that	involve	in	tap	water	administration	
As	shown	in	Figure	6.6,	the	municipal	government	departments	mainly	have	three	limited	conditions:	first,	
there	are	no	clear	boundaries	between	these	departments,	which	reduces	the	efficiency	of	administration;	
second,	there	is	no	effective	external	supervision	for	the	work	of	these	departments;	third,	similar	to	water	
company	A	and	water	treatment	plant	B,	government	departments	C	and	D	also	more	or	less	oppose	to	
privatisation.	With	three	limited	conditions,	information	disclosure	became	a	hybrid	problem	of	between	
A,	B,	C	and	D.	
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Figure	6.6:	The	limited	conditions	and	problems	of	Harbin	Municipal	Government	Department	C	and	D	
6.5.1 Opposition	to	privatisation	
Both	 interviewees	 from	C	and	D	expressed	 their	opposition	 to	privatisation,	although	 in	a	much	more	
discreet	manner	compared	to	water	company	A	and	water	treatment	plant	B.		
The	interviewee	from	C	was	very	cautious	about	the	question	of	privatisation.	‘I	did	not	know	privatisation	
management.	But	many	cities,	including	Shenzhen,	Shenyang,	and	Qiqihar	all	sold	their	water	companies	
at	a	 low	price	and	then	bought	them	back	at	a	high	price.	 […]	This	was	because	the	water	supply	was	
related	to	peoples’	livelihood.	Those	private	capitals	and	enterprises	would	not	comply	fully	with	the	baton	
of	government,	but	we	had	to	guarantee	citizens’	livelihood.	(If	not)	citizens	may	petition	for	their	benefits	
and	government	would	have	no	idea	about	it.’	Following	this	viewpoint,	he/she	then	emphasised	the	role	
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of	water	company	as	SOE.	‘SOE	was	like	the	central	bank	of	the	government,	it	would	guarantee	citizens’	
livelihoods	no	matter	how	much	money	it	had	lost.	But	(private	capital)	would	treat	water	supply	as	market	
behaviour.	Why	 did	 they	 supply	 you	 tap	water	 if	 their	 needs	were	 not	 satisfied?’	 In	 the	 end,	 he/she	
emphasised	again	that	 ‘I	have	no	 idea	about	privatisation,	 I	 just	 introduce	you	to	the	situations	of	 the	
other	cities	objectively.’		
Among	four	interviewees,	the	interviewee	from	D	was	the	only	one	who	thought	importing	private	capital	
could	be	an	option.	But	he/she	insisted	that	‘even	though	private	capital	could	occupy	a	small	amount	of	
the	shares	of	the	water	company,	the	large	shares	must	be	controlled	by	the	government’.	He/she	also	
promoted	the	 importance	of	water	security	 to	a	political	 security	 level.	 ‘Water	security	also	 related	 to	
national	security.	If	you	want	to	overthrow	a	country,	you	can	just	destroy	its	water	source.	That	would	be	
a	fatal	damage.’	He/she	reiterated	that	this	capital	must	be	supervised	strictly	by	the	government.	‘We	
should	never	loosen	our	grip	on	it.’	
As	 introduced	 in	 the	previous	 section,	 interviewees	 from	A	and	B	opposed	privatisation	because	 they	
questioned	the	professionalism	and	security	of	private	capitals.	But	the	interviewee	from	C	was	concerned	
about	 the	 potential	 interest	 conflict	 between	 the	 government	 and	 private	 capital.	 The	 government’s	
priority	task	is	to	guarantee	the	citizens’	livelihood,	whereas	the	private	capital’s	priority	task	is	to	secure	
profits.		
Two	presumptions	were	implicated	from	the	statement	of	C’s	interviewee:	first,	the	water	company	was	
deemed	to	lose	money;	second,	consumers	treat	water	company	as	a	government	department.	Thus	they	
would	complain	to	the	government	rather	than	water	company	about	the	problems	of	tap	water.	Both	
presumptions	 demonstrated	 the	 fact	 that	 in	 the	 Hybrid	 Institutional	 Architecture,	 the	 relationship	
between	 government	 and	 the	water	 company	was	 so	 close	 that	 even	 government	 official	 treat	water	
company	as	a	government	department.	From	the	government	perspective,	citizens’	livelihood	and	social	
stability	were	the	priority	tasks	for	water	company	as	SOE.	Thus,	the	deficit	and	debt	of	the	water	company	
were	not	considered	as	severe	enough	a	problem	by	government	officials,	 since	 they	had	 forecast	 the	
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scenario	that	SOE	was	running	 in	 loss.	However,	all	these	analyses	also	reflected	a	fact:	by	focusing	on	
keeping	the	current	stable	and	self-balanced	status,	improving	the	quality	of	tap	water	from	semi-potable	
to	potable	is	not	the	priority	task	for	government	departments.	
6.5.2 Ambiguous	 power	 boundaries	 and	 inconsistent	 power	 flow	
between	departments	
Given	the	complicity	of	water	administration,	the	power	division	among	government	departments	was	
sometimes	unclear,	making	the	power	flow	inconsistent.	From	the	horizontal	dimension	of	the	general	
urban	tap	water	provision	system,	the	problematic	power	division	embodies	in	municipal	administration	
level	 as	 the	 ambiguous	 power	 boundaries	 between	municipal	 government	 departments.	 As	 has	 been	
discussed	in	Chapters	3	and	4,	this	is	the	reflection	and	outcome	of	the	institutional	incoherency	in	power	
flow.	
One	 example	 of	 the	 ambiguous	 power	 boundaries	 and	 inconsistent	 power	 flow	 was	 the	 process	 of	
approving	Mopanshan	Reservoir	Water	Source	Conservation	Regulation.	Submitted	at	the	end	of	2009,	it	
took	both	the	local	and	provincial	government	more	than	three	years	to	approve	it.	From	Zhang	Chunlin’s	
viewpoint,	the	main	drafter	of	this	regulation,	this	was	due	to	the	fact	that	those	officials	who	possessed	
the	power	did	not	have	adequate	experience	in	environmental	protection	to	realise	the	importance	of	this	
regulation	(Ji,	2011).	In	this	case,	the	power	of	these	officials	did	not	reach	to	the	central	problem	that	
deserved	it.		
Even	 after	 the	 regulation	was	 approved,	 the	 power	 relationships	 between	 government	 agencies	were	
ambiguous	in	terms	of	water	environment	management.	Some	news	report	claimed	that	the	location	of	
Mopanshan	Reservoir	was	chosen	by	the	MWAB.	The	water	quality	of	natural		environment	was	monitored	
by	MEPB,	when	the	water	came	into	the	pipeline,	it	was	the	water	company	and	MHB’s	responsibility	to	
monitor	it	(Xie,	2011).	However,	in	the	interview	with	C,	the	interviewee	claimed	that	‘the	water	protection	
was	under	the	charge	of	C,	but	when	you	want	to	evaluate	the	water	quality	of	Mopanshan	Reservoir,	C	
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and	 A’s	 data	 were	 not	 valid,	 the	 only	 valid	 data	 was	 from	 the	 MEPB’.	 In	 the	 interview	 with	 D,	 the	
interviewee	 also	 admitted	 that	 ‘speaking	 of	 water	 environment,	 it	 was	 complicated,	 because	 it	 was	
associated	with	the	environmental	protection	bureau,	housing	department,	water	resources	department	
and	health	department,	the	boundaries	between	them	were	not	very	clear’.	In	other	words,	the	power	
boundary	between	MEPB	and	MWAB	in	water	environment	protection	was	ambiguous.		
Another	example	in	horizontal	dimension	was	MWAB’s	administration	on	A.	In	fact,	few	knew	that	MWAB	
only	administrated	A’s	business,	whereas	another	government	department,	Municipal	State-owned	Assets	
Supervision	and	Administration	Commission,	was	in	charge	of	A’s	other	important	issues	such	money	and	
staff.	In	the	interview,	the	interviewee	from	C	argued	that	‘MWAB	is	only	responsible	for	the	business	of	
water	companies,	they	do	not	take	care	of	other	issues’.	In	other	words,	the	power	flow	and	money	flow	
of	 A	 were	 derived	 from	 two	 different	 government	 departments.	 It	 is	 still	 unclear	 whether	 there	 is	 a	
cooperation	between	the	two	departments.	But	it	was	clear	that	the	administration	of	A	was	much	more	
complex	 and	 decentralised	 than	 people	 have	 previously	 presumed.	 The	 dispersed	 power	 and	 the	
ambiguous	power	boundaries	between	government	departments	reinforced	one	another.	
The	inconsistent	power	flow	between	departments	was	evidenced	in	the	interview	with	the	interviewee	
from	 A,	 who	 claimed	 that	 ‘some	 water	 companies	 were	 administrated	 by	 the	 MWAB,	 some	 are	
administrated	by	the	MCHURD.	[…]	This	was	because	of	the	problematic	administrative	structure.	In	the	
past,	we	were	not	administrated	by	the	MWAB	but	the	MCHURD.	Later,	central	government	initiated	the	
reform	 (Integrated	Water	Administration	Reform,	analysed	 in	 section	4.3.4).	However,	 this	 reform	was	
problematic,	but	at	that	time	it	was	too	late	to	rectify.	As	a	result,	those	water	companies	which	changed	
their	administrative	departments	were	kept	in	that	status,	but	those	who	did	not	change	also	kept	their	
status.	 Some	 areas	 even	 changed	 at	 first	 and	 then	 changed	 back	 again.	 This	 was	 because	 of	 the	
problematic	power	transformation	at	the	central	government	level,	especially	the	power	of	administrating	
tap	water	was	transformed	from	the	MHURD	to	the	MWR,	the	senior	department	of	the	MWAB.	Now	the	
administrative	order	and	documents	 from	the	MHURD	could	not	 reach	the	MWAB,	and	administrative	
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order	and	documents	from	the	MWAB	could	not	reach	water	company,	which	was	administrated	by	the	
MHURD.’	 He/she	 later	 clarified	 that	water	 companies	 in	Harbin	were	 in	 charge	 by	MWAB,	which	was	
administrated	by	the	municipal	government.	However,	it	still	received	operational	guidance	from	MCHURD.	
His/her	 statements	 about	 the	 problematic	 administration	 structure	 supported	 the	 argument	 about	
institutional	incoherency	in	power	flow	between	central,	provincial	and	local	government	departments,	
which	has	been	analysed	in	section	4.3.3.	However,	it	is	interesting	to	notice	that	as	a	senior	official	from	
the	water	company,	he/she	did	not	know	that	the	Super-Ministry	Reform	has	deprived	all	administration	
power	 of	 urban	water	 affairs	 from	 the	MHURD	 and	 handed	 over	 it	 to	municipal	 government.	 He/she	
argued	that	water	companies	were	still	under	the	administration	of	the	MHURD.		
The	interviewee	from	C	presented	another	more	obvious	example	about	the	influence	of	MHURD.	In	reply	
to	the	question	about	water	monitoring,	he/she	claimed	that	‘we	inspect	the	quality	of	outlet	tap	water	
twice	a	 year	 as	 required	by	MHURD’.	Obviously,	 his/her	words	 implicated	C	 still	 has	 connections	with	
MUURD.	
Both	examples	evidence	the	argument	this	thesis	has	made	in	section	3.3:	the	power	conflicts	between	
state	council	and	ministries	and	between	ministries	themselves	are	transmitted	to	the	municipal	 level.	
Without	a	series	of	effective	reforms	and	modifications	in	the	associated	standards,	regulation,	laws,	and	
industrial	associations,	the	power	boundaries	between	these	government	departments	will	still	keep	in	
ambiguous	 and	 intricate	 statues.	 Even	 after	 nearly	 20	 years,	 government	 administration	 reform,	 the	
MHURD	and	its	subordinate	departments	are	still	griping	a	certain	amount	of	power	regarding	urban	tap	
water	provision.	
Regarding	the	ambiguous	power	boundary	between	MWR	and	MEP,	the	interviewee	from	C	presented	an	
example.	He/she	argued	that	‘MWAB	only	monitors	the	quality	of	water	for	production	purpose.	Water	
source	protection	is	the	responsibility	of	MEPB’.	He/she	also	pointed	out	that	it	is	MWAB	was	responsible	
for	water	source	protection,	but	it	has	no	power	to	evaluate	and	declare	water	quality	of	different	water	
bodies,	 such	as	 river,	 lake	 and	groundwater.	 Thus,	MWAB	has	no	power	 to	make	 comments	on	water	
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quality	of	Mopanshan	Reservoir.	As	has	been	argued	in	section	4.3.3,	the	overlapping	administration	of	
water	affairs	between	MWR	and	MEP	 is	demonstrated	 in	 the	ambiguities	between	 the	administration	
responsibilities	of	‘water	resources	protection’,	‘water	pollution	control’	and	‘water	environment	quality’.	
6.5.3 Lack	of	external	supervision	
The	interviewee	from	water	company	A	admitted	that	there	were	at	least	three	departments	involved	in	
water	supervision.	‘The	first	department	was	the	water	quality	monitor	centre	from	the	water	treatment	
plant;	the	second	was	the	water	quality	monitor	centre	from	the	water	company;	the	third	was	the	Harbin	
Health	Supervision	Bureau.	In	most	capital	cities,	there	were	at	least	three	water	supervision	departments.’	
However,	there	was	a	paradox	regarding	external	supervision	for	both	the	water	company	and	government	
department.	 Being	 treated	 like	 a	 government	 department	 in	many	ways	 by	 itself,	 the	water	 company	
thought	the	supervision	from	another	government	department	was	an	effective	third-party	supervision,	
because	 it	 represented	 the	 government.	 The	 interviewee	 from	 water	 company	 A	 considered	 the	
supervision	of	D	was	a	 third-party	supervision.	 ‘D’s	 reputation	should	be	solid	enough	to	make	a	valid	
conclusion	because	it	represents	the	government.’		
The	core	of	paradox	was	the	instinctive	contradiction	of	SOE.	As	a	semi-government	and	semi-enterprise	
organisation,	SOE’s	self-identification	was	always	ambiguous.	This	was	why	when	talking	about	external	
supervision,	water	company	A	identified	itself	as	an	enterprise,	which	made	the	supervision	from	D	an	
external	supervision.	But	for	those	who	could	not	differentiate	the	SOE’s	identity	between	government	
department	and	enterprise,	namely	most	of	 the	 tap	water	 consumers,	 such	 supervision	would	not	be	
considered	as	‘external’	supervision.		
The	interviewee	from	D	admitted	that	they	tested	the	sample	of	outlet	tap	water	twice	a	year,	and	the	
sample	of	water	source	once	a	year.	The	other	health	department,	Harbin	Disease	Control	Centre,	would	
also	be	involved	in	water	supervision.	He/she	believed	that	the	establishment	of	third	party	supervision	
needed	to	in	line	with	China’s	specific	situation.	He/she	thought	funding	was	the	essential	problem.	‘In	
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fact,	 our	 country	 already	 established	 a	 water	 quality	 management	 system,	 including	 testing	 and	
supervision.	 If	 you	 want	 to	 invest	 a	 certain	 amount	 of	 attention	 and	 money,	 especially	 money,	 on	
establishing	the	third	party,	you	need	to	know	that	the	cost	of	testing	water	quality	is	high,	you	need	to	
ask	whether	it	was	worthwhile	for	the	whole	country.’		
The	interviewee	from	C	asked	a	question.	‘Who	was	the	third	party?’	He/she	expressed	his/her	confusion.	
‘I	do	not	understand	these	peoples’	idea.	They	did	not	trust	the	government,	but	the	government	was	the	
exact	 department	 that	 administrated	 water	 quality.	 We	 just	 uploaded	 water	 quality	 data	 honestly.’	
However,	he/she	then	made	a	cautious	statement.	‘I	did	not	have	any	thought	about	the	problem	of	third	
party	supervision.’	
6.5.4 No	plan	for	potable	tap	water	
All	four	interviewees	took	dim	views	of	the	development	of	potable	tap	water,	making	it	another	hybrid	
problem.	The	 interviewee	 from	water	 treatment	plant	B	 claimed	 that	 there	were	 two	main	problems:	
pipeline	arrangement	and	 funding.	 ‘Everybody	 thought	potable	 tap	water	was	good.	 […]	But	we	 really	
could	not	achieve	it	now.	The	first	problem	was	the	pipeline,	you	must	use	an	independent	new	pipeline	
rather	than	the	old	ones.	[…]	And	it	is	very	difficult	for	you	to	find	a	location	for	new	pipeline	underneath	
the	street,	where	sewage,	electronic,	and	heating	pipeline	are	buried.	They	could	not	be	exposed	on	the	
street	recklessly.	The	older	your	city	was,	the	harder	it	would	be.	[…]	Another	problem	was	money.	It	was	
not	a	small	investment.’	However,	in	the	end,	he/she	thought	the	potable	water	was	a	development	goal	
in	the	long	run.		
The	interviewee	from	water	company	A	thought	potable	tap	water	was	a	‘very	long-term	goal’	for	them.	
He/she	argued	that	‘even	after	50	years	China	might	still	not	be	able	to	achieve	this	goal.	I	do	not	think	it	
is	necessary	for	us	to	achieve	potable	tap	water.	Firstly,	China	is	too	big	to	employ	the	same	administration	
mode	as	those	small	western	countries.	We	could	not	change	our	administration	mode	as	smoothly	as	
those	countries.	Secondly,	in	China	we	seem	to	have	numerous	problems	about	pipeline	quality.	Without	
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pipelines	of	solid	quality,	it	would	be	absurd	to	discuss	the	possibility	of	potable	tap	water.’	He/she	then	
pointed	out	the	development	gap	between	different	areas	in	China.	‘From	a	long-run,	say	50	to	100	years,	
some	capital	cities	and	some	second-class	cities	might	be	able	to	achieve	the	goal	of	potable	tap	water,	
but	it	was	impossible	for	those	under-developed	areas	to	achieve	it.	For	these	areas,	they	would	not	have	
a	systematic	plan	for	their	development;	they	would	develop	step	by	step.’		
The	interviewee	from	D	thought	potable	tap	water	was	a	‘beautiful	but	far-fetched	dream’.	‘It	could	only	
be	achieved	in	a	limited	scope	in	certain	areas.	[…]	How	could	you	supply	potable	water	for	the	whole	city?	
That’s	not	a	small	amount	of	investment.’	His/her	concern	was	also	about	the	feasibility	of	this	goal.	‘This	
goal	was	not	feasible.	[…]	Currently,	the	most	important	goal	for	China	was	to	supply	safe	tap	water,	this	
was	a	feasible	and	practical	goal.	I	thought	it	was	a	future	issue	to	improve	the	water	quality	from	safe	to	
potable.’	Meanwhile,	she	thought	this	future	was	‘not	a	short-term	goal.’	‘Whether	it	was	a	long-term	goal,’	
he/she	said,	‘is	depending	on	China’s	environmental	condition,	its	economic	development	situation	and	
peoples’	needs.’	In	his/her	understanding,	safe	water	is	referring	to	tap	water	that	meet	the	national	tap	
water	quality	standard.	However,	as	has	been	highlighted	in	section	3.2,	that	kind	of	safe	water	is	not	‘safe’	
in	many	circumstances	given	to	the	loopholes	of	tap	water	definition	in	previous	studies.	
The	 interviewee	 from	 C	 reiterated	 the	 problem	 of	 the	 pipeline.	 He/she	 presented	 an	 example	 about	
potable	water	supply	in	Daqing,	a	city	located	in	north	China.	‘We	went	to	a	resident	community	in	Daqing	
where	 they	 supplied	 potable	 tap	 water.	 The	 tap	 water	 was	 supplied	 from	 water	 treatment	 plant	 to	
community	 at	 first	 and	 then	 was	 treated	 in	 the	 facility	 established	 in	 resident	 community.’	 He/she	
emphasised	that	the	pipe	for	potable	water	in	that	community	was	too	thin	to	be	used	to	supply	tap	water	
to	all	citizens,	which	made	this	mode	unpractical	to	be	adopted	and	promoted	widely.		
6.5.5 Problematic	information	disclosure	
As	 one	 of	 the	 most	 significant	 hybrid	 problems,	 the	 problematic	 information	 disclosure	 has	 been	
highlighted	in	the	second	sociogenic	water	sustainability	crisis,	introduced	in	section	5.4.	However,	further	
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incoherency	 in	 tap	water	quality	 information	disclosure	between	 the	water	 company	and	government	
department	can	be	observed	in	the	interviews.		
The	interviewee	from	water	treatment	plant	B	claimed	that	their	main	work	was	tap	water	production,	
and	given	 the	 risk	of	pollution,	 the	plant	 should	not	be	open	 to	 the	public.	 ‘It	 is	 the	government	who	
should	promote	the	tap	water	safety,’	he/she	said.	However,	he/she	also	admitted	that	he/she	did	not	
know	where	to	find	open	communication	channel	about	tap	water	quality	in	Harbin.	
The	interviewee	of	water	company	A	also	argued	that	it	was	the	government’s	responsibility	to	disclose	
the	 tap	 water	 quality	 information.	 ‘It	 was	 not	 the	 water	 company’s	 responsibility	 to	 release	 the	
information.	 We	 submitted	 all	 information	 to	 the	 government,	 and	 they	 needed	 to	 build	 an	 open	
communication	 channel	 to	 disclose	 it.	 It	 was	 possible	 that	 our	 city	 did	 not	 have	 such	 an	 open	
communication	channel.’	Later	he/she	added:	‘I	had	not	heard	of	any	government	department	in	our	city	
asking	us	for	this	information	before.’		
The	interviewee	from	D	also	admitted	that	he/she	did	not	know	how	much	information	had	been	disclosed.	
‘From	what	I	know,	regarding	the	information	about	tap	water	quality,	there	was	not	much	that	had	been	
disclosed.’	
However,	compared	to	other	interviewees,	the	interviewee	from	C	had	a	totally	different	opinion.	‘MWAB	
kept	promoting	the	water	quality	information,	including	the	promotion	from	the	water	company.	[…]	The	
water	 company	 already	 spent	 a	 great	 amount	 of	 effort	 to	 promote	 information	 disclosure.	 The	
government	department	also	put	the	water	quality	test	result	on	their	website	for	everyone	to	check.’	
He/she	 thought	 the	government	website	was	 the	most	authoritative	open	communication	channel	 for	
information	disclose:	 ‘the	other	 information	 channel	would	 ask	 for	money.	 […]	 They	did	not	have	 any	
budget,	and	I	thought	their	website	could	keep	this	information	permanently.	[…]	People	just	did	not	visit	
the	government	website.	If	you	tried	to	find	it,	you	could	find	it.’	Later	he/she	showed	that	the	information	
of	tap	water	quality	was	 listed	in	the	‘public	announcement’	section	of	MWAB’s	website,	mixed	with	a	
series	of	other	government	announcements.		
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Here,	the	problem	of	communication	has	been	turned	into	a	problem	of	authorisation.	Both	of	the	water	
treatment	 plant	 and	water	 company	 expressed	 their	willingness	 to	 disclose	 the	 information,	 but	 they	
emphasised	that	they	were	not	empowered	to	do	so.	Therefore,	the	government	became	the	only	agent	
that	held	 the	power	of	disclosing	 tap	water	quality	 information.	Meanwhile,	 it	 seems	 like	government	
departments	had	no	idea	of	its	importance	and	position	in	information	disclosure,	and	presumed	that	the	
water	company	had	promoted	the	tap	water	quality.	The	final	result	of	such	incoherency	was	that	even	
three	 interviewees	 did	 not	 know	where	 the	 information	was	 published,	 not	 to	mention	whether	 it	 is	
available	to	the	tap	water	consumer.	Regarding	information	disclosure,	MWAB	did	nothing	more	than	post	
the	 information	 in	 its	 website.	 This	 situation	was	 worsened	 by	 the	 dysfunction	 of	 the	 third	 party,	 as	
analysed	in	section	4.3.5.	
6.6 Semi-potable	tap	water	and	Consumer	Coping	
Strategy	Matrix:	two	inevitable	outcomes	
The	 previous	 three	 sections	 analysed	 the	 limited	 conditions	 and	 the	 problems	 of	 the	 three	 agents	 in	
Harbin’s	urban	tap	water	provision	system.	They	formed	a	Hybrid	Institutional	Architecture	that	was	only	
able	to	supply	semi-potable	tap	water	to	consumer,	who	had	to	treat	the	semi-potable	tap	water	again	in	
terms	 of	 Consumer	 Coping	 Strategy	Matrix.	 As	 shown	 in	 Figure	 6.7,	 in	 this	 process,	 there	were	 three	
limited	conditions	and	six	problems	that	directly	promoted	the	generation	of	semi-potable	tap	water	and	
the	 Consumer	 Coping	 Strategy	Matrix.	 As	 shown	 in	 Figure	 6.7,	 they	 have	 become	 the	 two	 inevitable	
outcomes	of	the	Hybrid	Institutional	Architecture	of	Harbin’s	urban	tap	water	provision	system.	
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Figure	6.7:	The	inevitable	outcomes	of	the	Hybrid	Institutional	Architecture:	semi-potable	tap	water	and	
the	Consumer	Coping	Strategy	Matrix	
6.6.1 Semi-potable	tap	water	
The	definition	of	Semi-potable	tap	water	has	been	presented	in	section	3.2.	The	interviewee	from	water	
company	A	admitted	that	during	winter	the	tap	water	quality	might	not	meet	the	New	Tap	Water	National	
Standard.	 ‘It	 depended	 on	 the	 season,’	 he/she	 said,	 ‘we	 did	 not	 have	 the	 advanced	water	 treatment	
equipment.	The	problem	of	low	temperature	and	low	turbidity	was	too	tough	to	be	fully	solved.	[…]	It	was	
a	tough	problem	for	many	cities’	tap	water	provision	systems.	No	effective	solution	had	been	offered	yet.’	
Besides	this	problem,	he/she	also	reiterated	the	issue	of	the	old	pipeline.	Similarly,	the	interviewee	from	
water	treatment	B	claimed	that	their	outlet	water	was	portable	tap	water,	but	also	implied	that	there	was	
pollution	 in	 the	pipeline	which	could	affect	 the	quality	of	 the	end	water.	The	 interviewee	 from	D	also	
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expressed	a	similar	opinion.	‘[…]Harbin	had	a	good	water	source,	but	when	it	transferred	through	the	old	
pipeline	and	secondary	water	supply	facilities,	its	quality	may	have	dropped.’	
There	was	no	doubt	that	Harbin’s	tap	water	was	semi-potable.	However,	previous	research	on	urban	tap	
water	did	not	outline	 the	 intricate	 interconnections	and	mutual	 influences	between	 these	 three	main	
agents	and	between	their	 limited	conditions	and	problems.	As	shown	 in	Figure	6.7,	 five	problems,	old	
urban	tap	water	pipeline,	old	water	treatment	equipment,	problematic	secondary	tap	water	facilities,	no	
plan	for	potable	tap	water	and	the	risk	of	long-distance	water	transfer	all	contribute	to	the	form	of	semi-
potable	tap	water.	As	analysed	before,	these	five	problems	by	themselves	were	caused	by	other	limited	
conditions	and	problems	existing	 in	Harbin’s	current	tap	water	provision	system.	Therefore,	 it	could	be	
concluded	 that	 Harbin’s	 semi-potable	 tap	water	was	 an	 inevitable	 outcome	 of	 the	 function	 of	 Hybrid	
Institutional	Architecture	of	Harbin’s	urban	tap	water	provision	system.		
6.6.2 Consumer	and	Consumer	Coping	Strategy	Matrix	
The	definition	of	Consumer	Coping	Strategy	Matrix	has	been	introduced	in	section	3.5.	As	demonstrated	
in	Figure	6.7,	there	were	three	limited	conditions	and	two	problems	that	stimulated	the	development	of	
the	Consumer	Coping	Strategy	Matrix.	
In	the	first	sociogenic	water	sustainability	crisis,	fragmented	water	distribution	and	low	quality	tap	water	
dramatically	promoted	the	Low	Cost	Traditional	Coping	Strategy.	The	traditions	of	boiled	water	and	self-
drilled	 water	 well	 still	 played	 a	 pivotal	 role.	Meanwhile,	 in	 this	 process,	 the	 government	 kept	 a	 tacit	
consent	in	its	uncontrolled	development,	causing	the	overexploitation	of	Harbin’s	groundwater.		
In	the	second	sociogenic	water	sustainability	crisis,	a	severe	pollution	in	water	source	and	a	problematic	
information	disclosure	intensified	consumer’s	powerlessness.	Tap	water	was	not	manageable	anymore	for	
those	consumers	who	relied	on	Tap	Water	Coping	Strategy.	Thus,	Non-Tap-Water	Coping	Strategy	boomed	
quickly.	Consequently,	 in	 the	 following	 four	years,	consumer’s	 institutional	distrust	 in	semi-potable	tap	
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water	was	nourished	by	their	social	memory	of	water	crisis,	which	significantly	reduced	the	sale	of	tap	
water.	
During	these	periods,	the	water	rates	was	always	kept	to	a	relatively	low	degree,	which	partially	justified	
the	supply	of	 semi-potable	 tap	water.	Whereas	media	continued	 its	 reports	about	 the	water	pollution	
issues	and	low	quality	tap	water,	a	problematic	information	disclosure	between	government	departments	
and	consumer	further	blocked	consumer	from	accessing	the	information	and	knowledge	of	water	quality.	
It	was	just	in	this	context	that	the	market	had	offered	a	series	of	products	such	as	bottled	water,	barrelled	
water,	and	domestic	water	filtration	equipment	as	alternatives	and	auxiliaries	for	tap	water.		
Given	that,	the	interviewee	from	A	claimed	that	‘the	people	have	been	misled	by	many	rumours’.	He/she	
insisted	that	‘I	only	drank	tap	water.	I	believed	that	it	was	the	best	water	among	other	options’.	He/she	
also	believed	that	the	standard	of	bottled	water	and	barrelled	water	was	not	as	professional	as	tap	water,	
and	the	companies	of	bottled	water	and	barrelled	water	were	also	not	as	regulated	as	SOE.	‘They	do	not	
have	a	regulated	market,	a	regulated	production	process,	a	regulated	monitoring	system	and	regulated	
business	administration.	All	of	these	deficient	regulations	might	have	contributed	to	the	 low	quality	of	
their	 production.’	 Given	 that,	 he/she	 believed	 that	 tap	 water	 was	 the	 safest	 water	 for	 consumers.	
‘Compared	to	western	countries	where	the	regulation	was	much	more	effective,	in	China	the	consumer	
had	no	idea	what	was	inside	their	beverage.	So	the	safest	way	of	drinking	water	was	to	drink	tap	water.’		
The	 interviewee	from	A	also	criticised	the	domestic	 tap	water	 filtration	equipment.	 ‘The	service	 life	of	
domestic	 water	 filtration	 equipment	 was	 limited,	 and	 they	 could	 not	 have	 the	 same	 function	 as	 the	
filtration	equipment	we	used	in	tap	water	treatment	plants.	They	might	not	be	replaced	for	years.	Thus,	it	
might	intensify	the	pollution.	In	the	water	treatment	plant,	there	was	a	strict	rule	to	change	the	filter	every	
two	months	 and	 to	 change	 the	 supplements	 every	 three	months.	 There	was	 also	 a	 rule	 to	wash	 the	
equipment	every	five	months.	No	matter	what	kind	of	domestic	water	filtration	consumers	were	using,	
they	could	not	maintain	the	equipment	as	frequently	as	we	did,	and	they	did	not	have	the	equipment	to	
change	and	modify	the	filtration	equipment	as	we	did.’	
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However,	besides	his/her	opposition	to	High	Cost	Commercial	Coping	Strategy,	he	implicated	his	support	
to	Low	Cost	Traditional	Coping	Strategy,	arguing	 in	particular	 that	drinking	boiled	 tap	water	 instead	of	
other	beverages	was	good	for	children’s	health.	
The	 interviewee	 from	 D	 expressed	 a	 similar	 opinion,	 emphasising	 that	 there	were	 risks	 of	 secondary	
pollution	 in	 bottled	water	 and	 barrelled	water.	 He/she	 claimed	 that	 he/she	 only	 drank	 tap	water	 and	
thought	 it	was	 the	 safest	 choice.	He/she	also	 implicated	his/her	normalisation	 to	 Low	Cost	Traditional	
Coping	Strategy	through	arguing	that	‘it	was	not	necessary	to	have	a	large	amount	of	residual	chlorine	if	
we	boiled	water’.	 This	means	 that	 he/she	had	 considered	boiling	water	 as	 an	 individualised	domestic	
disinfect	method	that	could	contribute	to	water	treatment	processes	of	‘source	to	consumer’	urban	semi-
potable	tap	water	provision	system.	
These	two	interviewees’	attitudes	evidenced	a	fact	that	even	for	those	water	experts,	boiled	water	was	
normalised	as	a	‘natural’	composition	of	the	general	urban	tap	water	provision	system,	not	to	mention	
what	general	consumer	thought	about	it.	Thus,	an	important	question	was	raised:	what	influence	did	the	
Consumer	 Coping	 Strategy	Matrix	 impose	 on	 the	 ‘source	 to	 consumer’	 urban	 semi-potable	 tap	water	
provision	system?	
To	some	extent,	this	question	could	be	answered	by	the	following	quotations	said	by	the	interviewee	from	
A:	‘Some	rich	cities	in	China	had	abundant	funds,	but	they	did	not	consider	water	supply	to	be	an	important	
issue.	They	thought	that	since	there	was	no	problem	for	people	to	drink	tap	water	for	dozens	of	years,	
why	should	we	invest	our	funding	in	it?	The	people	had	no	idea	about	the	tap	water	quality,	and	thus	even	
if	 it	 improved	 through	government	 funding,	 people	would	not	 appreciate	 it.	 Therefore,	 the	 leaders	of	
counties	and	cities	placed	little	attention	on	water	supply.	They	only	wanted	to	guarantee	the	basic	quality	
of	tap	water	to	the	degree	that	it	would	not	cause	any	health	problems	and	social	crises.	There	were	many	
other	fields	where	they	could	invest	their	funds.’	
The	above	statement	had	clarified	the	influence	of	the	Consumer	Coping	Strategy	Matrix	on	the	Hybrid	
Institutional	Architecture:	to	guarantee	the	basic	semi-potable	quality	of	tap	water.	As	shown	in	Figure	6.8,	
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with	that	quality	being	guaranteed,	there	were	no	other	stimulations	for	the	government	to	improve	tap	
water	quality	at	all.	In	other	words,	all	limited	conditions	of	the	Hybrid	Institutional	Architecture	would	
keep	without	 any	 amendments,	which	would	 then	 continue	 to	make	 semi-potable	 tap	water	 and	 the	
Consumer	Coping	Strategy	Matrix	inevitable	outcomes	of	the	urban	tap	water	provision	system.	As	has	
been	argued	in	Chapter	3,	since	the	Consumer	Coping	Strategy	Matrix	becomes	the	ultimate	solution	of	
all	systematic	problems	demonstrated	before,	 it	contributes	to	the	stability	and	the	self-balance	of	the	
Hybrid	Institutional	Architecture,	making	it	resist	to	any	external	stimulations	for	progressing.	
	
Figure	6.8:	The	influence	of	Consumer	Coping	Strategy	Matrix	on	the	Hybrid	Institutional	Architecture	
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6.7 Conclusion	
On	the	basis	of	interview	materials	from	four	interviewees	from	key	positions,	this	chapter	demonstrates	
the	Hybrid	Institutional	Architecture	of	Harbin’s	urban	tap	water	provision	system.	Through	highlighting	
the	limited	conditions,	the	problems	and	the	inevitable	outcomes	of	the	three	major	agents	in	tap	water	
provision	 system,	 it	 illustrates	 the	 complicated	 synchronisation	of	 the	Hybrid	 Institutional	Architecture	
that	has	been	ignored	in	previous	research	for	a	long	time.	The	emergence	of	semi-potable	tap	water	and	
the	Consumer	Coping	Strategy	Matrix	cannot	be	attributed	to	any	single	problem	or	the	limited	condition	
existing	in	any	single	agent	in	the	system.	It	needs	to	be	recognised	and	studied	as	an	inevitable	outcome	
of	 the	 interactions	 between	multiple	 limited	 conditions	 and	problems.	As	 the	 result	 of	 the	 Consumer	
Coping	Strategy	Matrix,	the	general	system	keeps	in	a	stable	self-balance	status	and	is	immune	from	any	
internal	or	external	stimulations.	Therefore,	a	vicious	circle	between	the	Hybrid	Institutional	Architecture	
and	the	Consumer	Coping	Strategy	Matrix	is	established,	which	further	strengthens	the	existence	of	both,	
whereas	nourishing	and	justifying	the	consumer’s	Institutionalised	distrust	in	semi-potable	tap	water.	
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 Conclusion	
7.1 The	retrospection	of	research	rationale	
In	terms	of	an	analysis	of	interview	materials,	previous	Chapter	present	a	concrete	case	study	of	Hybrid	
Institutional	 Architecture	 in	 Harbin’s	 current	 urban	 tap	 water	 provision	 system.	 This	 section	 aims	 to	
retrospect	the	answer	of	three	subordinate	research	questions	and	one	main	research	question	raised	in	
Section	1.2.	 It	 illustrates	 the	main	contributions	of	 theoretic	 thread	 functioning	as	 the	skeleton	of	 this	
thesis	analysis.	
The	 first	 subordinate	 research	 question	 is:	 what	 kind	 of	 tap	 water	 is	 supplied	 to	 China’s	 tap	 water	
consumer?	 To	 reply	 this	 question,	 this	 thesis	 coined	 two	 concepts,	 the	 semi-potable	 tap	 water,	 and	
potable	 tap	water,	 to	describe	 the	quality	of	 tap	water	 supplied	 from	China’s	 current	urban	 tap	water	
provision	 system	 from	 consumer’s	 perspective.	 Semi-potable	 tap	 water	 is	 defined	 as	 the	 tap	 water	
supplied	from	‘source	to	consumer’	urban	semi-tap	water	provision	system	with	a	semi-potable	quality	
that	demands	extra	treatments	to	have	a	potable	quality.	Meanwhile,	potable	tap	water	is	defined	as	the	
tap	water	that	has	been	treated	by	the	consumer	through	extra	treatment	to	have	potable	quality	in	the	
‘consumer	to	sip’	potable	water	production	process.	These	two	definitions	highlight	the	fact	that	given	tap	
water’s	 distinctive	 quality	 degree	 between	 undrinkable	 water	 and	 potable	 water,	 consumer	 coping	
strategies	 and	 consumption	 work	 need	 to	 be	 adopted	 to	 transform	 the	 semi-potable	 tap	 water	 into	
potable	tap	water.	
The	second	subordinate	research	question	is:	on	the	basis	of	the	answer	to	the	first	question,	what	kind	
of	system	is	supplying	the	aforementioned	tap	water?	To	answer	this	question,	this	thesis	first	identifies	
China’s	 current	 urban	 tap	 water	 provision	 system	 as	 a	 ‘source	 to	 consumer’	 semi-potable	 tap	 water	
provision	system.	To	highlight	the	core	of	this	system,	this	thesis	coined	the	concept	of	Hybrid	Institutional	
Architecture.	The	Hybrid	 Institutional	Architecture	 is	defined	as	an	 institutional	architecture	of	China’s	
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urban	 tap	 water	 provision	 system	 that	 encapsulates	 the	 institutional	 incoherencies	 in	
power/money/water	flows	and	embodies	them	into	hybrid	components	in	administration	and	operation	
of	the	system.	As	the	outcome	of	the	Hybrid	Institutional	Architecture,	‘source	to	consumer’	tap	water	
provision	system	is	only	capable	of	producing	semi-potable	tap	water,	which	gives	rise	to	the	emergence	
of	 ‘consumer	 to	 sip’	 potable	water	 production	 process,	which	 enables	 consumers	 to	 adopt	 Consumer	
Coping	Strategy	Matrix	to	produce	potable	water	by	themselves.	The	combination	of	‘source	to	consumer’	
semi-potable	tap	water	provision	system	and	‘consumer	to	sip’	potable	water	production	process	forms	a	
‘source	to	sip’	urban	potable	water	provision	system,	which,	to	a	 large	extent,	disguises	the	systematic	
flaws	existing	in	its	two	subordinate	systems.		
Chapter	4	examined	the	three	institutional	incoherencies	in	power/money/water	flows	respectively.	The	
institutional	incoherency	in	power	flow	was	examined	through	institutional	analysis	of	legal,	policy	and	
administration	aspects	of	urban	tap	water	provision	system,	along	with	a	discussion	of	dysfunction	of	the	
third	party,	such	as	NGOs	and	 industrial	associations.	The	 institutional	 incoherency	 in	money	flow	was	
demonstrated	through	analyses	of	China’s	tap	water	rates	and	marketization	reform	of	urban	public	utility.	
Finally,	the	institutional	incoherency	in	water	flow	was	illustrated	from	two	aspects:	the	developmental	
trajectory	of	China’s	water	standards,	and	the	comparison	between	strict	standard	and	the	grim	situation	
of	 China’s	 fresh	 water.	 Moreover,	 to	 unveil	 the	 Hybrid	 Institutional	 Architecture	 in	 a	 practical	 sense,	
Chapter	 6	 presented	 a	 case	 study	 of	 Harbin’s	 current	 tap	water	 provision	 system	 based	 on	 interview	
materials.	
The	third	subordinate	research	question	is:	on	the	basis	of	the	answers	to	the	first	and	second	question,	
what	 are	 the	 consumer’s	 reactions	 and	 responses	 in	 the	 aforementioned	 tap	 water	 and	 tap	 water	
provision	system?	To	answer	this	question,	the	definition	of	Consumer	Coping	Strategy	Matrix	is	coined	in	
this	thesis.	It	is	defined	as	a	matrix	of	all	China’s	tap	water	consumer’s	coping	strategies	in	dealing	with	
semi-potable	tap	water.	This	concept	integrates	the	meanings	of	two	concepts	introduced	in	Chapter	1,	
consumer	coping	strategy	and	consumer’s	consumption	work.	It	has	seven	facilitating	factors:	tradition,	
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government’s	 tacit	 consent,	market,	media’s	 propaganda,	 low	 tap	 water	 rate,	 water	 crises	 and	 social	
memory,	and	knowledge	and	 information	gap.	As	a	production	process	of	potable	water,	 it	makes	 the	
consumer	share	the	responsibility	of	water	production	with	other	agents	in	‘source	to	consumer’	urban	
semi-potable	 tap	water	provision	system.	Moreover,	 there	 is	a	mutual	 self-reinforcement	between	the	
normalisations	of	 the	Hybrid	 Institutional	Architecture,	 semi-potable	 tap	water,	 and	Consumer	Coping	
Strategy	Matrix,	which	enables	the	stable	and	self-balanced	operation	of	‘source	to	consumer’	urban	semi-
potable	tap	water	provision	system.	
The	main	research	question	of	this	thesis	is:	what	is	the	consumer’s	institutional	trust	and/or	distrust	in	
China’s	tap	water?	Given	the	answers	to	all	three	subordinate	research	questions,	this	thesis	highlights	
three	factors:	consumer’s	powerlessness	in	‘source	to	consumer’	semi-potable	tap	water	provision	system,	
consumer’s	dual	 identities	 in	 ‘consumer	to	sip’	potable	water	production	process,	and	the	problematic	
public	 propaganda.	 Accordingly,	 this	 thesis	 argues	 that	 Chinese	 tap	 water	 consumer	 has	 an	
institutionalised	 distrust	 in	 semi-potable	 tap	 water.	 This	 institutionalised	 distrust	 is	 evidenced	 in	 the	
prevalent	 adoption	 and	 normalisation	 of	 Consumer	 Coping	 Strategy	Matrix.	 The	 outcome	 of	 such	 an	
institutionalised	 distrust	 is	 catastrophic.	 The	 combination	 of	 Hybrid	 Institutional	 Architecture	 and	
Consumer	Coping	Strategy	Matrix	have	formed	a	dialectical	relationship	with	the	water	crisis.	On	the	one	
hand,	they	stimulate	the	development	of	each	other	mutually.	On	the	other,	they	also	keep	a	balance	with	
each	other.	Once	this	balance	is	thrown	off,	a	sociogenic	water	sustainability	crisis	would	outbreak.	The	
outbreak	 of	 sociogenic	 water	 sustainability	 crisis	 demands	 a	 certain	 contingent	 combination	 model	
composed	of	five	interconnected	conditions:	history	condition,	geography	condition,	political	condition,	
environmental	condition,	and	culture	condition.	Chapter	5	presents	case	studies	of	two	sociogenic	water	
sustainability	 crises	 occurred	 in	 Harbin.	 The	 first	 crisis	 is	 water	 scarcity	 and	 overexploitation	 of	 the	
groundwater	resource;	the	second	is	Songhua	River	Toxic	Spill	Crisis.	
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7.2 The	recapitulation	of	basic	findings	
According	to	the	retrospection	of	 research	rationale,	 this	section	summarises	the	basic	 findings	of	 this	
thesis.		
First,	 this	 thesis	 coined	 a	 series	 of	 crucial	 yet	 undeveloped	 concepts:	 the	 semi-potable	 tap	water,	 the	
Hybrid	Institutional	Architecture,	the	Consumer	Coping	Strategy	Matrix,	the	normalisation	of	semi-potable	
tap	 water,	 the	 institutionalised	 distrust	 in	 semi-potable	 tap	 water,	 and	 the	 incoherencies	 in	
power/money/water	 flows,	 and	 the	 sociogenic	 water	 sustainability	 crisis.	 As	 has	 been	 emphasised	 in	
Chapter	1,	none	of	these	concepts	has	been	systematically	examined	in	the	context	of	China	in	previous	
literatures.	
Second,	by	presenting	the	definitions	of	these	concepts,	this	thesis	also	illustrates	their	interconnections.	
The	Hybrid	Institutional	Architecture	and	incoherencies	in	flows	of	power,	money,	and	water	result	in	the	
general	and	widespread	phenomenon	of	the	normalisation	of	semi-potable	tap	water	and	 institutional	
distrust	for	the	consumer,	plus	the	Consumer	Coping	Strategy	Matrix.	The	imbalance	between	the	Hybrid	
Institutional	Architecture,	the	Consumer	Coping	Strategy	Matrix,	and	the	water	crisis	also	performs	as	the	
trigger	of	systemic	generation	of	sociogenic	water	sustainability	crises	and	water	scandals	of	various	kinds.	
This	is	evidenced	by	the	Harbin	case	study	and	the	information	on	ground	and	surface	water	resources,	
which	demonstrates	the	systemic	inability	to	modify	the	institutional	architecture	to	reduce	the	frequency	
and	risks	of	sustainability	crises	and	the	lack	of	transparency	and	accountability	for	crises	when	they	are	
occurring.	 As	 a	 vicious	 circle,	 all	 of	 these	 contributes	 to	 the	 institutionalisation	 and	 normalisation	 of	
distrust.	
Third,	the	in-depth	analysis	of	these	concepts	also	speaks	back	to	the	theoretical	frameworks	reviewed	in	
Chapter	2.	The	concept	Hybrid	Institutional	Architecture	is	established	on	the	basis	of	Harvey’s	concept	of	
Instituted	 Economic	 Process	 and	Swyngedouw’s	 concept	of	 nexus	of	 power/money/water.	 The	 former	
provides	a	 ‘source	to	sip’	holistic	analytical	perspective	to	analysis	 the	tap	water	provision	system;	the	
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latter	highlights	the	intertwining	of	water’s	tangible	physical	attributions	and	intangible	elements	such	as	
power	 and	money.	Moreover,	Wittfogel,	 Swyngedouw,	 Bakker,	 Molle	 and	 Kaika	 highlight	 the	 internal	
political	 incoherency	 in	 water	 resources	 administration	 mechanisms	 in	 other	 countries;	 Polanyi	 and	
Bakker’s	 theoretical	 accounts	 paves	 the	 way	 for	 an	 analysis	 of	 the	 inconsistency	 in	 money	 flow	 that	
circulating	in	and	encapsulated	by	Hybrid	Institutional	Architecture.	Meanwhile,	the	definition	of	Hybrid	
Institutional	 Architecture	 contributes	 to	 these	 theoretical	 accounts	 as	 a	 concrete	 case	 reflecting	 the	
political	 and	 economic	 incoherency	 existing	 in	 China.	 Compared	 to	 abstract	 theoretical	 accounts,	 it	
functions	more	like	a	practical	summarization	of	how	all	these	accounts	would	really	operate	in	a	specific	
context	 that	has	never	been	 fully	 investigated	yet.	 Likewise,	 the	concept	of	Consumer	Coping	Strategy	
Matrix	is	also	built	up	on	the	ground	of	Harvey’s	concept	of	Consumer	Coping	Strategy	and	Glucksmann’s	
concept	of	Consumer	Consumption	Work.	It	opens	up	a	new	research	perspective	for	these	two	concepts,	
which	enriches	their	potential	and	boots	their	explanation	power	in	the	context	China.	As	can	be	expected,	
it	will	bring	up	more	in-depth	research	on	consumer’s	coping	strategy	and	consumption	work.	
Fourth,	this	thesis	expands	the	research	scope	of	urban	tap	water	provision	from	the	limited,	conditioned	
research	 perspectives	 focusing	 on	 science,	 technology,	 and	 engineering	 to	 consumer’s	 behaviours,	
attitudes,	and	reactions.	This	is	the	first	research	that	stresses	the	consumer’s	coping	strategy	in	China’s	
urban	tap	water	provision	system	and	its	associated	influences	on	the	development	of	this	system.	The	
concept	of	Consumer	Coping	Strategy	Matrix	has	a	huge	academic	potential,	because	it	can	be	used	to	
explain	not	only	China’s	tap	water	provision	system,	but	also	many	other	issues	such	as	food	consumption,	
and	can	be	related	to	the	analysis	of	other	important	themes,	such	as	China’s	air	pollution.	
Fifth,	this	thesis	also	elaborates	the	discussion	in	three	themes	that	have	not	been	fully	explored	in	China’s	
academia,	 the	power	conflict	between	government	departments,	 the	development	 trajectory	of	water	
standards,	and	the	essential	reason	for	the	prosperous	market	of	bottled	and	barrelled	water.	The	analyses	
around	 these	 themes	 provided	 a	 powerful	 theoretical	 probe	 for	 this	 thesis	 to	 establish	 a	 distinctive	
theoretical	framework	other	than	many	research	on	China’s	urban	tap	water	provision.	
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Sixth,	 this	 thesis	 coined	 the	concept	of	 the	contingent	combination	model	of	China’s	 sociogenic	water	
sustainability	crisis	in	the	case	study	of	Harbin.	This	analysis	not	only	differentiates	the	sociogenic	aspect	
of	 sustainability	 crisis	 but	 also	 provides	 a	 new	 research	optic	 for	 scholars	 and	 government	 officials	 to	
scrutinise	the	causes	and	influence	of	water	crisis,	so	as	to	have	new	modifications	in	their	research	on	
and	response	to	the	water	crisis.	
Seventh,	 the	 example	 of	 water	 is	 symptomatic	 of	 the	 wider	 societal	 phenomenon	 of	 incidences	 of	
pollution	scandals,	 construction	 failures,	environmental	degradations,	etc.	As	such,	 this	 thesis	makes	a	
strong	case	about	water,	but	one	of	much	wider	significance	to	a	range	of	other	environmental	and	social	
challenges.	
7.3 Living	with	distrust:	the	latent	social	injustice	
Living	with	 institutional	 distrust,	 it	 seems	 like	 Chinese	 tap	water	 consumer’s	 powerlessness	 has	 been	
normalised	in	line	with	the	normalisation	of	semi-potable	tap	water,	the	Hybrid	Institutional	Architecture,	
and	the	Consumer	Coping	Strategy.	As	has	been	discussed	in	section	3.6	and	3.8,	it	is	such	normalisation	
and	its	mutual	self-reinforcement	that	makes	consumer’s	dual	roles	and	their	coping	strategies	‘invisible’	
in	the	general	‘source	to	sip’	potable	water	provision	system.	Thus,	consumer’s	powerlessness,	as	well	as	
its	associated	social	injustice,	are	perfectly	veiled	by	such	seemingly	potable	tap	water	provision	system,	
whose	 operation	 is	 fully	 relying	 on	 the	 combination	 of	 ‘source	 to	 sip’	 urban	 semi-potable	 tap	 water	
provision	system	and	‘consumer	to	sip’	potable	water	production	process.	In	other	words,	a	huge	social	
injustice	is	nourished	by	the	normalisation	and	implementation	of	consumer	coping	strategies	in	China.	
With	a	consumer	stratification	from	Consumer	Coping	Strategy	Matrix	(introduced	in	section	3.5.5),	those	
who	 are	 in	 higher	 class	 always	 keep	 stronger	 Consumer	 Coping	 Capacity	 to	 deal	 with	 sociogenic	
sustainability	crises.	
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Such	 social	 justice	 has	 three	 aspects:	 consumer’s	 institutional	 distrust	 in	 semi-potable	 tap	water,	 the	
stability	and	self-balance	of	Hybrid	Institutional	Architecture,	and	the	consumer’s	stratification	based	on	
Consumer	Coping	Strategy	Matrix.	
To	consumers,	they	are	living	with	institutional	distrust	in	tap	water,	which	also	can	be	considered	as	a	
type	of	institutional	insecurity	in	society.	As	section	3.9	has	shown,	Hybrid	Institutional	Architecture	and	
Consumer	Coping	Strategy	Matrix	has	formed	a	dialectical	balance	with	the	water	crisis.	Thus,	once	a	water	
crisis	is	serious	enough	to	overweigh	the	combination	of	the	two,	the	latent	social	injustice	and	consumer’s	
powerless	 would	 turn	 the	 consumer	 into	 the	 trigger	 of	 sociogenic	 water	 sustainability	 crises	 as	 has	
happened	twice	in	Harbin’s	history,	as	demonstrated	in	Chapter	5.	It	is	only	in	these	crises	that	such	social	
injustice	and	consumer	powerlessness	become	‘visible’	to	the	public.		
However,	 it	 is	extremely	important	to	note	here	that	the	strong	stability	and	self-balance	of	the	Hybrid	
Institutional	Architecture	 in	 ‘source	 to	consumer’	urban	semi-potable	 tap	water	provision	system	 is	by	
itself	the	root	of	consumer’s	powerlessness,	and	the	biggest	contribution	to	the	form	of	the	latent	social	
injustice	 behind	 such	 powerlessness.	 The	 power	 gap	 between	 consumer	 and	 the	 Hybrid	 Institutional	
Architecture	has	 reached	a	high	 level	 that	 it	has	been	normalised	by	both	 the	officials	working	 in	 the	
architecture	 and	 consumers	 themselves.	 Such	 normalisation	 has	 been	 revealed	 in	 the	 case	 study	 of	
Chapter	6.	
Finally,	 section	 3.5.5	 demonstrates	 the	 consumer’s	 stratification	 based	 on	 Consumer	 Coping	 Strategy	
Matrix.	Presumably,	this	stratification	has	intricate	connections	with	consumer’s	stratification	based	on	
other	variations,	particularly	residence	location	and	personal	income.	However,	such	argument	needs	to	
be	examined	by	practical	studies	in	the	future.		
This	stratification	is	latent	because	the	institutional	inconsistency	in	flaws	of	power/money/water	of	the	
Hybrid	Institutional	Architecture	are,	to	a	large	extent,	disguised	by	the	compensation	of	‘consumer	to	sip’	
potable	water	production	process	and	the	consumer’s	normalisation.	However,	as	has	been	highlighted	
before,	once	the	dialectical	balance	between	water	crisis	and	the	seemingly	‘source	to	sip’	urban	potable	
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tap	 water	 provision	 system	 break	 out,	 it	 would	 immediately	 expose	 the	 social	 injustice	 behind	 the	
consumer	stratification,	making	the	most	vulnerable	people	suffer	the	most	destructive	pollution.		
How	to	counteract	such	latent	social	injustice	is	still	an	open	question.	However,	what	can	be	assured	is	
that	 consumers	must	 develop	 an	 awareness	 to	 ‘de-normalise	 the	 normalisation’.	 In	 other	 words,	 the	
normalisation	 of	 semi-potable	 tap	 water,	 the	 Hybrid	 Institutional	 Architecture,	 the	 ‘consumer	 to	 sip’	
potable	 water	 production	 process,	 and	 the	 consumer’s	 powerlessness	 and	 insecurity	 must	 be	 ‘de-
normalised’	 to	 reveal	 and	 capture	 the	 social	 injustice	 hiding	 inside	 them.	 It	 is	 only	 by	 identifying	 and	
acknowledging	such	social	injustice	can	China’s	current	urban	tap	water	provision	system	begin	to	make	
progress.	Thus,	the	author	of	this	thesis	would	like	to	elaborate	his	research	in	this	field	in	the	future	with	
a	dream	that	Chinese	consumers	can	enjoy	their	deserved	potable	tap	water	as	their	peers	in	developed	
countries.	
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